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ABSTRACT 
 
PATRICK TOBIN: Crossroads at Ulm: Postwar West Germany and the 1958 Ulm 
Einsatzkommando Trial 
 
“Crossroads at Ulm” examines the intersection of politics, society, culture, and law in 
the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial. The largest Nazi crimes trial in West Germany since 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Ulm case convicted ten men for crimes 
of the Holocaust in 1941 Lithuania. The dissertation looks at different perspectives that 
various subcultures held on the trial. By exploring the involvement and attitudes of victims, 
perpetrators, investigators, prosecutors, public, media, and state and federal officials, the 
dissertation tells a broader story about conflicting and evolving West German attitudes 
towards the Nazi past in the 1950s. This multiperspective view of the trial offers insight into 
how and why West Germany came to rely upon its courts to address the aftermath of the 
Holocaust in the late 1950s. In the wake of the trial, the West German states created an 
agency for Nazi crimes investigations, appointing the Ulm trial’s prosecutor as its leader. 
Rather than explain this development as a result of top-down federal actions or bottom-up 
public criticism, the Ulm trial reveals a middle-out approach. Through the creation of a 
transnational network of critical voices, the Ulm trial prompted change first in the halls of 
local government offices. This then percolated to the top of government before filtering back 
down to the German streets. This study thus offers a new conceptualization of the 
relationship between government institutions, individual actors, and the formation of 
memorial cultures. 
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I. Prologue: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Garsden, June 24, 1941 
 
The victims were people who laughed, cried, loved, and worked, just like you and I – and just 
like the defendants themselves. For seventeen years, the sun has not shined for them 
anymore, and the victims have not even been allowed to rest in peace. Their graves were 
later ripped open, the bodies burned, and the ashes strewn in the wind to hide the traces of 
the atrocities. 
 
 – Erwin Schüle, Senior State Prosecutor, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm 
Einsatzkommando trial 
 
 
 An emergency broadcast interrupted the late night programming on local Lithuanian 
radio to warn of an imminent full-scale German invasion.
1
 Many were already asleep in the 
border town of Garsden (Lithuanian: Gargzdai; Yiddish: Gorzd). Feliksas Seputis, a 
Lithuanian photographer in his early thirties, had been up listening to the radio during that 
warm summer night when he heard the alarm.
2
 He ran to wake his wife, shouted to alert any 
sleeping neighbors, and rushed to the brewery in the town center. The town council had 
designated its large cellar as a shelter for the residents of Garsden, who now hurried to its 
safety. Seputis and nearly one thousand Garsden citizens, one-third the total population, 
huddled together as the war came to life. Those still asleep in their homes soon awakened to 
the roar of gunfire that rumbled through their small town and shook the walls of their homes. 
In the hours after midnight on June 22, 1941, the German army crossed the Lithuanian 
border. Operation Barbarossa, the largest ground invasion in military history, was underway. 
                                                 
1
 Statement by Feliksas Seputis (Augsburg, 22 February 1957), EL 322/II, Bü. 8, SL; all information unless 
otherwise cited comes from Urteil, EL 322/II, Bü 20, SL. 
 
2
 Statement by Feliksas Seputis (Augsburg, 22 February 1957), EL 322/II, Bü. 8, SL. 
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 That night, over three million Wehrmacht soldiers divided into three main armies – 
north, center, and south – launched an invasion of the Soviet Union that stretched from the 
Baltic to the Black Sea. The residents of Garsden, at the northernmost tip of this assault, 
found themselves among the first targets of Army Group North. Because Germany bordered 
only Lithuania among the Baltic States, the army had to first sweep through Lithuania in 
order to pivot through Latvia, Estonia, and on to Russia itself. Taking the border towns and 
securing all transportation lines comprised the mission of the first hours of the invasion. The 
army was to secure the bridge over the small Minge River east of Garsden by 4:10 in the 
morning. Although the invasion rolled through Lithuania, the German army encountered 
unexpectedly strong resistance in Garsden.  
* * * 
 On the eve of the invasion, Garsden embodied small town life in Eastern Europe. 
Little changed since the days of Tsarist rule before World War I, the town consisted of just a 
few streets. Carts traveled along the uneven cobblestones of the main Tomozhna road that led 
across the border to the port city of Memel (Lithuanian: Klaipeda) seventeen kilometers west 
of town. During the rainy season, the road and much of the town turned to mud.
3
 Along the 
Tomozhna, wood-framed buildings with thatched roofs marked the homes of the town’s 
relatively well-to-do, while the poorer residents lived by the alleys that branched off the main 
street. A small clearing in the town center served as a gathering place where the residents 
held market every Thursday. Most of the town was quite poor and commodities were few. As 
one resident recalled, “There were two kinds of poor men in Gorzd – those who did or did 
                                                 
3 Chaim Shoys, “Gorzd – A Shtetl in Lithuania,” trans. by Gloria Berkenstat Freund, in Gorzd Book: A 
Memorial to Jewish Community of Gorzd, ed. Yitzhak Alperovitz (Tel Aviv: The Gorzd Society, 1980), site 
accessed 12 August 2012, http://www.jewishgen.org/Yizkor/Gargzdai/gar017.html. 
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not have a goat for milking.”4 Historically, the economy relied on trade with Germany, 
selling livestock, animal skins, and vegetables. The main export was lumber, which the 
residents floated down the Minge to Germany. For a while, less honorable elements in town 
ran a black-market horse trade, which earned them the enmity of their neighbors and the 
nickname “the horse thieves of Garsden.”5  
The town was also historically Jewish, one of the oldest communities in Lithuania 
with roots dating to the middle ages. At the time of the German invasion, Jews comprised 
nearly fifty percent of the population.
6
 Through the end of the nineteenth century, the town 
had been a typical shtetl in Lithuania, with a majority Jewish population. The photographer 
Seputis described relations in Garsden between Jews and non-Jews as “at times good, at 
times bad.”7 This sentiment could fairly be applied to centuries of uneven relations between 
Lithuanians and Jews. During the Tsarist period there were flare-ups of anti-Semitism in 
Lithuania that culminated in pogroms. In these times of crisis, the Garsden Jews had grown 
accustomed to fleeing across the border to the city of Memel. It was there that they found 
refuge under the protection of the Prussians. 
The town’s long history and perpetual border status led to the development of a 
distinct Garsden Jewish culture. Because Garsden’s economic livelihood was historically 
dependent on Prussia, residents spoke a unique Yiddish-German dialect, but religiously and 
                                                 
4
 Hershl Meyer, “Some Memories of Our Gordz Home and Town,” trans. by Gloria Berkenstat Freund, in 
Gorzd Book.  
 
5
 Raphael Julius, “Gorzd (Gargzdai),” trans. by Barry Marks, Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities, Lithuania, 
ed. by Dov Levin (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1996), site accessed 12 August 2012, 
http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinkas_lita/lit_00187.html. 
 
6
 Aktennotiz über Einwohnerzahlen der Erschiessungsorte (14 December 1956), EL 322/II, Bü. 7, SL. 
 
7
 Statement by Feliksas Seputis (Augsburg, 22 February 1957), EL 322/II, Bü. 8, SL. 
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culturally rejected other German influences. Born of economic difficulties, the Jewish 
community developed an ethos based on a hardscrabble pride in small town life. Growing up 
there in the interwar years, Hershl Meyer recalled, “It was a shtetl in which the greatest 
number of Jews lived in poverty and worried about their income…. But instead of servility, 
the poverty carried a certain dignity and even arrogance as something for which we would 
later be praised, or with confidence that we would be redeemed.”8 Avraham Orenshteyn 
echoed these sentiments, celebrating the town’s cohesion in the face of difficulties: “Even 
though our city was small, I really loved her! It differed somehow from other shtetlekh of its 
size. I think even the people were different. More friendly and more sympathetic. They were 
devoted to each other. The entire shtetl grieved when some misfortune, God forbid, happened 
to someone. These were Gorzd Jews.”9 
 Though a poor town, there was a simplicity and harmony within the Jewish 
community that, looking back years later, Meyer could fondly remember with nostalgia for a 
community that once was. He described a scene of daily life in Garsden:  
A shtetl of mainly sturdy fathers and mothers, busy with the burden of earning a 
living, with raising children – sometimes in tears at saying goodbye to a son, a 
daughter, sometimes with breathless hearts going for the mail, seeking a longed for 
letter from America… Jews with weathered faces notched by the wind, muscular 
hands, healthy, folksy jokes and humor with the language of their trades: or with the 
speech of the roads and the highways to the villages, from hammering horseshoes, 
poles, blocks and from pulling loads. Here and there, a relaxed face of a “leader of the 
city,” or of a gemara [Talmud] teacher with soft, downy hands, an open face on 
which hovered a “the contrary is true” of an unfinished casuistic debate.10 
 
                                                 
8
 Meyer, “Some Memories,” Gorzd Book. 
 
9
 Avraham Orenshteyn, “My Shtetl Gordz,” trans. by Gloria Berkenstat Freund, in Gorzd Book. 
 
10
 Meyer, “Some Memories,” Gorzd Book. 
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For centuries, the Jews of Garsden had endured hardships of all kinds, but found ways to 
survive. The invasion that began on June 22 would shatter the community forever.  
Despite the fond remembrances of a tranquil Garsden, which intensified in 
comparison with the horrors that followed, ethnic tensions roiled beneath the surface of 
interwar Lithuania, and the reality of life of Garsden on the eve of war was far from idyllic. 
Relative to many states in interwar Eastern Europe, the Lithuanian government had been 
broadly accepting and tolerant of its Jewish community during the interwar period.
11
 But 
anti-Semitism was on the rise among elements of society. Lithuanian independence came 
through war with the Soviet Union after World War I, and this created a social climate 
deeply hostile to communism. Many Lithuanians came to believe in Judeo-Bolshevism and 
made false equivalencies between Jewish emancipation and the onset of communist rule. 
Over a decade later, Seputis still maintained that in Garsden “the Jews were the best 
comrades of the Russians.”12 These tensions boiled over with the Soviet takeover of 
Lithuania in 1940. As the Nazis rolled into Garsden, they encountered a society divided 
against its Jewish members and eager to exact revenge against communists. The Nazis would 
quickly learn to tap this reservoir of hatred as it sought local participation in the Holocaust. 
* * * 
 After a sleepless night, the door to the brewery cellar opened, and Seputis and the 
others peered up as the morning light filtered through the dusty air. The sounds of gunfire 
were fainter now, as the war had passed over their heads while they hid. The voice calling 
out from the light to the Garsden residents was German. Their new occupier ordered them 
                                                 
11
 Christoph Dieckmann, Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen, 1941-1944, Bd. 2 (Göttingen: Wallstein 
Verlag, 2011), 125-137. 
 
12
 Statement by Feliksas Seputis (Augsburg, 22 February 1957), EL 322/II, Bü. 8, SL. 
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out of the brewery and into the town square. Irena Permiakova, a young Lithuanian, recalled 
her positive first impression of the Germans: “We greeted them. They seemed to be so 
friendly and official.”13 The Jews of Garsden had a far different reaction. Slava Aranovits 
stated, “Two German motorized columns entered Gorzd on two sides with great pageantry. It 
did not take long until they captured the bridge over the river. We could no longer escape. 
The road east was cut off. The true hell began for the Gorzd Jews.”14 
As they took in the scene around them, the civilians observed the devastation of their 
town. Homes destroyed, streets torn up, and bodies of soldiers lying in the fields. An 
unknown number of civilians died during the invasion. Soon, a fire picked up and coursed 
through the center of the town, destroying many more homes and buildings. Since it spread 
primarily through the Jewish quarter, many believed the fire to have been deliberately set by 
the Germans.
15
 As he stood in the main square while the flames intensified, the thirteen year 
old Edvardas Cirtautas thought to himself, “In hell, things couldn’t be worse than this.”16 
Though the town center had been captured, fighting continued on the outskirts. As 
fire approached the town square, the Wehrmacht soldiers relocated the civilians to the city 
park. There they were joined by many other residents of Garsden who had fled their homes. 
By the early afternoon, the German army finally broke the Soviet resistance and pushed on. 
The battle for Garsden had not gone as planned. Nearly one hundred German soldiers died 
during the fight, but these losses did not halt the German advance. The war moved beyond 
                                                 
13
 Irena Permiakova, quoted in “Der Ulmer Prozess: SS-Einsatzgruppen vor Gericht,” directed by Eduard Erne, 
SWR (2006), 17”. 
 
14
 Slava Aronovits, “A Bit of History,” trans. by Gloria Berkenstat Freund, in Gorzd Book. 
 
15
 Hershl Meyer, “On the History of the Jews in Lithuania,” trans. by Gloria Berkenstat Freund, in Gorzd Book. 
 
16
 Edvardas Citautas, quoted in “Der Ulmer Prozess,” 18”. 
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Garsden and left its citizens to discover what kind of peace the Nazis aimed to impose. All 
day and night, the residents of Garsden waited in the park, guarded by German soldiers.  
* * * 
The previous decades had made Garsden’s residents accustomed to the uncertainty of 
life on the border. Historically a town between Prussia and Tsarist-controlled Lithuania, 
Garsden became the western edge of the newly independent Lithuanian state following 
World War I. Challenges to its territorial claims attended the state’s creation, and the new 
republic fought several wars of independence through the 1920s. One consequence of these 
wars was the expansion of Lithuania into the Memel region, which had initially been 
intended as a protectorate of the Entente following the Treaty of Versailles. This large, 
historically Prussian city sat just miles from Garsden and gave the state access to an 
important ice-free port on the Baltic. For the residents of Garsden, it opened up many new 
job opportunities. A bus began to run several times daily between the two, allowing many to 
commute to the more economically diverse Memel.
17
 For the first time in centuries, Garsden 
was a border town no longer.  
A resurgent Nazi Germany intent on reclaiming its pre-Versailles borders demanded 
the return of Memel in spring 1939. Confronted with little international opposition, Germany 
reclaimed the Prussian port, and Garsden found itself once again on the border. Its political 
situation grew more precarious with the invasion of Poland in September 1939. Under the 
revised terms of the secret pact between Germany and the Soviet Union in late September, 
Lithuania fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. The Lithuanians struck a Faustian bargain 
with the Soviets, who offered them Vilnius, the cultural capital of Lithuania that had 
                                                 
17
 Aronovits, “A Bit of History,” Gorzd Book. 
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remained under Polish control in the interwar period, in exchange for allowing Soviet troops 
to be stationed on Lithuanian soil. The Soviet military presence all but ended Lithuanian 
independence and culminated in official annexation to the Soviet Union in mid-1940.
18
  
The Soviet Union immediately imposed a harsh new order on Lithuanian society. 
Thousands of “anticommunist elements” were rounded up and deported to gulags, and all 
non-communist groups and organizations were banned.
19
 While some Lithuanians supported 
the regime and found new opportunities for advancement, the majority experienced the 
occupation as a year of horror. Lithuanian Jews also responded in a variety of ways to the 
Soviet system, some welcoming it as a way out of poverty, others hostile to its banning of 
organizational life.
20
 But virtually all were aware that the alternative of a Nazi occupation 
would have been far worse for them. Despite the diversity of Jewish responses, many 
Lithuanians quickly came to associate the new government with Jews, and anti-Semitism 
rose markedly from 1940-1941.
21
 
These political reversals compounded local problems in Garsden and left the town in 
an already precarious situation prior to the invasion. Once Memel joined the Third Reich, the 
Nazis immediately set about to declare the port city judenrein (free of Jews). Almost 
overnight, eighty percent of Garsden’s Jews lost their jobs.22 Those commuting to Memel 
were now forced to remain in Garsden, and the town bloated with unemployed citizens. 
Meanwhile, many Jewish natives of Memel fled to Garsden, growing the population even 
                                                 
18
 Dieckmann, 147-177. 
 
19
 Dieckmann, 147-155. 
 
20
 Dieckmann, 156-160. 
 
21
 Dieckmann, 161-163. 
 
22
 Aronovits, “A Bit of History,” Gorzd Book.  
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larger. Already overcrowded, Garsden was crippled in late summer 1939 when a fire broke 
out in the wooden town and destroyed 150 homes, mostly in the Jewish quarter.
23
  
* * * 
On the morning of June 23, after the civilians had spent a sleepless night in the town 
park, several vehicles rolled into Garsden from Memel and arrived at the park where the 
residents were being held. Unlike the Wehrmacht soldiers on guard, these new arrivals wore 
the black uniforms of the SS. Confusion set in among the civilians. The non-military SS 
appeared to be giving orders to the Wehrmacht troops, though what all this meant for those 
encamping in the park remained unclear. After some discussion, the lead SS officer allowed 
the Lithuanian residents to return to their homes. For many, this came as a relief. Thankful to 
be alive, they could now begin to mend the damage from the battle and resume some 
semblance of normal life. Despite the destruction of much of their town, many of the 
inhabitants could now look forward to life free from Soviet domination. 
Although the Lithuanians were told to return home, the SS officer ordered the Jews of 
Garsden to remain. Seputis and his wife, who were not Jewish but whose home had been 
destroyed in the invasion, remained in the park with nowhere else to go. They watched as the 
crowd dispersed. Left in the clearing were some six hundred Jews who lived in Garsden and 
now huddled together with their families.
24
 Those standing before the SS unit in the town 
park numbered perhaps half of the Jewish population, the others had either fled Garsden or 
remained in hiding in homes and cellars throughout town. 
                                                 
23
 Orenshteyn, “My Shtetl Gordz,” Gorzd Book. 
 
24
 Statement by Feliksas Seputis (Augsburg, 22 February 1957), EL 322/II, Bü. 8, SL. 
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The officer in charge gave no reason for detaining these Jewish civilians. Most of 
them were likely well aware by this point of the ghettos that had been created over the 
previous year in parts of occupied Poland. Certainly they knew of the rapid escalation of anti-
Semitism once Nazis seized Austria and Czechoslovakia. Perhaps they believed that the 
Nazis now intended to segregate the Jews of Garsden from their Lithuanian neighbors. Yet 
once the SS had isolated the Jews from the rest of the civilians, the officer ordered the able-
bodied male Jews to step forward and form rows. Over cries, protests, and mass confusion, 
over one hundred men were separated from their families. Now in lines, they were ordered to 
march west of town, back towards the German border. As they left the park, not knowing 
their destination or the Germans’ intent, the Jewish men of Garsden looked on the faces of 
their wives and children for the last time. 
Among the men was Max Feinstein, a soap manufacturer. Like many of the others in 
the group, Feinstein had only known Garsden for a short while. He had lived previously in 
Memel, but fled once the Nazis seized control.
25
 Looking around, Feinstein saw many other 
Jews who had joined him from Memel in Garsden. Scheer, Funk, and the three Korfmann 
brothers were all Memel cattle-dealers. Bernstein and Tauer, both machinists, also marched 
in line with Feinstein. They and others who had fled German territory now began a slow 
walk to the edge of town against the border. Many Garsden natives, such as Rabbi Meir 
Levin, also numbered among the male Jews selected in the town center.
26
 As a group, these 
men were clearly identifiable as Jews. They spoke their own dialect and accented Lithuanian 
and German. Many wore long beards and dressed in traditional clothing. In age they ranged 
                                                 
25
 Joachim Tauber first connected Feinstein with a Memel soap maker through comparison of the census 
records. See, Joachim Tauber, “Garsden, 24. Juni 1941,” Annaberger Annalen, v. 117 (1997), 128. 
 
26
 Julius, “Gorzd,” Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities, Lithuania. 
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from late teens to elderly men, though those physically impaired were spared from the 
selection on this occasion.  
Less than a mile from the town center, the men were ordered into an enclosure in a 
field to the left of the road. The border office between Garsden and Memel in the village of 
Laugallen sat just ahead. As the prisoners arrived, a unit from the border patrol came out to 
meet with the SS officers in charge. The SS officer ordered the border patrol to remain there 
guarding the prisoners, while he led his men back to the town center. Once there, the SS 
rounded up the Jews remaining in the park, mostly women and children, and led them three 
hundred meters east – the opposite direction as the first group – and held them in a barn. 
House-by-house searches were then carried out. Jewish men as well as suspected communists 
were brought out to join the others in the improvised prison. By evening, there were nearly 
two hundred prisoners in the clearing outside town. They remained there all night under the 
guard of the border patrol. 
In the late morning on June 24, barely two days since the war began, the SS officer in 
charge the day before returned to Garsden with a unit of SS men. At eleven o’clock, shortly 
after they arrived, a stream of eight to ten passenger vehicles crossed the border and entered 
Garsden. They carried sixteen Gestapo and ten SD officers. The respective heads of these 
units, two high-ranking officers, conferred and received a report from the lesser SS officer 
who had selected out the Jewish men the day prior. The commanding officers were strangers 
to the Garsden inhabitants. Their uniforms distinguished them as Nazi elite, but no one had 
seen their faces before. These two senior officers now surveyed the pockmarked border town. 
They saw the blackened walls throughout the town center, noted the cratered artillery pits 
12 
 
and dispersed debris, and walked among the bodies of German and Soviet troops that still lay 
scattered across the fields outside town.  
Soon a third senior officer arrived in Garsden, one likely recognized by many of the 
Jewish prisoners. Bernhard Fischer-Schweder arrived on his own before noon. As the police 
director in Memel, appointed immediately after the area joined the Third Reich, Fischer-
Schweder was among the more visible Nazi appointees in the area. A notorious self-
promoter, he made himself known upon his arrival in Memel and was currently negotiating 
to have a new bridge there named in his honor.
27
 When he appeared in Garsden, the police 
director was easily identified by his distinct SA uniform. He joined the two other senior 
officers in discussion. 
Shortly after noon, a large passenger truck drove in from Memel. When it arrived at 
the gathering with the various other German units on hand, a group of twenty uniformed 
police officers climbed out of the vehicle. They were armed with rifles. These were ordinary 
members of the police from the Memel area, many born and raised there. Feinstein and other 
prisoners recognized a number of the young men from their time in Memel. As the police 
pulled ammunition from the truck and other supplies, they unloaded a number of spades and 
shovels. These were Fischer-Schweder’s men, and they were the execution squad. 
The senior SD and Gestapo officers now began to give orders to clear the area and 
make preparations for an execution. They had their men relieve the border patrol unit and 
take over guard duty of the prisoners. The prisoners were ordered to remove and surrender all 
valuables, which were gathered by the guards and given to the border patrol agents. Some 
Jews were then ordered to remove the bodies of Soviet soldiers still on the battlefield. If 
                                                 
27
 “Eine neue Brücke am Aschhof,” newspaper unknown (2 September 1941), EL 322/II, Bü 73, SL. 
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doubts had persisted among the prisoners about the Nazis’ plans for them, these dissipated 
when a number of the Jewish men were led to a Russian tank trap near a horse pen outside 
town. They were given spades and shovels and told to enlarge the pit. Several Gestapo and 
SD officers took pleasure in the affair, striking the prisoners indiscriminately and yelling at 
them to dig faster. Rabbi Levin, the last rabbi of Garsden, was singled out for cruel abuse by 
the Nazis. Beaten when they cried out, the men were made to dig their own grave.  
While these preparations were underway, Fischer-Schweder approached the 
lieutenant who arrived with the twenty police officers. The prisoners watched as he led the 
lieutenant onto the battlefield and stopped before a wrecked German motorcycle. Nearby 
were the corpses of two Wehrmacht soldiers. Fischer-Schweder pointed at the bodies, then 
directed the lieutenant’s gaze towards the male Jewish prisoners and pointed. When they 
returned, word quickly spread among the police officers and then reached the prisoners’ ears. 
These Jews, they were told, had been “snipers” responsible for the fierce resistance in 
Garsden. They were to be killed for their crimes against the German army.  
For Feinstein, the Korfmann brothers, Rabbi Levin, and the rest, these charges were 
an outrage. They had hidden in basements since the battle broke out and had been under 
German guard since then. They were ordinary civilians with no partisan aspirations. There 
had been no civilian resistance of any kind in Garsden. Likely the prisoners saw through the 
thin veneer of these charges and recognized them as a fictive legal pretense to murder the 
men simply for being Jewish. As they began to shout and cry out, the guards lashed back 
with blows. 
Once the pit had been dug out into a long and shallow grave, the prisoners were led 
behind a partially destroyed wall in the field, concealing them from view of the town. The 
14 
 
police officers then formed two rows of ten each, approximately twenty meters from the 
grave. The Gestapo men guarded the two hundred and one prisoners, now with one woman – 
the wife of a communist functionary – among them. SD officers secured the perimeter 
around the site to bar any escape. The two senior Gestapo and SD officers stood nearby, 
joined by Fischer-Schweder, the SS officer from the day before, and several other officials 
who had since arrived from Memel. Members of the border patrol and other units observed 
from beyond the cordoned area. On hand that day was a complex and confusing cross-section 
of Nazi organizations. With the exception of a few of the men from Memel, none of these 
officers were known in Garsden. From ordinary police to hardened SS men, from border 
patrol agents to city officials, the execution in Garsden drew on every available state 
organization to supply manpower and support for the pending massacre.  
The executions began in the early afternoon, when a unit of Gestapo and SD men 
selected ten men from the prisoners. Yelling, they ordered the Jews to run to the grave and 
line up before it. “Faster, faster,” one shouted, “so we can call it a day sooner!” The cries and 
pleas for mercy from the men could be heard in town. Instructed to face the firing squad, 
each had two rifles pointed at him. The police lieutenant stood to the side of the shooters and 
addressed the victims: “You are being shot in the name of the Führer on account of crimes 
against the Wehrmacht.” After saying this, he gave the order to fire. The execution squad 
shot all ten men, in full view of the other prisoners. Their bodies fell into or along the edges 
of the grave. After the first salvo, Fischer-Schweder walked among the ten victims, some of 
whom were not yet dead. He and the lieutenant pulled their pistols and shot the still living in 
the head. 
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The next group of ten victims was then led out. They were ordered to place the bodies 
of the others in the grave and then to line up themselves before it. Again, the lieutenant stated 
the purpose for their execution and they were killed. Several Gestapo men now made sure all 
were dead. For the next several hours, twenty such executions took place. Each group was 
led out, made to place the previous victims in the grave, told they were being shot for crimes 
against the Nazi state, and killed. The ground became drenched in blood. On one occasion, a 
young teenager was among those shot. Still alive and writhing in agony, he pleaded, “One 
more!” A Gestapo officer shot him again with his pistol. One of the shooters became sick 
during the afternoon and had to be replaced. Seputis and the other Garsden residents heard 
the gunfire and screams at regular intervals as it echoed throughout the town.  
In time, Feinstein the soap maker was selected and led to the grave. He placed the 
body of a neighbor in the grave and turned to confront the firing squad. While the lieutenant 
read out the execution order, he looked at the men aiming rifles at him and recognized one of 
the shooters. It was a young police officer he knew from Memel. Locking eyes with his 
acquaintance and killer, Feinstein called out just before the firing order, “Gustav, shoot 
well!”  
Over a mile away, the Jewish women and children remained locked in a barn. They 
may not have been able to hear the shots. The Nazis assuaged their concerns by telling them 
that the men had been sent to a work camp and were being looked after. They readily 
accepted this lie, their minds unable to conceive of the alternative. Rahel Yamai, a Jewish 
woman locked away and the only one in the barn to survive the war, said that no one could 
truly imagine that these innocent men had been marched off to be shot.
28
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After several hours, all 201 prisoners had been killed. The SD officer confirmed the 
number killed with the senior Gestapo officer. Their bodies were covered in dirt. Later, 
concerns over the smell and public health risks led the Garsden residents to exhume the grave 
and pour in lime.
29
 In mid-September, many of these German officers returned to Garsden. 
Lithuanian auxiliaries had replaced the policemen as the execution squad. This time, they 
targeted the Jewish women and children who had been held in a barn since the war’s opening 
days. Subjected to forced labor and starved, they had resorted to eating grass in an effort to 
stay alive.
30
 When the execution squad returned in the fall, this group was led to a clearing 
east of town and killed, like their husbands, fathers, and brothers before them.
31
 Many of the 
town’s remaining Jews were sent to the ghetto in Kowno, where the majority would perish.  
By the end of the year, Garsden was declared judenrein. Half the town’s population 
had been murdered and a community destroyed forever. All across Lithuania, Jewish 
communities suffered a similar fate. By the end of 1941, just six months after the German 
invasion, nearly eighty percent of all Lithuanian Jews had been murdered in open air 
shootings like that in Garsden. The loss was not just of life, but of a way of life that had 
persisted through centuries. As Aronovits, who had left Garsden before the invasion, later 
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wrote, “Who can imagine Gorzd without Jews? And who can imagine Gorzd without the 
Yiddish language on the streets and alleys of the shtetl?”32 
It was late afternoon on June 24 when the execution squad began to pack up its 
equipment. The residents of Garsden watched the men prepare to leave. The killers had 
unfamiliar faces and came from unknown units and towns. Various officers had exerted 
influence over the execution, and no one could say for certain which – if any – of those 
present had ultimately been responsible for the murders. The witnesses to the massacre were 
now lying in a ditch on the edge of town. For anyone hoping to understand what had 
transpired, the only people now with answers were climbing into trucks on their way back to 
Germany. Overhead, a small Russian air raid had started against Memel, where smoke 
clouded the horizon. The war was just beginning. The colonnade pulled out of the field and 
back onto the main road to Memel. As civilians looked on, the vehicles rumbled out of 
Garsden, rounded a bend through the woods, and disappeared. 
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II. Introduction: The 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando Trial 
 
When first contacted about this case, one witness asked the detective, “Why are you digging 
up these old things?” This witness thus posed a question which has doubtless also been 
posed to you by your friends, namely, “Even if such atrocities were committed, why must we 
– the Germans – inflict wounds on ourselves by making a display of our own shame for all 
the world to see after seventeen years? And why must we once again rip open wounds that 
have barely healed since 1945?”  
 
– Erwin Schüle, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial 
 
 
 In the late spring of 1958 along the banks of the Danube in the West German city of 
Ulm, ten men appeared in court to stand trial for the murder of several thousand Jews in 
Lithuania. Since 1941, when these Holocaust perpetrators carried out their crimes, the 
defendants had experienced nearly four more years of war and then fanned out across West 
Germany and reintegrated into postwar society. Though they had carved various routes 
towards reintegration, their pasts bound them together and brought them all to Ulm seventeen 
years later to confront their crimes. For four months, dozens testified about the defendants’ 
role in Einsatzkommando Tilsit, a death squad responsible for destroying the Jewish 
communities along a stretch of the German-Lithuanian border. The trial showcased the fruits 
of a three-year investigation that at its peak employed three teams of detectives spread across 
the country and required a sustained international effort to find evidence and witnesses of 
these crimes. By the time it began, the trial in Ulm had become the largest Nazi crimes case 
to that point put before a West German court.
1
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In the end, the court found all ten defendants guilty.  The verdict validated the 
extraordinary efforts of the investigators and inspired renewed discussions over the 
responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany to prosecute perpetrators from the Nazi 
era. By October, little over a month after the trial’s end, the justice ministers of West 
Germany agreed to create a new agency to coordinate Nazi crimes investigations, known as 
the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärungen national-sozialistischer 
Gewaltverbrechen (Central Office of the State Justice Ministries for the Investigation of 
National Socialist Crimes of Violence). To lead the Zentrale Stelle, the ministers appointed 
the prosecutor of the trial in Ulm and staffed it with the case’s lead investigators. Over the 
next decades, this organization launched thousands of investigations into hitherto 
unprosecuted Nazi crimes.
2
 Within three years, the investigation that began as a small affair 
in a provincial town in southwest Germany had blossomed into a trial so prominent that it 
forced the West German judiciary down a path of ongoing prosecutions of Nazi criminals. 
The significance and strangeness of this 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando Trial, as it has 
since become known, becomes all the more apparent set against the dominant trends of the 
postwar period. Throughout the 1950s, prosecutions for Nazi crimes steadily declined to 
levels not seen again for several decades. An era of prosecutorial apathy reflected the 
dominant political interests of the time. The Federal Republic pursued a program of amnesty 
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and reintegration, rather than prosecution, of former Nazis in an effort to paper over social 
divisions and move the country out from under the shadow of Nazism. These desires found 
wide resonance among many West Germans, who preferred to consider themselves victims, 
not supporters, of Nazism. Through the 1950s, the interests of the courts, the government, 
and the public of West Germany converged in their willingness to forgo a critical assessment 
of the Nazi past in order to focus on the perceived needs of the present.  
But if the Ulm trial sat uncomfortably among these prevalent attitudes of the 1950s, it 
seemed to herald the sea change in West German attitudes towards the Nazi era that came 
into full view by the 1960s. With the creation of the Zentrale Stelle in 1958, the courts began 
to engage more earnestly than ever before in prosecuting Nazi criminals. Moreover, where 
earlier crimes had often skewed to emphasize German victims of Nazis, crimes of the 
Holocaust came to dominate this new era of prosecutions. These changes inspired shifts 
throughout the West German government and society. The federal government agreed to 
extend the statute of limitations on the most serious crimes committed during the Third 
Reich, and a rising generation began to ask more critical questions about the country’s 
response to the Nazi era. As a result, the issue of coming to terms with the Nazi past loomed 
much larger in public discourse during the 1960s than it had during the previous decade.  
 Thus the Ulm trial was – and has often been seen as – a crossroads in West German 
attitudes towards the Nazi past. Two major approaches to the Nazi past intersected at Ulm. 
One favored continuing the policies of the 1950s, which viewed the needs of the present as 
more important than extended prosecutions of Nazi crimes. The other argued that 
prosecutions and processing the Nazi past ought to be an integral part of West Germany’s 
commitment to justice. Various groups within society also crossed paths in the course of the 
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Ulm trial. For the perpetrators, the Ulm trial signaled the end of their decade-long effort to 
reintegrate into postwar society and avoid prosecution for their crimes. For the investigators, 
the trial symbolized the culmination of three years of investigative struggles and successes in 
bringing these criminals to justice. Just as the Ulm trial marked the end of these stories, it 
opened space for the beginning of others. The government and to a lesser extent the public 
interpreted the trial in Ulm and its verdict as an opportunity for a wider discussion over the 
Nazi crimes issue in West Germany. All of these groups and subcultures within society thus 
approached Ulm from a different vantage. Because it was a point of intersection for this 
cross-section of society, the Ulm trial tells a much wider story about 1950s West Germany 
and debates over coming to terms with the Nazi past. 
 More than just a symbol of these debates, the Ulm trial also helped determine their 
outcome. Precisely because the trial brought together so many differing voices, certain 
groups began to speak with one another for the first time, which contributed to a critical 
minority voice within West Germany.
3
 Eager prosecutors, skilled investigators, Jewish rights 
organizations, scholars, and others found common cause in the Ulm trial and used that 
experience to leverage state officials for a more concerted judicial confrontation with the 
Nazi era. They were able to accomplish this because the West German public exhibited a 
largely muted response to the trial. Public ambivalence created a discursive space for this 
vocal minority to promote its views within the government. As a model for understanding 
shifts in memorial culture, the Ulm trial shows a complex and nuanced process of coalition-
building underway in West Germany. It was through the construction of a network of like-
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minded actors – public and private, individuals and organizations – that reforms percolated to 
the top of the government before filtering back down to society at large. 
 
The Ulm Trial in Legal, Cultural, and Transnational History 
By portraying the Ulm trial as both a symbolic forum of debate over the Nazi past and 
as a determining factor in the emergence of a critical memorial culture in West Germany, this 
dissertation contributes to three fields of historical scholarship. First, in the legal history of 
West Germany, the creation of the Zentrale Stelle in 1958 is widely regarded as the key 
moment of delineation between an apathetic and activist prosecutorial culture towards Nazi 
crimes. I argue that the Ulm trial was both the engine that drove the debates over the creation 
of the Zentrale Stelle and the blueprint for its design. Second, in regards to post-1945 cultural 
attitudes towards the Nazi past, I draw attention to the consequences of government programs 
favoring reintegration and public emphasis on German victimization. Though these attitudes 
aimed to create social stability, they created blindspots in society that allowed perpetrators to 
conceal themselves in plain sight for over a decade. Finally, I argue for the importance of the 
Ulm trial in transnational understandings of the emergence of Holocaust memorial cultures 
throughout Western Europe, North America, and Israel. Though a trial in the backwoods of 
West Germany, the Ulm case succeeded due to its reliance on a transnational network of 
actors actively coordinating their efforts to advance Holocaust awareness.   
  In the legal history of postwar West Germany, the Ulm trial occupies a prominent 
though ill-defined place. The size of the trial, the nature of the crime being prosecuted, and 
the verdict all contrasted with the major trends of prosecutions in the 1950s. The creation of 
the Zentrale Stelle in the wake of the trial cemented Ulm’s place in the legal history of Nazi 
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crimes prosecutions, but the relationship between these three – 1950s prosecutorial culture, 
the Ulm trial, and the Zentrale Stelle – has remained unclear.4 Scholarship has tended to 
focus on early trials before 1949 and after the 1960s, which has left trials of the 1950s, like 
that in Ulm, understudied.
5
 I argue that the Ulm trial demonstrated the problems with hitherto 
dominant approaches to Nazi crimes cases and offered a plausible alternative approach. It 
was this plausible alternative that became the inspiration for the Zentrale Stelle. 
 To understand this argument, it is necessary first to explain how and why 
prosecutions were at an all time low by the mid-1950s. Nazi crimes investigations in West 
Germany had undergone two starkly different phases prior to the Ulm trial.
6
 The first, from 
1945-1949, corresponded to the era of Allied occupation and witnessed the most robust 
period of Nazi crimes prosecutions since 1945. Besides the prominent International Military 
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Tribunal at Nuremberg and the successor trials, West German courts were actively 
prosecuting Nazi crimes. Investigators opened files on 14,406 crimes during this period, and 
prosecutors issued indictments for 13,333.
7
 No other four year period in post-1945 German 
history witnessed more than a quarter of these numbers.  
The sheer quantity of these cases, however, is misleading. In cases that led to 
indictments, nearly half resulted in acquittals.
8
 The crimes prosecuted in these cases were 
also fairly uniform. Eighty-five percent of the cases pursued crimes committed in Germany, 
and over half were for Endphase crimes, or crimes committed during the chaotic months of 
retreat and collapse in the final stage of the war.
 9
 In just under two-thirds of the cases, 
Germans were the primary victim group, with crimes of the Holocaust, in which the victims 
were Jewish, accounting for half of the remaining one-third. A disproportional relationship 
emerged between the types of crimes committed under the Third Reich and those prosecuted 
after the war, in which crimes against German civilians became overrepresented relative to 
those targeting non-Germans in the east.
10
 
The reasons for the high acquittal rate and the focus on crimes committed against 
Germans in the early phase of prosecutions can largely be attributed to Allied control over 
postwar prosecutions. The Nuremberg trials in particular dominated legal proceedings. Their 
scope, sense of finality, and international composition lent them a primacy over all others. 
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The trials of Nazi elite at Nuremberg served a broad public role in the Allied program of 
denazification and reeducation.
11
 The subsequent trials carried out in each Allied zone 
continued to mix this role of trial as public spectacle and tool of justice. The Allies also 
limited West German courts to investigating only crimes committed by Germans against 
other Germans in the jurisdictional region of the prosecutors.
12
 As a result, the vast majority 
of Nazi crimes, which took place outside Germany and targeted non-Germans, fell outside 
the jurisdiction of West German courts. 
Throughout the postwar period, these factors contributed to a distorted image of 
crimes in the Third Reich. The Allied trials and the surrounding media attention they 
received failed to distinguish between the singular nature of the crimes committed against 
Jews, for instance, and traditional war crimes. Consequently, this confusing muddle of 
conventional war crimes and uniquely Nazi crimes obscured the particular thrust of crimes 
against European Jews.
13
 When crimes against Jews were prosecuted, the perpetrators were 
characterized as sadists and ideological fanatics, thus further deflecting any culpability away 
from ordinary West Germans.
14
 By limiting West German courts to prosecuting crimes 
committed against Germans, the Allies also fueled a narrative of German victimization by 
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deemphasizing crimes that targeted other ethnic groups. The resulting legacies from these 
aspects led many Germans both to associate crimes against Jews with “victor’s justice” and 
to develop a narrative of German suffering at the hands of the Führer.
15
 
These attitudes coupled with the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 
led to the beginning of a second phase of prosecutions from 1949 to 1950, when new cases 
sharply declined. Rates of investigations dropped by fifty percent between 1949 and 1950 to 
1,951 and fell another fifty percent the following year. In all, the nine year period prior to the 
Ulm trial resulted in just 4,996 new investigations. Prosecutors filed only 2,252 indictments 
during this same stretch, and nearly 1,400 of these came in the single year of 1950 as a result 
of investigations already begun before the creation of the Federal Republic.
16
  
To a large extent, this decline reflected the dominant belief that the majority of 
serious offenders had already been sought out and punished. The federal government did not 
make further prosecutions a priority, so a declining number of new cases emerged randomly 
and with no oversight or coordination from the government.
17
 Prosecutors took a passive 
approach and did little to initiate investigations. The cases that did begin occurred often as a 
result of coincidental encounters between victims and perpetrators. Other trends continued. 
Crimes committed in Germany constituted over seventy percent of all trials, and Endphase 
crimes just under half.
18
 Moreover, these cases were extraordinarily difficult, as they required 
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great efforts to uncover evidence of criminality that had taken place years before and often in 
parts of Europe now behind the Iron Curtain. By the middle of the decade, all signs indicated 
that Nazi crimes prosecutions were coming to an end.  
To most outside observers, the surprising emergence of a massive trial in Ulm in 
1958 seemed a complete aberration from this trend. In fact it proved the first indication that 
this trend would quickly reverse itself. The creation of the Zentrale Stelle in the wake of the 
trial initiated a new era of prosecutions, when new investigations were launched in numbers 
not seen since the first years after 1945.
19
 Because the agency was created just months after 
the verdict in Ulm and because the prosecutor in Ulm became its first president, historians 
have widely recognized the importance of the trial in the creation of the agency. Two views 
in particular have emerged to explain this relationship. The traditional explanation, put 
forward in the 1970s, argued that the Ulm trial prompted a public outcry that spurred the 
government into taking more serious action against Nazi criminals.
20
 While there is still 
general agreement that the Ulm trial provided a momentary impulse behind the creation of 
the Zentrale Stelle, a wave of recent scholarship has argued that the agency emerged not from 
massive public support, but rather from political anxieties over possible international and 
domestic frustrations with the weak West German response to former Nazis.
21
 This view has 
consequently deemphasized the role of the Ulm trial in the creation of the Zentrale Stelle.  
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 Rather than viewing this shift as a consequence of top-down or bottom-up initiatives, 
I argue for a middle-out approach by focusing on the changes that began within local and 
state judiciaries. In the course of the Ulm investigation, whole categories of unprosecuted 
Nazi crimes came to the attention of prosecutors and investigators. Rather than sit on this 
information or attempt to pass it off to other jurisdictions, key personnel involved in the Ulm 
trial – chief among them its prosecutor and the state attorney general – used these newly 
discovered crimes to catch the ear of highly placed justice officials in West Germany. They 
posited that a coordinated effort among the West German states could better carry out future 
investigations than a competitive judiciary seeking to avoid jurisdiction over undesired 
prosecutions. This spurred a typically slow-moving state bureaucracy into fast action, as the 
question of ongoing Nazi crimes prosecutions found its way onto the state justice ministers’ 
conference agenda in October 1958. At this conference, the ministers agreed to create the 
Zentrale Stelle. The entire issue had been pushed not by an angered public or an anxious 
federal government, but by several activist prosecutors and bureaucrats. The Ulm trial – and 
in particular the personnel behind it – was the engine that drove the discussion on the 
Zentrale Stelle.  
 More than just raising the question of unprosecuted Nazi crimes, the Ulm trial was 
the answer to that question. In order to understand the structure and purpose behind the 
Zentrale Stelle, one must look to the three year Ulm investigation that provided a blueprint 
for the agency. The first year of the investigation followed conventional approaches in 1950s 
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Nazi crimes cases. It began in 1955, just a year after the all-time postwar low for new 
investigations. Prosecutors devoted few resources to the case, and a culture of low 
expectations in the prosecutor’s office made the case a low priority. But in June 1956 a new 
prosecutor, Erwin Schüle, fundamentally overhauled the case. He pioneered a strategy of 
investigating the “crime complex,” which placed particular crimes into the broader context of 
the Nazi state apparatus. The crime complex investigation required using a range of evidence 
– such as perpetrator accounts, survivor testimony, contemporary documentation, and 
historical works – to build a case. Though a more expensive and expansive approach, the 
verdict in Ulm proved its effectiveness and became the inspiration for the creation of the 
Zentrale Stelle. Both Schüle and the investigators made up the core staff of the Zentrale 
Stelle, and the agency was largely built to house their talents and showcase their methods. 
  The Ulm trial was thus not some interchangeable part – the tool at hand that allowed 
West Germans to repair their approach to the Nazi past. Instead, the Ulm trial was an 
essential component for this process and for the creation of the Zentrale Stelle. The engine 
that drove the discussion over the Zentrale Stelle and the blueprint for its design, the Ulm 
trial fundamentally shaped the judicial approach to Nazi crimes in West Germany since 1958. 
The construction, form, and function of the Zentrale Stelle resulted directly from the 
decisions made by Ulm prosecutors and investigators.  
* * * 
 Second, this dissertation draws attention to the complex set of attitudes espoused at 
various levels of West German society towards the question of the Nazi past in the postwar 
period. Ever since the 1960s, when West Germans began to address the Nazi era and the 
Holocaust more openly and in earnest, scholars have looked back to the fifteen years after the 
30 
 
war to understand why these issues had not surfaced earlier. Compared with the prominent 
discussions of Nazi criminality and the Holocaust during the 1960s, the absence of any 
similar public discourse during the 1950s was conspicuous. Upon closer examination, recent 
scholarship has shown that the 1950s in fact were a fertile period for discussion over the Nazi 
era, but in ways starkly different from and advancing different needs than the Holocaust-
centered understanding of the past that later emerged.  
Current scholarship posits that the main features of West Germany’s response to the 
Nazi period can be explained through the particular array of factors that comprised the 
political, diplomatic, and social realities of the postwar period. Two of the most influential 
proponents of this view were Jeffrey Herf and Norbert Frei. Herf has argued that in the West 
the postwar years constituted an effort to avoid ongoing discussion of the Nazi era in favor of 
political stability. In order to move forward, West Germany was forced to delay justice.
22
 
Frei’s work has similarly found a lack of willingness to deal with German complicity in 
Hitler’s crimes throughout the 1950s. He detailed the “politics of the past” under West 
German Chancellor Adenauer to mask social divisions through the creation of amnesty 
programs and hiring incentives to bring former Nazis back into society.
23
 As Herf had done, 
Frei portrayed postwar West Germany as a forward-looking state, too pressed with the needs 
of the present to engage in concerns over the past. In both iterations, the challenge of dealing 
with the Nazi past was therefore conceived at the federal level as primarily a social issue, and 
not an issue of morality or justice.  
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If Herf and Frei conclusively revealed federal aversions to a critical confrontation 
with the Nazi era in the postwar period, more recent work by Robert Moeller and others has 
demonstrated the way these views permeated throughout society. Central to Moeller’s work 
is the notion that West Germans engaged in a “selective memory” of the Nazi era during the 
postwar years.
24
 They actively and widely discussed the Nazi period ever since the end of the 
war, but their discussions through the 1950s centered on the notion of German victimization. 
Having endured twelve years of Nazi dictatorship, the destruction of their homes and cities, 
the epidemic of rape at the hands of the invading Red Army, the division of their country, the 
ongoing imprisonment of their POWs, the pursuit of “victor’s justice” at Nuremberg, and the 
mass expulsions of ethnic Germans from the East, many Germans felt that they had suffered 
and continued to suffer.
25
 All of these events created what Konrad Jarausch has termed “new 
points of reference through collective suffering.”26 In orienting themselves away from the 
Nazi past, West Germans chose to emphasize aspects of that past and the postwar occupation 
years that led to the belief that they had suffered greatly as a people over previous decades.  
Because West Germans considered themselves victims, little attention was given to 
the victimization of other groups, especially Jews. Few voices in the streets were able to 
contradict the message of German victimization. As Atina Grossmann has argued, the 
absence of Jews from postwar society made it easy for many Germans to overlook them as a 
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victim group.
27
 This was not to say that they denied the Holocaust, but rather that in the echo 
chamber of postwar victimization the only way to be heard was to shout the loudest, and the 
dearth of Holocaust survivors were unable to drown out the cries of German suffering. The 
introduction of the selective memory framework therefore significantly opened up the field 
of postwar studies by suggesting that this time period consisted of competing and 
overlapping narratives of the past, a crammed field of interpretations out of which a 
Holocaust-centered understanding of the Nazi era slowly began to emerge in the 1960s.  
Paradoxically, the massive Ulm trial emerged out of this postwar culture of amnesty, 
reintegration, and selective memory. The former members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit all 
found refuge in West Germany after the war thanks largely to these dominant attitudes in the 
government and within society. The policies of reintegration and the widespread beliefs in 
German victimization created conditions favorable for Holocaust perpetrators seeking to 
avoid prosecution.
28
 For over a decade, the ten Ulm defendants succeeded in manipulating 
the anxieties in postwar West Germany to allow them to reintegrate into society. But by 
capitalizing on these policies and beliefs, the perpetrators undermined the very legitimacy of 
these attitudes. As the Ulm trial made clear, the victimization narrative had become so 
pervasive and all-encompassing that even perpetrators had been able to lay claim to it. By 
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abusing these programs and misappropriating the label of victim, the Ulm defendants 
attacked the very credibility of the postwar state.
29
 
A close study of the origins and evolution of the Ulm trial also reveals the 
extraordinarily complicated and manifold attitudes that existed in postwar society towards 
the Nazi past. Even the victimization narrative was neither monolithic nor did it hold a 
monopoly on opinions. Through the Ulm trial, a wide range of perspectives about the 
relationship between the Federal Republic and the Third Reich emerge. Perpetrators, 
survivors, scholars, federal officials, local bureaucrats, the media, and the public all brought 
differing expectations about to the Ulm trial. Thus this case study affords a more complicated 
picture of the memory culture in postwar West Germany than is possible in larger surveys of 
the time period. There was a remarkable dynamism of opinion during that long postwar 
decade, as ideals and beliefs about the new state and the old clashed over the direction of 
West Germany. The trial in Ulm became one important site of conflict in this debate.  
* * * 
Third, the evolution of the Ulm trial reveals the transnational dimensions of West 
German attempts to confront the Nazi past. Events unique to West Germany shaped the 
particular outcome of the country’s memorial culture, but the general willingness to critically 
engage the Nazi past was part of an interconnected transnational moment in Western Europe, 
North America, and Israel. West Germany’s broad story shows a state unwilling or unable to 
seriously confront Nazi era crimes during the postwar decade, until a transformation occurred 
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during the 1960s that prompted a more critical reassessment of the relationship between the 
Federal Republic and its predecessor. While this is often seen as a German story, I argue that 
this also occurred within a global context of chiefly Western states converging at nearly the 
same time on a Holocaust-centered interpretation of the Nazi era. 
The West German arc resembled that of other countries after the war. In Israel, in 
order to project an aura of Israeli strength, the Holocaust and its survivors – generally 
interpreted at the time as symbols of Jewish weakness – were left out of public discourse 
during the 1950s.
30
 It was only in the 1960s, beginning with the arrest of Adolf Eichmann 
and the consequent testimony of dozens of survivors at his much publicized trial in Jerusalem 
in 1961, that this situation begin to reverse itself.
31
 What Henry Rousso described in France 
as the “Vichy syndrome,” describes a similar process and timeframe for dealing with the 
Nazi era.
32
 There too an initial unwillingness to examine the role of the Vichy government in 
Nazi crimes during the 1950s gave way by the end of the 1960s to an “obsession” with the 
Vichy regime and its role as a collaborator state. Peter Novick has noted that by the end of 
the 1960s Americans also began to discuss the Holocaust regularly, and it came to inform 
dominant understanding of World War II.
33
 The 1960s thus marked the beginning of a 
cultural reappraisal of the Nazi period that occurred in various national contexts. 
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By setting West Germany alongside these examples, one can detect a broad pattern of 
states beginning a critical reevaluation of the past in the 1960s. The striking parallels across 
these instances has led some historians to suggest that national mourning mimicked human 
psychological responses to trauma – a period of amnesia leading to a return of memory. 
Through the 1980s, a dominant view of postwar West Germany’s relationship to the past 
emphasized the country’s “inability to mourn.” This concept, best articulated by Alexander 
and Margerete Mitscherlich in 1967, posited that postwar Germany was recovering from 
trauma and thus repressed the past in order to move forward.
34
 Even Rousso’s concept of a 
“syndrome” suggested a psychological process of addressing the Nazi era. 
Other historians have rejected the psychological implications of this view, but the 
notion that the postwar period engaged in a “silence” about the Holocaust has persisted.35 To 
explain why this era of silence ended, historians have widely converged on important events, 
such as the Eichmann trial, that forced the international public to confront the historical 
reality of the Holocaust. Annette Wieviorka, for example, has recently looked at the role of 
the Holocaust survivor after 1945 and has argued that in response to the Eichmann trial, 
survivors became the symbolic carrier of Holocaust memory throughout North America, 
Western Europe, and Israel.
36
 Other historians have similarly evaluated the impact of various 
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carriers of memory – films, books, memorials, trials – on the formation of Holocaust-
centered understandings of the past.
37
  
While much of the transnational scholarship emphasizes very public confrontations 
with the past, I argue that key transnational aspects of the emergent memorial culture in West 
Germany occurred in the background and out of public view. Here I draw on a mounting 
critique of the “myth of silence” about the Holocaust in the postwar period.38 While it 
remains true that public discussions of the Holocaust remained relatively muted prior to the 
1960s throughout most of the West, this does not mean that no discussions were taking place. 
To the contrary, an important and increasingly influential group of actors – survivors, 
research institutes, Jewish rights organizations, and scholars – were actively engaging in the 
process of coming to terms with the Nazi era and the genocide of European Jews.
39
 Far from 
being a lost decade of remembrance, it was during the 1950s that the groundwork was laid 
for the later emergence of a Holocaust-centered understanding of the Nazi era.
40
  
This dimension of processing the Nazi era is essential for understanding how and why 
the Ulm trial emerged at a moment of seeming decline in West German interest over Nazi 
crimes prosecution. The trial succeeded because the investigation tapped into a growing 
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network of individuals and organizations committed to a more historical appraisal of the Nazi 
era. Tucked away across the west, these pockets of activism had opportunities to engage one 
another and the public through events like the Ulm trial. As a forum for exchange, the Ulm 
trial provided an opportunity for the network to make its case for a critical assessment of the 
Holocaust. This suggests that central to the process of coming to terms with the past was the 
behind-the-scenes work of advocates actively constructing a network to push for a 
confrontation with the Nazi past and the persecution of Jews.  
Considering the transnational dimensions of the Ulm trial also highlights the 
importance of the 1950s for understanding the emergence of a memorial culture in the 1960s. 
What emerged in the 1960s what not only a more critical approach to dealing with the Nazi 
past, but one that allowed victims a greater role in that process.  In this sense, one sees 
through the Ulm trial an important moment of evolution towards this victim-centered 
memorial culture.  Initial attempts to deal with Nazi crimes had largely relegated Jewish 
survivors to the sideline, in favor of using historical records and perpetrator testimony.
41
  
This changed by the 1960s, most prominently with the trial of Adolf Eichmann, but 
indications of a shift were already evident at the Ulm trial.  By using an extensive network of 
organizations and resources, the investigators conducted a global search for Jewish survivors 
to testify.  That they found none spoke only to the extensive nature of the Einsatzkommando 
Tilsit crimes, and not to a lack of effort on the investigators’ part.  Seen as a form of 
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transitional justice, the Ulm trial attempted to create a forum that would allow the victims to 
confront their perpetrators directly.
42
 
Thus many of the major transitions in West German attitudes towards the Nazi past 
were underway during the Ulm trial.  The emergence of a more self-critical response to the 
Nazi era towards the end of the 1950s directly resulted from the hard work of a vocal 
minority during the postwar period advocating for such a response. The Ulm trial was a 
crucial moment in this process. These disparate actors, their voices relegated to the 
wilderness for much of the postwar period, began to speak with one another, finding strength 
in their common causes. The Ulm trial brought together Jewish rights activists, Holocaust 
survivor networks, activist prosecutors, historians, archivists, concerned citizens, and leading 
intellectuals. The trial flourished due to their coordinated efforts. By constructing a 
transnational network engaged in the work of coming to terms with the Nazi past, the Ulm 
trial contributed to a far larger process that would soon burst onto the public stage across 
much of the world. For several months in the summer of 1958, Ulm became the epicenter in 
this expanding universe of Holocaust memorial culture. 
 
Sources 
This dissertation draws on a diverse array of primary source material. The core 
documentation comes from the Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg in Germany. This archive contains 
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all major trial records beginning with the investigation of Bernhard Fischer-Schweder in 
1955 and continues through the trial and into the appeals of the verdict in the 1960s. They 
provide the most precise day-by-day account of the evolution of the case through its various 
phases.  
Taking this narrow story and placing it into the larger legal, cultural, and 
transnational histories of coming to terms with the Nazi past required consulting a much 
wider group of sources. Other city, state, and federal archives in West Germany provided 
insights into the culture of the Ulm prosecutor’s office, the Baden-Württemberg state 
judiciary, and the Federal Ministry of Justice. These various levels of government often had 
starkly different takes on the investigation and trial underway in Ulm, and their internal 
correspondence is necessary for understanding the internal dynamics of the justice system in 
West Germany.  
To gauge public response to the trial, I consulted a wide array of media. Local, 
regional, national, and international newspapers all covered the case, as did radio outlets. 
This coverage not only highlights the way West Germans widely interpreted the trial, but 
also provides a detailed chronology of the four-month trial, as no transcriptions of the trial 
itself exist. Finally, an archived collection of over one hundred letters sent in by citizens 
interested in the Ulm trial reveal a striking diversity of personal opinions over the nature of 
the case.  
Because much of this story involves individuals – perpetrators, prosecutors, officials 
– many of the sources deal with these individuals’ backgrounds and lives. First, personnel 
records of various state officials from German archives grant insights into the lead 
investigators’ and prosecutors’ professional lives. Second, the microfilmed records of the 
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Berlin Document Center in Washington, DC as well as many postwar investigation 
statements provide necessary information on the wartime and postwar lives of the Ulm 
defendants. Finally, I conducted a series of oral history interviews with three individuals 
involved in the trial: a lead investigator, an attorney who represented one of the defendants, 
and a clerk in the Ulm courthouse.
43
 Their perspectives afford essential information the 
climate of the courtroom, the challenges of the case, and the personalities of the main actors. 
Numerous other personal records, such as defendants’ correspondence and the journal entries 
from the trial of another defense attorney, have been used in an attempt to understand the 
individuals involved in the trial. 
To uncover the transnational web the Ulm trial spun, research at various organization 
archives helped piece together a global paper trail. Beginning in the city archive of Stuttgart, 
which holds the records of the leading Jewish rights organization in the city, a set of 
correspondence leading to similar groups in Israel, Great Britain, France, and the United 
States emerged. Through research at the Yad Vashem archive in Jerusalem and the Wiener 
Library in London, it has been possible to find the missing half of much of this 
correspondence. Recently declassified American intelligence reports also draw attention to 
the perceived global threat of resurgent Nazism in the postwar period. Since several of those 
involved in the Ulm trial fostered this far-right sentiment, these records contribute to 
understanding the mood of paranoia and uncertainty that pervaded postwar society. 
Through this wide assortment of primary sources, as well as extensive secondary 
scholarship, this dissertation reveals a plurality of responses to the trial and to the Nazi past 
at various levels of government and in different pockets of society. Much of this archival 
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information has not been researched before. While most contemporaries saw the Ulm trial as 
a significant moment, few could agree at the time on what it actually signified. The archival 
record portrays a society rife with internal divisions, conflicting priorities, and anxieties over 
the future of the state. 
 
Organization 
The dissertation has a four-part structure. These sections have a temporal structure 
mirroring the evolution of the trial: Reintegration, Investigation, Trial, and Legacy. This 
division also allows for different sections to address different subcultures within West 
Germany. The first part focuses on perpetrators, the second on investigators and prosecutors, 
and the fourth on government officials and the public. The exception is part three, which 
examines the trial as a confluence of all these groups. The trial became the point of 
intersection in the stories explored in the other sections.  
Part one explores the postwar lives of the Einsatzkommando Tilsit perpetrators after 
1945 to illuminate dominant attitudes about the Nazi past during the initial postwar decade. 
These perpetrators and their choices functioned like barometers for measuring the changing 
attitudes towards Nazi crimes and ongoing prosecutions in the postwar period. They 
attempted to reintegrate in ways that they felt would diminish any questions about their past, 
thus their choices reveal the evolving contours of Holocaust consciousness in West Germany. 
These perpetrators faced a surprisingly open set of possibilities for reintegration, and none 
faced any prosecution for their role in the Holocaust in Lithuania prior to the Ulm 
investigation. Their ability to avoid detection for these murders reveals the general lack of 
awareness that permeated society and state regarding crimes of the Holocaust in Eastern 
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Europe. In addition to the ten future defendants at the trial, the section includes other 
members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit who avoided prosecution in Ulm in order to present a 
wider perspective on the successes and failures of perpetrator reintegration. Though the 
perpetrators carved their own individual paths towards reintegration, their responses 
generally fell along a spectrum of five possible responses: flight from Germany, concealment 
of the past through extralegal means (i.e. using false identification), resumption of prewar life 
and routines, continued adherence to the Nazi cause, and suicide. 
Part two, consisting of two chapters, examines the three-year investigation that ended 
with the trial of ten Einsatzkommando Tilsit members in 1958. Primarily concerned with the 
internal evolution of this investigation, this section focuses on the culture of the West 
German judiciary in the mid-1950s and the tactics at its disposal for investigating fifteen year 
old crimes that occurred behind the Iron Curtain in Lithuania. Chapter 2 analyzes the first 
stage of this investigation, when the case proceeded on the directives of the Ulm prosecutor’s 
office, without the intervention of higher government offices, and with Bernhard Fischer-
Schweder as the sole target of the investigation. This first phase from 1955-1956 was a 
typical example of the minimal effort afforded to most 1950s Nazi crimes cases. The 
prosecutor’s office in Ulm allocated few resources to the investigation and based their 
evidence on perpetrator testimony. The lead investigators lacked any experience with Nazi 
crimes cases, and consequently perpetrators were largely taken at their word, which proved 
extraordinarily unreliable and mendacious. 
The second phase of the trial, explored in part three, began with the intervention of 
the state judiciary in 1956 and represented a revolution in the prosecution of Nazi crimes. 
Now, an entire “crime complex” was the target of the investigation, which led to ten 
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indictments. Substantial resources allowed investigators and prosecutors to utilize all 
potential information at their disposal, and a historical approach to the investigation based on 
war era documentation created a massive body of evidence against the perpetrators. The 
investigators worked with an international network of organizations, survivors and witnesses, 
archives, and historians to build a comprehensive case against Einsatzkommando Tilsit. 
Contrasting these two periods of the investigation explains how and why the Ulm trial 
emerged as the largest Nazi crimes case to that point prosecuted in a West German court. The 
contrast also highlights the distinctions between Nazi crimes cases investigated by 
conventional 1950s standards and those that adopted a more sustained, contextual, and 
historical approach to Nazi criminality in the wake of the Ulm trial.  
Part three blends the perpetrator and prosecutor stories of the first two sections 
through a focus on the four-month trial in Ulm in 1958. This trial also added new actors to 
the story, such as the defense attorneys, the judges and jury, the media, and the public. This 
section therefore addresses the interactions among these in the Ulm courtroom and their 
attempts to shape and understand its outcome. While the ostensible goal of the trial was to 
arrive at a verdict in the trial of these ten men, all present also recognized the symbolic 
importance of this case in defining the future of West Germany’s response to the Nazi past. 
Defense attorneys made the case that such trials undermined the country’s ability to move 
forward and address the needs of the present, while prosecutors argued that the trial 
constituted proof of the state’s inadequate response to the past and therefore the need to 
devote more resources and energy to dealing with Nazi crimes. Media outlets conversely 
portrayed the defendants according to well-worn tropes of Nazi radicals and sadists. Central 
to the views of the Ulm trial was therefore a longer-standing debate over Nazi criminality, 
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which considered perpetrators as unwilling participants in Hitler’s crimes, legally culpable 
criminals, or bestial murderers.  
In the final section, the complicated legacy of the Ulm trial is examined through an 
analysis of the reactions of the public and the West German government to the verdict. 
Through an assembly of newspaper articles and a trove of letters to the prosecutor’s office 
from an assortment of citizens, the impact of the trial on the West German public in the form 
of fostering the demand for a more intensive dealing with the Nazi past is seen as 
questionable. Though a wide array of views were expressed, few citizens suggested that the 
trial made them think differently about their relationship to Nazi era crimes. To the contrary, 
most interpreted the Ulm trial according to their preconceived ideas and expectations about 
postwar justice and Nazi crimes. The true impact and legacy of the Ulm trial must therefore 
be seen through an analysis of the debates it sparked within the halls of the West German 
judiciary. With the Ulm prosecutors pushing an agenda for more investigations, the West 
German state ministers agreed to create the Zentrale Stelle to coordinate future cases. To 
head the new agency, the ministers appointed the lead prosecutor of the trial and its 
investigative team. The legacy of the Ulm trial was therefore not in creating broad-based 
popular support for a new approach to Nazi crimes prosecutions, but rather in fostering a 
process of consensus-building within the state judiciaries which only later spread throughout 
much of the West German public. 
* * * 
 “It appears,” the early modern philosopher G.W. Leibniz once stated, “that in the 
smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies, 
souls…Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, 
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no confusion save in appearance, somewhat as it might appear to be in a pond at a 
distance.”44 The 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial may be a small particle – a pond in the 
distance – in the broader history of postwar Europe, but upon closer inspection it yields a 
world of meanings. Through the study of the Ulm trial, one sees the complicated society of 
1950s West Germany. Victims, perpetrators, investigators, prosecutors, public, media, and 
state and federal officials all occupied a place in this trial and all brought a different 
perspective to it. By exploring the histories of these groups through the Ulm trial, the 
dissertation tells a broader story about conflicting and evolving West German attitudes 
towards the Nazi past.
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III. Reintegration: A Perpetrator’s History of Postwar West Germany 
 
When we heard the shocking reports after 1945 of the concentration camps, when we learned 
through the Nuremberg trials of the unimaginable crimes conceived of and committed by 
Germans who led the Reich for over a decade, we did not want to believe these things. We 
did not want it to be true. We barricaded ourselves behind the belief that that we were the 
vanquished people who had been burdened with everything…And today? What is the reason 
today why a large part of the population doesn’t want to hear anything more? It is the shame 
we all feel that sons of our nation were capable of such deeds. One might counter, “We see 
that, but why then is this trial first being carried out today?” This question can only be 
answered if one returns to the year 1945. 
 
– Erwin Schüle, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial 
 
 
 Erich Frohwann stood atop a hill on the outskirts of Salzburg and looked out across 
the ruined city. Over the previous months he had been part of a massive German retreat in the 
face of the Russian invasion. After serving in Pressburg (present day Bratislava), he was 
forced further west in May 1945, across Austria, until he arrived in Salzburg. Now, on July 
18, 1945, the forty-three year old looked out across the failure and collapse of the Third 
Reich, manifested as smoldering rubble and privation, and bleakly considered his options for 
the future.
1
 
 Just a few years earlier, Frohwann had been an ascendant member of the rapidly 
expanding Nazi empire.
2
 Young, intelligent, married, and Aryan, Frohwann saw before him 
endless possibilities in Germany under Hitler. In 1937, the Gleiwitz native joined the Nazi 
Party and SS. With a doctorate in law, he was among the many highly-educated young 
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officers recruited into service. Although he received no SS officer training, Frohwann was 
instated initially as an Untersturmführer. By 1941, he had become Kriminalkommissar and 
leader of Grenzpolizeikommissariat (GPK) Memel. This office was organized under the 
larger office of the Stapostelle Tilsit, which coordinated Nazi police efforts along a 
significant portion of the German-Lithuanian border. As such, Frohwann and his office 
constituted the frontline of the Nazi state on the eve of war with Soviet Russia.  
 In the wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Frohwann participated in the 
actions that would distinguish him within the Nazi ranks and define his postwar life. As head 
of GPK Memel, he was among the small group of Nazi officials and department heads who 
authorized and carried out the executions of Jewish Lithuanians in the town of Garsden, 
across the border from Frohwann’s post in Memel.3 Under his orders, members of GPK 
Memel arrested and interned all Jews of Garsden. They systematically conducted a house-by-
house search for Jewish inhabitants and guarded the victims on the day of the shooting. 
Frohwann also suggested to his superiors a date and location for these civilians to be 
executed. This essential involvment in the Garsden executions made him an integral member 
of the newly formed Einsatzkommando Tilsit. Over the coming months, Frohwann involved 
himself in numerous subsequent massacres. Within a year, he had been promoted to 
Hauptsturmführer. 
 Four years later, the actions that had distinguished him as an earnest and devoted 
member of the Nazi regime now marked him as a war criminal. With a strong understanding 
of both law and the criminality of his involvment with the Third Reich, this former member 
of the Nazi elite found himself with few postwar options. Since June 1945, he scraped out a 
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living as a salesman in Salzburg, hoping to lay low and avoid the Allied sweeps for Nazis 
occurring within the occupied territories. Already there was talk of the horrors of the 
concentration camps and rumors of massive war crimes trials. His hometown of Gleiwitz 
now lay on Polish soil and the threat of retributive justice prevented any thoughts of a return. 
Though married and young, the dejected Holocaust perpetrator believed he faced long odds 
for a successful postwar life. Like Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and others before him, 
Frohwann refused to allow the Allies to prosecute him for his crimes.
4
 On the morning of 
July 18, 1945, at the peak of the hill in Hallwang, Frohwann secured one end of a rope to a 
tree, the other around his neck, and took his life.
5
 
* * * 
 For the leaders of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, uncertainty loomed on the postwar 
horizon. Most of these men had spent entire careers in the service of the Third Reich. As 
Holocaust perpetrators, many rightly feared prosecution at the hands of the Allies. Regime 
change signaled not just possible prosecution, but also economic hardship as they had now 
lost their positions and many their homes. Some, like Frohwann, could not imagine a viable 
way forward and preferred suicide. His decision was not isolated; at least four other 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit members committed suicide in the postwar period.
6
 The majority, 
though, attempted a new life after 1945. Since their participation in the murders of 
Lithuanian Jews in the summer of 1941, the officers had pursued divergent paths. Most 
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moved to different cities and held other posts after 1941, and by the end of the war they faced 
hard choices about how best to reintegrate into society.  
 Even though they generally encountered similar situations after 1945, no two 
perpetrators shared the same postwar experiences. They interpreted their circumstances in a 
wide variety of ways. Those who believed that they faced likely prosecution after the war 
went to great lengths to obscure their past, to forge new identities, to escape Germany, or 
even to take their own lives. Others, however, had no such anxieties and attempted to resume 
their prewar lives as best they could, as though nothing had ever happened. As a result, the 
former perpetrators of Einsatzkommando Tilsit constantly probed at the margins of 
acceptability in postwar society, eagerly searching out opportunities, raising their heads and 
surveying the landscape in search of stable employment and safe environs. This created a 
panoply of postwar responses that was highly dynamic and changed in response to the 
evolution of political, social, and legal priorities in postwar German life.  
 Woven throughout this chapter like the perpetrators throughout Europe in 1945 are 
the varied stories of the leaders of Einsatzkommando Tilsit as they reintegrated into postwar 
Germany.
7
 This chapter staggers their biographies in a loosely chronological framework in 
order to focus on moments of interaction with postwar authorities – ranging from the Allies, 
denazification boards, the West German government, to employers.
8
 How the perpetrators 
engaged with or avoided these authorities provides insight into how they interpreted postwar 
attitudes towards the Nazi past. Assuming each sought self-preservation and actively avoided 
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prosecution, then the choices they made, the language they used, and the lives they created 
for themselves can all be interpreted as a manifestation of what they believed to be 
acceptable behavior in Germany after 1945. These were Holocaust perpetrators who 
masqueraded after the war as ordinary civilians. Their success depended on their ability to 
accurately read shifting attitudes towards the Nazi past and camouflage themselves 
accordingly. They hid behind masks of respectability, and during the postwar decade these 
disguises were very convincing. 
 Because of the different paths they chose, a history of postwar Germany told from the 
perspective of the perpetrators touches on a wide array of familiar themes but casts them in a 
new light. Many of the tools West Germans used to move past the Nazi era also served to 
benefit former Nazis. Political goals and social attitudes could be contorted and put to the use 
of Holocaust perpetrators eager to avoid prosecution under the Allies, the denazification 
boards, or the West German state. There were certain notes that perpetrators could strike that 
played to the sensibilities of the public. Here was a nascent state threatened by the Soviets in 
the east, and eager to oppose any revival of fascism. Germans wanted to repair their cities 
and welcome their husbands, fathers, and brothers home. They worried about the fate of the 
POWs still held by the Soviets into the 1950s, and they expressed sympathy for those ethnic 
Germans forced from their homes in Eastern Europe by revanchist locals. These were 
dominant anxieties among the German public after 1945. Within these conditions, anyone 
could be a potential victim, and very few were seen as perpetrators. To understand how 
Holocaust perpetrators could escape justice is therefore to understand how they could 
transform themselves into victims. 
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The Zero Hour 
 The Elbe River follows a twisted path northwest from its origins in the Krkonoše 
Mountains of Central Europe through Bohemia and the plains of central Germany before 
emptying into the North Sea. Not quite halfway through its journey, the waters meander past 
the German city Schönebeck, a few miles south of Magdeburg. Since World War I, the 
Elbebrücke, an imposing Jugendstil bridge with rounded steel tresses, had arched across this 
two-hundred yard span of the Elbe, connecting Schönebeck to the east. During the desperate 
defense of the Third Reich, German troops destroyed the bridge, leaving the slow waters of 
the Elbe not crossable in Schönebeck, but the city itself exposed to the American forces.  
 Hans-Joachim Böhme approached the Elbe on foot from the east in early May 1945, 
intending to cross into Schönebeck.
9
 There he hoped to find his mother, who had fled from 
Magdeburg to stay with her brother during the aerial raids and military assault. The twisted 
heap of the Elbebrücke, though, forced Böhme north. As he continued to follow the river, he 
avoided his hometown of Magdeburg altogether, as the city swarmed with the U.S. Army. 
Eventually, finding few opportunities to cross the Elbe without risking exposure to foreign 
troops, Böhme decided to risk the wide cold waters. Though not a particularly difficult swim, 
for an individual with chronic leg pain this would have been a desperate decision.
10
 
 On one side of the waters stood Böhme, a thirty-six year old member of the Nazi 
elite. In the Nazi Party since 1933, he joined the SS in 1938. During the 1930s, he trained in 
law and, upon passing the bar in 1936, began to work for the state. He had been a model 
Nazi; committed, loyal, and dependable, Böhme steadily ascended the Nazi hierarchy. From 
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1938 to 1940, he worked in the Gestapo in Kiel, before transferring to a post as leader of the 
Stapo Tilsit office in 1940, where he remained until 1943. In that post, he became head of the 
unit Einsatzkommando Tilsit, which carried out the massacres of Jews and suspected 
communists along the Lithuanian border in the summer and fall of 1941. He ran afoul of the 
state just once, in 1943, when he took a service vehicle without permission to attend his 
father’s funeral.11 In late 1943, Böhme wounded his leg in battle, and he spent nearly six 
months recovering.
12
 By mid-1944 he became head of Einsatzkommando 3 before his 
transfer to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin later that year. By the end of the war he 
had achieved the rank of SS-Standartenführer, the highest rank below general within the 
organization. 
 At some point during his swim across the Elbe, Böhme shed his Nazi identity. When 
he emerged on its west bank, he had transformed himself from an SS Übermensch into a 
penniless Wehrmacht veteran from the east. He soon made his way back south to 
Schönebeck, but his mother had already moved on. Indeed, much of the population along that 
stretch of the river had begun to relocate. Although the Americans had invaded and occupied 
the area, postwar decisions already dictated that it would fall into the Soviet sphere. Reading 
the political terrain, Böhme recognized that his best opportunity to avoid detection for his 
crimes now lay farther west, away from the Soviets and the lands in which he had made his 
career. He again followed the Elbe northwest to the British controlled city of Lüneburg.  
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 Outside Lüneburg, in the small town of Reinstorf, Böhme began to establish his new 
identity. The area of the Lüneburg Heath had long been an established Nazi stronghold, an 
agrarian bastion of fascism in northern Germany. The psychiatric hospital there had carried 
out euthanasia actions against children, and thousands of prisoners passed through the 
Lüneburg train station en route to Belsen concentration camp.
13
 A Nazi seeking safe harbor 
could count on finding sympathetic locals in Lüneburg. In Reinstorf, Böhme met a farmer 
who agreed to take him on as a farmhand. Böhme gained the farmer’s favor with the “cover 
story that I had been a soldier who had fled from a postwar camp and could find no work in 
the cities because I had no release papers.”14 Böhme found refuge in the home of a rural 
farmer by appealing to the widespread belief that ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers were 
untainted by the crimes of the SS.
15
 The farmer likely felt that Böhme’s internment by the 
Allies was a clear demonstration of victor’s justice and thereby facilitated his efforts to avoid 
unjust postwar imprisonment.  
 Manipulating the sensibilities of a northern farmer may have earned Böhme food and 
shelter, but it did not solve the problem of avoiding the Allies. The farmer’s willingness to 
aid did not extend to outright harboring of a fugitive, and Böhme was required to register 
with the Reinstorf town hall. He much later boasted to authorities that “I was registered in 
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Reinstorf under my correct name and particulars as early as August 1945,” though this only 
tells part of the story.
16
 He did register with his correct name, but he altered his particulars 
slightly. From his days in the Gestapo in Kiel, Böhme still had a false passport that identified 
him as “Dr. Böhme, Master of Business Administration.” Böhme had no such training. This 
passport, however, allowed him to register with the office without alerting the Allies to his 
true background in the Nazi state. A number of questions might have surfaced in the 
Reinstorf town hall about this application: Why would someone with a passport from Kiel 
register in Reinstorf claiming to be a refugee from the east? Why would he have only a single 
form of identification? Why would a master of business administration want to work as a 
hired field laborer? But amidst the chaotic demographic reshuffling in postwar Germany, 
these questions were not raised, and Böhme’s passport made possible his reentry into society 
without any time in a postwar camp.  
 The disorder inherent at all levels of German society in 1945 that Böhme seized upon 
benefitted swaths of prominent Nazis. Just in the area of the Lüneberg Heath, where Böhme 
had settled, two architects of the Holocaust had tried their hands at duping the occupiers in 
May 1945. Heinrich Himmler had been captured there towards the end of the month, 
attempting to pass for a lesser officer.
17
 More successfully, Adolf Eichmann had escaped the 
U.S. Army and hidden out under an assumed identity, working as a woodman in a small 
village barely an hour southwest of Böhme.
18
 If these top-level, extremely well-known 
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individuals could contemplate such bold deceptions, then the opportunities for less prominent 
perpetrators, such as Böhme, to evade the authorities were legion.  
* * * 
A significant dimension of Böhme’s postwar reintegration lay in his ability to insert 
himself into the very real problem confronting Germany after 1945 concerning the massive 
numbers of refugees from the east. Though Böhme created this fictional biography of 
himself, for many Germans this constituted their postwar reality. An estimated 12 million 
Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) and East Prussians were forced from their homes in Eastern 
Europe after the war. An estimated 700,000 of them died during the process, as Eastern 
Europeans directed all their anti-Nazi aggression on the ethnic Germans in their midst.
19
 
Although many in the West turned a blind eye to this ethnic cleansing, the expellees became 
a symbol of the victim status that many Germans asserted for themselves.
20
 From this 
perspective, for twelve years they had suffered under Hitler, and now, as a consequence of 
his war, many Germans had lost not only their homes but their very homelands. Their 
experiences fueled a wider narrative of victimization that emerged after 1945, and these 
refugees stood in for the suffering of all Germans.
21
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The status afforded to German refugees and expellees became a form of social 
amnesty, as many in society were willing to ignore these individuals’ pasts because of their 
symbolic importance as victims. Such an attitude directly benefitted many members of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit who were natives of now foreign lands. They came to occupied 
Germany legitimately as refugees and found that conditions there made it easy for them to 
avoid significant questions about their pasts. Of the ten men later put on trial in Ulm, five had 
been born in German territories lost after 1945. Many others not tried at Ulm, such as 
Frohwann, had spent their prewar lives in lands that became Poland or the Soviet Union. 
As a native of Tilsit, Edwin Sakuth could not return to his prewar home.
22
 Tilsit had 
been an important city in East Prussia for centuries until it fell into Soviet control in 1945. 
With the exception of a year spent in Canada in 1930, he had lived only in Tilsit prior to the 
war. He joined the Nazi Party early, in 1931, and six years later took a position in the city’s 
SD office.
23
 By 1941, Sakuth was heading the Memel branch of SD Tilsit, which put him 
into contact with the leadership of Einsatzkommando Tilsit. As the war effort crumbled, 
Sakuth and his family had no choice but to abandon Tilsit. His wife and children fled ahead 
of him to western Germany. As with Böhme, Sakuth crossed the Elbe at war’s end and 
reunited with his family in the Harz region. Although sentenced in 1947 to two years 
imprisonment (he would serve seven months) by a denazification panel, Sakuth’s 
reintegration was free from major difficulties. His denazification result was standard due to 
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his SD membership, and no investigation took place into his wartime record.
24
 The 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders remained a secret of the east.  
Werner Kreuzmann’s postwar story closely mirrored Sakuth’s. Born in 1909 in the 
East Prussian capital of Königsberg, Kreuzmann spent the prewar years studying law.
25
 He 
joined the Nazi party and SA early on, which allowed his police career to flourish.
26
 By 
1939, he was working for the Königsberg state police at the Jewish affairs desk. In 1941, he 
transferred to the farther perimeters of the German state and became the head of Abteilung II 
in Stapo Tilsit, where he oversaw all issues related to enemies of the state, foremost among 
them Jews and communists. He not only played an organizational role in the Garsden 
executions, but on several occasions during that summer he acted as Böhme’s representative 
and personally authorized several Einsatzkommando Tilsit shootings. Pushed west as the war 
effort collapsed, Kreuzmann was arrested in spring 1945 by the British and held in a camp in 
Fallingbostel until 1948. Thereafter, a denazification court sentenced him to two and a half 
years for membership in criminal organizations, but applied this as time served and released 
Kreuzmann into West Germany. He returned to his family, who had fled to Westerdeistrich 
in the far north, and was able to reintegrate without any investigation into his past.
27
  
Kreuzmann and Sakuth’s experiences were typical for many of the members of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit who became refugees in the wake of 1945. For these perpetrators, 
the experience of the refugee combined loss with opportunity. Though forced out of their 
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homes, they encountered the Allies and denazification boards unencumbered. Their 
memberships in the Nazi party or SS could still result in sentencing by a denazification court, 
but the courts widely lacked the capacity to make serious and sustained inquiries into an 
individual’s wartime behavior. Many police records from cities in the east had been 
destroyed during the Nazi retreat, leaving few means for denazification authorities to 
disprove the stories these expellees told of their service. Meanwhile, because the widespread 
refugee crisis became transmuted into a fictive victimization status for many Germans, these 
perpetrators could take advantage of these misguided sympathies and fade into the ether of 
society.  
* * * 
Not all refugees in Germany were German, nor were all Einsatzkommando Tilsit 
members. One group eager to flee was those who had allied themselves with the Nazi 
occupiers. These willing locals provided the cooperation that so greatly facilitated the 
extermination of Jews in Eastern Europe. When Nazis entered foreign areas, they frequently 
lacked the linguistic tools and the cultural knowledge to identify and separate the Jewish 
inhabitants of a town. Volunteers readily emerged throughout the occupied Nazi empire to 
help in this task. Though rarely pro-Nazi, these individuals were typically stridently anti-
communist and anti-Semitic. Ardent believers in the myth of Judeo-Bolshevism, civilians 
throughout Eastern European communities became eager perpetrators of the Holocaust.  
Einsatzkommando Tilsit had relied on such auxiliaries and local support throughout 
its operations in the summer and fall of 1941. One of the most prominent collaborating 
Lithuanians volunteered not only himself but his police force to assist in the arrest and 
execution of Jewish civilians. Pranas Lukys took command of the Lithuanian secret police 
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force in the border town of Krottingen immediately after the German invasion in June 1941. 
The day after the Garsden execution, the newly formed Einsatzkommando Tilsit unit arrived 
in Krottingen for a similar execution. Lukys assisted in identifying the Jewish residents of the 
town. Over the coming months, Einsatzkommando Tilsit returned to Krottingen for five 
additional mass executions, and Lukys volunteered to assist on all but two occasions.
28
  
Lukys’ support for the Nazi genocide of Europe’s Jews stemmed from a complicated 
blend of Lithuanian nationalism, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism. In 1900, when Lukys 
was born, the state of Lithuania did not exist; its lands lay predominantly under Tsarist 
Russian control, with the exception of a small strip that included Memel belonging to the 
Germans. In the wake of World War I, these pieces were granted to the new Lithuanian state, 
which then fought a series of wars to preserve its independence from 1918 to 1920 against 
Poland and Russia. As a nineteen year old, Lukys was seized by the spirit of nationalism and 
joined the campaigns against the Poles and Russians. From 1926 to 1940, he headed the 
security police in Krottingen, until the Soviet invasion forced him to flee to German territory. 
Working in a labor camp near Tilsit, Lukys began to contact the Nazi authorities and made 
clear his interest in finding employment under the Third Reich. On June 21, 1941, he and a 
group of former Lithuanian police were picked up and driven to Memel. There, Nazi 
authorities informed them that war was imminent and that they would be appointed to replace 
the Soviet-backed Lithuanian police along the border. Two days later, Lukys found himself 
again at the helm of the Krottingen police, able to exact revenge for his exile on the 
communists and Jews he held responsible.
29
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Despite his willful participation in the murder of Jews and communists, Lukys was no 
Nazi ideologue. He cooperated with the Germans when they shared a common foe, but he 
remained a Lithuanian nationalist at heart and soon found himself on the opposite side of the 
Nazis. In December 1942, he and several others in the Lithuanian police were arrested by the 
Gestapo and imprisoned in Kowno. According to Lukys, this arrest stemmed from his 
participation in the Lithuanian underground movement. In 1944, he succeeded in escaping 
and fled with his family to Austria. After a month, he believed he saw an opportunity 
between the evacuation of the Germans and the occupation of the Soviets to return to 
Lithuania. His calculations were off, however, and he was again arrested by the Gestapo, this 
time in Memel. Once more, he escaped and this time fled Lithuania for good.
30
 
Because of his brutal leadership against the civilians of Krottingen, Lukys could not 
possibly hope to remain in Lithuania after the Red Army regained control. By 1944, he and 
his family became refugees and occasionally used the surname “Jakys.” By September 1945, 
they were living in a refugee camp in Augsburg, where Jakys began to work in a kitchen for 
the U.S. Army, a post he held for several years.
31
 Meanwhile, at a camp in Kempten, two 
former residents of Krottingen filed allegations that Lukys had been a brutal and sadistic 
police officer, but these statements did not lead to any investigation, likely a result of his 
name change.
32
 He and his wife separated in 1949, when she took the family to the United 
States, and Lukys opted to remain behind, only sporadically employed. Because he was not a 
German, Lukys never had to appear before a denazification panel.  
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The only questioning Lukys seems to have faced came in 1951, when he had to 
present materials to the International Refugee Organization. Created by the United Nations to 
facilitate and look after the many refugees of World War II (though significantly this did not 
include German refugees), the IRO could offer assistance to Lukys (he was again using his 
real name).
33
 Two statements, likely provided by Lukys as references, testified that he had 
been a good and proper officer. One wrote in stilted English:  
[Lukys] fought with criminals and communist bandits, who terrorized the peaceful 
people of Lithuania and set fire to their houses and destroyed their property. In the 
end of the year 1942 Mr. Lukys being provoked by the communists was arrested by 
the German ‘Gestapo’ and put into prison in Kaunas, from where he escaped in the 
summer 1944. I have to mention that Mr. Lukys fought his entire life with the 
communists and he is a great enemy of them.
34
 
 
This statement reveals how easily individuals could manipulate and frame the truth in 
postwar society. Technically, all aspects of the statements are true: Lukys hated communists, 
he was arrested by the Gestapo, and the Soviets had imposed a harsh occupation on 
Lithuanians. But the statement also obscures that his fights against “criminals and communist 
bandits” involved his voluntary participation in the executions of innocent civilians. His role 
as a perpetrator of the Holocaust could be reformulated in such a way as to make Lukys 
appear a model of anti-communism, a champion of the Cold War, and a victim of the Nazis.  
* * * 
Bernhard Fischer-Schweder spent the last days of war in a military hospital 
recovering from a shrapnel wound.
35
 During those days of recovery he began to consider for 
the first time in twenty years his future without Nazism. For a Nazi and SS officer as deeply 
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implicated in the Third Reich and its crimes as Fischer-Schweder, he had good reasons to 
fear this regime change. As early as 1925, he had joined the SA – the brute security force for 
the nascent Nazi party.
36
 Four years later, he joined the party. With his early membership, 
Fischer-Schweder was considered an “old fighter” (alter Kämpfer), someone attracted to the 
party early on when it was little more than a thuggish movement of anti-Semites and 
Versailles revisionists. Because of his standing in the SA, Fischer-Schweder was taken into 
“protective custody” by the SS in 1934 during the Röhm purge, which Hitler – under 
pressure from the military as well as Göring and Himmler – had reluctantly ordered, thereby 
eliminating their rivals and decapitating the leadership of the SA. After nearly three months, 
according to Gestapo reports, Fischer-Schweder was released because “proof of his 
participation in the Röhm revolt could not be found.” 37 Incarceration did little to dim his 
enthusiasm for Nazism, however, and in 1941 he was promoted to Police Director in Memel, 
which carried with it SS membership. He remained in the SS thereafter, though he was 
reassigned after 1942 and served in various Panzer divisions of the Waffen-SS until the 
injuries he sustained in the closing months of the war. Now, confronting a political present 
deeply hostile to his violent past, this old fighter decided to create himself anew. 
He interpreted postwar society as many others had: as a blank slate. The German 
Stunde Null (zero hour) became an immediate and convenient narrative of rupture after 1945. 
Evidence for this view dominated the scene. The presence of so many men being held in 
captivity while women were forced to clear the debris of war – giving rise to the popular 
postwar image of the Trümmerfrau (woman of the rubble) – fueled a sense of society in 
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chaos, its traditional gender roles inverted.
38
 Moreover, the leveling of the urban landscape 
engendered a belief that the past itself had been erased. The novelty of the concept also 
served a political end: if Germany was separated from its past, then it might be possible to 
bracket off the Nazi era and move forward. Politicians were not the only ones who found the 
notion of total rupture a useful palliative; many Germans with a past to conceal also seized 
upon the convenient caesura.  
Although scars and impaired mobility from his injury became a constant reminder of 
wartime experience, Fischer-Schweder quickly set about erasing other markings of his life 
before 1945, embracing his own version of the Stunde Null.
39
 First, he had to find a way to 
clear denazification. After recovering from his wounds, Fischer-Schweder was automatically 
interned in an American POW camp in Bavaria. The massive organizational efforts that 
denazification required meant that individuals were largely trusted to answer forms honestly 
regarding their past associations with the Nazi regime; little bureaucratic slack existed for 
investigating and exposing deceit.
40
 For many former SS officers and prominent Nazis, 
submitting an incomplete or inaccurate form therefore offered the best chance of avoiding an 
extended stay in an Allied camp.
41
 Fischer-Schweder chose this route. He fabricated a new 
identity, listing his name as Bernd Fischer and his birth date as February 13, 1904, instead of 
January 12, 1904. As for his wartime activities, he noted his career in the civil service and 
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stated that he became Police Director in Memel in 1941, absent any mention of his 
membership and accompanying promotions within the ranks of the SS. On March 5, 1946, 
the Spruchkammer (denazification court) in Bad Neustadt, a town in southwest Germany not 
far from Ulm, declared him to be “unaffected” by Nazism.42 He rejoined society. 
 Though his calculated change in name and birth date helped him avoid extended time 
in a denazification camp, it also forced him to start his career over after the war. Because of 
his desire to avoid the spotlight and because the Allies had purged the civil service of former 
Nazis, Fischer-Schweder found himself in a double bind. As a result, he aimed low. For the 
initial postwar years, Bernhard Fischer-Schweder worked a series of odd jobs as Bernd 
Fischer. He began first as a clerk in Bad Neustadt and after 1948 as a salesman.
43
 Though he 
likely found sales less desirable than police work, the position was stable and out of the 
public eye. 
Professionally reborn, Fischer-Schweder also created a new personal life for himself 
in the postwar era. While recovering in the military hospital, he had stopped communicating 
with his wife, and she learned his whereabouts only by chance.
44
 Though married since 1935, 
he divorced shortly after the war. Within months, he remarried, and the couple soon had a 
child.
45
 The new family settled in southwest Germany, far from the eastern Prussian cities 
where Fischer-Schweder had spent his life before 1945. 
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By the end of the 1940s, Fischer-Schweder’s metamorphosis was complete. He had 
been able to start over in a new city with a new name, new career, and new family. This 
reintegration path suggests that early on he believed his past could destroy his postwar life. 
Although denazification authorities hardly had the capacity to uncover his past on their own, 
Fischer-Schweder’s decisions to deceive them, divorce his spouse, and relocate across 
Germany indicate that he nevertheless feared such an investigation. Confronted with what he 
perceived as a direct threat, Fischer-Schweder fled his past.  
* * * 
Despite the headache of denazification, most members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit 
confronted it head on and found that they were able to navigate the process with few 
repercussions. The entire practice became so flawed and riddled with loopholes that 
extensive contortions – passing as a farmer, changing one’s name – were unnecessary for the 
majority. The Allies initially pursued denazification with great zeal, but by 1946 other 
priorities loomed and the management of denazification transferred from the Allies to the 
Germans themselves. This shift mirrored a transition among the Western powers from 
concern over the Nazi past to the Soviet east. As Germans began to take the lead in the 
panels, they sought to avoid divisive politics. As a result, denazification quickly deteriorated 
into a system of rubber stamping.  
The Spruchkammer were expected to classify individuals in one of five categories of 
involvement in the Nazi regime. Over the next few years, the bottom two categories of least 
involvement swelled, and nearly sixty percent of all those who underwent denazification 
were placed in these categories.
46
 Barring any overt evidence implying deeper involvement 
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in the state or its crimes, the Spruchkammer forewent extensive investigations, imposed a 
minor fine on some, and released the vast majority out into society. The entire process 
became a cynical form of theater for many Germans, who referred to the exoneration 
certificates as Persilscheine, which might be translated as “Clorox cards,” indicating that the 
court had whitewashed their Nazi past.  
  The unfortunately named Harm Harms made extensive efforts to receive his 
Persilschein from the Spruchkammer in Bremen. He first encountered the denazification 
board in 1948 after having spent the previous three years in various prisoner of war and 
denazification camps. His uncertain circumstances began in September 1944. That month, 
Harms had been forced to leave Tilsit in East Prussia as part of a general evacuation.
47
 Since 
1939, with the exception of a failed one-month assignment in Lyons, Harms and his family 
had lived in Tilsit, where he had worked in the Grenzpolizeikommissariat as a Kriminal 
Kommissar. Upon their evacuation, Harms and his wife moved in with their daughter in 
Potsdam, where they remained until 1945. By the end of the war, they had resettled at the 
home of his mother-in-law in Bremen, and he succeeded briefly in finding work at a Focke-
Wulf plant. On June 22, 1945, the American Counter Intelligence Corps arrested Harms in 
Bremen because he had been a member of the Gestapo in the 1930s, and he was sent to the 
Bremen Civilian Internment Center.
48
 Over the next three years, Harms spent time in camps 
throughout the western occupation zones. By 1948, he had arrived at a camp in Riespot, 
where he finally came before the denazification tribunal. 
                                                 
47
 Arrest report (22 June 1945), EL 322/II, Bü 124, SL. 
 
48
 Detention Report (22 June 1945), EL 322/II, Bü 124, SL. 
 
67 
 
 The camp years had taken a physical toll on Harms. Born in 1892, he was only in his 
fifties, yet his body suffered beyond those years. His long and increasingly haggard pale face 
was framed by a pair of elfin ears and brown hair that quickly thinned and grayed. Heavy 
bags formed under his blue eyes, and poor diet had left him with a full set of false teeth. To 
maintain some income at the camp, he worked first as a mason, before turning to a less 
physically demanding job as a shoemaker.
49
 Over the long, lean years in the camp, he lost 
over twenty pounds, and by 1948 Harms was a small and frail fifty-five year old.
50
 The 
experience of internment, as he explained, “left me physically weakened after 38 months.”51 
 As a result of his experiences in the camps, Harms seized on his denazification trial as 
an opportunity to regain his freedom. Certain facts of his background were beyond dispute. 
He had finished his education at fourteen and worked for several years as a hotel porter 
before joining the military in 1912. After his service in World War I, he enlisted in the 
Freikorps unit Märker, which operated in the north.
52
 In 1933, Harms joined the Nazi Party 
and applied for membership in the SS in 1939, though he was denied for failing to provide 
sufficient evidence of Aryan ancestry.
53
 According to the Hamburg police department, 
Harms had begun work in the city’s Schutzpolizei in 1919.54 In 1934, he moved from the 
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Kriminalpolizei to the Staatspolizei, where he oversaw political affairs. While in Hamburg, 
his unit was taken over by the Gestapo in 1937. His desire to return to the criminal detective 
branch led to his ultimate transfer to Tilsit in 1939. This combination of party and SS 
membership and time served in the Gestapo formed the core of the case against him. It was a 
question of what he did during those years in the police under the Third Reich that would 
determine how the denazification panel would categorize him and what additional sentencing 
he might face.  
With three years to prepare, Harms had solidified his defense. First, he explained that 
his membership in the Nazi party and other illegal organizations resulted from career 
necessity. Although a member of the SPD until 1933, Harms claimed that the Nazi takeover 
left him “in a particularly bad economic situation.”55 As a result, “I tried to keep my position 
[in the police] at any cost in the interest of my family, since I had three children.” Despite his 
membership in the party, he insisted that his background membership in the SPD continued 
to hinder his career advancement under the Third Reich. Regarding his work in the police, he 
insisted on numerous occasions that he had been involved only in “purely criminal cases (i.e. 
murder, theft, rape)” and that he “had nothing to do with Jews as racial enemies.”56 “There is 
no one in the world,” Harms stated, “to whom I have done wrong.”57 Echoing his own 
claims, he offered statements from friends and colleagues who had known him “since 
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childhood,” who all signed a statement claiming that “we would never consider him capable 
of a crime, or even of misconduct.”58  
Through this defense, Harms presented himself to the denazification authorities as a 
simple man who wanted little more than to care for his family and serve his country. An 
ideological opponent of the Nazi regime, he worked as a policeman to maintain peace and to 
combat violent crime. As he concluded in his statement: 
As a refugee from the east, I have lost everything. My wife has to eke out a living as a 
lowly cleaning lady. My oldest son is dead, my second is missing, and my daughter’s 
husband left her with two small children. My nine-year-old son shares the fate of my 
wife. Why should my family suffer so much grief and sorrow? For three years now I 
have been detained. I have always been fair to everyone, have never voted for a Nazi, 
and have only tried to do my duty as a civil servant. I am now fifty-six years old and 
my wife fifty-one. In the few years that I have left to live, I would like to care for my 
family and help in the rebuilding of our so badly ailing country.
59
 
 
Here was a man who tried to pluck as many notes of sympathy as possible: a refugee from 
the east, a former civil servant who did no harm to anyone, a husband unable to care for his 
wife, a father who had lost children to the war, and a tired old man who wanted nothing more 
than to go home and live out his remaining years in peace and service to his country. The 
extraordinarily self-pitying nature of his defense created the image of a man broken and 
emasculated from the experiences of war and internment, an individual more victim than 
perpetrator. 
 In preparing its decision, the Spruchkammer had to categorize Harms under one of 
five possibilities. These categories, established by the Allies in March 1946 under the Law 
for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism (Befreiungsgesetz), presented a 
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spectrum of involvment in the Nazi regime.
60
 From most implicated in the state to least, these 
categories were: I. major offender (Hauptschuldiger); II. activist, militarist, and/or profiteer 
(Aktivist, Militarist, Nutzniesser); III. lesser offender (Minderbelasteter); IV. nominal 
follower (Mitläufer); and V. exonerated person (Entlasteter). The first four classifications 
carried corresponding recommended punishment, ranging from extended imprisonment and 
loss of voting rights for the major offenders to fines against nominal followers. 
 Upon reviewing the materials against and in defense of Harms, the investigator 
concluded that no extensive investigations into him were needed.
61
 On October 18, 1948, the 
denazification board in Bremen ruled that Harms had been a Mitläufer in the Nazi 
movement.
62
 Being categorized as a nominal follower was likely the most positive outcome 
for Harms, given his party membership and Gestapo background. Typically such a judgment 
would result in a fine or additional sentencing for the defendant, but in this instance the court 
decided to forego any such punishments “in consideration of the fact that the person 
concerned was interned for thirty-eight months and has lost everything as a displaced 
person.” 
 Harms now had his Persilschein, though his experience with denazification 
surprisingly did not end here. For most perpetrators, it did. Those who made it through 
denazification could disappear back into German life. Yet for Harms, the denazification 
result was unsatisfying.  
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 “I hereby file an appeal,” Harms wrote in a handwritten letter to the Spruchkammer in 
November, “against the decision from October 18, 1948.”63 His appeal requested a re-
categorization from nominal follower to exonerated person status. Though Harms did not 
contest the charges regarding his membership in the Nazi Party or SS, he argued that these 
memberships obscured a persistent internal opposition to fascism. Most significantly, he 
insisted, “I actively resisted the National Socialistic tyranny to the extent of my powers and 
thereby suffered disadvantages.” This was not the casual wording of a camp shoemaker, but 
the deliberate statement of a skilled detective. In order for Harms to win his appeal, he 
needed to demonstrate that he met the strict definition laid out under the denazification law 
for an exonerated person. According to Article 13 of the Befreiungsgesetz, exonerated 
persons were those who “in spite of their formal membership, candidacy or other external 
indications, not only showed a passive attitude but also actively resisted the National 
Socialistic tyranny to the extent of their powers and thereby suffered disadvantages [author’s 
emphasis].”64 His appeal invoked the identical language of the law. 
  To support his claim, Harms offered anecdotes of resistance and suffering. A central 
story involved his brief encounter with the wife of Ernst Thälmann, the one-time leader of 
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Thälmann’s wife, Rosa, was arrested and brought 
into the Hamburg police station on Göring’s orders in 1937. Supposedly Harms had been 
present upon her arrival, and he made her coffee and arranged for her to be dropped back off 
at her home. These gestures earned him a sharp rebuke from his superiors. Thereafter, Harms 
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was denied the promotion he desired. He explained, “I was considered too soft and remained 
an inner Marxist. They transferred me to Tilsit on February 1, 1939. I had to leave behind my 
nice house and my nice garden plot, which I had had since 1930.” Harms’ resistance took the 
form of preparing coffee, and the punishment he faced involved career stasis and relocation 
(though in the process of relocating to Tilsit, he was promoted). He concluded his appeal 
with a swipe at the new state’s legitimacy, “My entire life I have acted justly, and I cannot 
and will not accept that on account of this I should be condemned by a democratically-
governed state.”  
 In early June, nearly eight months after Harms’ initial appeal, the prosecutor called on 
the Spruchkammer to uphold its categorization of Harms as a Mitläufer “because the person 
concerned has not fulfilled the conditions for the application of Article 13.”65 Two weeks 
later, the Spruchkammer agreed and rejected Harms’ appeal. The court found that while he 
may not have joined the Gestapo eagerly and that his work there was likely “not involved 
with the pursuit of political opponents of the Nazi regime,” Harms was “not so uninvolved 
(entlastet) that he can be categorized as an Entlasteter.”66 His claims of active resistance were 
unsubstantiated and, in their mind, constituted “only the mere completion of professional 
duties.” Harms now had to pay the additional costs of his failed appeal. 
 Harms had explicitly seized on the language of victim in postwar society to defend 
his case, but although he struck the right tone, he seems to have played the wrong notes. In 
his attempt to come across as an anti-fascist who had suffered for his beliefs, he portrayed 
himself as a pro-communist “inner Marxist,” which was unlikely to earn him the sympathies 
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of a West German denazification panel. Ernst Thälmann, the man whose wife Harms claimed 
to have saved, had become a martyr for the East Germans. Already they were making plans 
for a new Thälmann memorial bridge across the Elbe in Schönebeck. Meanwhile, in the west, 
Thälmann was seen as a destructive force, a man whose attacks on the SPD during the 
Weimar years had paved the way for Hitler’s ascendancy. Harms’ decision to tie himself to 
this hero of the communist east therefore had an opposite effect than intended, as he 
ostracized himself from the denazification panel. 
* * * 
 The years immediately after 1945 were characterized by extremes. On one hand, 
flawed denazification policies allowed huge swaths of potential Nazi criminals to avoid 
prosecution. On the other hand, the years from 1945-1949 saw the most intense period of 
prosecution for Nazi crimes. Besides the prominent International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg and the successor trials, a significant number of Nazi crimes cases were taking 
place at this time before German courts in the western zones. To some extent, who was and 
was not prosecuted contained an element of chance. A particularly clever and manipulative 
perpetrator or an eager and resourceful Spruchkammer could sway whether or not an 
investigation occurred. A more significant factor in determining postwar prosecutions 
stemmed from the crimes perpetrated. Allies limited German jurisdiction to crimes commit 
against Germans, which meant that crimes against Lithuanian Jews could not be prosecuted 
in West German courts. As a result, postwar prosecutions focused overwhelmingly on crimes 
in concentration camps, at high levels of government, within the military, and inside German 
borders.
67
 This proved fortuitous for the Einsatzkommando Tilsit members, as the few 
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investigations into Einsatzgruppen tended to focus chiefly on high-ranking officials. The 
prosecutions up to 1949 constituted a remarkable flurry of judicial activity, but they left huge 
swaths of crimes unexplored.  
 The first Nazi crimes trial took place in Lüneburg, just miles from where Böhme was 
tilling soil in the fields. Because this area had provided bedrock support for Nazism, the 
Allies made a point of hosting a prominent trial there. The case, prosecuted by the British, 
began in September 1945 and tried forty-nine officers from the Bergen-Belsen concentration 
camp for various war crimes and crimes against humanity.
68
 The camp was already central to 
Allied denazification efforts, as they began to show the documentary Death Mills throughout 
the occupied zones, which consisted of gruesome footage from the camp’s liberation. While 
some Germans, particularly in northern Germany, looked at the film and trial as instances of 
Greuelpropaganda (atrocity propaganda) and victor’s justice, the majority registered general 
apathy towards the prosecutions. This apathy turned to fatigue during the more intensive and 
far more public International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that started later in 1945. These 
proceedings against the Nazi elite dwarfed the case in Lüneburg and captured the media 
attention of the world. Nevertheless, most West Germans met the constant inundation of 
reportage on the trials with declining interest.
69
 This early after the war, most Germans found 
themselves too engaged in more immediate problems such as rebuilding their homes and 
securing food for their families to seriously engage in these trials as a reeducation effort, as 
the Allies had hoped.
70
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What most Germans were willing to accept about these trials was a certain portrait of 
Nazi criminality that focused on the elites. By the end of the Bergen-Belsen case, the 
Nuremberg proceedings, and its subsequent trials of other perpetrator groups, it became clear 
that the Allies were chiefly interested in prosecuting senior officials in the Nazi state and 
those who ran concentration camps. One prominent trial of the leadership of the 
Einsatzgruppen did take place under the Allied prosecutions from 1947-48, yet this resulted 
in a skewed perspective of these units and their role in the Holocaust.
71
 The Allies relied 
extensively on wartime reports from the Einsatzgruppen leadership, which created the 
impression that this was a fundamentally top heavy organization. The importance of 
improvisational on-the-ground decision-making of units like Einsatzkommando Tilsit did not 
appear during the trial. To the extent that the initial postwar period drew attention to the 
open-air mass executions of the Holocaust, it also closed off further discussion by purporting 
to have dealt conclusively with those most responsible. 
This is not to say, however, that all members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit avoided 
postwar prosecution. Most members of the Einsatzkommando had rotated in and out, usually 
involved for only a matter of months. They had many years and many other posts within the 
Nazi regime to commit other acts of criminality and atrocity. When it came to avoiding 
postwar prosecution at the hands of the Allies, these perpetrators were often more concerned 
about concealing criminal behavior on either side of their participation in massacres in 1941 
Lithuania. Such was the case for Werner Hersmann, the former leader of SD Tilsit and the 
most senior officer behind Böhme in the Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders.   
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While most Tilsit members avoided prosecution for over a decade, Hersmann’s 
postwar was defined by a litany of interrogations and investigations. Born in Duisburg in 
1904, Hersmann’s early years were marked by the instability and listlessness characteristic of 
many young men’s lives in Weimar.72 By 1930, he was unemployed after a string of 
positions in various factories and as a film theater operator Frankfurt. National Socialism 
offered him solutions and purpose. He joined the party in 1930 and the SS a year later.
73
 
Well-regarded by his seniors, Hersmann began a successful career in the Nazi state.
74
 By 
1941, he transferred from a position as SD head in Weimar to Tilsit. After his leadership in 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit, Hersmann transferred again in May 1942 to Einsatzgruppe D and 
later that year assumed control of Einsatzkommando 11a. Wounded in 1943, he worked 
briefly at the RSHA in Berlin, before returning to the field in various SS units at the close of 
war. His career in the service of the Nazi state thus spanned numerous criminal 
organizations. The prominent role Hersmann played in so many organizations during the war 
made it very difficult for him to hide after.  
Having committed so many crimes, it is important to consider why Hersmann had not 
attempted a reintegration strategy of concealment, as Böhme and Fischer-Schweder – and to 
a lesser extent, Harms – had done. Those men were opportunists, willing to sell out their 
pasts to save their future. Hersmann was cut from a different cloth and belonged to a group of 
committed and fanatic Nazi ideologues. He did not conceal his past because he believed in 
his actions. He rejected the authority of the Allies and postwar state to pass judgment on his 
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actions. He did not claim to have acted against his will in carrying out massacres or 
suppressing local populations because he acted of his own volition and because the desires of 
the state mirrored his own personal convictions. Rather than lead him to abandon all 
commitment to Hitler’s fascism, the postwar conditions Hersmann confronted hardened his 
beliefs. As a result, in an era when many found it easy to disappear into the wilds of postwar 
society, Hersmann was conspicuous, as he faced interrogations concerning three separate sets 
of war crimes in the postwar decade.  
His first run-in with investigators came in late June 1947, when U.S. investigators 
representing the Office of Chief of Council for War Crimes (OCCWC) interrogated him for 
two days at the Darmstadt camp where he was being held since the end of the war.
75
 
Beginning in 1946, the OCCWC began to carry out investigations for subsequent trials of 
other major crimes not being prosecuted in the main Nuremberg trial.
76
 For their 
investigation into the pending trial of Einsatzgruppen leadership, they interviewed hundreds 
of former officers and members of the Einsatzgruppen, but limited the prosecution to just 
twenty-two.
77
 Hersmann was interrogated on account of his role as head of 
Einsatzkommando 11a, but he had only served in this unit in 1943 and the trial focused 
chiefly on crimes from 1941-1942. As a result, Hersmann was interrogated just once and his 
role in Einsatzkommando Tilsit never surfaced. 
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His respite was short lived. In 1949, he was again arrested, this time on the orders of a 
West German court.
78
 While the Allies were pursuing high level officers in the Nazi state, 
German courts had also begun to prosecute their own Nazi crimes cases. Constrained by the 
Allies in their jurisdiction, German prosecutors at this time could only pursue crimes 
committed on German soil.
79
 Since very little of the Holocaust took place within Germany, 
this meant that a very different set of crimes took precedence in the German judiciary. Many 
cases involved denunciation, euthanasia, or the destruction of property during Kristallnacht. 
One important set of crimes open to German courts were the so-called Endphase crimes, 
which involved German violence against other Germans during the last desperate days of 
war.
80
 It was for one such incident that the Traunstein prosecutor arrested Hersmann. 
On April 28, 1945, during the very last days of the Third Reich, citizens in the 
Bavarian town of Altötting attempted to overthrow the local Nazi force, liberate the city, and 
thereby stave off its destruction at the hands of the quickly advancing U.S. Army.
81
 Early that 
morning a message had gone out on the radio declaring the “Freedom Action of Bavaria,” a 
well-intentioned but futile plan to demonstrate to the Allies that not all Germans were 
Nazis.
82
 The call inspired the Altötting district administrator (Landrat) and several associates 
to arrest six prominent Nazis, including the town’s mayor. By the early afternoon, word of 
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the arrests had spread to a group of Nazi officers in the area. They took immediate control of 
the situation and released their comrades. The Kreisleiter then identified those responsible, 
and by two o’clock that afternoon five resisters had been arrested. By this point, an SS unit 
led by Hersmann had arrived on the scene. A hasty show trial immediately declared all five 
guilty. Hersmann selected a shooting squad from his SS troops, which summarily executed 
the citizens. The resisters were dead before nightfall. American troops liberated the city three 
days later.  
Hersmann and Olaf Sigismund, another SS officer on the scene that day, were put on 
trial for their participation in the Altötting murders in the nearby city Traunstein in 1950.
83
 
Because these crimes occurred publicly, because they took place so close to the end of the 
war, and above all because German civilians were the victim group, the Altötting murders 
became an important target for postwar prosecutors. Cases like these were relatively easy to 
investigate and prosecute, given the many witnesses and often close familiarity with units 
stationed in one’s town. But they also reverberated with themes that Germans wished to 
believe about themselves after 1945: that many had wanted to resist, that to resist would have 
meant certain death, and that now that the Nazis were gone a system of democracy and 
justice could again flourish. These factors suggest why – of all the atrocities he saw and 
participated in prior to 1945 – Hersmann was tried first for the murder of five Germans, 
nearly a decade before his trial for the murder of five thousand Lithuanian Jews.  
The Traunstein trial of Hersmann resulted in an eight-year conviction. These murders 
had so clearly originated from Nazi fanaticism that there could have been little doubt about 
the verdict. In explaining the decision, the judge wrote, “Neither the defendant Hersmann nor 
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the defendant Sigismund can claim to have been carried away by a conflict of duty or 
influenced by threat or force into committing these crimes.”84 The two men “had merely been 
given the order to break the ongoing resistance in Altötting during the Freedom Action 
Bavaria.” As a result, “The two defendants were in position to make their own decision about 
the fate of the arrested Altötting citizens.” Because he had authorized the murders, Hersmann 
now faced imprisonment for the next eight years in Traunstein. In 1952, while still in prison, 
his case went before a denazification panel. Based on his deep involvement in the Nazi 
regime and his recent conviction, he was unsurprisingly deemed a class one “major 
offender,” and additional sentencing was retroactively added on to be served concurrently 
with his Traunstein sentence.  
 
A New Germany 
 After the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949, many in politics 
and society readied to declare the postwar era over. Between denazification and the 
Nuremberg trials, most prominent Nazis had been captured and tried. Since the currency 
reforms the year earlier, the economy rumbled with activity. Tensions between east and west 
roiled since the Berlin blockade. The years immediately after 1945 had been marked by 
chaotic demographics, uncertain political realities, and economic privation. Now, most West 
Germans eagerly turned away from those years and sought stability under the new republic. 
For many, the needs of the present and concerns of the future trumped the problems of the 
past.
85
 For many former Nazis, this shift of priorities created favorable conditions for their 
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reintegration. Many had spent the initial postwar years defensively trying to ward off 
inquiries into their past, but now real opportunities existed and the threat of investigation 
never seemed less than in the early 1950s.  
To the extent that West Germans continued to worry about lingering problems from 
the Nazi era they focused on the continued plight of the POWs who remained in Soviet 
custody. Already by 1950, over one million had returned, but an estimated 34,000 still sat in 
Soviet camps.
86
 A major foreign policy aim of the Adenauer government was to bring these 
POWs home, a mission not accomplished until 1955. Because of their continued captivity, 
these POWs became inflected with the moral purpose of the Cold War and embodied the 
emerging narrative of multiple German victimizations.
87
 Since the cessation of Allied trials, 
the knee-jerk victim status many Germans claimed softened, as a desire to find a “usable 
past” emerged.88 Such views often incorporated narratives of rebirth, and the continued 
captivity of many Germans signified the inability to move forward. The POWs became the 
counterpoint to the refugees and expellees: millions of refugees had been forced out of the 
east, and now thousands were being held captive within it. In order to set West Germany on 
its proper course, the POWs needed to be returned.  
As they began to be released from the camps during the early 1950s, these 
Heimkehrer (returnees) were quickly cast as the new ideal German citizen. They had suffered 
at the hands of both Hitler and Stalin, and one could build a strong house of democracy with 
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these post-totalitarian men as its pillars.
89
 They also spoke to a sense of rupture within 
German family life: with men imprisoned and women forced to provide for the families, 
traditional gender roles had been upturned. The POWs in the east became the symbolic 
missing piece of the puzzle – with their return, so too would West Germany return to an 
imagined normalcy. With such a status, the Heimkehrer quickly became politicized. The SPD 
first attempted to woo their vote, putting forward several pieces of legislation to provide 
economic assistance to these POWs from the east. Not wanting to oppose the new model 
German man, the other political groups fell in line, and the Heimkehrergesetz (Law for the 
Returnees) passed in 1950, awarding 100DM per month to the returnees.
90
 Despite the hopes 
and ambitions projected onto the Heimkehrer, a 1957 study revealed that, as a group, the 
returnees were more authoritarian, less liberal, and less democratic than the majority of 
German citizens.
91
 Moreover, a tension emerged regarding the few thousand still in the east 
after 1950. Although West Germans saw them increasingly as victims, in many cases these 
individuals remained in Soviet custody because they were war criminals and the most die-
hard, ideologically committed Nazis.
92
 
 Werner Schmidt-Hammer was not among these fanatical Nazis, but as a Heimkehrer 
he benefitted from the policies and status afforded to the late returnees of World War II. 
Since the end of the war, Schmidt-Hammer had been a POW in Tito’s Yugoslavia. The 
thirty-eight year old Schmidt-Hammer spent six weeks on a “starvation diet” in Ljubljana 
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before being transferred to a work detail in Belgrade in 1945.
93
 For over two years he 
remained there until being sent to another camp in Zrenjanin, Serbia. He described these as 
“hopeless, agonizing years.”94 “I fell deeper and deeper into total despair,” he later wrote, “I 
was totally broken mentally.” This description of his experiences, offered several years later 
in the 1950s, perfectly captured the expectations of suffering that many West Germans held 
for the Heimkehrer. In 1948, Tito famously broke with Stalin, and several months later with 
no reason given Schmidt-Hammer was released from his Yugoslavian captivity. Finally able 
to return to Germany, he arrived just as the constitution of the Federal Republic was being 
drafted. 
 Ten years earlier on the eve of war with Poland, little in Schmidt-Hammer’s life 
indicated the odyssey that would take him from his family, transform him into a perpetrator 
of the Holocaust, then leave him marooned in a Yugoslavian prison through the 1940s. Born 
to a pharmacist in East Prussia in 1907, Schmidt-Hammer moved at the age of six to his 
uncle’s home in Breslau in order to pursue higher education. “By family tradition,” he 
admitted, “I was attuned to nationalism. Inspired by appropriate readings and historical 
teachings, I admired the old Prussian kings; they remained a model of duty to me, their 
soldiers a model of discipline and obedience.”95 German children were fed a steady diet of 
Prussian king worship, but this would not make him an obvious disciple of Hitler. Whatever 
his boyhood notions of duty, he devoted himself to the study of optometry, and during the 
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early 1930s he worked at the large optics firm Carl Zeiss in Jena. Beginning in 1936, he ran 
his own practice in Königsberg, until drafted into the police in 1939.  
Having avoided joining the Wehrmacht, Schmidt-Hammer took a number of police 
officer training courses. Between 1939 and 1941 he held various posts “guarding military 
areas and important buildings” in the Königsberg Schutzpolizei, was transferred late in 1940 
to Tilsit, and by 1941 had been appointed lieutenant and adjutant to the head of a Kommando 
of the Schutzpolizei in Memel.
96
 In this position, he was asked to head the shooting squad on 
the day of the Garsden executions. Schmidt-Hammer led his troop of Memel policemen out 
into the fields, where he issued the firing orders for the murder of the Jewish men there. 
Schmidt-Hammer remained in Memel until 1943, at which point he transferred to Yugoslavia 
in a volunteer police battalion (Polizeifreiwilligenbataillon), which consisted of Yugoslavian 
collaborators headed by German officers and non-commissioned officers, such as Schmidt-
Hammer. Throughout his entire career, Schmidt-Hammer never joined the Nazi Party, even 
though this was the career expectation for an officer. In 1941, his superior granted him an 
exemption from an order requiring that all Memel officers join the SS.
97
 
When Schmidt-Hammer was finally released from his postwar internment, he, like 
many members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, had no home to which he could return. All the 
German cities he had once called home – Elbing, Breslau, Königsberg, Tilsit, and Memel – 
were no longer German. In 1944, his family fled Memel for Rendsburg in northern Germany 
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as part of a general evacuation.
98
 Schmidt-Hammer had not seen his wife and children since. 
Upon his release from Yugoslavia, Schmidt-Hammer later wrote: 
I returned to my family haggard and broken – without joy, without hope of being able 
to return to a normal life. Nothing experienced at the start of the war with Russia has 
been forgotten; now and forever it is a heavy burden for me to bear. But then I had a 
thought: as much as humanly possible, the hardship I have experienced has balanced 
out the suffering which arose due to my role implementing the execution orders.
99
 
 
Casting himself as a latter-day Odysseus forced to endure an endless litany of trials in 
penance for his sins, Schmidt-Hammer created a narrative of atonement. If anything, he felt 
his punishment had exceeded his crimes, and now the mistakes of 1941 would haunt him 
endlessly. 
Despite his self-pity, upon his return to Germany, Schmidt-Hammer faced fewer 
obstacles than most. As a Heimkehrer with no Nazi membership, he faced no difficulties with 
denazification and was immediately exonerated. While many struggled to find employment, 
Schmidt-Hammer returned to his old position. Carl Zeiss, the optics firm where he had once 
worked in Jena, had opened a new plant in the west and offered Schmidt-Hammer a position. 
By late 1949, he relocated the family to Aalen and had begun working as he had before the 
war, under the same name, with the same wife and family, and with the full blessing of the 
law as an optometrist. For Schmidt-Hammer, the postwar experience in Yugoslavia may have 
been difficult and memories of atrocity perhaps did weigh on his conscience, but his time as 
a POW abroad also expedited his reintegration into West Germany, and his role in 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit had left no paper trail. Instead, he was a policeman who refused the 
Nazi party, a refugee from the east, a late Heimkehrer, a man who wanted little more than his 
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family and old life back – he was the embodiment of the new West German male. Because 
Schmidt-Hammer was all these things, no one worried whether he might not also have been a 
Holocaust perpetrator. 
* * * 
The passage of the Basic Law in 1949 creating the West German state carried with it 
an important though at the time not fully developed amendment concerning members of the 
civil service who lost their positions after 1945. Many had been categorically purged by the 
Allies, while others as refugees had lost the cities in which they had worked. In determining 
how best to deal with these individuals, the drafters of the constitution included Article 131, 
which stated: 
The legal relations of persons, including refugees and expellees, who on 8 May 1945 
were employed in the public service, have left the service for reasons other than those 
recognized by civil service regulations or collective bargaining agreements, and have 
not yet been reinstated or are employed in positions that do not correspond to those 
they previously held, shall be regulated by a federal law. The same shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to persons, including refugees and expellees, who on 8 May 1945 were 
entitled to pensions and related benefits and who for reasons other than those 
recognized by civil service regulations or collective bargaining agreements no longer 
receive any such pension or related benefits. Until the pertinent federal law takes 
effect, no legal claims may be made, unless state (Land) law otherwise provides.
100
  
 
This amendment solved little, but established that the federal government would, at a later 
date, enact a law dealing with the problem of civil servants. In the interim, local governments 
could make their own choices about what to do about the hiring and pensioning of these 
individuals. 
 Harm Harms decided not to wait for the Bonn government to solve the 131 problem 
and pressed the local Bremen authorities to take action on his behalf. Since his failed attempt 
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at exoneration by the Spruchkammer, Harms had spent the year working as a shoemaker in 
Bremen. He was the oldest of the Einsatzkommando Tilsit officers, and as a result his 
postwar career options were particularly narrowed. He found hope in Article 131. Now at 
retirement age and with twenty years police experience, Harms decided to apply for his 
pension. On October 3, 1950, Harms completed the necessary Article 131 paperwork with 
the Bremen Senate Commission for Human Resources. In listing his career in the civil 
service, Harms noted his long tenure in the police, but carefully omitted any mention of his 
time in the Hamburg Gestapo.
101
 
 Unlike his attempts at defrauding the denazification authorities, Harms’ efforts to 
receive a pension under the as-yet unclear terms of Article 131 proved successful. In April 
1951, Harms began to collect monthly pension checks valued at over 100 DM. Over the next 
several years, the Holocaust perpetrator, masquerading as a simple, old police officer earned 
8,624 DM from the Federal Republic.
102
 Though not a fortune, the pension along with his 
continued work as a shoemaker allowed Harms to find peace and stability in postwar West 
Germany. Despite constantly putting himself in front of various government authorities, 
neither had Harms found himself the subject of any investigation, nor had his participation in 
mass killings in Lithuania ever once come to light.  
* * * 
In May 1951, the Federal Republic of Germany passed the long-awaited law 
promised under Article 131. The delay stemmed from an extensive research campaign to 
look into the full scope of the problem: just how many West Germans might be eligible for 
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reinstatement to the civil service? This question had to take into account the huge numbers of 
refugees and expellees from the east, as well as the results of the denazification panels. Based 
on the government’s report, any decision on Article 131 could affect up to 430,000 West 
Germans (345,000 still of working age and 85,000 pensioners), though these estimates 
proved quite conservative.
103
 At the time, the Federal Republic already had one of the most 
extensive bureaucracies among modern states, with 2.1 million – nearly one out of every ten 
West Germans – working in the civil service. Article 131 raised the possibility of having to 
add nearly 20 percent more employees or pensioners to the swollen civil service.
104
 
Although a fiscal problem, this was also a political opportunity. No party wanted to 
alienate itself from such a number of voters, and as a result the “Law Regulating the Legal 
Status of those Persons Falling under Article 131 of the Basic Law” flew through the 
Bundestag with no votes against and only two abstentions. The law opened the path for the 
reintegration of hundreds of thousands into the civil service. Each state was to allocate a 
minimum of 20 percent of its employee expenditures towards the salaries of the new “131-
ers.” The law particularly targeted those expelled from the east as subject to this 20 percent, 
though nothing barred those purged from West German posts from also reapplying. Several 
small restrictions were placed on those who could reapply. Membership in the Gestapo and 
Waffen-SS could still prohibit one from rejoining the civil service, unless that person could 
show that they had been automatically taken into such organizations and not done so 
voluntarily (as Harms had earlier argued before the Bremen Spruchkammer). All 
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denazification rulings remained in effect, though by 1951 most sentences had already been 
served. Some were permanently barred from the civil service due to their denazification 
results, but this caveat was applied in only 0.4 percent of all cases.
105
  
Gold rush fever struck West Germany, and thousands of West Germans – among 
them huge numbers of former Nazis – descended on their local town halls to file the 
paperwork for reinstatement to the civil service. Harms had been only an early prospector; 
other members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit also hoped to find their own corner of postwar 
heaven in the halls of West German bureaucracy. Crucially, Article 131 had stipulated that 
those with over ten years experience should be hired to a position commensurate to their 
earlier post. Individuals like the Einsatzkommando Tilsit members had been career civil 
servants and had held important and influential posts as officers. These men were not simply 
applying to find themselves at the back of career line; they were being placed back into 
leadership positions.  
Few so seamlessly worked their way back into postwar society as Gerhard Carsten. 
Carsten checked all the boxes for an open acceptance into West Germany. A native of East 
Prussia who had spent most of his life in Tilsit, Carsten was an expellee from the east. Posted 
in Denmark at the end of the war, he spent five years in a Danish POW camp. Though by no 
means could this be compared to a Soviet camp, Carsten could nonetheless claim to be a 
Heimkehrer kept away from the German homeland for far too long. His only career prior 
1945 had been working in the police based out of Tilsit. Now, with the passage of the Article 
131 law, Carsten found an opportunity for reinstatement.
106
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This image of Carsten as a hard-luck policeman with no direction home conflicted 
with his record of activity while in Tilsit. After applying several times to become a detective, 
in 1938 he was assigned to Stapo Tilsit, whereupon he undertook a three-month officer 
training course at the RSHA in Berlin. Likely this promotion came along as a result of his 
decision to join the Nazi party the year prior, though his simultaneous application to the SS 
was denied on racial grounds. Nevertheless, at the time of Memel’s return to Germany in 
1940, Carsten had advanced sufficiently to be appointed as the head of the border police unit 
in Schmalleningken. During the late summer in 1941, Carsten used his position there to assist 
in the murders of several hundred Jews on at least three separate incidents.
107
 
As with the other members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, these crimes did not follow 
him to West Germany. Upon his repatriation in 1950, Carsten joined his family first in 
Neheim-Hüsten. Employed for several years as an industrial worker, he soon filed an 
application for reinstatement to the civil service under the terms of Article 131. In 1953, his 
application was approved and Carsten began work once more as a detective in nearby 
Arnsberg.
108
 As with the other members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, postwar authorities saw 
in Carsten what they wanted to see: an honest policeman who, through the cruelties of the 
war and its aftermath, had lost his home, his livelihood, and years of his life. Moreover, by 
incentivizing the hiring of former civil servants from the east, Article 131 had created a logic 
that discouraged officials from asking questions about an applicant’s past. During the period 
of denazification, flawed though it was, authorities were interested in a person’s background 
to determine criminality; in the wake of Article 131, they saw only a résumé.  
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* * * 
After Article 131 took effect, Bernhard Fischer-Schweder continued to live under his 
assumed identity as Bernd Fischer, a Bad Neustadt vacuum salesman. By 1955, however, the 
allure of rejoining the civil service proved too strong to ignore. Fischer-Schweder wanted 
financial security more than he feared prosecution, and in 1953 he joined the fray to 
reintegration. First, he faced a problem of his own creation: the false name and birth date he 
had been using on papers since 1945. “Bernd Fischer” needed the résumé of “Bernhard 
Fischer-Schweder.” To make this happen, he brought the “trivial change” in his birth date to 
the attention of the local administrators, claiming a clerical error.
109
 Since denazification no 
longer threatened, the consequences for this admission were limited to a few key strokes 
noting the change.  
He also filed two applications – one for a civil service position in the region of North-
Württemberg, the other to qualify for Article 131 status – and here the issue becomes more 
curious. On the first, he continued to use his falsified information, listing his name as 
“Bernhard Fischer” and his birth date as “13 February 1904.”110 Yet, on the very next day he 
filed the second application, and here he gave his name as “Bernhard Fischer-Schweder” and 
his date of birth as “12 January 1904.”111 A clerical error this was not. Fischer-Schweder 
either began to use information selectively, depending on the application and audience, or 
had confused himself with his frequent changes. For the moment, officials failed to discover 
the discrepancy. 
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 The reemergence of Fischer-Schweder into public life in Western Germany began 
with his second application for reinstatement to the civil service in accordance with Article 
131. In addition to his full name and actual birth date, he stated that he was born in Berlin in 
the borough of Spandau and at the age of twenty received a vocational degree as a technician. 
His résumé noted he had been a civil servant his entire life, beginning in 1932 when he 
entered the police force. Fischer-Schweder steadily worked his way up the ranks of the 
detective division, emerging as superintendent in the eastern German city of Breslau in 1939. 
By 1940, he had been reassigned to Memel, and in 1941, Fischer-Schweder became director 
of the police force. According to the application, he saw action in the war from October 1943 
to June 1945, which ended in a several week stay at the POW camp in Linz. Not included on 
the statement was mention of his Nazi and SS memberships.
112
  
 Within a few weeks of his application, a routine procedural check turned up the 
various names Fischer-Schweder had been using since 1945. Asked to clarify, he argued that 
in order to avoid “automatic imprisonment in and eventual deportation” to the Soviet Union, 
he began using the name “Fischer” as early as 1942, when eventual German defeat began to 
seem likely.
113
 The change, in other words, came not as an attempt to shirk postwar justice, 
but to avoid the cruelties of life in a Soviet camp. This explanation capitalized not only on 
Cold War tensions, but also on West German anxiety over POWs in the Soviet Union. By 
tapping into this sentiment, Fischer-Schweder’s justifications for changing his name won 
over local officials. They approved his application for reinstatement to the civil service. 
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 Once the Article 131 application was approved, Fischer-Schweder’s application for a 
position in North-Württemberg began to bear fruit. Apart from the use of his assumed name 
and birth date, the résumé on his application for a civil service position in the district of 
North-Württemberg was nearly identical to that of the Article 131 form. Given his service as 
a police director for the substantial city of Memel, he was well qualified. When his 
application came across their desks in early December, authorities felt that the “experiences 
of Fischer as a civil servant” seemed the perfect remedy to the “multiple and difficult duties” 
facing those in charge of the refugee camp situation in Ulm.
114
 Initially intended to hold 
2,500 refugees in the postwar period, by 1953 Ulm-Wilhelmsburg overflowed with nearly 
3,800 refugees, most German, fleeing the Soviet-dominated east. To this point, the camp had 
been subsumed as a part of the larger Ulm-Römerstrasse camp, but the challenges and day-
to-day needs of the Wilhelmsburg camp made the need for an individual director apparent. 
Since the middle of October 1953, officials had allocated funds for the new hire.
115
 
 On January 18, 1954, the vacuum salesman became the camp director in Ulm. As the 
camp’s first director, he encountered a system in disarray. His military background led him to 
institute a string of disciplinary initiatives. Guards now wore brown uniforms, and entry to 
the camp became limited to the eastern gate, where identification papers were required. He 
began a physical renovation of the facilities, as many buildings were still in disrepair from 
wartime aerial bombing raids.
116
 When nearly forty residents fell ill shortly after he took 
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control, he initiated measures to raise health and diet conditions within the camp.
117
 After 
only a month, Fischer-Schweder was briefly but strongly considered by the regional 
government to take over leadership of the larger camp near Stuttgart.
118
 Even the local press 
noted the “fresh air” he brought to the Ulm camp. Fischer-Schweder’s “purposeful and 
energetic” planning had systematically raised the quality of life in the camp.119 Encouraged 
by his successes and confident about his future, Fischer-Schweder moved the family to Ulm 
later that year.
120
  
 To this point, Fischer-Schweder seemed to have navigated the postwar situation 
perfectly. He remained out of sight long enough to avoid serious investigation by the Allies, 
and now he had reemerged in time to capitalize on a period of amnesties and reintegration 
efforts by the Adenauer administration. In order to achieve this postwar arc, though, he had 
been forced to play a dangerous game with the details of his past. He used false information 
to clear denazification, but then coupled this denazification with his real name and select 
details of his wartime experiences to gain re-admittance to the civil service under Article 
131. When questions did emerge about discrepancies in his personnel record, he invoked the 
popular victimization narrative and stated that he feared Russian persecution. His dexterity 
with truth and lies had created a house of cards construction that depended on the situation 
being viewed from the single angle Fischer-Schweder determined. But now that he had 
stepped back into public life, he could no longer control his own exposure. 
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* * * 
If postwar perpetrators functioned as a barometer, constantly measuring any changes 
in pressure that might forecast a heightened risk of prosecution, then Article 131 became the 
clearest piece of evidence that the new West German state was fostering a climate conducive 
to reintegration. Above all, Adenauer favored social integration over political division.
121
 He, 
like many Germans, had felt that denazification had gone too far. While those guilty of 
crimes needed to be punished, Adenauer worried in a September 1949 address that 
denazification had divided Germans into “those without political blemishes and those with 
such blemishes. This distinction must be overcome as soon as possible.”122 In this perhaps 
well-intentioned spirit, the Bundestag began to pass a spate of legislation during the first half 
of the 1950s aimed at ironing out whatever social divisions had attended the end of the 1940s 
and that era of denazification. Starting with the passage of a 1949 amnesty law for many 
convicted by denazification courts, the early West German government voiced its goal of 
reintegration over prosecution. As Norbert Frei has stated, the 1949 amnesty law “constituted 
an act of high political symbolism.”123  
By the time Article 131 was approved in 1951, there could be little doubt about the 
safe haven being created in West Germany. Article 131 became more than an economic 
opportunity—it was an all-clear signal that the perpetrators could come out from hiding. 
Provided no new allegations or evidence of criminality were brought before the state, it was 
clear that the state would no longer be actively seeking out such information. These variables 
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transformed West Germany into a haven for former Nazis, as the state offered opportunities 
for reintegration and showed little interest in ongoing prosecutions.
124
 
By the end of the 1940s, Hans-Joachim Böhme found clear evidence that the political 
and social culture of western Germany was changing in his favor. Stranded on a farm in the 
Lüneburg heath, Böhme began to seek out career opportunities that played more to his 
intellectual capabilities. He scoured job advertisements and sent off applications for various 
office positions. In the fall of 1948, he received an interview with a tax accountant in 
Karlsruhe, in southwest Württemberg-Baden. The accountant needed a lawyer and looked 
favorably on Böhme’s application. In the interview, Böhme explained, “I came from East 
Prussia and had lost my papers. Vis-à-vis my prior background I told him nothing.”125 His 
interview landed him the position, and Böhme, the longtime Nazi and one time farmer, 
became a tax attorney in postwar West Germany. This relocation to Karlsruhe brought him 
into delayed contact with denazification authorities, but Böhme again used his passport and 
obscured his Nazi background from the officials. As a result, Böhme passed through 
denazification without any difficulties. 
 Once in Karlsruhe and through the process of denazification, Böhme began to 
assemble an actual postwar life for himself. Employed in a position for which he had actual 
qualifications, he could imagine a future in this far off corner of Germany. In 1950, he 
married a Karlsruhe secretary, and the couple had a daughter several years later.
126
 Böhme 
briefly went unemployed in 1951, when the firm closed, but his wife found him a post at the 
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Badenia-Bausparkasse, a savings and loan office, where he worked as a lawyer in the 
mortgage department.
127
 More than any other member of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, Böhme 
had completely remade himself in the postwar period. Others resumed old posts or sought 
reinstatement to the civil service, but Böhme created an entirely new life and bore no 
markings of his old self as a Holocaust perpetrator. A good employee well-liked at work and 
loved at home, Böhme had embraced the Stunde Null. His path had twisted southwest from 
the among the highest ranks of the Nazi profession in Eastern Europe through the lowly 
fields of central Germany as a farmhand before arriving at the opening to the Black Forest as 
an accountant. This meandering route had carried him beneath the channels of Allied and 
West German authorities and allowed him to resurface across Central Europe as an ordinary 
German.  
* * * 
 Werner Hersmann emerged into West Germany in January 1954, paroled by the 
Traunstein court for his participation in the murder of five Altötting civilians.
128
 By this 
point, Hersmann was fifty years old, a convicted murderer, and a “major offender” in the 
Third Reich. He lacked any touch for postwar politics and had become a magnet for 
investigators. With his criminal record, Article 131 status was out of the question and even 
finding decent work would require an open-minded employer. Perhaps if he had just been 
convicted for vague crimes against communists in the east, he might have found a hardened 
anti-Bolshevist to take up his cause, but because he had killed five German civilians in the 
final week of the war the situation for him in 1954 did not look good. Only a Nazi apologist 
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hostile to the postwar state could look on Hersmann as an asset, and so it was fortunate that 
he encountered the agency Stille Hilfe. 
 Stille Hilfe, or more fully Die Stille Hilfe für Kriegsgefangene und Internierte (Silent 
Assistance for POWs and Interned Persons), occupied a prominent position in the seedy 
underbelly of postwar society.
129
 Founded after the war by Helene Elisabeth Princessin von 
Isenburg, the organization worked initially on the principal that those arrested and 
imprisoned after 1945 by the Allies faced unjust punishments. By 1950, Stille Hilfe focused 
on the mistreatment and the continued unfair imprisonment of several hundred prominent 
Nazis in Landsberg penitentiary, which became a symbol for far-right conservatives to rail 
against the injustices of the postwar era. The nominal aim of the organization was to provide 
legal and material to these prisoners. The “Mother of the Prisoners,” as Princess von Isenburg 
became known, explained her purpose in a 1951 interview: “People today often say to me, 
‘Why do you care about Landsberg of all things?’ There’s a good reason: no organizations 
keep the Landsberg prisoners in mind and their relatives receive no support. If Jews were still 
being persecuted today, I would take up their cause just the same.”130 Even though when 
Jews actually were being persecuted, she had been a Nazi party member who did nothing to 
speak out against their mistreatment, her high birth and background as a non-medical 
practitioner lent credibility and support for her and her cause.  
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 The agency became a breeding ground for far-right Nazi crimes apologetics, and 
many of the legal strategies for defending war criminals were pioneered by its leadership.
131
 
The preeminent legal mind behind these strategies was Rudolf Aschenauer, a young Munich-
based attorney. Aschenauer had risen to prominence as the defense attorney for Otto 
Ohlendorf, the chief defendant in the Allied trial of Einsatzgruppen leadership. The case 
launched his career as a Nazi crimes specialist, and he would come to exert wide influence in 
1958 during the Ulm trial.
132
 Working with Stille Hilfe, Aschenauer took the lead on 
advocating for the release of the Landsberg prisoners. He also started a working group of 
like-minded legal minds to work on ending Nazi prosecutions, a group known as the 
Heidelberg Kreis.  
By the mid-1950s, the pro-Nazi orientation of the Stille Hilfe began to shine more 
clearly through the thin veneer of charity for prisoners. Moving beyond the Landsberg issue, 
it began to take on the causes of all Nazis being held in Germany and abroad. The agency 
provided material aid to those who had escaped Germany, and it was widely believed to have 
played a role in ferreting prominent Nazis out of Germany to safety in the early postwar 
years. In late 1957, Stille Hilfe prepared care packages for many Nazi criminals to cheer 
them up during the holiday season. The January 1958 newsletter printed a table listing the 
numbers of those convicted being held in prisons across Europe, and Princess von Isenburg 
wrote, “It would have been a sad Christmas for these poor people without our help this 
year.”133 One can only sympathize with convicted Nazi criminals for so long before it 
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becomes clear that one’s sympathies also lie with their crimes. The agency had become a 
perfect place for a convicted war criminal like Hersmann with few other options to turn. 
Beginning in 1955, Hersmann took up employment at the Stille Hilfe.
134
 Although 
unclear what services he performed for the group, Hersmann had clearly navigated postwar 
society with no interest in absorbing any of its democratic impulses and having steadfastly 
resisted any pressures to renounce the Nazi cause. Shiftless and often unemployed prior to 
1933, his experiences in the Third Reich had been a steady string of promotions and 
apparently gave him a strong sense of belonging. After 1945, he found himself constantly 
dragged before various authorities and made to answer for his role in the Nazi empire. The 
lone bright spot in his life were those years as a Nazi, under a regime which gave approval to 
him for carrying out his basest desires. Whether he feared any subsequent prosecutions after 
his release it 1954, Hersmann willfully made no attempts to atone for his past. When he 
began work for the fascists at Stille Hilfe, Hersmann showed that, however futile the effort, 
he would continue to advocate on behalf of the Nazi cause. 
* * * 
 Organizations like Stille Hilfe fed into a broad paranoia about ex-Nazi clandestine 
organizations, nefariously plotting a return to power. Often, these concerns centered on 
smuggling prominent Nazis out of occupied Germany to safe haven in the Middle East or 
South America. Rumors of the notorious shadow network ODESSA (the Organization of 
Former SS Officers), which scholars now agree never existed, inspired conspiracy theories 
among Allies and Nazi hunters alike, who suspected this alleged network was not only aiding 
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in Nazis’ escape but also actively plotting the return of Nazi rule to Germany.135 A 1950 CIA 
report, for example, warned of a “heavily armed colony” of Nazis in Bolivia.136 While such 
concerns of Nazi resurgence may have been overblown, certainly there was proof that many 
Nazis were escaping Germany’s borders and often had help in doing so. Well known 
incidents, such as the escapes of Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele, showed that 
individuals with the right connections could evade authorities with minimal difficulty. 
Several hundred high-level Nazis escaped through “ratlines” into South Tyrol, through Italy, 
and on to Argentina or other nations that turned blind eyes to their presence.
137
  
 For the former members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, few saw any need for flight. A 
wide array of options existed that would allow them to remain within Germany, so for many 
this option proved preferable to the immense difficulties of starting life anew in a foreign 
country. Moreover, these perpetrators took their cues from the politics of the day, and they 
saw very few prosecutions underway that would indicate their involvement in Lithuanian 
massacres might come before a court. The major Nuremberg trials focused only on the elites 
and other cases like the Bergen-Belsen trial focused on camp crimes and crimes within 
Germany. For these mostly mid-level Nazi officers who carried out mass murder in small 
towns throughout Lithuanian, the threat of prosecution seemed small. 
 Of the many officers responsible for the Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders, only one 
chose to leave West Germany, and he did not do so until the early 1950s. Wilhelm Gerke had 
been born in 1906 to a family with roots working the fields of Ritze, a small town midway 
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between Hamburg and Berlin. His career aspiration was to become a detective, and he first 
entered the Leipzig police force in 1928. He joined the Nazi party in 1933 and enrolled in 
numerous officer training courses over the next several years. By the late 1930s, Gerke was a 
member of the SS, and on the eve of war with the Soviet Union he transferred to Stapo Tilsit. 
He worked there initially under Harms before being made a Kriminalkommissar in the fall of 
1941, a post he held until 1944. His last task during the war involved destroying documents 
of the police and other administrative records. Thereafter, the Tilsit office evacuated west. He 
contracted shingles during the flight and ended the war in an American POW camp.
138
 
 Bounced between camps for several years, by 1948 Gerke was sentenced to eighteen 
months by the Hamburg Spruchkammer for his membership and involvement in Nazi 
organizations.
139
 He found employment until 1951 doing agricultural work for a friend near 
his hometown. Gerke’s family, however, remained in the Soviet east, and he hoped to secure 
better employment so as to make possible their move to the west. A newspaper advertisement 
alerted him to a company in Osnabrück which “provided Germans as lumberjacks for a firm 
in Sweden.” Gerke applied and by fall 1951, he had taken up residence and employment in 
Sweden. Gerke later insisted that he relocated not out of any desire to conceal his past but 
purely to improve his financial circumstances.
140
 A year later, though, his family had 
managed to escape to West Berlin, but rather than return to Germany, Gerke brought his 
family to Sweden where they remained through the 1950s.
141
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The End of Reintegration 
 By late summer 1954, fresh doubts about Bernhard Fischer-Schweder’s past surfaced 
in the North-Württemberg regional government. In addition to the troubling revelation that 
he had been falsifying his name and birth date, his claims to have been the Police Director in 
Memel and yet not a member of the Nazi Party appeared dubious.
142
 The massive problems 
facing the Allies and Germany at the end of the war had made it possible for Fischer-
Schweder and others to submit false information; the bureaucratic logjam rendered individual 
verifications highly unlikely. Resources that for political and financial reasons were 
unavailable to the Allies after the war now existed in 1950s West Germany.
143
 The 
bureaucratic and organizational infrastructure had been built up substantially, as more 
groups, organizations, and political agencies existed to assist in the reintegration of Nazis on 
the one hand and to investigate those who had bypassed denazification channels on the other. 
The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) 
and the Berlin Document Center were two such agencies. 
 In 1950, the Federal Republic created the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz to serve 
as a national agency charged with investigating those whose behavior threatened the integrity 
of the Basic Law constitution. At first, this charter translated primarily into tracking 
communists in West Germany, but because of its resources and networks, the agency soon 
became a central asset for background investigations. As such, North-Württemberg officials 
wrote first to the Bundesamt when questions about Fischer-Schweder’s past arose. In August 
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1954, the Bundesamt in turn reached out to the Berlin Document Center for information on 
potential Nazi or SS membership for Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, born January 12, 1904.
144
 
 The Berlin Document Center (BDC) had only been fully operational since October 
1953 but held millions of captured Nazi documents, including a near-total registry of Nazi 
and SS membership.
145
 The archive therefore provided the largest extant database for 
information regarding membership in Nazi organizations as well as rank and assignment 
during the Third Reich. In 1953, the BDC remained under the jurisdiction of the US 
Department of State. Unlike conventional archives which tend to group documents by 
provenance, all records there were arranged by name, making it inefficient for those 
researching a given event, but invaluable for information on individuals. When authorities 
accessed the archive for information on Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, a thick file emerged that 
revealed the extent of his involvement in the Third Reich. Although it contained no mention 
of his role in the Tilsit murders, the file contained damaging documents, such as a 1942 letter 
thanking Himmler for a birthday gift.
146
 The BDC provided unambiguous information on his 
role in the Nazi party, in the SS, and as a committed Nazi ideologue. 
By November 1954, the Berlin Document Center findings arrived at the office of the 
regional government in charge of Fischer-Schweder’s employment.147 Since he had “hidden 
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his membership in the [Nazi] Party and SS” from the military tribunal in Bad Neustadt, his 
“unaffected” denazification status was invalid, which meant that his hiring under Article 131 
was also nullified.
148
 But politically sensitive questions remained. If word got out that the 
local government had hired an SS officer to run a displaced persons camp, the situation could 
prove a public relations nightmare.  
 Two days later, the officials decided to ask Fischer-Schweder to resign in order to 
keep the scandal quiet. This desire to avoid a public reaction was also fueled by a sense of 
concern for Fischer-Schweder. As they noted, “Fischer is handicapped, he is married, and he 
has a child. He would have to go to great lengths to create a new life.”149 They reflected 
positively on his service as the camp director, and though he had forced their hand through 
his falsehoods, they wished him no long-term ill. To this end, they provided a letter of 
recommendation for future applications, which noted the “care and cultivation” he had 
shown in his leadership at the camp.
150
 The realization that he had been a member of the SS 
seemingly posed no inherent moral dilemmas for authorities. Given the narrowly defined 
concept of perpetrator in this time period, officials looked on Fischer-Schweder as just 
another individual that Hitler coerced into service. The decision showed that they tacitly 
accepted his self-image as a victim of the Third Reich. It was not Fischer-Schweder’s past 
that cost him his post, but rather that he had lied about this past.  
 Fischer-Schweder delayed as long as he could, but in the end found no choice but to 
acquiesce to the demand. On February 2, 1955, he resigned, claiming to have found “an 
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extremely opportune job” elsewhere.151 In fact, he had no such offer and quickly grew 
discouraged after months of rejections from prospective employers. Frustrated, he wrote to 
the regional government in late March requesting reinstatement as head of the Ulm-
Wilhelmsburg camp.
152
 His letter noted the difficulties inherent in finding a new job at the 
age of fifty-one and the injustice being done to him on account of his past affiliations. “Based 
simply on my upbringing,” he added, “I joined the Party at a very young age, not knowing 
what forms it would later take.”153 For what may have been the first time, he was invoking a 
reworked version of the victimization narrative: not only had he suffered under the Nazis, 
now he was being unfairly targeted by the Federal Republic. He went on to state that certain 
individuals would confirm his claims if given the opportunity. But from the perspective of 
the officials, the matter was closed and Fischer-Schweder no longer had a place at the Ulm 
camp. On April 13, 1955, he was officially fired from the camp.
154
 
 Unsatisfied with their decision, Fischer-Schweder made the exceptional decision to 
turn to the courts for reinstatement. On April 18, he filed a lawsuit in the Ulm labor court 
against the government. This shockingly public confrontation revealed that he feared 
investigation so little, he was willing to attack the state in court over his perceived 
mistreatment.
155
 He argued along similar lines to his earlier defenses: he had indeed been a 
member of the Nazi party, but was not ideologically motivated; he had suffered under the 
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regime in 1934; and he had always performed dutifully as a civil servant. In his statement, he 
wrote that he had “committed no political crime” and that his “political history as stated here 
was the full truth.”156  
 To help in his defense, he assembled a range of endorsements from friends and 
colleagues who spoke glowingly of him, and invoked the language of victimization. One 
noted that Fischer-Schweder had been taken “very much against his will” into the SS.157 
Another indicated that Fischer-Schweder had aided in the escape of a Jewish man to Prague 
in the days after Kristallnacht in 1938.
158
 Fischer-Schweder’s interpretation of contemporary 
attitudes led him to believe that he could win his case if he convinced the court that he 
suffered under Hitler and acted against the Nazi regime.  
 Like much else in 1955, the trial did not go well for Fischer-Schweder. Legally, the 
court “rejected the suit as unfounded.”159 Against his argument that the resignation should be 
nullified, the court argued that he had hardly been coerced and so the resignation stood. From 
this, it followed that his firing was moot, stating, “It did not depend on whether the accused 
state still had the right…to terminate the employment on April 13, 1955. At that time the 
employment contract no longer existed.”160 The court saddled Fischer-Schweder with the 
2000DM legal costs, a significant sum for the unemployed plaintiff. This outcome revealed 
that empathy for wartime behavior had its clear limits. Masquerading as a victim of Nazism 
may have helped him secure a civil service position and even won him the initial 
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understanding of his former employers, but claiming to be a victim of the West German state 
did not make for a winning legal defense in the Ulm labor court of 1955. 
The unusual case of an SS officer suing for his right to run a refugee camp caught the 
attention of local press, which commented on Fischer-Schweder’s “reemergence” and his 
“interesting labor court trial.”161 A German news wire agency requested “to be informed of 
the next meeting date” for additional reporting.162 In response to the press coverage, Fischer-
Schweder wrote a letter to the editor. On May 26, 1955 – one day after an article about his 
lawsuit appeared in the press – a brief seven-point statement appeared in the local newspaper, 
the Ulmer Nachrichten. In addition to summarizing his lawsuit, Fischer-Schweder argued 
again that he had been a victim of the SS in 1934 and that during the war “I kept many 
people – Christians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, and Poles – from harm and mortal danger.” 
He also used Cold War tensions to explain his false postwar information, and as to the issue 
of why he continued to use false information in 1953, he distilled the essence of his postwar 
integration tactics: “I had no reason to bring up things that I was not asked about.”163  
With this letter and trial, Fischer-Schweder had finally run up against the limits of 
tolerance of postwar society. He had grown far too comfortable in mid-1950s German 
society. With the recent firing, unsuccessful lawsuit, and poor media coverage, he may have 
felt isolated and unlucky, but not criminal and certainly he saw no reason to hide. As he 
would soon realize, however, he had overstepped the limits of acceptable behavior for former 
Nazis in postwar society. While many West Germans still distinguished between the horrors 
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of Nazism and the many Germans who were seduced by its appeal, these frivolous lawsuits, 
condescending letters to the editor, and fraudulent postwar deceptions of a former SS officer 
destroyed whatever tolerance was left for Fischer-Schweder. He did not realize that through 
these decisions he had set into motion a chain of events that would undo the reintegration 
strategies of not just himself but the other members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit.  
* * * 
 In December 1955, just six months after Fischer-Schweder’s lawsuit, Franz Behrendt 
received a letter from his old friend and colleague Herbert Schmidtke. A few days earlier, 
Schmidtke had unexpectedly been called in by Stuttgart-based detectives regarding an 
investigation. Both Schmidtke and Behrendt had previously served in the Memel police, and 
the target of the investigation seemed to be their former director, Bernhard Fischer-
Schweder.
164
 Schmidtke had been asked repeatedly over several hours about Fischer-
Schweder’s role in massacres along the German-Lithuanian border. At the end of the 
interrogation, detectives asked Schmidtke if he knew the names or addresses of any other 
former Memel policemen. He recalled the name Erich Frohwann, but then informed 
detectives that he had committed suicide at the end of the war. Other than Frohwann, 
Schmidtke insisted he knew of no other individuals who might be of assistance. Now, back 
home in Tuttlingen, Schmidtke wrote to Behrendt to inform him of this new investigation. 
Concerned about the case and grateful to his friend, Behrendt asked to be kept 
informed should Schmidtke learn anything more, then proceeded to burn the letter. Born a 
few years apart in Memel, the two had known each other since childhood, when they sang 
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together in a Christian youth group.
165
 Both joined the police force and in 1939, following 
the return of Memel to Germany, both became members of the Grenzpolizeikommissariat. 
Later that year, their paths diverged slightly when Behrendt transferred to Stapo Tilsit as a 
Lithuanian translator.
166
 As translator, Behrendt played a central role in gaining the 
complicity of locals to assist in the Einsatzkommando Tilsit executions during 1941. After 
the war, both men fled west, as the Memelland was purged of Germans, and they arrived in 
occupied Germany. By the mid-1950s, Schmidtke had settled near Lake Constance in the 
south and Behrendt in Hamburg-Harburg to the north. 
Although unclear how close their contact had been during the postwar period, their 
correspondence in late 1955 sparked a renewed bond between the two. Over the next year, 
Behrendt began to vent his frustrations at his postwar situation, as he desired more 
opportunities than his current position as a book-keeper afforded. Meanwhile, Schmidtke 
succeeded in rejoining the police force under the terms of Article 131 and had moved to 
Bielefeld. By July 1956, Behrendt had hatched a scheme that would allow him to rejoin the 
police. Because of the secrecy with which they pursued their plans, reconstructing the precise 
decision-making is difficult, but Behrendt solicited Schmidtke for a letter of reference in 
order to gain state employment. Schmidtke had slipped back into the civil service, and now 
he was to hold the door open for Behrendt.
167
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Behrendt’s plan involved reaching out to another former colleague, Otto Steinberger. 
Like Schmidtke, Steinberger had already succeeded in gaining reemployment in the police. 
He had only returned to Germany the year prior, as he was one of the last POWs released 
from the Soviet Union.
168
 Steinberger had emerged from the experience embittered by his 
captivity and eager to make something new of his life. He described the USSR to his 
comrades: “Everything is sh--! …It’s not worth the breath of a dog. (You’ll have to forgive 
me on these points, but there seems to me to be no cultivated expressions for conveying these 
conditions).”169 He did, however, have cultivated expressions when it came to writing a letter 
on behalf of Behrendt. These statements were signed legal affidavits, and as such they carried 
the threat of perjury for false claims. Acknowledging that, Steinberger wrote in late July 
1956 that Behrendt “was known to be a man with an open, honest character, who was equally 
valued and liked in and out of the office by his superiors and colleagues.”170 
Once Behrendt received Steinberger’s endorsement, he turned to Schmidtke for a 
similar affidavit. He wrote, “It would make me happy if you, along with Otto, could help to 
put [my] house back in order. Then you’d have close companions at your ready – and good 
friends are rare these days.”171 Schmidtke responded with an affidavit in support of 
Behrendt’s attempt to rejoin the police service. He wrote, “I know of no incidents in which 
Behrendt would have taken part in any inhumane activities. Such an allegation would be 
unthinkable just on the basis of his sensitive character and the fact of his participation in the 
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drama and singing group of the Christian Youth Movement in Memel.”172 Both sets of 
statements were then passed along to the Ministry of the Interior in Lower Saxony, where 
Behrendt hoped to find employment.  
While Behrendt awaited news from his application, he stayed informed about the 
investigation into Fischer-Schweder. The nature of the case remained unclear, as the 
detectives steadfastly kept any mention out of the newspapers. Behrendt had to rely on 
Schmidtke for information. Since his first interrogation in late 1955, Schmidtke was called 
before the detectives an additional three times over the next year. Additionally, now that 
Schmidtke belonged to the police, he had access to information about ongoing investigations 
in West Germany not available to the public. Recognizing both the importance of 
Schmidtke’s position and need for secrecy, Behrendt wrote, “I read (in your letter) about 
your four interrogations. It’s really not pleasant. It would be good if you could keep me up to 
date. I’ll put your letter in the oven immediately and recommend that you do the same with 
mine.”173 The survival of the letter shows that Schmidtke did not share Behrendt’s anxieties, 
but he did share what information he had on the investigation.  
Each of Schmidtke’s interrogtations came after an interval of a several months, and so 
each allowed him to make some insights into the evolution of the case. After the second 
meeting, in February 1956, Schmidtke realized that the case was centering on the massacres 
in Garsden and two other Lithuanian towns, though questions still focused on Fischer-
Schweder’s involvement. By July, however, a clear shift had taken place. In his third 
interrogation, he was asked only about the role Hans-Joachim Böhme had played in the 
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executions; in previous meetings, Böhme’s name had never been mentioned. Depending on 
how carefully Schmidtke monitored the police bulletins, he would have also seen an “Urgent 
Place of Residence Investigation” request in August 1956.174 Issued from the Stuttgart police 
department, this request asked for the last known whereabouts of Böhme. For Schmidtke, this 
could only mean one thing: the investigation of Fischer-Schweder was expanding. 
The information alarmed Behrendt because, even while his application for the 
Hannover police department was still being reviewed, he began to make plans for an escape 
to South Africa. Though he would later claim to have long-held plans to visit a friend there, 
Behrendt had no background in international tourism and a trip to South Africa seems 
fiscally irresponsible for a man who had spent previous years complaining about the 
difficulty of providing for his family. South Africa had clearly become the lifeline Behrendt 
left for himself as it became clear that the investigation of Fischer-Schweder was 
metastasizing into something that threatened his own future. His plans to flee developed too 
slowly, however, and on April 12, 1957, he was called in for questioning. Five days later, 
Ulm detectives arrested him. 
* * * 
 Between Schmidtke’s early interrogation by tentative Ulm investigators in the wake 
of Fischer-Schweder’s lawsuit and the arrest of Behrendt two years later, it was clear that a 
case initially targeting Fischer-Schweder had expanded significantly. During that two year 
window, ten former members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit would all be arrested in connection 
with this Ulm case. Of those arrested, only Behrendt, who thanks to his contacts with 
Schmidtke, and possibly Carsten, who was working as a detective in Arnsberg, had any 
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indication that such an investigation was underfoot. All ten, however, first learned that they 
were themselves the subject of the investigation only once police arrived at their doorsteps to 
bring them in for questioning. 
 Fischer-Schweder was arrested first on April 28, 1956. Over the next year, an 
intensive period of arrests took place. Hans-Joachim Böhme followed in June; then Harm 
Harms and Werner Hersmann by the end of October. The end of 1956 saw the quick 
succession of arrests of Werner Kreuzmann, Edwin Sakuth, and Gerhard Carsten. By 
February, Pranas Lukys was in custody and by April, Behrendt. Werner Schmidt-Hammer 
had been interrogated early on in 1955, but was not arrested until June 1957. These ten men 
became the defendants in an Ulm investigation into Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders. 
Wilhelm Gerke’s escape to Sweden prevented his arrest, as prosecutors could not secure his 
extradition in time for the trial. Herbert Schmidtke similarly was not arrested in time for the 
Ulm case; his role in the Tilsit crimes was too uncertain, though he would eventually find 
himself under investigation in 1958. But for the majority of the officers responsible for 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit, their postwar routes of reintegration ended in Ulm. 
 
Conclusion 
In exploring the various postwar biographies of these perpetrators, it is difficult to 
summarize their experiences. They pursued a wide variety of options, faced differing 
opportunities, and made individual choices that allowed each to carve out a unique path 
towards reintegration. Despite the plurality of their responses, all of them succeeded for over 
a decade in avoiding investigation into their role in Einsatzkommando Tilsit. This diversity of 
experiences is therefore itself an important commentary on the broad flexibility of postwar 
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society in absorbing Holocaust perpetrators. Although many postwar authorities reviewed 
these individuals’ backgrounds, none found their time in the borderlands of Germany and 
Lithuania to be of concern. The types of crimes and profiles of the criminals under suspicion 
after 1945 did not map onto the experiences of Einsatzkommando Tilsit and its perpetrators. 
As a result, the Tilsit members had full freedom of choice in their postwar lives. 
Out of the many reintegration routes selected, it is possible to divine a general 
topology of response. Five categories emerge as the main options available to postwar 
perpetrators. The most extreme of the five were suicide and flight. Frohwann and others 
chose suicide rather than confront what they considered to be likely prosecution. Of the 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit members, only Gerke chose to flee West Germany outright, though 
Behrendt was in the planning stages of such an exodus on the eve of his arrest. For the 
majority, though, these solutions did not seem proportionate to the problem. The fact that 
most perpetrators chose to live in West Germany revealed that they did not consider 
prosecution imminent or likely. Taking one’s life or abandoning Germany altogether seemed 
excessive and unnecessary for the majority; they preferred alternatives. 
The more likely channels for reintegration therefore fall into three groups: deception, 
normalization, and continuation. The perpetrators who stayed tended to deceive the postwar 
state about their past, to normalize their experiences and integrate them into their own life 
stories, or to continue to advocate for the Nazi cause. On some level, all engaged in forms of 
deception, as none ever admitted openly to the true nature of their roles in the Nazi state upon 
the advent of the war with the Soviet Union. Others made deception central to their lives, 
though. Fischer-Schweder and Böhme most notably took active steps to erase their pasts after 
1945. Fischer-Schweder invented a false identity, while Böhme created an entirely new life 
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and career. The majority of the perpetrators attempted to integrate their pre-1945 lives into 
their postwar lives. Harms and Schmidt-Hammer, for instance, transformed their biographies 
into passion plays. Having suffered first under the Nazis, they now suffered under the Allies 
and West German state. Inherent in their accounts was a belief that they could be reborn in 
postwar society. The least common response was that of Hersmann, who proved so 
committed to the Nazi regime that he refused to let it die. It is possible that many of the 
perpetrators remained dedicated fascists in their hearts, but when it came to their postwar 
livelihoods all but Hersmann openly renounced any Nazi sympathies.  
In making their postwar choices, the Tilsit members seemed to have been influenced 
by their backgrounds in the Nazi state. To a great extent, their decisions came down to 
personal choice, but the level of their commitment to and involvement in the Third Reich 
also influenced how they might respond. Those most committed to Nazism – Böhme, 
Hersmann, Frohwann, and Fischer-Schweder – tended to polarize towards the most extreme 
responses of suicide, deception, and continuation. These men had all shown enthusiasm for 
the Nazi party, joining typically at an early age, and they were career SS men. Many of the 
other perpetrators showed less outright ideological sympathy for the Nazi party, and as a 
result their postwar behavior gravitated towards the more moderate attempts to normalize 
their experiences. Men like Harms, Schmidt-Hammer, Sakuth, Behrendt, Carsten, and 
Kreuzmann had been ordinary members of the police, and to some extent it likely came as a 
surprise to them that they would constitute the frontline of Nazi aggression against Jews and 
communists. After the war, these former police officers found it easier to portray themselves 
as common victims of the Nazi state, and they did not have to undergo the same contortions 
as the more hard-line members in attempting to reintegrate.  
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Underpinning this wide range of responses was a common attempt among the 
perpetrators to portray themselves to various postwar authorities as victims. Contemporary 
society tends to look back on the Nazi era and cast all the actors in roles of good and evil. 
The triangle of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders is familiar and well-established today. 
But in postwar West Germany, these categories were extraordinarily fluid. Who was 
considered a perpetrator, a victim, or a bystander depended very much on how one presented 
him or herself. It was not hard for many Germans to cast themselves in the role of the victim; 
many claimed to have opposed and suffered under Hitler, many had lost their homes and 
loved ones, and many others had lost their homelands. To the extent that there were 
perpetrators, Germans looked at the Nazi elite and a few sadistic SS men as the driving force 
behind a brutal dictatorship that suppressed all internal dissent. Meanwhile, few Jews were 
present in society to stake out their own status as victims and to discredit this emerging 
narrative. Thus the triangle saw a majority seeking refuge under the category of victim, 
which fueled the evaporation of the bystander category, and a small minority of Nazi elites 
and low-level sadists standing in as perpetrators. Under such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that so many of the Tilsit officers attempted to and succeeded in appropriating the 
label of victim for themselves.  
 Finally, the biographies of the perpetrators reveal a level of interconnectedness that 
linked them together since the Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders. Though they may have 
thought themselves lone wolves, personally determining their own postwar fate, their lives in 
fact remained intimately bound with one another and forever tied to their crimes on the 
border marches of Germany-Lithuania. All of these men had been able to avoid prosecution 
for their role in the Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders. As they enjoyed the postwar lives they 
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created for themselves, they must have felt comfortable in their belief that their crimes lay 
many years back and miles away. Unknown to them, one mistake by one of them would undo 
everyone’s efforts at reintegration.  
  
 
 
 
 
IV. Investigation: The Bernhard Fischer-Schweder Case 
 
If seventeen years ago a person, be it man, woman, or child, was killed in horrible fashion in 
this city and if today the killer or killers were found, how would the public react? Would they 
say, “Let the dead lie in peace; punishing the criminals will not bring the dead back to life?” 
Would this be the answer? Of course not! Everyone would welcome the arrest of the killer 
and want him held accountable by our laws. Why then in this case, which concerns the 
gruesome murder of thousands of people – men, women, and children never convicted by a 
court of wrongdoing – is the question asked, “Is this trial necessary?” 
 
– Erwin Schüle, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial 
 
 
 The initial impulses for an investigation of Bernhard Fischer-Schweder came not 
from politicians aggrieved of his abuses of the court system or from former employers 
embarrassed by his fraudulent hire. Instead, they arrived in the form of a criminal allegation 
that predated his labor court case. In March 1955, when Fischer-Schweder lost his position as 
camp director, he initially and unsuccessfully sought employment in the civil service in 
Baden.
1
 Dr. E. Ballweg, who oversaw the division, had to carry out interviews regarding his 
potential hiring. Ballweg realized that his current secretary, Meta Poneleit, happened to have 
worked in the Memel police department under Fischer-Schweder in Memel in 1941.
2
 No 
doubt struck by the coincidence, Ballweg took the opportunity to phone her about her former 
employer, not minding that she was vacationing at the time. When asked about Fischer-
Schweder, she responded, “He was Satan.”3 Pressed for more details, she stated that he was 
an “immoderate drunk” and that there was a “burning hatred of Fischer-Schweder by both 
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police officers and other officials because of his excessive Nazism.” Though these were 
damaging character assessments, she saved her most serious allegation for the end: “He 
organized the shooting of Jews in a ghetto near Memel.”  
Ballweg wrote a report on the conversation, passed it along to his superiors, and on 
April 18, the information arrived at the North Württemberg state police headquarters in 
Stuttgart.
4
 The investigator there then wrote his counterparts in South Baden, where Poneleit 
lived, asking them to interrogate her “about everything she knows about Fischer-Schweder” 
and to send them three copies of her full statement “as soon as possible.”5 The following day 
they spoke with Poneleit. In her formal statement, she reiterated her claims that Fischer-
Schweder had been a “150% SS-Oberführer” and “brutal ruler.”6 She also repeated a story 
she had initially told to Ballweg: 
According to someone in the police service, Fischer went to the Memel ghetto for his 
pleasure one Sunday. There was a four-meter wide grave there that had been dug out 
for shootings. He said to a Jew, if you can jump over this grave and make it 
successfully to the other side, I will let you live. During the leap over the grave, he 
then shot him.
7
 
 
Despite these strong statements, Poneleit also retreated from her authority on the subject. She 
suggested that any shootings were likely organized “by higher offices.”8 She said that she 
had “little to do” with Fischer-Schweder and that she “in no way could not make concrete 
statements because everything that I have explained only came to my ears through rumors.” 
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Instead, she suggested that they speak with the former lieutenant, “Schmitthammer, who 
supposedly can be found working as an optometrist in the Rendsberg region.” The 
interrogators noted that she seemed “embarrassed” to be put in this situation, and she worried 
that they were “putting the cart before the horse” (dass hier das Pferd am Schwanz 
aufgezäumt würde) by not speaking first with officers in the Memel police who had regular 
contact with Fischer-Schweder. 
  Investigators concurred and began to search for “Schmitthammer” and a few officers 
Poneleit had mentioned. Over the next six weeks, they labored to track down these 
individuals and turned up little information on Fischer-Schweder. They asked about possible 
spelling variants for Schmitthammer, but Poneleit could not recall.
9
 Another of the 
individuals she had mentioned died the previous year.
10
 The investigators were surprised to 
learn in late May about Fischer-Schweder’s lawsuit in the Ulm labor court, but this 
information only fueled more speculation and rumor.
11
 One letter suggested that they track 
down “a businessman from Berlin-Spandau with the first name ‘Robert’” who had allegedly 
been staying at a guesthouse thirty miles north of Ulm and knew Fischer-Schweder since 
1927.
12
 These kinds of miscellaneous leads meant that after six weeks, they had uncovered 
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possible evidence of criminal behavior, but precise information on very little.
13
 By June 13, 
1955, detectives presented their findings to the Ulm prosecutor’s office, which asked them to 
continue their investigation.
14
  
This investigation would stretch on for nearly three years and culminate in the trial of 
ten Einsatzkommando Tilsit members. But it would be a mistake to think that the evolution of 
this trial followed a linear or conventional path. The small-scale origins of the case bore no 
indication of the consequential trial it would become. During the initial year of the 
investigation, Fischer-Schweder remained the sole target of the investigation. Although 
evidence of massive crimes was uncovered, prosecutors limited their case to the former camp 
director. In this regard, the first phase of the investigation mirrored 1950s West German Nazi 
crimes prosecutions. The case began via a chance encounter with a perpetrator that brought 
allegations before the state. This case failed to register as a high priority for the state, which 
preferred to focus on more contemporary crimes. As a result, the minimum effort was 
devoted to determine whether an indictment was justified.  
Beginning with the Poneleit allegations in March 1955 and ending with the 
indictment of Fischer-Schweder in May 1956, this chapter considers the troubled first year of 
the Ulm investigation. Despite a year’s efforts by the prosecutor and his team, Fischer-
Schweder (and for that matter, the other nine defendants) nearly avoided prosecution 
altogether. It was only thanks to the transformation of the investigation during its second 
phase, discussed in the next chapter, that the case expanded to ten defendants and made it to 
                                                 
13
 Statement by Robert Chalcupek (Stuttgart, 28 May 1955), EL 322/II, Bü 7, SL. 
 
14
 Landespolizei Nordwürttemberg – Kriminalhauptstelle to Staatsanwaltschaft Ulm (8 June 1955), EL 322/II, 
Bü 1, SL; Anzeige gegen Fischer-Schweder, Bernhard; Landespolizeidirektion Nordwürttemberg, 
Kriminalhauptstelle (Stuttgart, 3 November 1955), EL 322/II, Bü 1, SL. 
 
123 
 
trial. To understand this first phase of the Fischer-Schweder investigation is to understand 
how fundamentally the cards were stacked against prosecutors investigating crimes of the 
Holocaust in postwar West Germany. The struggles of the investigators and prosecutors 
during this investigation were symptomatic of the typical problems with Nazi crimes 
investigations in 1950s West Germany. The issue was not just that many prosecutors and 
detectives took little interest in bringing Nazi criminals to justice, but also that even those 
who worked earnestly did not fully comprehend or have available the resources needed to 
investigate and prosecute this special set of crimes. They did not have the tools to carry out 
such investigations because the Ulm trial had not yet invented them. 
 
In Ulm, about Ulm, and all around Ulm 
The actual city of Ulm seemed as unlikely a place as anywhere in West Germany to 
become an epicenter in the country’s judicial attempts to confront its Nazi past. A small city 
downstream from the Danube’s origins, Ulm was a conservative town in a conservative state. 
Since the return of the political parties in postwar West Germany, Ulm voted to the right.
15
 
During the 1950s, debates over the prosecution of former Nazis fell fairly strictly along 
political lines. The Christian Democrats, under Chancellor Adenauer, favored continued 
amnesty in the name of social cohesion; the Social Democrats on the left, however, 
increasingly pushed the need to deal more seriously with the Nazi past.
16
 Ulm was proudly 
Christian Democratic, even earning a reputation as a hard-line, conservative West German 
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city.
17
 From a political standpoint, the city seemed more likely to harbor Nazi criminals than 
to prosecute them. 
Ulm’s main cultural and historical legacies today consist of laying claim to the 
world’s tallest cathedral steeple and being the birthplace of Albert Einstein and hometown of 
Erwin Rommel. Most German schoolchildren encounter the Swabian town through a tongue-
twisting mnemonic for remembering prepositions: In Ulm, um Ulm, und um Ulm herum (in 
Ulm, about Ulm, and all around Ulm). The Ulm Spatz (sparrow) had been the symbol of the 
city since the construction of the iconic cathedral that soars above the town in the middle 
ages. The story goes that in trying to move timber past the city walls for a new town hall, 
builders became stuck at the narrow entry gate. While debating whether to destroy the walls 
or change the building plans, a sparrow flew overhead and began to lay branches lengthwise 
to fit into the nest. Suddenly, the solution to the lumber problem was solved: rotate the 
lumber ninety-degrees and it could pass unfettered through the city’s gates.  
The humble stories Ulmers tell about themselves belie the important and turbulent 
past of the city. The Danube, with its mouth hundreds of miles away on the Black Sea coast, 
has defined the city, and Ulm's fortunes have risen and fallen on its waters. Although not yet 
the broad and inspiring river of Vienna or Budapest, the Danube in Ulm is fully navigable, 
and Ulm derived its strategic importance from serving as a gateway between the Danube 
proper and the Black Forest rivulets upstream. It was from these shores that many medieval 
Germanic merchants – the Donauschwaben – disembarked to settle the fertile valley in 
Eastern Europe. During this time, Ulm flourished as a trading center; in addition to the east to 
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west flow of goods down river, the city became an important stop on trade between Germany 
and the rich urban areas of Northern Italy. Under Frederick Barbarossa and his Hohenstaufen 
dynasty, Ulm became a free imperial city, and this wealth bequeathed Ulm its monumental 
cathedral. Centuries later, Napoleon achieved a critical victory at Ulm over the Austrians, 
who sought refuge behind the city’s strong walls only to be surrounded and, lacking aid, 
forced to surrender. Although Ulm maintained strategic military importance and 
industrialized during the nineteenth century, by the twentieth it had comfortably settled into 
its position as a second-tier German city filled with monuments to its once prominent self.  
 By 1945, most of this historic center of Ulm lay in ruins, as the city’s interior 
mirrored the condition of much of urban Germany. Eighty-five percent of the city had been 
destroyed; of 12,756 prewar buildings, only 2,633 remained undamaged.
18
 The population 
had dropped from its prewar level of 68,585 to 28,585. This forty percent decline was mostly 
due to mass exodus from the city, though 5,761 Ulm inhabitants died as a result of the war 
itself.
19
 Not until 1951 did the city return to its prewar population. During the war, the city 
produced military trucks among other war assets, which made it a valuable aerial raid target. 
Due to its position in the far south of Germany, however, the Allies were unable to strike 
substantially at Ulm until the later stages of the war. By 1944, with aerial supremacy over 
Germany nearly complete, Ulm began to suffer sustained attacks. On the evening of 
December 17, 1944, the worst single day of bombing in the city, an estimated 25,000 
inhabitants lost their homes and 700 were killed. By the end of the war, only the blackened 
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cathedral spire provided a reminder that the city had once been Ulm.
20
 Allies and the 
civilians now set themselves to the enormous task of creating order out of the city of rubble. 
The Danube that bisected the city also served as a dividing line for the postwar state 
boundaries. The east bank of the river became part of Bavaria, while the western part, home 
to the majority of the city and its historic center, belonged to Württemberg-Baden. During the 
immediate postwar years, however, both fell into the U.S. occupation zone. A more logical 
border would have placed Ulm in the French-controlled Württemberg-Hohenzollern, but 
Americans wanted control of the entire Karlsruhe-Munich Autobahn, which passed near 
Ulm.
21
 As a result, from the first days of the postwar period, Ulm became a city on the 
margins of the state with its capital sixty miles northwest in Stuttgart. By 1952, 
Württemberg-Baden merged with the former French occupation zones of neighboring 
Württemberg-Hohenzollern and Baden (Südbaden), to form the current state of Baden-
Württemberg.
22
  
One of the immediate challenges to the occupiers was establishing a functioning 
judiciary to maintain peace and restore civilian order within Germany.
23
 In the American 
zone of Württemberg-Baden, the state attorney general worked out of the capital, Stuttgart, 
while a number of other secondary prosecutor’s offices were established regionally 
throughout the state. Ulm became the home of one of these branches. Once the new West 
German judiciary had been created, Allies faced a challenge in staffing it. The German legal 
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system had been one of the most thoroughly nazified professions during the Third Reich, and 
in many cases, the most talented jurists were also the most severely implicated in crimes of 
the state.
24
 Many members of the legal community found it necessary to join the Nazi party 
in order to advance within the ranks of the judiciary, making it exceptionally difficult to find 
able jurists not tainted by Nazism to fill the postwar ranks. Those who had not joined the 
party, meanwhile, constituted a mixed-bag of personalities. Some were exceptional citizens 
determined to make a moral statement through their refusal, others were obstinate individuals 
who preferred to zig when others zagged. When the American occupiers chose Rudolf Saup 
to head the Ulm prosecutor's office in 1945, they got a person who tilted towards the 
stubborn end of the spectrum.  
Saup, like many involved in the Ulm Einsatzkommando trial, was not originally from 
Ulm. Born in 1897 in a village outside Roggendorf, itself a small town near the northern 
German city of Lübeck, Saup first came to the area as a university student in Tübingen.
25
 
One of the premier universities in Germany, Tübingen trained many of the legal minds 
behind the Ulm trial.
26
 After receiving his doctorate of law in 1925, Saup began work as an 
assistant prosecutor within the Stuttgart area until promoted to district attorney in Ulm in 
1940. According to a later denazification panel, he navigated Hitler's rule without ever 
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joining the Nazi party, and for this reason, the American occupiers appointed him the head 
prosecutor of Ulm in 1945, a position he would hold until retiring in 1962.
27
 
In this position, Saup provided badly needed stability. Given the destruction of Ulm’s 
urban landscape, the importance of establishing a reliable and functioning judiciary cannot be 
overstated. The development of this apparatus was one of Saup’s signature achievements. As 
a newspaper article later noted, “It is thanks to Saup that the Ulm prosecutor's office was 
reorganized under difficult circumstances after the overthrow and became a model 
functioning office.”28 Saup benefited in particular from already having worked in Ulm for a 
number of years. Unlike many replacements after 1945, he knew the office and the region, 
and this familiarity helped him maintain his position until retiring in 1962.  
 Saup's stability, however, came with drawbacks. For one, he lacked vision and sought 
stability through a conservation of effort. His superior, State Attorney General Erich 
Nellmann, later described him as “not a particularly active prosecutor.”29 Especially when it 
came to politically sensitive situations, as with the Fischer-Schweder investigation, Saup 
preferred to tread water, neither impeding these efforts through overt inaction nor advancing 
them through exerted efforts. He hoped, it seemed, to avoid the attention that might attend 
either end of the spectrum. Saup’s aloof attitude created an uninspired culture within the 
prosecutor’s office. Nellmann noted that although he had always found Saup to be “courteous 
and friendly,” those who worked under him complained that he “was not in very close 
contact” with them. 
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Rudolf Mettler, in particular, chafed under Saup's leadership during the Fischer-
Schweder case. Later Saup's replacement, Mettler spent the 1950s as head of the major 
crimes unit in Ulm.
30
 In this capacity, the allegations brought against Fischer-Schweder fell 
under his oversight. Together, the two Rudolfs defined the first year of the investigation. 
While Mettler conducted daily oversight of the investigation, it was Saup’s occasional 
interventions that determined the permissible scale and scope of Mettler's efforts. 
Increasingly, Mettler felt that the upper bounds of the efforts and resources Saup allowed for 
the investigation of the case fell shy of what was needed to bring the matter to a satisfying 
resolution. Saup never freed Mettler from his other case obligations to pursue the Fischer-
Schweder case. At one point in 1956, Mettler had fifty-four additional cases on his plate.
31
 
Greatly overworked, Mettler could not devote the time and attention to the Fischer-Schweder 
investigation that he would have preferred.  
Mettler’s approach to law contrasted with Saup’s timid and constricting leadership. 
He combined a deliberative, detail-oriented approach with a tendency to theorize, making 
him a hybrid of a desk-bound German bureaucrat and an ivory tower intellectual. “The art of 
being a good attorney,” Mettler once stated, “is not only knowledge of the articles and 
methods of criminal investigations, but also the capacity to understand the man or the woman 
who is sitting in the dock.”32 While he stressed the need to master the technical aspects of the 
profession, it is significant that he saw what he did as an art. There were many rote, routine, 
and perfunctory aspects of the discipline, but at its core beat a human heart. This thoughtful, 
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methodical, and empathetic approach made for first-rate results, but came at the cost of 
significant effort and time. In Saup's mechanized and routinized office, Mettler's deliberative 
style found few rewards and little encouragement. Without the freedom to explore cases as 
he saw fit, Mettler operated under constant strain. Overworked, he suffered from frequent 
health issues and was prone to nervous attacks.
33
 Despite such limitations, colleagues thought 
highly of Mettler. Even Saup acknowledged that “he has very good legal skills, excellent 
knowledge of criminal law, and is a very reliable, very thorough and also diligent worker.”34 
Mettler first came to Ulm in 1948. Born about one-hundred miles northwest in 
Maulbronn on November 5, 1905, Mettler grew up in a well-educated Lutheran family. His 
father held a doctorate and served as principal at a nearby school. At the age of seventeen, he 
attended a Protestant seminary, where he received the equivalent of his Gymnasium degree in 
1924. After taking his first legal examination in 1931, Mettler began work as a clerk in the 
Ellwangen courtroom. His political sensibilities are unclear, but Mettler did join the Nazi 
party in 1933. Likely, his membership derived from professional expectations, though he 
spent several years as a Blockleiter, a low level Nazi position analogous to heading a 
neighborhood watch, in Ellwangen.
35
 From 1937 until 1945, Mettler became a full-time 
prosecutor in Kempten in the Allgäu region. With the occupation of Germany, Mettler was 
interned for six months by the Allies. Purged from his post, he spent several years out of the 
legal field. After a 1948 decision by the Ellwangen court that he had been a Category IV 
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Mitläufer in the Nazi cause, Mettler received an offer to join the prosecutor's office in Ulm 
under the leadership of Saup.
36
 
Beginning in June of that year, Mettler took up his position in Ulm, commuting over 
fifty miles each day from Kempten.
37
 Finally contented with the position a year later, he 
relocated his family to Ulm in May 1948.
38
 At that point, Mettler had three children with his 
first wife. Married since 1936, she died at the age of forty-nine in May 1952.
39
 Ten months 
later, Mettler had another child with a second wife, Hilde.
40
 Although he suffered recurring 
health problems during the 1950s, Mettler was able to settle into his life in Ulm and spend 
time with his family. He developed a passion for gardening, hiking the nearby Swabian Alps, 
and playing music.
41
 Over the coming years, he and Hilde had two more children. Mettler 
had thus experienced a series of advances and reverses since 1945. His health faltered for 
years and he lost his first wife at a young age, but he found a new partner, continued to grow 
his family, and secured an important position in the prosecutor's office in Ulm. 
In June 1955, Mettler received the case that would prove the most challenging and 
physically draining of his entire career. It is likely that Saup and Mettler were already 
familiar with the Fischer-Schweder scandal. His poorly conceived lawsuit against the state 
government had brought unfavorable and prominent media attention in the Ulm newspapers, 
and one would expect the prosecutor’s office to stay abreast of the happenings in the nearby 
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labor court. When the allegations against Fischer-Schweder from the former Memel 
secretary, Meta Poneleit, arrived at their office, perhaps they had already been bracing for a 
possible investigation. But the specific crimes alleged certainly shocked their sensibilities. 
The prosecutor’s office responded on June 15, asking the police “to carry out the necessary 
investigations to clarify the accusations leveled against the accused.”42 
 
The Banker and the Mechanic 
By endorsing the efforts of the investigators to date, Mettler gave the go-ahead to the 
Stuttgart detectives to continue their preliminary investigation. Since the investigators so far 
had uncovered nothing specific, Mettler urged them to continue digging, but only when 
clarification was needed or the investigators had taken a wrong turn did Mettler directly 
involve himself in the case. With so many additional cases demanding Mettler’s immediate 
attention, this chance investigation into a fifteen-year-old crime did not occupy much space 
at his cluttered work desk. As another prosecutor later explained the situation, “He could 
either properly work on the Fischer-Schweder case, or on the other cases.”43 The conspicuous 
absence of the Ulm prosecutors meant that from this point until early 1956, the major 
developments in the case took place in the police headquarters in Stuttgart.  
The key personnel involved during the investigation were the detectives at the North-
Württemberg police headquarters in Stuttgart. At this time, Erwin Stimpfig, a thirty-nine year 
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old Stuttgart native oversaw the unit responsible for murder cases.
44
 Helmut Opferkuch and 
Robert Weida joined the case in its earliest days and stayed on as the main investigators 
through the Ulm trial in 1958. After the trial concluded, both were appointed to a new task 
force for the investigation of Nazi criminals. Although they made their subsequent careers as 
Nazi crimes specialists as a direct consequence of the Fischer-Schweder case, prior to this 
neither had direct experience with investigations of the sort they were about to undertake.  
Opferkuch did have prior experience with Fischer-Schweder, though. Since 1952, 
Opferkuch had worked in the political crimes division of the North-Württemberg state police. 
For the most part, this entailed issues with postwar refugees, which familiarized him with the 
nature of the Third Reich in Eastern Europe, but failed to give him experience in 
investigating murder cases. According to Opferkuch, he had by chance spoken with an 
officer in the Ulm branch of the state police in 1954, who mentioned that the new camp 
director, Fischer-Schweder, had been police director in Memel in 1941. When Opferkuch 
inquired about his Nazi past, he was surprised to hear that Fischer-Schweder claimed no such 
involvement. Opferkuch recalled, “I didn’t believe him. So I began to investigate.”45 He went 
through the available party membership information and turned up elements of the Berlin 
Document Center findings that would later force Fischer-Schweder’s resignation, in turn 
triggering the lawsuit and Poneleit allegations. Because of this early involvement, Opferkuch 
requested to work the case when the criminal allegations surfaced the following year. 
Little in his background suggested that he would go on to become one of the leading 
Nazi crimes investigators in West Germany. Born on November 16, 1919, in 
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Adelmannsfelden, near Aalen, Helmut Opferkuch spent most of his prewar life in 
Ludwigsburg, where his father relocated to open a plant nursery in 1925. Opferkuch received 
training in banking, and beginning in 1939, the young man started work as a salaried banker 
in Ludwigsburg.
46
 His employment came to a quick end, as it did for most twenty-year-old 
German males, as war broke out in earnest. In 1941, he entered military service in Heilbronn, 
until his Wehrmacht unit transferred to the North Caucasus in 1942. During the retreat in 
1943, he moved back to the Crimea where he served on coastal patrol. Injured in June 1944, 
Opferkuch lost most hearing in his left ear. He spent much of the following year in the 
military hospital. His military career ended during the retreat through northern Italy, where 
he was captured by the U.S. army and held until July 1946. 
After the war, Opferkuch had every intention of returning to his prewar life. He 
moved back to Ludwigsburg and married in 1946. Finding a position as a banker, however, 
proved difficult. In occupied Germany, there was little need for bankers; instead, there was 
an entire bureaucracy to rebuild, ideally using the least nazified parts of German society. 
Since Opferkuch had served only as a young soldier during the war and did not have party 
membership, he was a candidate for the new German civil service. When he and another man 
went to the employment office to find a job, they were told that two positions were available: 
one in the police, the other as a clerk. Neither man expressed a preference, and so they 
decided to draw straws.
47
 Based on this moment’s decision and quite literally the luck of the 
draw, Opferkuch went from being a banker to a detective. He worked briefly for a few years 
outside Stuttgart before his transfer in 1952 to the police headquarters in Stuttgart.  
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The assignment to the Fischer-Schweder case therefore signified a major promotion 
for Opferkuch regarding the kind of cases he normally worked. A detective for less than ten 
years and just thirty-five years old, such an assignment could either signal the talents of the 
young detective or reflect the relative low priority this case held within the police force. 
Likely, truth lies on both sides. Opferkuch brought familiarity with Fischer-Schweder to the 
case, which helped in certain respects. But asking a junior detective, with no experience in 
murder cases – let alone mass murder cases – to investigate crimes that took place over a 
decade ago in an unfamiliar land raises legitimate questions about how seriously the 
prosecutor’s office and the police force took the Fischer-Schweder case.  
Opferkuch did not work the case in isolation. The other major detective was Robert 
Weida. Not a banker, but a mechanic by training, Weida worked alongside Opferkuch. As the 
senior officer, Weida was not always as active as Opferkuch in the field, but he did 
coordinate efforts between the detectives, the higher-level state police officials, and the Ulm 
prosecutors. A committed Social Democrat, Weida had perhaps the clearest and most explicit 
political ambitions in investigating Nazi crimes of any justice officials involved in the Ulm 
case.
48
 In the wake of the trial, he too would join the detectives’ commission for the Zentrale 
Stelle and become an outspoken advocate for the importance of Nazi crimes prosecutions.
49
  
Just a few years older than Opferkuch, Weida was born in 1915 to a Protestant family 
in Freiburg. He began work there as a mechanic until 1936, when he joined the military.
50
 In 
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the Luftwaffe, Weida served in Italy and later France until 1945, at which point he was 
captured and taken into an English prisoner of war camp.
51
 Two months later, Weida was 
released, and in 1947 the denazification Spruchkammer in Heilbronn declared him “not 
affected” by Nazism.52 The postwar opened up opportunities for those without Nazi pasts, 
and Weida began work as a rank-and-file police officer in a small town outside Heilbronn in 
1946.
53
 After additional training, he joined the state police headquarters in Stuttgart in 1949 
as a clerk (Sachbearbeiter), and by 1954, received a promotion to senior detective 
(Kriminalobersekretär).
54
 In this position, he and Opferkuch, under their superior Stimpfig 
and on the instructions of Mettler, carried out the investigation of Fischer-Schweder. 
Although Opferkuch and Weida would go on to be the leading West German 
investigators of Nazi crimes, they were both neophytes when it came to investigating the 
types of crimes alleged against Fischer-Schweder in 1955, and they faced a steep learning 
curve. One challenge at the onset regarded the West German legal approach to Nazi crimes. 
Rather than prosecuting “crimes against humanity,” as the Allies had done and which most 
Germans condemned as ex post facto law, the state decided to prosecute all such crimes 
under the 1940 German criminal code. This meant that the state drew no legal distinction 
between state-sanctioned, state-organized mass executions and first-degree murder 
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committed by deviant individuals.
55
 To prove Fischer-Schweder guilty of murder, the 
investigators therefore needed specific evidence that he had taken human life in accordance 
with the strict West German criteria that distinguished first-degree murder from homicide. 
This, in turn, required proving a base motive, blood lust, treacherousness, or maliciousness. 
These categories required the investigators to go beyond the question of whether or not 
Fischer-Schweder had carried out massacres; they had to prove that he had acted of his own 
volition, behaved in a particularly gratuitous and heinous manner, or internalized the base 
motives of his superiors if he had merely carried out orders. The question of motivation was 
central. In their efforts to find evidence of crimes, they were as interested in the personality 
of Fischer-Schweder as they were in his actions, a factor that would drive the interrogations. 
The West German legal interpretation that murder was murder, regardless of the 
regime under which it occurred, did not hold in practice, however. Most investigations start 
with a crime, and the work of the detective is to identify the criminal. But instances like the 
Fischer-Schweder case inverted this dynamic. Detectives received information that he had 
engaged in criminal behavior, and the purpose of the investigation was to identify the crimes. 
This shift required an entirely different approach to a murder investigation, and from the 
outset, Opferkuch and Weida were unsure how to proceed. Their plan was to find former 
Memel police associates of Fischer-Schweder and interrogate them about his tenure as police 
director and learn what they could about any possible shootings in the Memel region. With 
no concrete evidence of crimes, they hoped the former police would supply this. Yet this 
strategy yielded only five interviews during the first two months of the investigation.  
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Simply locating these individuals proved a challenge. At this point in West Germany, 
there was no centralized resource for the detectives to consult regarding the types of alleged 
crimes. No central database contained the names of those who had served in various units or 
in the Memel police force. From the initial Poneleit statements, the detectives had learned of 
various other individuals who might be able to shed light on the possible crimes involving 
Fischer-Schweder from 1941, but connecting these names to real individuals with specific 
addresses in West Germany proved extraordinarily difficult. Poneleit herself, as mentioned 
earlier, had fingered Schmidt-Hammer as possibly involved in shootings, but investigators 
could not find anyone with the spelling she provided. The same challenges confronted them 
with other individuals: were they looking for Kleinmann or Kveimann, Mischkat or 
Meschkat?
56
 With no centralized options or coordinating agency, the detectives were forced 
to send off inquiry after inquiry to various local police offices, representative agencies from 
former East Prussian cities, and town administrations in hopes of finding a match.
57
 
Predictably, these efforts rarely found success. 
Not until late July 1955 did the investigators carry out the first interrogation of 
consequence. Stuttgart investigator Opferkuch traveled north to Peine to speak with Hans 
Günther, a man mentioned in Poneleit’s statement.58 Born in 1889, Günther had been a major 
in the Schutzpolizei in Memel during Fischer-Schweder’s tenure, as well Schmidt-Hammer’s 
superior, which made him a potential source of a great deal of information on executions and 
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on Schmidt-Hammer’s whereabouts. Opferkuch came prepared to discuss Fischer-Schweder 
and his criminality. Günther was more than willing to help make a case against the police 
director in order to deflect attention off himself. Even though Günther professed “no close 
professional contact with him and absolutely no insights into his personal life,” he described 
Fischer-Schweder as “an excessively committed Nazi,” who was “often drunk on the job.”59  
Regarding Fischer-Schweder’s crimes, Günther claimed “no Jews were to be found in 
Memel at the time in question,” but recalled “that multiple shootings of Jews were carried out 
in the border towns of Polangen and Krottingen, directly on the German-Memelland border, 
in the timeframe from 1940-1943.” Fischer-Schweder had “gathered together a shooting 
squad [Erschiessungskommando] from a group of Schutzpolizei…approximately thirty men, 
or one platoon.” Though he could not say for certain, he reasoned that the orders for these 
shootings must have originated from a higher office, since Fischer-Schweder had no 
jurisdiction outside Memel. More precise details on any shootings escaped his memory. 
Opferkuch asked for others with whom he should speak, and Günther stated that his former 
adjutants, Schwerdtfeger and Schmidt-Hammer, had been involved in these shootings and 
could provide additional details. He insisted that he had taken no role in any executions and 
noted that “even though I belonged to the Nazi Party since 1933, I am not an opponent of 
Jews,” offering as proof that he went to a Jewish doctor in the early 1930s.60 
Encouraged by the interview, Opferkuch wrote his superiors. He believed that 
Günther had “incriminated Fischer-Schweder with his claim that the order for the creation of 
a shooting squad was issued by him…. Possibly he is himself not fully responsible, but had 
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only relayed the order.”61 These statements had proven useful, particularly since Günther had 
been a prominent official within the Memel civil service. Unlike many subsequent witnesses, 
Günther seemed relatively willing to discuss the situation along the German-Lithuanian 
border in 1941, yet later evidence would indicate that he held a much larger role in the 
massacres than he admitted to Opferkuch.
62
 Unfortunately for the investigators, he died soon 
after the interview, and they had no opportunity to speak with him further.
63
  
Nearly two weeks after the Günther interview, Weida and Opferkuch combined 
efforts and traveled to Kaiserslautern to interrogate Gerhard Schwerdtfeger, who had been 
Günther’s adjutant in Memel and supposedly took part in mass executions alongside Fischer-
Schweder.
64
 Not much older than Weida and Opferkuch, Schwerdtfeger had served in Memel 
since 1940 and relocated to Kaiserslautern in 1954 from his hometown Berlin. As the three 
men discussed the Fischer-Schweder case on August 10, the former adjutant agreed with 
Günther’s statements that an execution squad “of one officer and thirty men” had been 
organized “by the police director.” When pressed about whether the victims of these 
shootings were Jews from a camp or ghetto, Schwerdtfeger stated that “to my knowledge 
there were no camps of Jews in the entire area. If I recall correctly, it was saboteurs, spies, or 
similar elements.” Contrary to what Günther indicated, he insisted that he “neither led the 
shooting squad nor took part in it as a witness.” Instead, he claimed “Schmitthammer” had 
been the officer in charge of the unit. Finally, Schwerdtfeger described Fischer-Schweder as 
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the kind of “egomaniacal” person who “acted more from emotion rather than like a man who 
had a thorough education.”65  
Following the Schwerdtfeger interrogation, the investigation stalled. In the previous 
two months, Weida and Opferkuch had conducted only two meaningful interviews. It was 
clear that “Schmitthammer” was a person of interest, but they had no success tracking him 
down. For the next two months, they failed to advance the case through any additional 
interviews. They spoke with three other individuals, but these could offer “no incriminating 
statements” on Fischer-Schweder.66 Through interrogations of Poneleit, Günther, and 
Schwerdtfeger, they had learned only that Fischer-Schweder had been widely disliked and 
that executions took place somewhere in the Memel vicinity in 1941. It was not immediately 
clear though that anything illegal had occurred. Poneleit had alleged the shooting of Jewish 
civilians, but by her own admission, she had no direct knowledge of the events she described. 
Moreover, the other witnesses, who were both officers, insisted no Jewish ghettoes or camps 
existed within the area at that time. Instead, Schwerdtfeger claimed that any people shot were 
spies and saboteurs, which would have made their deaths permissible under international law.  
The investigators’ inability to find concrete information also reflected their lack of 
knowledge and faulty assumptions about the circumstances in which these executions took 
place. Both investigators were attuned to the seriousness of the allegations Poneleit leveled 
about the shooting of Jews in a ghetto. This story corresponded to the conceptions of the 
Holocaust handed down through popular culture and the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg and successor trials. These ideas characterized the Holocaust as taking place in 
                                                 
65
 Statement by Gerhard Schwerdtfeger (Kaiserslautern, 10 August 1955), EL 322/II, Bü 1, SL. 
 
66
 Statement by Artur Hennig (Hamburg, 30 July 1955), EL 322/II, Bü 1, SL; Opferkuch to 
Landespolizeidirektion Nord-Württemberg (30 July 1955), EA 48/2 I, Bü 3110, SL. 
 
142 
 
ghettoes, camps, or in the fields at the hands of preselected dyed-in-the-wool fanatic 
Einsatzgruppen members. But such scenarios did not map onto the events in the border area 
of the summer of 1941. There were no camps or ghettos at this point in the Memel area, and 
because the investigation targeted a former police director, no one suspected open-air mass 
executions. The expectations, then, that any crimes committed must have involved camps or 
ghettoes framed the investigation.  
Because of the detectives’ misconceptions, those interrogated gained the upper hand 
in the investigation. Men like Schwerdtfeger and Günther knew exactly what had happened 
along the border. There had been no camps or ghettoes, but there had been mass executions. 
When they heard detectives asking generic questions about Memel area ghettoes and 
concentration camps, they knew the detectives were unaware of the mass executions or of the 
enormity of the crimes they were probing into. As former police officers themselves, the 
witnesses therefore fed the detectives what they wanted to hear. They helped to make a case 
against Fischer-Schweder by providing negative images of the police director, all the while 
concealing the true extent and nature of the crimes carried out by the shooting squad.  
The consequence of these deceptions was that from June until October 1955, Weida 
and Opferkuch’s efforts had been sidelined into an investigative cul-de-sac. Detectives not 
did not know how to pursue this case effectively and they seemed to lack drive. Despite the 
enormous scale of the crimes and their politically sensitive nature, there was no urgency in 
the first four months of the Fischer-Schweder investigation. The investigators worked their 
case in isolation, with little input from the Ulm prosecutors. Without any external pressure 
pushing the investigation, the case languished. Barring any new breakthroughs, prosecution 
seemed unlikely.  
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Pressure from the Jewish Community 
Otto Böhnke, a resident of Ulm originally from Memel, read with great interest an 
exchange in the Ulmer Nachrichten in late May 1955. He saw first an article about Bernhard 
Fischer-Schweder, the former police director of Memel, suing the labor court for 
reinstatement to a refugee camp position. The following day, the paper ran a letter of defense 
from Fischer-Schweder, in which he declared his clean background and proper behavior in 
the Third Reich. Böhnke did not know Fischer-Schweder personally, but had heard of his 
reputation as a “150 percent Nazi.”67 He had been a refugee and spent time in a postwar 
displaced persons camp and was outraged that “despite the good intentions of the responsible 
offices to help refugees, the bad intentions of a few often twist these positives around.”  
Surprised by the disparity between Fischer-Schweder’s bad reputation in Memel and 
the self-image he was trying to promote, Böhnke wrote to a former acquaintance, Wilhelm 
Kersten, about the issue. Although the two had not seen each other since 1939, Böhnke knew 
that Kersten had worked under Fischer-Schweder in Memel. Moreover, Böhnke had learned 
that Kersten “was arrested on account of this man [Fischer-Schweder].” He forwarded 
Fischer-Schweder’s letter to the editor and asked, “What do you think about this situation, 
my dear Mr. Kersten? Should we accept this defense of Fischer-Schweder’s, which combines 
poetry and truth? Or would it not be better to at least bring a little of his behavior in Memel 
to light? What can you say about this from your own knowledge?”68  
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Slightly over a month later, Kersten responded.
69
 Writing from Hannover, he seemed 
genuinely glad to have heard from an old colleague. Regarding the situation at hand, Kersten 
was baffled. Fischer-Schweder’s claims had rested on two main points: first that he had 
joined the SS against his will, and second that he had acted with charity toward all civilians, 
regardless of race or creed. Both hit false notes for Kersten. Regarding Fischer-Schweder’s 
alleged victimization by the SS, he replied to Böhnke, “Mr. Fischer had explained to me that 
he did everything he could in order to go from the SA to the SS.” Kersten had also shared the 
letter to the editor with another former Memel policeman, Max Kahlberg, and upon reading 
the claims, “He could only shake his head that he [Fischer-Schweder] had supposedly been a 
friend to Jews and Poles.” According to Kersten, “Fischer-Schweder…led the first shooting 
of some 100 Jews in Garsden.”70 
After receiving this incriminating statement, Böhnke seems to have gone first to the 
refugee camp where Fischer-Schweder had worked to determine the best course of action. 
There he was put in touch with the main Baden-Württemberg Jewish cultural organization, 
the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung – Württemberg und Hohenzollern. An Ulm representative 
of the agency responded to the Fischer-Schweder allegations with frustration that “such a 
man could slip by all denazification authorities” and forwarded the statement on to the head 
of the organization, Josef Warscher.
71
 Warscher, a Buchenwald survivor, had been head of 
the organization since it was re-founded in 1945.
72
 Its predecessor, forced to close by the 
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Nazis in 1933, dated back to the early nineteenth century, and as such, the organization’s re-
founding formed an important part of reconstituting Jewish life in West Germany.
73
 By the 
mid-1950s, the agency spoke for over five hundred Jews living in the state, and this 
collective voice, as the surviving remnant of the substantial pre-1933 Jewish community, 
could have substantial effect if brought to bear on the judiciary.
74
 
On September 12, 1955, Warscher forwarded the Kersten allegations on to the Ulm 
prosecutor’s office.75 The information had a tremendous and immediate impact, more 
significant in many ways than the initial Poneleit allegations. Warscher wrote a one-sentence 
letter stating, “We hereby file a criminal complaint against Mr. Fischer-Schweder and, 
regarding that, refer to the section marked in red on the second page.” What followed was a 
copy of Kersten’s letter to Böhnke with the allegations of a mass execution in Garsden 
heavily underlined. This letter affected both the prosecutors and investigators. For Saup and 
Mettler, the intervention of this external, critical public voice added the sense of urgency 
absent from the first few months of the investigation. The Fischer-Schweder case had always 
threatened to scandalize the state, and perhaps because of this, there was little overt pressure 
to dig up details about his past if no one was asking. But now, the main Jewish agency of the 
region was asking and in fact demanding an investigation. This did not mean that the Ulm 
prosecutors needed to devote maximum effort, but at least something above the tokenism of 
sending a few investigators off on a handful of interrogations.  
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 Mettler sent the Kersten letter on to the Stuttgart detectives a few days after receiving 
it “with the request for the instatement and instigation [Anstellung und Veranlassung] of the 
necessary investigations.”76 For Weida and Opferkuch, the Kersten allegations provided the 
needed shot in the arm. Even the explosive sentence revealed three crucial details: “Fischer-
Schweder…led the first shooting of some 100 Jews in Garsden.”77 The place name of 
Garsden gave immediate strength to the investigation. As the Günther and Schwerdtfeger 
statements indicated, asking about vague crimes led to vague answers. Asking about a 
specific crime, though, greatly enhanced their ability to extract actionable responses from the 
witnesses. It also got the investigators off their misguided emphasis on unknown camps and 
ghettos, focusing instead on executions carried out within a small town. Second, the 
implication that this was only the first execution turned the investigators on to the fact that 
there was a complex of mass shootings during the period. If Fischer-Schweder had only been 
involved in one of these, at the very least that meant there were others who also had been 
involved. Finally, Kersten contradicted the Schwerdtfeger claim that only partisans and spies 
were shot with his explicit assertion that those killed had been Jews. 
 Most important was that the investigators now had a few more people to interrogate. 
Kersten and his colleague Kahlberg had both suggested intimate knowledge of Fischer-
Schweder and the executions. To determine whether or not these actions rose to the level of a 
prosecutable crime, Opferkuch and Weida followed up with the two men. Since both 
witnesses lived far north in Hanover, the detectives turned to the local Hanoverian police to 
carry out the interrogation. Weida wrote them with a list of five questions for Kersten and 
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Kahlberg. Straightforward questions, they concerned who “organized and carried out the 
shootings,” what “role Fischer-Schweder played,” whether or not these executions were 
carried out due to a “court order or on the order of a superior office,” what the precise details 
of the shootings were, and finally “names and addresses of additional witnesses.”78  
This process of relying on local police officials to carry out interrogations became the 
norm during the first year of the investigation. From June 1955 until May 1956, the Stuttgart 
detectives traveled for the case just six times.
79
 Two of these had already come during the 
Günther and Schwerdtferger interrogations. For the most part, they outsourced their 
interrogations, trusting in the capacity of their fellow police officers to pursue the case as best 
they could. A sheet of questions, they reasoned, could provide adequate answers. By contrast, 
during the last two years of the investigation, from May 1956 until the case was prepared for 
trial in January 1958, the detectives traveled 102 times. To some extent, this reflects the 
general slow pace of the first year of the investigation, compared with its second phase. But 
the farming out of interrogations to other departments also significantly led to this disparity 
in travel time devoted to the investigation. Although less expensive, the reliance on other 
departments became detrimental to the investigation later on, as will become apparent in the 
next chapter. During the first year of the investigation, Weida and Opferkuch tended to 
analyze interrogations, but carried out few of their own.  
Hanoverian police spoke first with Kersten on Friday, October 7.
80
 The fifty-year old 
East Prussian native offered detailed and incriminating information about Fischer-Schweder. 
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He described how “a few days after the outbreak of war with Russia, the first execution of 
Jews was carried out in Garsden, Lithuania (about 20 kilometers from Memel).” Although he 
did not know who ordered the shooting, he recalled that “some 200 Jews (men, women, and 
children) had to dig out their own grave. Then they were shot about ten each by officers, who 
were under the leadership and oversight of Police Director Fischer-Schweder, in the presence 
of multiple Gestapo officers.” As a driver in the police, Kersten stated that he observed these 
executions, but did not take part in the shootings. “I myself watched,” he stated, “as Fischer-
Schweder, following the actions of the officers, shot Jews dying in the grave with his pistol.” 
As to the question of whether these executions were performed based on “a court order or the 
order of a superior office,” Kersten claimed not to know.81 
 After the weekend, detectives interrogated Max Kahlberg, who also lived in 
Hannover and like Kersten, had been a driver in the Memel police.
82
 Unlike Kersten, he 
claimed he did “not see or witness anything with my own eyes.” Nevertheless, he had been 
Fischer-Schweder’s driver with regularity and stated, “At the time, I had the feeling that 
Fischer-Schweder took a great deal of pleasure, joy [Lust], and lust [Wollust] in these 
executions of Jews and always was interested in them. He was an outspoken Jew-hater.” 
When the Hanover detectives pressed him on details, Kahlberg described an execution that 
had taken place not in Garsden, but in Polangen, north of Memel along the North Sea coast. 
In June 1941, he had “to drive some 22 police officers to Polangen. My comrades later 
explained to me…that over seventy Jews had to be shot.” He could only recall a few 
particularities of the execution, such as that “before the shooting the Jews took off their 
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jewelry.” He stated that similar executions took place in Krottingen and Garsden. He also 
reported a story he heard about Fischer-Schweder at the Polangen execution that “one Jew, 
who only had his finger shot off, in mortal fear started a scuffle with Fischer-Schweder, who 
then killed him with his pistol.”83 
 Following these interrogations, the detectives had gleaned important details. Weida 
and Opferkuch were now able to establish a clear timeline for any crimes: late June 1941. 
Since both alleged executions had taken place on Lithuanian soil, these massacres could only 
have occurred following the June 22, 1941 invasion. Further, they had learned of three likely 
sites of execution: Garsden, Polangen, and Krottingen. No statements could fully corroborate 
the details of the other’s, but all witnesses were in agreement that police officers from 
Memel, under the leadership of Fischer-Schweder, had comprised the firing squad at these 
sites. Moreover, every witness to this point had made an explicit point of depicting Fischer-
Schweder negatively. Kersten and Kahlberg had even described particular instances of 
Fischer-Schweder carrying out murder. Disagreement remained over whether or not the 
victims were primarily Jewish or state opponents. In all, the investigators were beginning to 
construct a solid case. Thanks to the intervention of the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung, they 
now had crime sites, a timeframe, a possible victim group, and at least one perpetrator. 
 
“A Seedy and Questionable Impression” 
 On November 3, 1955, Opferkuch filed a forty-four page criminal complaint to the 
Ulm prosecutor's office against Fischer-Schweder “on suspicion of multiple crimes of 
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murder…and creating false identification” (the latter based on his postwar frauds).84 After 
summarizing the efforts to date, the report concluded with a plan for the remainder of the 
investigation. Thanks to the recent statements they had gathered, Opferkuch began to feel 
more confident in the future of the case. No longer vainly searching for information, they 
were accumulating names of former Memel police officers and had precise questions to ask 
these potential witnesses. Nevertheless, there was a long ways to go between evidence of 
crimes and a prosecutable case. One aim was to interrogate old witnesses once more. In light 
of subsequent statements, Schwerdtfeger’s earlier claims not to have known of any shootings 
in the area were “not to be trusted.” Opferkuch intended to bring him in for further 
questioning. He also wanted to speak with Kahlberg and Kersten personally because of the 
“considerable importance” of their statements. Finally, regarding the target of the case, 
Opferkuch wrote, “The interrogation of Fischer-Schweder will not take place until newly 
discovered witnesses are interrogated about the person and events in question.” 
 The investigation had developed into a predictable pattern by this point. With the 
Cold War in full swing and financial resources pinched, there was no conversation about 
investigating the crime sites in Lithuania, which lay beyond the Iron Curtain. Opferkuch and 
Weida aimed to build their case instead on testimony from former colleagues of Fischer-
Schweder. They would speak with one, ask questions about the executions, and try to 
pinpoint Fischer-Schweder’s role therein. Each witness would then offer names of additional 
witnesses. This helped the detectives uncover the dispersed network of ex-Memel police in 
West Germany. Conspicuous in their absence from this investigative approach were the Ulm 
prosecutors. Characteristic of Saup’s office, Mettler did not directly involve himself in the 
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investigation. What developed was a one-sided affair, in which Weida and Opferkuch 
pursued the case, filed summaries of their findings off to Ulm, and received little in the way 
of direction, beyond that they maintain a focus on Fischer-Schweder. This absence of 
involvement indicates passive support for the investigative strategy of relying on former 
Memel police testimony to build the case.  
 This testimony, however, came with serious, if not yet fully realized limitations. 
Already, Weida and Opferkuch had come to realize that at least one witness had likely held 
back significant information. Prying accurate accounts from many witnesses, particularly 
when this would often involve self-incriminating information, proved an extraordinary 
challenge. In subsequent interviews, when the investigators had more precise questions, 
Schwerdtfeger and other’s memories suddenly returned, and they were able to recall precise 
names and dates that had earlier eluded them. Even if individuals were forthcoming about 
their own involvement in executions, moral and legal questions surfaced. The best witnesses 
would be those with the most firsthand knowledge of the crimes involved, which implied that 
many of these key witnesses would have been co-perpetrators of the same crimes for which 
Fischer-Schweder was being investigated. The investigators and prosecutors needed to 
confront whether or not to enlarge the investigation to these individuals. 
One of the strongest challenges of this kind came when investigators finally located 
Günther’s other adjutant, Werner Schmidt-Hammer. The detectives had tried to locate him 
since the Poneleit statements back in April, and only now, via an association of former 
Memel residents, had they succeeded in tracking the optometrist to his home in 
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Heidenheim.
85
 Schmidt-Hammer’s statements from November 9 provided the clearest picture 
yet of how the execution in Garsden was carried out, and his recollections seemed most 
reliable because of their self-incriminating nature.
86
 He recalled that shortly after the war 
with Russia started, he and others in Memel learned that “the rear guard of the advance 
German troops in Lithuania were killed by partisans.” As a result, Fischer-Schweder 
“ordered the creation of an execution squad, which was drawn from members of the 
Schutzpolizei from the Memel police.” This unit was approximately ten to twelve strong, and 
“I was appointed by Major Günther as leader of this squad.” The squad members were told 
that an SD unit had already arrested partisans, and the police would carry out the executions. 
The unit drove to Garsden, and upon arrival, Fischer-Schweder asked “that we be shown 
where the soldiers had been killed by partisans.”87  
When they arrived at the execution site in Garsden, Schmidt-Hammer saw a grave 
twenty-meters across and recalled SD officers guarding a group of forty to fifty people. “I 
had the impression,” he stated, “that it really was a question of partisans, because these 
people made a rather seedy and questionable impression…My opinion was that there were no 
Jews among these people.” Before the executions commenced, Fischer-Schweder approached 
Schmidt-Hammer, as leader of the squad, and instructed that “I should explain to the 
partisans why they are to be shot.” Soon, the SD troops brought out approximately a dozen 
prisoners, stood them before the grave in a line parallel to the execution squad. Schmidt-
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Hammer then informed the prisoners, “You are being shot in the name of the Führer for the 
murder of German troops.” The executions “took about thirty minutes.”88  
Schmidt-Hammer’s statements were a mixed bag for the investigators. On the one 
hand, he offered detailed and precise information on the Garsden executions. He did so in a 
forthcoming and polite fashion, presenting his account as one police officer to another, not 
behaving like a criminal with something to hide.
89
 For example, he informed the detectives 
that he had led an additional two executions within a week of Garsden. By placing himself in 
a central role, Schmidt-Hammer lent credibility to his claims. His account also established 
Fischer-Schweder as a principle architect of these executions. On the other hand, Schmidt-
Hammer revived claims that partisans, not Jews, were the victims of the shootings. He 
insisted that neither women nor children were among the victims, only adult male partisans. 
If the victims were enemy combatants, the legal parameters of the case shifted dramatically. 
In essence, Schmidt-Hammer’s statements clarified key aspects of the shooting, but blurred 
the most important detail that would determine the legality of the executions.  
Following Schmidt-Hammer’s statements, the investigation entered into its most 
productive period of the first year. During the two weeks leading up to December 15, the 
investigators conducted nine new interrogations. In the subsequent six months, only seven 
interrogations would occur. This spike in activity owed to the names and information 
gathered through the Schmidt-Hammer interrogation. Of the nine, there were five former 
Memel policemen (two, Kersten and Kahlberg, were being re-interrogated); one member of 
the border police office (Grenzpolizeikommissariat) in Memel; one Kreisleiter in Memel; and 
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two senior officials in East Prussia, one a commander in the Ordnungspolizei in Königsberg, 
the other District President of Gumbinnen.
90
 Although the nine interrogations continued the 
plan of speaking with former state employees (and likely co-perpetrators), the investigators 
found breadth in the types of employees they interrogated.  
These nine interrogations also yielded three significant new witnesses. One had been 
a police officer in Memel and was assigned to the execution squad in Garsden and Krottingen 
under Schmidt-Hammer. Richard Freyth, a native of Memel, was able to offer precise detail 
on these shootings, even recalling the names of several of the victims. A second witness, 
Herbert Schmidtke, a Memel native who was now living in Tuttlingen, had worked in the 
Grenzpolizeikommissariat in Memel and had little contact with Fischer-Schweder but 
firsthand knowledge of the shootings. His office, under the leadership of Erich Frohwann, 
was organized under Abteilung III of Stapostelle Tilsit. At the time, Harm Harms headed that 
division, and the entire Tilsit office was overseen by Hans-Joachim Böhme.
91
 Schmidtke at 
the time stated none of this, except that Frohwann had led the Memel office. This posed little 
threat to anyone else though, including Schmidtke himself, since “Frohwann had committed 
suicide in Prague in 1945.”92 A final new witness was Kurt Grau, the Kreisleiter of Memel. 
Not directly affiliated with the police, Grau had been a senior official within the Memel 
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government. He had been a witness to the Garsden shootings, and had regular contact with 
Fischer-Schweder. The two even hunted game together in the forests outside Memel.  
These three statements in particular, combined with the other six statements carried 
out during this two-week period, provided on-the-ground information about the shootings as 
well as the complicated command structure of the East Prussian police at the outbreak of war. 
Significantly, Opferkuch and another Stuttgart detective carried out seven of these 
interrogations on their own during a six-day trip north.
93
 Of Freyth, Schmidtke, and Grau, 
only Schmidtke was interrogated by local police and not by Opferkuch. This meant that the 
Stuttgart detectives could press witnesses immediately on unclear or contradictory points, 
where proxy interrogators lacked the background knowledge to challenge witnesses. As the 
investigation began to enter into its core weeks of activity, Weida and Opferkuch came to 
focus on three dominant questions. First, what exactly happened at the execution sites of 
Garsden, Krottingen, and Polangen? Second, what was the identity of the victims: Jews or 
partisans? Third, had Fischer-Schweder or a higher office given the orders for the 
executions? The ability of the investigators to answer these questions during the first year of 
investigation hinged on the outcome of these nine interrogations.  
To answer the first question, the investigators began to rely on a strategy of finding 
shared visual identifiers or moments from the executions to construct a solid case. Since one-
to-one mapping of memories regarding execution sites among the different participants 
seemed unlikely, the detectives tried to locate common points of reference within these 
conflicting memories. Upon reinterrogating Kersten and Kahlberg, Opferkuch pressed for 
specific details and visual markers from the executions. Kersten recounted his knowledge of 
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Garsden offering more precise information than his initial statement. He recalled that “about 
200-300” were kept in a “fenced-in horse pen” with a few Russians among them, including 
one woman.
94
 Meanwhile, Kahlberg stated that he had earlier misidentified Krottingen as 
Polangen. He insisted that his statements were true, but he had confused the place name. 
Now, he described in detail the Krottingen execution site as about five hundred meters from 
town near a “thicket [Wäldchen] with a barn or woodshed surrounded by straw or hay.”95 
Inside the barn were about fifty men, with their wives and children outside who “wept and 
wailed and wanted to try to save their own from the shooting.” These details about a horse-
pen in Garsden and a thicket and woodshed in Krottingen became points of orientation for 
the investigators as they moved the case forward. 
Richard Freyth, the newly identified Memel police officer had been present at both 
sites and corroborated certain but not all aspects of their statements.
96
 Before the Garsden 
shooting, he was assigned to a unit for a “special assignment,” but “we were not informed 
about its aims or nature.” Recalling neither dead Germans nor Russians in the town center, he 
remembered Jews being kept in a “small meadow,” which “could have been an area fenced in 
as a horse-pen.” He estimated that 100 to 120 were killed, and he “dimly recalled” one 
Russian woman among the victims. During the day, there was a Russian air attack against 
Memel and a “mushroom cloud” was visible in the sky. He also recounted a short version of 
the Krottingen executions, but could not recall any thicket or woodshed. Herbert Schmidtke 
of the Grenzpolizeikommissariat in Memel recalled the Garsden executions along similar 
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lines as Freyth, stating that a reserve lieutenant (Schmidt-Hammer) gave the firing squad 
orders to shoot groups of ten to twelve Jews.
97
 Also present at the site in his account were 
Fischer-Schweder, Frohwann, and a few SS officers. Schmidtke claimed only an 
observational role for himself at the shootings. 
Grau, the Kreisleiter, could confirm a number of these details. Not directly affiliated 
with the police, Grau represented a senior official within the Memel government, and as such 
had regular contact with Fischer-Schweder. When the war broke out, Grau worked to assist 
women and children in the rear areas of the assault. Fischer-Schweder informed him on the 
morning of June 24 that a number of civilian “snipers” had been captured in Garsden. 
Around eleven o’clock, Grau arrived to the town, where he saw a group of civilians being 
held by SD Tilsit members in a “horse-pen.” Fischer-Schweder then informed him that all 
would be shot for partisan activity. When asked if the SD personnel would carry out the 
executions, Fischer-Schweder said, “It was laughable that the SD with so few people could 
carry out the execution of so many.” After a group of police arrived, Fischer-Schweder 
explained to Grau “that because the SD was represented so weakly, he decided to take over 
the execution of those locked up with a shooting squad he had selected.” Grau stood slightly 
over fifty meters away as he watched the executions, until a “mushroom cloud” over Memel 
called him back to the city.
98
 
In his summary of the investigations from December 15, Opferkuch informed the 
Ulm prosecutors that they had likely uncovered four distinct executions.
99
 Although the 
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accounts of these did not fully fit together, key pieces of information did overlap. Most 
evidence focused on a shooting in Garsden, but additional witnesses pointed to crimes in 
Krottingen. Since Freyth and Kahlberg widely disagreed on the Krottingen shooting, 
Opferkuch concluded that two separate executions had taken place. The final execution, 
alleged by Freyth, involved the shooting of jailed partisans near Pogegen.
100
 Kahlberg had 
also indicated several other executions sites, but had no details on these.
101
 The recurring 
memory of a horse-pen used as an impromptu jail proved a distinctive feature of the Garsden 
executions. As Kahlberg’s shifting stance on whether a recalled shooting took place in 
Polangen or Krottingen indicated, place names could not be recalled with complete accuracy, 
but unusual visuals like a horse-pen or a woodshed allowed the investigators to at least 
recognize that witnesses were discussing the same event.  
The second investigative aim during this two-week burst was to determine the 
identity of the victims and the motivations for the executions. Interestingly, the rank-and-file 
were of one mind on the issue: those killed were Jews. Kersten insisted once again that 
women and children were among the victims and that “there were no partisans present 
because they simply did not exist after two or three days of war with Russia.”102 Kahlberg 
concurred that “weeks after the beginning of the hostilities with Russia there were to my 
knowledge still no partisans.”103 Instead, he could tell “by their Jewish dialect” that the 
victims were Lithuanian Jews.
104
 Many Jews living in Garsden had only recently fled from 
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Memel upon its takeover by the Germans, and Freyth knew several victims personally, such 
as the sixty-five year old Korfmann and his three adult sons who worked at the cattle market 
in prewar Memel. Herbert Schmidtke, who worked in the Grenzpolizeikommissariat, 
described Garsden’s local population as “very anti-Jewish…without any influence from 
German propaganda.”105 Not only did Germans target the town’s Jewish population, but he 
alleged that Lithuanian police had assisted in the executions. 
By contrast, the argument that those killed had been partisans remained the hallmark 
explanation of the more senior officers. Already, Schmidt-Hammer and Schwerdtfeger, two 
lieutenants in the Schutzpolizei, had explicitly made these arguments, and now Kreisleiter 
Grau presented his own version. He recalled virtually no partisan activity in the area, except 
for a “center of resistance” in Garsden.106 “It was said,” Grau explained, “that resistance in 
Garsden was carried out not by Russian troops, but from the civilian population.” Although 
he could tell “by their clothing” that many among them were Jews, Grau insisted that they 
were targeted as partisans. His demeanor in these explanations unnerved Opferkuch, who 
wrote that Grau “showed little understanding” about the seriousness of the investigation, 
even asking the detectives, “Why are you digging up these old things that we’ve moved 
beyond over the past fifteen years?” Opferkuch wrote that Grau, both then and now, “found 
the shootings of civilians fully in order.”107  
In his summary of these many interrogations, Opferkuch concluded that the identity 
of the victims had not yet been determined “with absolute certainty.” The split between the 
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officers and the non-officers only confused the issue, and many claims conflicted. Kersten 
insisted that many women and children had been shot, but others disagreed. Opferkuch 
wrote, “It is only certain that the lion’s share of those shot was made up of Jews.”108 Whether 
these people were shot because they were Jews or because they had engaged in partisan 
warfare against the invading Germans remained unresolved. 
The third major point of inquiry pursued following Schmidt-Hammer’s statements 
concerned the exact role that Fischer-Schweder played in authorizing the executions. To a 
man, the witnesses identified Fischer-Schweder as involved in the shootings, and those 
present in Garsden all recalled the police director’s presence at the shooting site. Yet, none 
could state with certainty whether Fischer-Schweder had acted on orders or had initiated the 
shootings on his own. The Memel police were least likely to know the provenance of senior 
orders, but the presence of Schmidtke’s unit and other SS officers lent credibility to the idea 
that the plan for the execution did not originate with Fischer-Schweder. As a senior official, 
Grau described in detail Fischer-Schweder’s involvement in preparing and carrying out these 
executions, but even he was unsure if the orders for the execution originated with the Memel 
police or from higher up.
109
 Another witness, who had been a commander in the order police 
in Königsberg, informed Opferkuch that if Fischer-Schweder had received his orders from a 
higher office and not carried those out, he would have faced charges of “insubordination” 
and a “likely a minimum punishment of being sent to a concentration camp.”110 
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This information led Opferkuch to inform the Ulm prosecutors that the provenance of 
the orders did not come from the local government. If Fischer-Schweder himself had not 
authorized the executions, which remained a possibility, the orders likely hailed from the 
Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) in Berlin, the SS- and Polizeiführer 
in Königsberg, or from SD Tilsit. Opferkuch then suggested two courses of options: “Either 
Fischer-Schweder should be interrogated next…or the people listed below and in the attached 
statements, so far as it’s possible, should be investigated first and heard as witnesses.”111  
 
“Infected by the Pessimistic Attitude of the Ulm Prosecutor’s Office” 
Following the productive burst of interrogations in late 1955, the case waned for the 
next five months. The Ulm prosecutor’s office faced a choice: commit more resources and 
personnel to allow the investigation to develop as needed, or bring it to a close. The types of 
crimes uncovered to date spread well beyond Fischer-Schweder, and action was needed to 
determine how this would affect the investigation. Saup, not surprisingly, stalled for months. 
In February 1956, both he and Mettler asked the detectives to follow up with new witnesses, 
as they began to prepare indictments. On February 4, 1956, Saup wrote to his superior in 
Stuttgart explaining the plan for the investigation, and Mettler wrote his own letter to the 
detectives with directives for the coming months. Both letters conveyed a lack of enthusiasm 
for the direction of the case and a desire to do the minimum needed to end it. 
In Saup’s letter to State Attorney General Erich Nellmann, he complained that “the 
investigation is complicated by the fact that the events date far back in time and the relatively 
few witnesses to interrogate are scattered throughout West Germany. The witness statements 
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largely contradict each other. Only the interrogations carried out by the appropriate 
detectives at the Stuttgart office themselves have been of use.”112 As a result of these 
complications, Saup intended to continue the investigation, relying on Opferkuch and the 
other Stuttgart detectives to conduct interrogations as much as possible. Once additional 
individuals had been interrogated, they would bring in Fischer-Schweder himself. These 
efforts, he wrote, “will take some time.” Although Saup recognized the incompleteness of the 
investigation and the resources required to bring it satisfactorily to a close, he neither freed 
Mettler from his other caseload, nor did he appoint another prosecutor to assist in the case.
113
 
Saup had also “not yet decided whether to extend the current investigation against the 
three police officers investigated so far living in West Germany.”114 To this point, the case 
had focused exclusively on the involvement of Fischer-Schweder, but the investigation had 
widened the web of culpability to include many others who had been involved in decision-
making roles during the same sets of executions. Schmidt-Hammer, for example, had given 
the actual firing orders in Garsden and elsewhere, and Saup needed to determine whether to 
extend his case to include him, ignore this incriminating information, or defer it to the court 
with jurisdiction where Schmidt-Hammer currently lived. To this point, Saup displayed no 
interest in expanding the case, and likely considered only the latter two. 
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In Mettler's letter to the detectives from the same day, he outlined a series of 
investigative imperatives for them to work on over the coming months.
115
 First, he instructed 
them to look into allegations made by a number of witnesses that other executions had taken 
place in nearby towns, such as Telschei, Polangen, and Salanti. They needed to determine 
how widespread the executions were along the German-Lithuanian border. To help him make 
sense of all these towns, he also requested a map of the area as it was in 1941. Second, the 
issue of partisan activity needed attention. Third, Mettler worried about the Schmidtke 
statement, which had been recorded by local detectives in Tuttlingen and which Mettler 
found to be “not sufficient.”116 He instructed Opferkuch to conduct another interrogation 
with him personally. Among several other minor points, Mettler wanted clearer information 
on the involvement of personnel within the Memel police. 
Saup and Mettler’s position on the case emphasized minimal action over the coming 
months. Additional resources for an expansion of the case were not forthcoming, so 
investigators instead had to focus merely on tracking down the few remaining witnesses, 
verifying information, and preparing the case to be handed off fully to the prosecutors. For 
the investigators, this seemed a complete let down. They had learned of massive and 
substantial crimes not yet prosecuted, but were told to turn over no additional stones. Another 
prosecutor later worried that the “investigators are no longer in a good place with the case, 
having been infected by the pessimistic attitude of the Ulm prosecutor’s office.”117 The 
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investigation had proven difficult enough, but now that investigators seemed on the verge of 
breaking through and building a corpus of evidence, these instructions deflated their efforts. 
From late 1955 until May 1956, the detectives interrogated only an additional six 
people in addition to conducting a reinterrogation of Schmidtke with Opferkuch present. 
Several of those interrogated had been senior individuals within the East Prussian 
government who provided information on command structures within the Third Reich.
118
 The 
only major advance made during these six months was the discovery of a new witness, Kurt 
Neubacher, who had been in the execution squad led by Schmidt-Hammer.
119
 In January 
1956, Neubacher provided an additional perspective on the Garsden and Krottingen murders. 
He confirmed key details about Garsden: Jews had been the victims, but they were partisans; 
one Russian woman was also killed; an air raid took place in Memel at the end of the 
shootings; some kind of enclosure stood near the execution site. His version of Krottingen 
hewed close to earlier statements by his colleague Freyth, but Neubacher remembered a 
crucial aspect involving the selection of men to be shot. The prisoners appeared one-by-one 
before Fischer-Schweder, a group of Gestapo officers, and a Lithuanian, who then sent them 
to the left or right. In the end, the larger of the two groups with about eighty men were shot in 
a similar fashion as in Garsden. Neubacher also recalled an additional shooting of one 
hundred men in Polangen that took place in the dunes along the Baltic coast. 
By March 1956, the investigation had effectively run its course. The detectives had 
interrogated those they could find with the resources available and turned up a lot of potential 
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evidence. Nevertheless, as Opferkuch noted in his report to the Ulm prosecutors, “The 
investigation carried out has provided as of yet no clarification on the fundamental question 
of whether Fischer-Schweder carried out the shootings of Jews based on orders from a higher 
office or on his own initiative.” As for the issue of the identity of those killed – whether 
Jewish or partisan – Opferkuch wrote that the “statements…are very contradictory.”120  
Opferkuch then appended a chart that showcased how a banker’s mind functioned as 
a detective.
121
 Spanning several large sheets of paper, Opferkuch had drawn up a grid and 
tabulated the statements received to date. Running across the top of the columns was a list of 
categories: witness, execution site, execution date, number of Jews arrested, number of those 
shot, Fischer-Schweder’s location, characteristics of the area, special notes, and so forth. As 
he then filled in the details gleaned, the chart grew to include eight entries on Garsden alone, 
and many others on Krottingen, Polangen, Pogegen, and other alleged execution sites. Of the 
entries on Garsden, all but one placed Fischer-Schweder at the site, all but one agreed 
Schmidt-Hammer led the execution squad, and the majority placed the date in late June 1941.  
But discrepancies became apparent. The estimates on those killed in Garsden ranged 
from fifty to three hundred. Some claimed the shootings took place in a field, others by a 
horse-pen, still others on the edge of town. These were not trivial mistakes. Imprecise or 
contradictory statements eroded the entire basis of a legal argument for prosecution. If they 
could not prove what exactly happened on the day of the shootings, there would be no 
possibility of a conviction for Fischer-Schweder. The entire case already rested on testimony 
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from others involved in the crimes; if this testimony failed to agree with itself, the case 
would fall apart. For Opferkuch the banker, the case did not add up. The only option left was 
to interrogate Fischer-Schweder.  
 After reviewing this chart and Opferkuch's conclusions, Mettler and Saup agreed that 
the only remaining step was to bring in Fischer-Schweder. Saup wrote to State Attorney 
General Erich Nellmann in early April informing him of the intention to interrogate the main 
target of the investigation.
122
 To close out the case, Mettler asked the North-Württemberg 
government for access to his personnel files, which contained Fischer-Schweder's application 
materials and records from his leadership of the Ulm refugee camp.
123
 On April 28, 1956, 
Mettler filed a request to the Ulm district court (Amtsgericht) for an arrest warrant against 
Fischer-Schweder for “at least 400 counts of murder.”124 Specifically, the warrant request 
alleged that the Memel police director had pulled together a unit for executions which had: 
 1. On June 24, 1941 in Garsden shot at least 100 Jews, among them women and 
children, and 
 2. At the end of June 1941 in Krottingen shot at least 200 Jewish men and around 100 
Lithuanian men. 
 
During the Garsden executions, Mettler wrote, Fischer-Schweder had shot with a pistol those 
who were still alive, and during the Krottingen shootings, he had put together an “improvised 
court” (Schnellgericht) to decide which Lithuanians would live or die.125 These last two 
points, since they showed Fischer-Schweder acting of his own volition and thereby either 
internalizing the base motives of the orders or displaying blood lust, allowed Mettler to make 
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a case for crimes of murder. At 6:20 in the evening on May 3, 1956, the Ulm court issued an 
arrest warrant for Fischer-Schweder.
126
 
 
The Memel Police Director  
 Although they had never met Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, Opferkuch and Weida had 
spent almost an entire year getting to know him as well as they possibly could. They had 
reviewed his wartime record with the assistance of the Berlin Document Center. They had 
spoken with his former colleagues and associates from Memel, as well as others who knew 
him from his time in Berlin and Breslau. Working with the state government, they studied his 
postwar deceptions on his denazification and Article 131 forms, looked into his tenure as 
camp director in Ulm, and followed the progress of his lawsuit before the labor court. 
Through all of these endeavors, they had come to form opinions not only about his criminal 
behavior in Lithuania but also about the man himself. 
 The near consensus opinion depicted Fischer-Schweder as an egotistical, harsh, and 
deeply committed Nazi and anti-Semite. In statements about Fischer-Schweder, few kind 
words were ever spoken. Certain individuals had express reason to dislike the police director. 
Kersten was quite forthcoming about the sources of his contempt. While on service in 
Memel, he had unknowingly cited Fischer-Schweder’s wife for walking her dog without a 
leash. Consequently, the police director sentenced him to a two-week prison sentence.
127
 
Additionally, Kersten’s name had been “Kerschies” until Fischer-Schweder required him to 
change it because he had wanted “the members of his office to have German sounding 
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names.”128 Another witness had been sent to Sachsenhausen for four months by Fischer-
Schweder for “agitating the public and telling horror stories [Greuelmärchen]” about the war 
with Russia.
129
 Even nominal friends, like his hunting partner Grau, described him at best as 
“reserved.” Others who professed to have no close relationship or knowledge of Fischer-
Schweder still made a point to state that he was not well liked.  
 The widely negative view that emerged of Fischer-Schweder seems not to have been 
mere self-exculpatory statements made by co-perpetrators, eager to shift the focus onto a 
brutal police director. Had that been the case, one might have expected similarly harsh 
character assessments of others deeply involved in officer roles in the shootings, such as 
Schmidt-Hammer, but this was not the case. Kersten, so quick to implicate Fischer-Schweder 
in murder, expressed deep regret over having to involve Schmidt-Hammer in such matters. 
“I’m truly sorry,” he said, “that through my statements I have to incriminate not only 
Fischer-Schweder, but also Schmidt-Hammer, who I got to know as a humane and highly 
respectable officer.”130 Kahlberg similarly praised Schmidt-Hammer as “a good, dear chap 
[Kerl],” who was “harmless and generally liked.”131 These statements contrasted sharply with 
the portrayal of Fischer-Schweder and suggest that, however limited the perpetrator 
testimony might be on other points, they converged in their critical assessment of the brief 
tenure of the police director of Memel. 
These depictions formed the basis for Weida and Opferkuch’s understanding of 
Fischer-Schweder. They knew him chiefly as a brutal and sadistic Nazi leader in Memel, but 
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he had worn many other hats during his life. In addition to being a passionate and committed 
Nazi who had joined the party early in 1925, he had been a police officer, a SA officer who 
opposed the SS, and later a SS officer himself. He had been a prisoner of the Nazis and later 
of the Allies. He was a defrauder of, a civil servant in, and a claimant against the West 
German state. He had been a father and a husband (twice) and an intermittent salesman. 
When he came into the police office in Ulm on May 2, a day prior to the issuing of his arrest 
warrant, Fischer-Schweder was again employed as a salesman, and it seems it was this hat 
that he decided to wear to the interrogation. He impressed Weida, who later recalled him as a 
“tall, good looking, very dynamic and energetic older man.”132 He had to employ all his 
dynamism and craft that day against the detectives as he pitched the hardest sell of his life: 
disprove the preponderance of evidence the detectives arrayed before him that pointed to his 
role as an architect of the Holocaust in Lithuania. 
 The interrogation of Fischer-Schweder began on the morning of May 2 and lasted 
into the afternoon. He asked at one point if they could pause so he could go home for lunch, 
at which point Weida and Opferkuch had him placed under provisional arrest to prevent him 
from leaving. The interrogation began with broad questions about his background and how 
he came to Memel. He described his work there as “not very easy.”133 The police department 
he inherited had “extremely slovenly operations,” with men often drinking beer and schnapps 
in the backroom. His efforts to clean up the place, he claimed, were likely a reason for the 
many disparaging portraits of his leadership. He depicted a complicated and overlapping 
chain of command, with him ostensibly in charge of the various Memel police units, but 
                                                 
132
 Robert Weida, “Unbewältigte Vergangenheit” (undated), in possession of the author. 
 
133
 Statement by Bernhard Fischer-Schweder (Ulm, 2 May 1956), EL 322/II, Bü 1, SL. 
 
170 
 
subject to the interventions of various regional authorities. The interrogation then moved into 
his activities after Memel, continuing through the postwar period. Through all of this, Weida 
and Opferkuch did not ask any questions about executions or the aim of the investigation. 
 A quarter of the way through the interrogation, the investigators leveled their case. 
“You are accused,” they stated, “of having organized and personally participated in the 
carrying out of multiple executions of Jews in June and July 1941 during your tenure as 
Police Director in Memel. Is this correct?” Fischer-Schweder responded, “The accusation is 
untrue.” He then launched into a long description of the origins of the Garsden executions.134  
He described the general uncertainty that prevailed regarding jurisdiction upon the 
rapid expansion of the German Reich after war began with Russia. Memel abutted the 
Lithuanian border, and higher up officials looked to his police unit to assist in maintaining 
peace along the border towns. In particular, the town of Garsden, which he described as 
“only inhabited by Jews,” had been a center of resistance. On June 23, Frohwann, the head of 
the GPK in Memel, spoke with Fischer-Schweder and informed him that “the Staatspolizei 
had jurisdiction over Jews.” Frohwann’s chief, Stapostelle Tilsit leader Böhme, then called 
Fischer-Schweder and explained that Berlin had instructed him to carry out the execution of 
the partisans. These individuals, Fischer-Schweder emphasized, were to be shot “not as Jews, 
but as snipers and murderers of German soldiers.” Böhme, however, “had no people to 
organize into a shooting squad,” and he requested the assistance of the Memel police. The 
following day, Frohwann brought Fischer-Schweder an order to this effect issued from the 
Befehlshaber of the Ordnungspolizei. Günther and Frohwann then took the initiative in 
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organizing the execution squad. Fischer-Schweder went on to describe his recollections of 
the Garsden execution itself.
135
 
He stated that “except for the previously mentioned case in Garsden” he played no 
organizational role in any additional executions. He had attended a shooting in Krottingen 
“by chance,” but could not to remember whether Memel police officers had taken part. 
Interestingly, he confessed to having shot one man who attempted to flee the execution, but 
had shot him “purely instinctively” because he believed him to be “a convicted criminal.” 
The responsible parties, according to Fischer-Schweder, were Hitler’s inner circle, the GPK 
Memel officer leader Frohwann, Memel Schutzpolizei commander Günther, and Stapo Tilsit 
leader Hans-Joachim Böhme. Conveniently for Fischer-Schweder, all but Böhme were dead, 
and no one had seen Böhme since war’s end.136  
 In assessing his statements, Opferkuch wrote that Fischer-Schweder’s testimony 
contained “extensive contradictions with the previous statements of witnesses and 
participants.” Due to time constraints, they had been unable to press him on all of these 
contradictions, and when they did, Fischer-Schweder affected a haughty demeanor. 
Confronted with the allegations of Kahlberg about a shooting in Krottingen, Fischer-
Schweder called them a “pure product of his imagination.” In deciding how best to move 
forward with the case, Opferkuch stated that “further investigations to clarify the facts of the 
case…are urgently needed.”137 
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 Over the next few weeks, Opferkuch and Weida conducted several additional 
interrogations, including a week-long interrogation in Stuttgart of Fischer-Schweder, who 
remained in police custody.
138
 Apart from a few additional details and a hand-drawn chart by 
Fischer-Schweder of the Memel police chain of command and a sketch of the shooting in 
Garsden, these interrogations did not substantially alter the case. In essence, the state of the 
investigation had not changed since Opferkuch’s chart from early March. They had amassed 
a core of statements regarding executions along the Lithuanian border, but significant 
disagreements over details and the origins of the orders for these executions remained. 
 Nevertheless, on June 4, 1956, Saup wrote to State Attorney General Nellmann about 
the case. He enclosed all the materials gathered to date and informed Nellmann, “It is 
intended to submit in the near future a request for a preliminary investigation 
[Voruntersuchung].”139 This meant that the case had taken the form Saup saw fit to begin to 
prepare the case for trial. Those interrogated would be required to make a formal statement 
before an interrogating judge, and Mettler would use these judicial statements to draft an 
indictment against Fischer-Schweder. The investigation would likely soon come to an end, 
and Fischer-Schweder alone would be indicted. 
 
Conclusion 
 When Mettler and Saup decided to launch a formal investigation into Fischer-
Schweder in June 1955, they joined a small group of West German prosecutors. That year 
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only 276 new investigations for Nazi crimes were opened in the Federal Republic. Though 
the number may seem impressive, this was down from a postwar high of 4,160 in 1948 and 
just above the low set the previous year.
140
 Later in the decade, in part as a result of the 
investigation they initiated against Fischer-Schweder, new investigations would again top 
one-thousand annually. But at the time the case was initiated, West German prosecutions for 
all Nazi crimes were at their nadir, and many of the crimes charged did not involve the 
capital offenses of which Fischer-Schweder was accused. This decline in prosecutions 
reflected the broader disengagement in postwar society from dealing with the consequences 
of the Nazi past, and this disengagement had a serious impact on the initial months of the 
Fischer-Schweder investigation. Part I discussed how this process took the form of a 
victimization narrative that gave harbor to perpetrators, but this same shift reverberated 
throughout the judiciary and created conditions that hindered prosecutors and investigators’ 
ability to pursue Nazi criminals. 
 In understanding the first year of preparation for the trial, it is important to consider 
the ways that Saup and Mettler’s approach was inflected with the same pervasive lack of 
interest in Nazi crimes trials affecting most of the West German judiciary. They had not 
torpedoed the investigation, but neither had they made the case a priority. Mettler was 
completely overworked and unable to monitor or make a priority of the Fischer-Schweder 
investigation. For months, he did not correspond with the detectives, instead only passively 
receiving infrequent reports. When the detectives had made little progress after a few 
months, there was no letter of concern or pressure for results coming from the Ulm 
prosecutors. Only with the intervention of the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung did the Ulm 
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office begin to consider the case a priority. Most significantly, as the investigation uncovered 
a web of criminal behavior, the prosecution insisted on a Fischer-Schweder focus. They 
closed off the investigation once a general consensus of criminality emerged, but well before 
they had identified exact details or concrete evidence not based on the fluid and deceptive 
testimony of co-perpetrators.  
This lack of oversight was particularly harmful for the investigation given the 
background of the investigators and the nature of the crimes. Neither Weida nor Opferkuch 
had experience with Nazi crimes cases, and they struggled to sustain a measured pace to the 
investigation. They knew of no central resource to consult for information on these crimes, 
and no agency existed to coordinate their efforts. The two men were isolated and burdened 
with the near insurmountable task of reproducing whole cloth the mechanisms of the 
Holocaust during early 1941 in Lithuania. Added to that, neither detective had access to the 
crime locations or even knowledge of the area. Moreover, the events in question were 
extraordinarily complex, with overlapping chains of command and various units involved in 
the massacres.  As a result, the investigators had found many witnesses but gathered little 
concrete evidence. With few resources at their disposal, they had few other choices than to 
focus on perpetrator testimony, and even then, they needed to rely on other departments to 
conduct interrogations. The investigators had done the best they could do with the hand they 
had been dealt, but they had been dealt a very bad hand. 
 Many of these problems manifested as a result of the culture of the Ulm prosecutor’s 
office under Saup. He epitomized the postwar prosecutor strategy of placing minimal effort 
into Nazi prosecutions. This is not to say that all of the other district attorneys in Ulm felt 
likewise, but rather that few resources and scant manpower were devoted to such 
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investigations. This was the case with the Ulm trial. Saup pursued the case only until enough 
had been done that they needed do no more. With an investigation into Fischer-Schweder 
convincingly carried out (in his mind), Saup prepared to close the investigation and move on 
to an indictment. This was Saupian strategy at its clearest. Although their investigation 
revealed that Fischer-Schweder had been simply one of many responsible parties in the 
executions of at least several hundred Lithuanian Jews and communists, Saup ignored the 
broader web of involvement and pushed ahead in the prosecution of the individual against 
whom initial allegations had emerged.  
 Understanding why Saup would pursue the Fischer-Schweder case in this way 
suggests the lingering but still powerful belief in areas of postwar society that if the delicate 
narrative of German victimization was to be upheld, any challenges to it needed to be 
handled with a doctor’s care. Individuals who challenged this, such as Fischer-Schweder, 
needed to be carefully excised from society. Saup did not consider it good practice to rip 
open the wounds of the past and expose whole pockets of unacknowledged criminality. He 
was a rare individual who remained in the judiciary throughout the entire Nazi period without 
joining the party, sacrificing his career in the process. Thus, there can be no suspicion that 
Saup had any residual sympathies for Nazi ideologues like Fischer-Schweder.  
Instead, Saup’s unwillingness to devote needed resources to the investigation 
indicates that he continued to emphasize stability over division, a choice he had faced when 
confronted with the social chaos of the immediate postwar period. During those years, he 
successfully rehabilitated the Ulm office and prevented the dissolution of a functioning 
judiciary in that region. Nevertheless, by the mid-1950s, Germany’s judiciary no longer 
needed to be preserved: it had to be reformed, and Saup was not a reformer. Placing blinders 
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on an investigation did not prevent social tensions, it invited them. In still believing himself 
to be on the side of preserving social stability, he came to devalue the preponderance of Nazi 
criminals in West Germany and the need to investigate them.  
  
 
 
 
 
V. Investigation: The Einsatzkommando Tilsit Case 
 
This trial is first being carried out today only because the defiant appearance of one of the 
accused in public alerted us to the whereabouts of his former subordinates and set the ball in 
motion. Once this got going, it took tremendous legwork to uncover these relationships and 
to find the documents that weren’t in German hands. One could only guess how many police 
were at one point involved in this case. With this in mind, allow me to thank the detectives in 
particular because they did far more than their duty. I feel that I should also thank the 
American Consulate, the American Air Force, and the Document Center for the support 
which was extended to us.  
 
– Erwin Schüle, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial 
 
 
 As the Ulm prosecutors prepared to bring the Fischer-Schweder case to a close, a 
sudden intervention by Baden-Württemberg Attorney General Erich Nellmann altered the 
trajectory of the investigation. On June 9, 1956, Nellmann wrote letters to the Justice 
Ministry of Baden-Württemberg and to Rudolf Saup, the head prosecutor in Ulm. Nellmann 
informed them, “I have reviewed the current progress of the investigation and have come to 
the conclusion that further extensive investigations are necessary to clear up the facts of the 
case.” He added that “the current investigation was insufficient and that it must be started 
over practically from scratch.” His suggestions entailed an expanded investigation, and he 
asked Saup to “free Dr. Mettler up from his other duties for this task.” 1 That week, Nellmann 
also appointed the Ludwigsburg Senior State Prosecutor Erwin Schüle to assist Ulm 
prosecutor Rudolf Mettler on the case. 
 Nellmann’s intervention and the appointment of Schüle to the case marked the clear 
moment of delineation between the conventional approach to the case undertaken the 
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previous year and the radical transformation of the investigation that would culminate in the 
prosecution of ten defendants. Schüle’s first involvement in the case came just a few days 
after Nellmann’s letter, when Schüle sent a copy of amateur historian Gerald Reitlinger’s The 
Final Solution to the Ulm prosecutor’s office.2 Based on research of wartime documentation, 
Reitlinger’s work had only recently been translated from English into German and was the 
first major attempt to chronicle the Nazi destruction of European Jews. By sending the book 
to the prosecutor’s office, Schüle indicated the new empirical and historical approach he 
intended to take towards the investigation.  
 Over the coming year – culminating in the formal indictments of ten individuals on 
June 25, 1957 – the case underwent a complete structural overhaul. Most significantly, the 
target of the investigation shifted from Fischer-Schweder as the sole suspect to all 
perpetrators involved in the mass murders. This conceptualization of the case eventually 
became known as investigating the “crime complex.”3 Fischer-Schweder’s crimes had taken 
place only in the context of a much broader web of criminality along the borders of Lithuania 
in 1941, which involved far more than one man. The new target of the investigation would 
focus on this entire criminal apparatus. Such a shift, though, placed far more pressure on the 
investigators and prosecutors, as the burden of proof grew heavier with the expanded case. 
Investigators now needed to uncover the inner workings of the Third Reich in Eastern Europe 
at the outbreak of war – from Hitler’s inner circle to low level policemen, from SS architects 
of the Holocaust to local Wehrmacht personnel. This substantial undertaking resulted in the 
expansion of the case from one defendant to ten in just under a year. 
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To accomplish these new aims, Schüle and the Ulm investigators needed to pioneer 
new approaches to Nazi crimes cases. Even though they had to prosecute the crimes in 
accordance with West German criminal law, these cases could not be investigated like 
contemporary murder cases. The struggles of the first year of the investigation made clear 
that traditional approaches were not effective. With no accessible crime scenes and only a 
collection of flawed perpetrator memories, new types of evidence and strategies for 
investigating were needed. With increased resources and dedication, the investigators 
widened their efforts. Investigators traveled throughout Germany in the search for witnesses 
to testify, mastered the scholarship on the Third Reich, uncovered archival materials, 
developed a network of survivor groups, and facilitated an international flow of information 
and materials. All of these measures yielded a far more substantial body of evidence against 
the defendants than had been accumulated during the first year of the case. At the end of the 
investigation, Schüle’s indictments of the ten men culminated in a detailed 212-page history 
of the Lithuanian Holocaust in 1941, based on a host of archival evidence, expert testimony, 
and statements from over two hundred witnesses.
4
 Under Schüle, the team had become West 
Germany’s de facto legal experts on the Holocaust.  
 Taken together, the crime complex approach and its corollary investigative strategies 
transformed the case from a parochial Ulm affair to an internationally prominent Nazi crimes 
prosecution. The unlikely emergence of this massive trial in the city of Ulm can only be 
understood as a consequence of the involvement of officials within the Baden-Württemberg 
state judiciary. With the backing of the state, the investigators could pursue all leads in the 
case, without concern for resources, and as a result the case quickly spilled beyond West 
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Germany’s borders. Over the coming year, the investigators worked with agencies and 
individuals throughout Western Europe, North and South America, Africa, and the Middle 
East. Through these engagements, the case broke through the limitations of the first year of 
the case. The prosecutors, in short, could expand the case from one to ten defendants because 
they had expanded the investigation from the disinterested Ulm prosecutor’s office to an 
international network of allies actively seeking to strengthen the investigation by providing 
information and resources on crimes in Lithuania and the Holocaust. 
Despite the prolific accomplishments of the Ulm team, the investigation still 
encountered serious limitations in the capacity of the West German legal system to deal with 
the Nazi crimes issue. Schüle and his team were able to innovate and transform the 
investigative strategies, but they operated within a constrained system. Communication with 
the communist east, for one, remained impossible. Other weaknesses involved the limited 
willingness of the federal government to engage in the issue, jurisdictional debates with other 
state prosecutors’ offices, and unreliable police departments throughout Germany. No 
solutions existed for addressing these problems, so Schüle and his team were forced to devise 
their own strategies and innovations. In 1950s West Germany, for a prosecutor’s office to 
bring successful indictments against a Nazi criminal enterprise required a massive and 
sustained international effort to learn the complicated workings of the Nazi state at war.  
 
The Independent Attorney 
 During the middle of the Ulm trial, Baden-Württemberg Attorney General Erich 
Nellmann reflected on his 1956 decision to overhaul the case. He wrote, “Fischer-Schweder, 
who up until then was the only Ulm trial defendant in custody, would have been set free and 
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the case dropped if the Prosecutor’s Office of the Higher Regional Court [Erwin Schüle] had 
not intervened.”5 Even before the verdict in the case was handed down, Nellmann believed 
that his decision had rescued the case from collapse. By halting Ulm prosecutor Rudolf 
Saup’s efforts to move the case to indictment and deputizing Schüle to oversee the 
investigation, he made a priority of a case that had received only minimal attention the 
previous year. Similarly, the Baden-Württemberg Justice Ministry had expressed no interest 
in the direction Nellmann was attempting to move the case. In response to Nellmann’s 1956 
letter, an internal memo to the Justice Minister, Wolfgang Haussmann, stated, “It is not clear 
why State Attorney General Nellmann intends to prevent the Ulm prosecutor’s office from 
moving the case to the preliminary investigation stage [Voruntersuchung].”6  
Nellmann’s intervention therefore seems to have been a decision that originated in his 
office. Neither Saup beneath him nor Haussmann above expressed interest in anything but a 
speedy resolution to the case. Nellmann alone favored expansion. What motivated Nellmann 
to call explicitly for a more sustained investigation? Was he a staunch opponent of Nazism, a 
career opportunist hoping to make his mark, or something else altogether? This single 
decision did more than any other to shape the trial in Ulm, and in an attempt to understand its 
causes, we must look first to Nellmann himself. 
 Born in 1895, Nellmann was not a young man at the time of his involvement in the 
Fischer-Schweder case. He would reach mandatory retirement age a few years later in 1961, 
and had already entered the twilight of a career that stretched back to the early 1920s.
7
 He 
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grew up in a Protestant family in the town of Grossachsenheim, near Stuttgart. He attended 
school mostly in Stuttgart and across the Neckar River in Bad Canstatt. Like most men of his 
generation, Nellmann served in World War I and saw action in France in the field artillery, 
where he was fortunate to survive the killing fields of Verdun in 1916. In 1923, he married 
his wife Hilde, and the couple remained together until his death in 1968. They had four 
children, the last born in 1932. With the exception of his experience in the trenches during 
World War I, Nellmann lived his entire life within fifty miles of Stuttgart.  
Like Saup and others, Nellmann trained in law at the University of Tübingen. 
Completing his degrees in 1925, he began a quick ascent up the legal profession. Following a 
series of promotions, Nellmann became a prosecutor in 1927 and by 1934 a judge 
(Amtsgerichtsrat) for the district court in Tübingen. At that point, however, his career stalled 
under the Nazi dictatorship. Also like Saup, Nellmann never joined the Nazi Party, only 
acquiring membership in a few Nazi-affiliated organizations.
8
 Without party membership, 
Nellmann faced little prospect of further promotions. Seemingly apolitical, at no point in his 
career did he ever belong to a political party from any part of the spectrum.  
Whatever his motivations for not joining the Nazi party, he willingly continued on as 
a judge during the entirety of the Third Reich. Moreover, his lack of party membership did 
not deter his superiors from praising his professional services to Hitler’s state. The District 
Court President (Landgerichtspräsident) in March 1936 wrote that Nellmann “has proven to 
be a very good criminal judge,” describing him as “reliable,” “decisive,” and in possession of 
“good skills and good powers of judgment.” He added that “his trial performance is calm and 
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deliberate, benevolent but resolute.”9 The head of the Tübingen court a year later similarly 
described a man whose “political demeanor is faultless. His leadership in office is 
impeccable and to my knowledge there are no faults in his out of office conduct.”10 Such 
statements suggest that any personal opposition to the Nazi state did not prevent him from 
carrying out his service to that state in such a way as to earn the accolades of his superiors. 
His lack of membership served him well in the postwar period. A 1946 decision 
allowed him to retain his post, as the Allied occupation struggled to reconstruct a denazified 
judiciary from the personnel of a highly-nazified profession.
11
 For the next two years, he 
served as the de facto State Attorney General (Generalstaatsanwalt) in Württemberg-
Hohenzollern, with its capital in Tübingen, though he retained the lesser title of Director of 
the District Court (Amtsgerichtsdirektor). This required Nellmann to conduct the duties of a 
higher office, while reaping none of its financial or professional gains. In 1948, the Justice 
Ministry sought to make this appointment official, noting his “great zeal and untiring 
diligence” in the post.12 For unclear reasons, however, the French-occupation authorities 
decided against this nomination. Nellmann bristled at the rejection. He requested a return to 
his old position, explaining acerbically: 
As you know, I neither desired nor wanted this appointment, but only at your urging 
and after two years of maintaining the position did I no longer oppose my 
appointment. But if the Military Government, which for two years had no objection to 
my appointment… now is not content with it, then I think that after two years of the 
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most intense work I am owed at least the right to retire from this never sought and 
never liked position.
13
 
 
The Justice Ministry tried to make things right by appointing him later that year to serve on a 
denazification panel (Spruchkammer), but a Nellmann scorned had no desire for the post and 
told them to appoint “a substitute.”14 The following year, he accepted a promotion to District 
Court President (Landgerichtspräsident) in Hechingen, south of Tübingen.
15
 By 1950, 
Württemberg-Baden, sought to poach Nellmann and appoint him Senior State Prosecutor 
(Oberstaatsanwalt) in Stuttgart.
16
 Again, Nellmann opposed the promotion.
17
  
 In 1953, the merger of the states of southwest Germany forced the reshuffling of the 
judiciary, and Nellmann received an appointment to Assistant Secretary (Ministerialrat) in 
the Justice Ministry of Baden-Württemberg, a position that, for once, he accepted.
18
 A few 
months later, the State Attorney General Richard Schmid received a promotion, which 
opened up his post. The Justice Ministry, referring to Nellmann as a “very experienced 
prosecutor” with “more than four years of leadership of the State Attorney General position 
in Tübingen” under his belt, nominated him.19 Nellmann accepted without objection.20 Later 
that year, Justice Minister Wolfgang Haussmann publicly announced Nellmann’s new 
appointment and praised the new attorney general: “His long career as a judge, prosecutor, 
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district court president, and division leader in the Justice Ministry have made him appropriate 
for the high office, in addition to the fact that he has already handled the duties of an attorney 
general successfully under the difficult conditions of the postwar years in Tübingen.”21 
 Anecdotal evidence indicates that in the postwar period Nellmann associated with a 
circle of colleagues, mostly graduates of his generation from Tübingen, who expressed 
interest in a stronger judicial process of dealing with Nazi era crimes.
22
 Two colleagues in 
particular hint at Nellmann’s attitudes towards coming to terms with the Nazi past. The first 
was Richard Schmid, who became head of the state supreme court and was Nellmann’s 
predecessor as attorney general. A lifelong socialist and postwar member of the SPD, Schmid 
had been an opponent of the Nazi regime.
23
 Later on the eve of the Ulm trial, Schmid would 
appoint a hand-picked judge to oversee the proceedings in hopes of securing a conviction.
24
 
The second colleague of Nellmann’s was his attorney general counterpart in Hesse, Fritz 
Bauer. The preeminent West German jurist advocating for Nazi crimes prosecutions, Bauer 
was a Stuttgart native and attended Tübingen along with Schmid and Nellmann.
25
 Bauer 
notably introduced the concept of the “unjust state” as a way of approaching Nazi Germany 
from a legal perspective. For Bauer, the legal challenge of prosecuting individuals for 
carrying out the orders of the state could be circumvented by characterizing the Nazi state 
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itself as an illegal and unjust organization. The notion of the unjust state found resonance in 
legal circles in West Germany, and this phrase later appeared in Nellmann’s explanations of 
the Ulm trial.
26
 The possible influence of these individuals on Nellmann’s own thoughts 
regarding the Ulm case provides important insights into the ways that individual motivations 
and influential colleagues could tilt the balance from an unmotivated and lackadaisical 
judiciary to a massive effort harnessing the potential of the state. 
What emerges from this portrait of Nellmann is less a fierce opponent of Nazism 
(though he may have had such feelings) or a career opportunist, than a surprisingly 
independent-minded government official. Although he refused the join the Nazi party, he 
executed its laws as a judge for the entire dictatorship. He sacrificed his career by not joining 
the Nazi party, but he also declined a postwar appointment to sit on a denazification panel. 
After the war, Nellmann refused numerous promotions and found himself appointed to the 
supreme prosecutor position in the state despite his obstinacy, seemingly on the strengths of 
his abilities as a legal mind. Also, by 1956, he had advanced to one of the most senior 
positions in the state, and with forced retirement looming in 1961, he was even freer to act 
independently and without regard for any possible career considerations.  
 This independent-mindedness suggests that Nellmann’s intervention in the Fischer-
Schweder investigation dovetailed with his own predilections to act as he saw fit, regardless 
of norms. As an individual who had spent his career going against career expectations – 
rejecting promotions, refusing party memberships – his decision to go against the legal 
pattern of pursuing the minimum in Nazi crimes cases by demanding that his prosecutors 
pursue the maximum displayed a continuity of personality. Interestingly, on paper he and 
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Ulm prosecutor Saup shared many similarities in terms of their careers and independence, but 
they emerged in the postwar period on totally different ends of the spectrum. Saup sought the 
preservation of a fragile social peace, while Nellmann in the eve of his career saw an 
investigation on the brink of failure for no reason but a lack of effort. The evidence available 
and his biographical record suggest that Nellmann’s decision to expand the case was made by 
him alone without the input of (and apparently contrary to the interests of) higher offices. 
 
Schüle and the New Approach 
 Erwin Schüle assumed effective control of the case by late June 1956. The Ulm 
prosecutor Rudolf Mettler remained the lead prosecutor, but he began to suffer from a series 
of medical problems that took him away from the investigation for weeks at a time.
27
 Even 
when Mettler was healthy, the innovation and élan that Schüle brought to the case left no 
doubt who was driving the prosecution forward. Schüle, a former Nazi party member from 
1937, took to the case with great energy.
28
 Forty-two years old, he had carved a similar 
career as Mettler; both seem to have joined the Nazi party from career opportunism rather 
than ideological commitment. But Schüle had a fundamentally different approach to Nazi 
crimes prosecutions. While Mettler preferred a deskbound style of operation, Schüle liked to 
work in the field, often conducting interrogations himself and travelling throughout Germany 
alongside his detectives on the frontlines of the investigation.  
 Schüle first set about evaluating the strengths of the team working on the case. 
Immediately, he ran into the stubborn lack of interest that radiated from the Ulm prosecutor’s 
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office that threatened to “infect” those too long exposed.29 Sympathetic to Mettler’s illnesses, 
Schüle nevertheless insisted in a meeting with Saup on June 21 that someone fill in during 
Mettler’s absences. Even though many Ulm prosecutors complained that their “current 
workload made it impossible to do anything in the Fischer-Schweder case,” Schüle received 
the assistance he needed.
30
 Whenever Mettler fell ill, another prosecutor stepped up to assist 
Schüle on the case. 
The following week Schüle met with lead detective Robert Weida. The investigator 
had just learned that the Stuttgart police department intended to reassign him, but he 
explained to Schüle that “he would prefer to remain on the Fischer-Schweder case.” If Weida 
left, in all likelihood the less experienced Helmut Opferkuch would assume leadership on the 
case. For the previous few weeks Weida and Opferkuch had routinely subjected Fischer-
Schweder to interrogations, and Weida noted a troubling trend in Opferkuch’s demeanor. 
“Every afternoon that Fischer-Schweder was present here in Stuttgart,” Weida explained, 
“Opferkuch would make him coffee. In this way, Fischer-Schweder apparently gained the 
upper hand.” The conversation led Schüle to conclude that “Weida appeared stronger than 
Opferkuch.” Although he “did not want to say anything negative about Opferkuch as a 
detective,” Schüle agreed that the case would be best served if both detectives remained on 
the case with Weida in the supervisory role.
31
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With the team consolidated, Schüle turned his focus to overhauling the investigation. 
Fundamentally, what the case needed was a change in the minimal goals, narrow focus, and 
culture of low expectation that prevailed during the first year in the Ulm prosecutor’s office. 
With little interest in pursuing the case and few resources to do so, the investigators had 
consequently been pursuing a narrow track of inquiry that led them to find only what they 
sought out to prove: the case could begin and end with Fischer-Schweder. Nellmann and 
Schüle realized that this culture had produced flimsy results. The first order of business, 
consequently, was to encourage the staff to consider new approaches to the case and to allow 
them to follow the evidence, even if that led beyond Fischer-Schweder. 
With the backing of Nellmann and his pledge of material support, the investigation 
shifted into a gear not possible during the first year. The detectives continued their program 
of interrogating witnesses and plying them for the names of additional witnesses, but for 
several reasons these efforts became much more successful over the coming year. First, 
additional investigators from Stuttgart assisted Weida and Opferkuch on the case. Second, 
the detectives now traveled across Germany to conduct interrogations themselves, rather than 
relying on local police departments to do so. Employing experienced and knowledgeable 
interrogators proved crucial in confronting reluctant and mendacious witnesses. As Schüle 
later explained: 
Witnesses who were interrogated by local police departments denied either knowing 
anything about the events in question or they made such empty claims regarding the 
time period that their statements led nowhere. These same witnesses who were later 
re-interrogated by specialized officers proved to be well informed and often made 
statements about specific events of which the investigators themselves were 
unaware.
32
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Despite the great financial expenses for the state, Weida, Opferkuch, and the other detectives 
could now conduct interrogations themselves in order to detect inconsistencies in accounts 
and to achieve a degree of specificity not possible earlier. 
These two advantages reached their apex in December 1956, when Schüle planned a 
nine-day investigation operation requiring the involvement of six detectives. The detectives 
formed three teams: “Group Oberpfalz-Franken,” a two man team led by Weida, would 
conduct interrogations in eastern Germany; “Group Ostsee-Nordsee,” led by detective 
Fahrion, deployed to the north; and “Group Berlin,” consisting of Schüle, Opferkuch, and a 
third detective, planned a research trip into the divided city.
33
 Mettler stayed in Ulm because 
Schüle “considered it necessary at this point in the investigation for there to be one 
prosecutor available at all times.”34 In this one week, they planned to interrogate sixteen 
witnesses; during the entire first year, detectives had only spoken with thirty-two.  
Beyond Schüle’s ability to put more men into the field, he had access to resources 
that allowed him to expand the reach of the case and pursue leads that might earlier have 
gone cold. For example, shortly after Schüle took over the case, Fischer-Schweder put forth 
an alibi through his lawyers that he had vacationed at the Baltic Sea resort town Schwarzort 
(Juodkranté) with a woman, not his wife, at the start of July 1941. This established, his 
defense team argued, “how and why the accused neither knew nor could know of additional 
shootings in the time from July 1 to July 31, 1941.”35 Fischer-Schweder provided only the 
last name of his presumed mistress and likely hoped that they would be unable to find her. 
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Over the next two months, however, the detectives located her former husband and then 
tracked her down to Baghdad, where her second husband, a British officer, was stationed.
36
 
When she reentered Germany to visit family, detectives were ready and she was interrogated 
in Kiel. She stated, “In no way was I in Schwarzort with Mr. Fischer in July 1941. I say that 
with certainty because the war with Russia started about a week after my return from 
Schwarzort.”37 With additional resources, the Ulm investigators could take on substantial 
field work throughout and beyond Germany and follow up on details however minor.  
The investigators’ interrogations of former members of the Nazi state continued to 
constitute one core aim of the investigation under Schüle, but Schüle took a broader view on 
the issue. He wanted military personnel, Gestapo officers, and above all senior Nazi officials 
brought into the investigation. By looking beyond Memel, Schüle hoped to better understand 
what had happened there. In the year following Schüle’s involvement, the investigators 
interrogated or corresponded with over two hundred witnesses. They continued to track down 
those involved in the police and government in the Memel area, but they branched out to 
interrogate individuals involved at all levels of the Third Reich. This information provided a 
wider context for understanding the mechanisms of Nazi rule as it manifested itself in 
Eastern Europe and as it targeted the extermination of Jews living there.  
The most significant change Schüle brought to the investigation was his decision to 
avoid building the case solely on perpetrator testimony. Their accounts were too partial, 
contradictory, and self-exculpatory to stand up to a withering assault from defense attorneys. 
Too many terms of the case were being dictated by what the defendants chose to reveal, and 
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this imbalance inevitably favored the perpetrators. In the first year of the investigation, this 
approach barely succeeded in finding information sufficient to indict Fischer-Schweder. Over 
the coming year, they added nine additional witnesses to the investigation, and they did so by 
finding other means of gathering evidence. As Schüle later explained: 
When exposing still prosecutable Nazi crimes—murder, manslaughter, as well as 
aiding and abetting—the generally agreed upon methods for investigating capital 
crimes break down. We cannot survey the crime scene and therefore cannot secure 
any evidence. We have no bodies and cannot get the fingerprints or other information 
of the perpetrators. The crimes lay fifteen and more years back, so witnesses and their 
statements are to be evaluated particularly critically. Therefore, the prosecutor, whose 
job it is to identify these crimes, must look for other ways and means of bringing the 
facts to light.
38
  
 
Schüle and his team identified two main avenues for identifying other types of sources. One 
involved a search for non-perpetrator, non-German witnesses to the shootings; the other 
relied on scholarship, which led to the discovery of wartime records and documentation. 
To find these two source groups, Schüle came to depend increasingly on “historical 
consultants.”39 In business, companies often encounter situations demanding skills outside 
their typical purview; in such cases, they turn to external consultants who provide the 
expertise lacking within the company. The essence of the transformation of the Fischer-
Schweder investigation can be understood through Schüle’s decision to rely on historical 
consultants with expertise in the areas of the Nazi state, the Holocaust, and Lithuanian Jews. 
Schüle saw that many of the questions that had arisen in the case demanded a degree of 
knowledge about the past that none of the investigators possessed. The German judiciary had 
few answers; without any centralized agency or group focused on assisting in Nazi crimes 
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cases, Schüle had no support network within the state. Consequently, he turned to non-state 
actors: Jewish rights associations, professors, historians, archivists, and other organizations. 
Schüle had to construct this network of historical consultants, in the process bringing many 
of these groups which shared similar goals into contact with one another for the first time.  
 
The Search for Survivors 
 One of the most important partnerships Schüle developed came from his decision to 
reengage a familiar face in the investigation. In November 1956, several months after Schüle 
took over the case, he reached out to the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung based in Stuttgart. 
Under the leadership of Josef Warscher, the Jewish organization for Baden-Württemberg had 
already proven instrumental in advancing the case against Fischer-Schweder. Over a year 
earlier, Warscher had been responsible for forwarding allegations to the Ulm prosecutors, 
which for the first time alerted the detectives about a massacre in Garsden. More 
substantively, the critical voice the organization provided on behalf of the victims of these 
crimes gave the case a more concrete public purpose and motivated the investigators. For 
Nellmann, this pressure contributed to his decision to expand the case. As he noted in his 
seminal letter from June 9, 1956, “I should also point out that the charges have been filed by 
the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde [sic]. A rapid and complete clarification of the facts of the 
case is therefore necessary for a variety of reasons.”40 The organization had played a clear 
role to this point in determining the floor for the investigation: detectives needed to pursue 
the case at the very least to a level that would satisfy the Jewish community of the state. 
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 When Schüle reached out to Warscher in early November, the organization soon 
came to define the case’s ceiling. The upper reaches of what the case could accomplish rested 
in part on the abilities and resources of the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung and its leader. 
Previously, the organization had loomed over the investigation and shaped it through public 
pressure. Now, Schüle turned to Warscher and solicited the active engagement of the 
organization. It is unclear what exactly Schüle said to Warscher or where the decision to tap 
into the potential of the community stemmed from, but on November 8, Warscher fired off a 
barrage of letters to a global network of associations interested in the fate of European Jewry.  
 Although the involvement of the Kultusvereinigung greatly expanded the scale of the 
investigation, it was not the first such network that the investigators had attempted to access. 
When Schüle and Nellmann first decided to restructure the case, they saw that the over-
dependence on the testimony of former perpetrators hindered their ability to secure a 
conviction. But finding non-perpetrator witnesses proved extraordinarily difficult. The first 
idea that Nellmann devised and Schüle implemented involved clergy and the Lithuanian Red 
Cross. Several days after Nellmann ordered Saup to re-launch the investigation, he sent the 
Ulm prosecutor a list of priests obtained from a contact who had formerly been stationed in 
Lithuania.
41
 He wanted the investigators to speak with them and hopefully learn which clergy 
had worked in the towns where mass shootings occurred. He explained his rationale to Saup: 
“These priests could then make statements about how those shot were gathered together, 
whether there was partisan fighting, and whether court proceedings were held.”42 A few 
weeks later, Schüle fumed after a meeting with Saup that left him “convinced that nothing 
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has been done either in the direction of the Lithuanian clergy, the Lithuanian Red Cross, or 
anything else.”43 He made the pursuit of these groups a core aim over the summer of 1956.  
 One of the Ulm prosecutors followed up on Schüle’s demands shortly after their 
meeting. In a letter to the priests that Nellmann had located, an Ulm prosecutor asked Fathers 
Alfonsas Riskus and Anton Bunga whether they had knowledge of any crimes carried out in 
warzone Lithuania.
44
 Neither offered information, but they did alert the prosecutors to 
possible sources of information. Bunga suggested that they speak with Bishop Vincentas 
Padolskis, who had been bishop in the diocese in question and was now stationed in Rome.
45
 
Riskus later sent Vogelmann the address for the Lithuanian Central Committee (Litauisches 
Zentralkommittee), which could potentially help them locate Lithuanians with information.
46
 
 On July 21, the Ulm prosecutor’s office sent a letter to Rome addressed to Bishop 
Padolskis, which suggested that because he had been bishop in the diocese “perhaps you 
might be able to provide statements about these incidents.”47 Barring that, they beseeched the 
bishop to list the names of any priests stationed in Garsden, Polangen, Krottingen, or 
Pogegen. In mid-August Padolskis’ response arrived. Unable to recall the names of any 
priests working in the area, Padolskis offered a few details of German anti-Jewish policies. In 
1941, they had carried out a program “of special actions against the Jews,” which involved 
ghettoization and mass executions. He underscored that while the churches opposed all such 
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measures, they had no recourse for affecting policy. A Lithuanian official had told him at the 
time, “In these affairs nothing can be changed and nothing can be done to help because the 
Germans are in control and no Lithuanians should involve themselves in these issues.”48  
Though the clergy strategy yielded few new witnesses for the investigation, it did 
showcase both the creativity and naïveté of the new prosecutors on the case.
49
 Nellmann and 
Schüle were convinced of the need to transform the case, but neither had a blueprint for how 
to do this. The decision to look to Catholic priests for help on the case represented a degree 
of innovation previously unseen in the Fischer-Schweder investigation. Ostensibly, many of 
these priests would have been pushed out of Lithuania following the communist takeover, 
which put them geographically within reach of the prosecutors. Moreover, the prosecutors 
clearly felt that the priests, as community leaders, could offer a moral perspective 
unassailable in court, in sharp distinction from the self-serving perpetrator testimony. But in 
thinking along these lines, they also projected back into the past their own conceptions of 
church behavior, which often failed to correspond to the historical record. Far from neutral 
observers of the crimes committed against Jews, priests were often conduits for the spread 
and legitimatization of anti-Semitism in the east.
50
 That Schüle and Nellmann were unaware 
of this is not surprising, as even scholars had yet to fully understand this complicity, but their 
unawareness underscores that, at all levels of the investigation, the state faced an enormous 
information deficit. 
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By November, the prosecutors decided to turn to the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung 
in an effort to advance the case. The decision, though logical, was not obvious. Throughout 
postwar Germany, Jewish communities struggled to regroup and establish old connections. 
Very few German Jews had survived the Holocaust, let alone returned home after, and many 
of the estimated 250,000 survivors within postwar German borders in 1946 were displaced 
persons from the east.
51
 In this context, the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung reformed in order 
to rebuild the Jewish community of Württemberg. The group had as few as nine members in 
1946, but a decade later the number had risen to 569.
52
 Though a significant increase, the 
group remained relatively small, and its main work focused on providing material aid for its 
members. On the occasions when it did interact with the state government, this typically 
concerned issues such as the preservation of Jewish sites, Hebrew education opportunities in 
the area, and other matters important for the reconstitution of Jewish life. Although the 
organization had earlier intervened to file a criminal complaint against Fischer-Schweder, it 
was not clear how, if at all, the Kultusvereinigung could actively assist in the investigation. 
The small size of the organization actually concealed a number of its strengths. First, 
the Kultusvereinigung was not a self-sustaining organization. It relied on aid from various 
foreign Jewish organizations invested in the redevelopment of Jewish communities, which 
meant that the group had knowledge of and access to an array of international organizations. 
Second, the association had extensive contacts with Jewish survivors. Significant numbers of 
displaced Jews had spent some time in the Baden-Württemberg area, and the association had 
advocated on their behalf. These contacts meant that the Kultusvereinigung had developed a 
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particular set of skills that enabled Warscher and his staff to locate Jews who had fled their 
communities in the wake of the Holocaust.  
This network had been put to some use in earlier prosecutions. In the immediate 
postwar years, the Kultusvereinigung had filed numerous claims in southwest German courts 
on behalf of the region’s Jewish community. Most involved restitution for damaged, 
destroyed, or looted property during the Third Reich, in particular during Kristallnacht in 
November 1938.
53
 In 1951, the association had also relied on information from organizations 
such as the Yidisher Visnshaftlekher Institut (YIVO) in New York and the Centre de 
Documentation Juive Contemporaine in Paris to provide evidence for the allegations.
54
 These 
contributions, however, had all but ended by the mid-1950s. Moreover, the involvement 
seemed a one-way street, in which the Kultusvereinigung brought claims, as it had against 
Fischer-Schweder, but the state prosecutors did not solicit the office’s engagement. Schüle’s 
decision to enlist Warscher’s support proved to be a decisive moment for the investigation. 
On November 8, 1956, Warscher sent off letters to a series of Jewish organizations: 
the Wiener Library based in London, the United Restitution Organization in New York, and 
Yad Vashem in Jerusalem.
55
 In these, he explained that the prosecutors in Ulm were 
investigating individuals “who allegedly took part in the murder of Jews in Lithuania…The 
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prosecutor’s office has so far come a long ways, but they are hoping to make more arrests.”56 
In this interest, Warscher wrote, “I have been asked to identify literature about the era of 
persecutions in Lithuania and, when possible, witnesses as well.” Although Warscher 
realized that “there may not be many survivors because Jews in Lithuania were killed in such 
great numbers,” he held out hope that eyewitnesses might be found. As he later explained:  
The jurors of the court will not be as impressed by depictions based on available 
literature as they will be by an eyewitness explanation of his own experiences. This 
makes an entirely different and ultimately deeper impression. You must not forget 
that since the time of these events – since the end of the war – more than ten years 
have passed, and the memories of the war years have surely faded for the jurors. So it 
is necessary to depict the horror before the court, as clearly and dramatically as 
possible, and for that the involvement of eyewitnesses is of the greatest importance.
57
 
 
To help find witnesses, Warscher sent along the names of the execution sites under 
investigation, as well as the prosecutors’ information so they could be contacted directly. A 
few weeks later, he extended similar letters to two other groups, the World Jewish Congress 
and the YIVO, both in New York.
58
 By January, clearly encouraged by Warscher’s efforts, 
the Ulm investigators prepared especially for him an eight-page summary of the investigation 
and photographs of the seven defendants by that point in custody, which they asked him to 
“forward to relevant agencies to identify witnesses.”59 
The Israeli organization Yad Vashem took to Warscher’s call for witnesses with great 
zeal. The seeds for this organization were sown as early as 1942, when Zionist proposals 
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circulated about the creation of a memorial to victims of the Holocaust.
60
 By 1953, the Israeli 
Knesset passed the Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Act, which established the Authority 
for the Martyrs and Heroes of the Holocaust, known as Yad Vashem. Conceived in broad 
terms, the memorial would consist of a physical monument, but also of an institution with the 
mission “to gather, investigate, and publish all evidence of the Holocaust and heroism.”61 
This research wing became a central database of records relating to the Holocaust, including 
an extensive effort to catalog and identify victims and survivors of the Holocaust. As a 
repository of testimony and accounts of survival, Yad Vashem had emerged by the 1950s as 
a preeminent scholarly resource for information on the victims of Nazi crimes. 
Immediately upon his involvement in the case, Warscher had written to Daniel 
Cohen, an employee at Yad Vashem he learned of through an associate of the 
Kultusvereinigung, but received no response until January.
62
 The delay had nothing to do 
with a lack of interest on the part of the Israeli organization to assist the German prosecution. 
To the contrary, as Cohen explained in his letter to Warscher from January 7, “Upon my 
return to Jerusalem I found your letter from November 8, 1956 still unopened…I 
immediately forwarded its contents to the leader of the Yad Vashem Archive, Dr. Kermisz. 
This research will be carried out as quickly as possible, and he will then contact you directly 
about his findings.”63 
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When Josef Kermisz received the contents of Warscher’s letter, he at once went into 
action locating information of use for the investigation. After identifying a number of 
publications detailing the fate of Jews in Lithuania, he wrote to their authors on January 6. 
Kermisz told them, “The prosecutors need information and witnesses about the period of 
persecution in Lita [Jewish settlement area of Lithuania]. We did not obtain any information 
regarding the names of criminals, the dates they participated in the persecution, etc., because 
this is indeed a secretive matter…Thus we are coming to you with a question: do you hold 
information about the activities of German war criminals in the places mentioned above?”64 
Three days later, he heard back from one of the authors, Israel Kaplan, a survivor from 
Lithuania who had gathered survivor testimony immediately after the Holocaust.
65
 Kaplan 
informed Kermisz, “Two weeks ago, I communicated with the Wiener Library in London, 
and I promised to help them as much as I can regarding the preparation for the trial in 
Stuttgart.” Despite his willingness to assist in the case, Kaplan regretted to tell the archivist, 
“From the district of Tilsit (the villages near the Memel belt to Wirballen and Augustowo) 
where the Gestapo was active, remains a terrifyingly small number of Jews, and only a few 
of them [less than ten] are in Israel.”66  
On January 13, Kermisz sent his preliminary findings to the Kultusvereinigung in 
Stuttgart. With “apologies for the delay of our response,” the Yad Vashem scholar presented 
Warscher with an array of potential sources. In addition to including a translated copy of 
Kaplan’s letter, Kermisz listed references to Lithuanian Jews in the International Military 
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Tribunal records, then suggested a number of individuals who had written on Lithuanian 
Jews that may be of use. He identified references to Krottingen in one author’s account, a 
description of Polangen in another, and of Garsden in still one more. New York City, he 
wrote, was home to the Jewish-Lithuanian Cultural Society, which had also published a 
number of works that might be of interest. Additionally, Yad Vashem had possession of a list 
of Lithuanian war criminals if the prosecutors had interest in that, and he had written to the 
Wiener Library for additional support. Kermisz concluded, “It goes without saying that we 
will keep your request in mind as we carry out further review and processing of our 
materials, and you will be informed immediately of any new information.”67 
Between Kermisz’s receipt of Warscher’s request and his letter of response, only a 
week had elapsed. Yet in that week, Kermisz had identified and brought to their attention a 
half-dozen scholars and new sources of information. Without Warscher and Kermisz’s 
involvement, almost certainly none of these materials – being not only far off in Israel but 
largely in Yiddish and Hebrew – would ever have come to the Ulm prosecutors’ attention.  
While Yad Vashem was making inroads regarding possible survivors in Israel, YIVO 
was producing similar results in the United States. Originally founded in 1925 in Vilnius, the 
Yidisher Visnshaftlekher Institut (Yiddish Scientific Institute) had the purpose of serving as a 
scholarly research center into Jewish culture and history in Eastern Europe. With the advent 
of World War II, YIVO relocated to New York, and there it began to assume a form similar 
to Yad Vashem as it emphasized the collection and publication of information related to the 
fate of European Jews.
68
 In mid-January 1957, Warscher contacted YIVO in the interest of 
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locating witnesses because “as yet no witnesses can be found in Germany.”69 At the end of 
the month, a representative at YIVO responded, “We have asked our experts on Lithuanian 
issues to assemble everything that might be of service for your and the Stuttgart Attn. 
General’s use.” Thus far, they were able to offer the names of individuals with knowledge of 
the Holocaust in Lithuania. They also suggested Warscher turn to Yad Vashem which held 
“extensive materials and reports from eyewitnesses on the destruction of Jews in Eastern 
Europe.” Finally, they offered “to engage the entire Yiddish press in America this week 
about our search on your behalf for Lithuanian Jews who survived the destruction of the 
Lithuanian town Garsden.” 70 
The Yad Vashem and YIVO reports arrived to Warscher less than two weeks apart 
and both reports converged on one individual who might have information. Eliezer 
Jeruschalmi, who currently lived in Haifa, had recently authored a Yiddish work titled 
Destruction of Jews in Shavli Ghetto and in Neighboring Shtetls, in which he referred to 
executions of children in Polangen.
71
 In late February, Jeruschalmi wrote to Warscher about 
what he knew.
72
 His son, Mordechai, had earlier penned an account of a “Soviet children’s 
camp [Kinderlager]” in Polangen, a German translation of which Yad Vashem forwarded in 
July 1957.
73
 He also claimed to be in possession of over 4,000 documents relating to the 
Holocaust in Lithuania, though most of these related to the Schaulen ghetto, outside 
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Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s area of activity. His most hopeful insight, however, related to two 
individuals who may have survived the shootings: Kuschmir and Reifer, addresses unknown.  
Although this seemed the moment that Warscher and the Ulm prosecutors had been 
waiting for – the first concrete eyewitness accounts from a survivor – the network of Jewish 
associations soon ran out of luck. Kermisz at Yad Vashem spent several months tracking 
down Kuschmir and Reifer. He succeeded in locating “Reifer,” whose actual name was 
Elijahu Reif.
74
 Though Warscher wrote for information, this witness never materialized. 
Kermisz pursued the Kuschmir lead all the way to the Israeli Department of the Interior and 
the Department of Familial Inquiry, but in both instances, Kermisz learned that the state was 
unable to provide additional information.
75
 The search for survivors in Israel had gone cold.
76
 
A few weeks later, in early May 1957, the YIVO-led search in American arrived at 
the same conclusion. In a letter to Warscher, Executive Secretary Schwartz wrote, “Many 
announcements were made in the press – by us, by the URO, by the Jewish Worker’s 
Committee.” Unfortunately, these efforts had resulted in only a few possible leads, and none 
to date had resulted in credible witnesses. Schwartz came to a dour conclusion about their 
efforts. “We deeply regret,” he stated, “that the results are so limited, but what more can you 
or I do? Put simply: 99 percent of the witnesses have already died years ago.”77 
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 Warscher had no choice but to inform Schüle on May 17 that despite attempts made 
over the past seven months, he had not identified any survivors.
78
 In a later letter, Warscher 
explained to Schüle that the crimes in question are “some of the tragic cases that were so 
total that there were no survivors.”79 As to be expected, the absence of survivor accounts 
came as a blow to the investigation. Schüle responded on May 20, “I take it that your 
investigation into witnesses in Israel and the USA have unfortunately, as I feared, come to 
naught.”80 But as a nimble jurist, Schüle refused to abandon the effort as wasted. He 
explained to Warscher, “As shocking as the facts are, in order to use this for the case I need 
to be able to present official copies of the widespread calls for witnesses made on the radio 
and in newspapers.” By asking Warscher for documentation of all efforts made to identify 
witnesses, Schüle was devising an alternate strategy. If no survivors could be found, then 
their absence could be used as evidence of the extensiveness of the crimes committed.  
The involvement of the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung, and by extension of the 
URO, YIVO, Wiener Library, Yad Vashem, and other Jewish associations, in the search for 
survivors of Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s crimes constituted a significant and overlooked aspect 
of the Ulm investigation. Because these efforts yielded no survivors, it may be tempting to 
consider the strategy a failure. Yet, as Schüle noted, the extent to which these organizations 
attempted to find witnesses simply underscored the severity of the crimes committed. 
Numerous organizations circulating efforts throughout Israel, America, and Western Europe 
could not find a single surviving Jew from the Memelland.  
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It is important as well not to reduce these organizations’ involvement to a simple 
calculus of success or failure to locate witnesses. Investigations are not measured solely by 
their outcome; they can be evaluated by the expansiveness of their efforts. Schüle approached 
the case not from the narrow confines of perpetrator accounts, but considered the possibilities 
of engaging bystander and victim testimony as well. He widened the array of the potential 
witnesses, and in so doing he raised the bar for what the case could hope to achieve. To 
pursue these potential sources, he reached out to an organization with no formal relation to 
the state. But it did have connections, and these were what Schüle and the investigators 
lacked. Schüle recognized the limitations on his team to locate witnesses, and so, rather than 
close off that possibility, he found other channels through which to pursue this goal. In the 
end, the strategy of engaging these networks of Jewish associations revealed Schüle’s 
flexible and innovative approach to the case. 
Finally, the experience of working with Warscher and the other organizations 
showcased a new means of investigating and prosecuting war criminals. Since war’s end, 
most of these associations had worked extensively on gathering, sifting through, and 
processing information on the Holocaust. Increasingly, these groups spoke to one another: 
Yad Vashem could recommend the Wiener Library to Warscher, and YIVO could 
recommend Yad Vashem. They were constructing a hitherto untapped network of Holocaust 
scholars and a repository for survivors and their testimony. Thanks to Warscher, Schüle 
learned the potential of this resource. Without fail, these associations proved eager to assist. 
By reaching out to them, Schüle expanded the labor force of his investigation exponentially. 
A single request for information reverberated throughout the international Jewish 
community; that Schüle’s searches found no voices does not mean they fell on deaf ears.  
207 
 
 
Scholars and their Sources 
 In 1959, Schüle reflected back on the difficulties of Nazi crimes investigations. He 
wrote that these cases often lead to a situation where “even when convinced of the guilt of a 
person, I could see no possibility for providing evidence of guilt.”81 This was the situation 
when Schüle first came to the case. Though Fischer-Schweder’s criminality seemed apparent 
to all, Nellmann and Schüle clearly did not believe that the Ulm prosecutors would be able to 
prove this conclusively in a court of law. As Schüle looked over the progress made prior to 
his assignment to the Ulm case in 1956, he found a possible solution:  
After I became acquainted with the material, I suddenly realized that I could still find 
and evaluate crime evidence, even if of a different form than traditional crimes. I 
realized that this evidence was no less reliable than that found in more recent crime 
cases. I consider documents among these pieces of evidence. We need to subdivide 
these documents into those which have an official nature and therefore irrefutable 
value as evidence, particularly those stemming from the perpetrators themselves, and 
those which come from the few survivors of the extermination efforts.”82 
 
Although the search for these few survivor accounts had come up short, finding wartime 
documentation from the perpetrators became a key aim of his investigation and one which 
yielded substantial results. From the very first day that Schüle joined the case, he emphasized 
a scholarly approach to the investigation, which would augment witness accounts with 
scholarship and wartime documentation. Schüle believed that anchoring the fluid imprecision 
of human memory in the science of academia and the data of archives could provide an 
empirical case against the defendants.  
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Beyond making a symbolic gesture, when Schüle sent the Ulm team Reitlinger’s The 
Final Solution, he was pointing out potential new sources. As a logistical guide, Reitlinger’s 
work had a number of recommendations. One of the first historical attempts at a systematic 
and source-based analysis for the evolution and implementation of Nazi genocidal policies 
against Jews, Reitlinger’s narrative drew heavily on records from the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg and the successor trials.
83
 At the time, those records constituted the 
best combination of Nazi documentation and testimony for understanding the mechanisms of 
the Holocaust. The Nuremberg proceedings had relied extensively on wartime documentation 
to make their case against the defendants.
84
 This documentation became not only a crucial 
source for Reitlinger, but also provided an investigative model that Schüle aimed to replicate.  
The primary Nuremberg trial records had by this point been published in a series of 
volumes, which offered the investigators a collection of wartime records from Hitler’s inner 
circle on the Holocaust in Eastern Europe. Although available to the investigators, during the 
first year of the case they went unused. Quite possibly, Mettler and the detectives were 
unaware of the publication until the Reitlinger work brought them to their attention. Another 
likelihood is that the records did not appear as relevant prior to Schüle’s involvement. With 
the narrow focus on Fischer-Schweder and a few select crime sites in Lithuania, the Ulm 
prosecutors’ office had never considered these records as a useful source, since they 
documented higher level decisions and structures of power within the Nazi state. Only once 
Schüle arrived did the apparatus of criminality become central to the case. 
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As the team began to go through these records, they realized that in fact a great deal 
of information relating specifically to the murder of Jews in Lithuania did exist, but the 
documents existed in unpublished records from different cases. In addition to the main 
proceedings at Nuremberg against the Nazi inner circle for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, the Allies prosecuted a number of other groups of criminals in the so-called 
“successor trials.” These trials involved Nazi doctors, corporations, the foreign ministry, and 
– most important for the Ulm investigators – the Einsatzgruppen. In The United States of 
America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al., members of the various Einsatzgruppen were tried for 
their murder of over one million civilians during the war.
85
 As the detectives in Ulm learned 
of the case, they began to focus on the trial aspects relating to Einsatzgruppe A, which 
targeted the Baltic States. 
As early as June 1956, Nellmann expressed interest in gaining access to the 
information gathered for the Einsatzgruppen trial.
86
 In particular, he gravitated towards the 
records concerning Martin Sandberger, a co-defendant at the Ohlendorf trial who had been 
head of Sonderkommando 1a of Einsatzgruppe A. In this unit, Sandberger had followed 
behind the Wehrmacht during the June invasion of Soviet-controlled Lithuania. The 
investigators hoped the court records that led to his conviction might hold information of use 
for the Einsatzkommando Tilsit case. Since the case had taken place under the jurisdiction of 
the American authorities, access to the records, however, presented obstacles. On July 24, 
1956, Nellmann wrote to the American consulate to explain the situation.
87
 He informed the 
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consulate that these records would be “of the utmost importance for conducting the 
investigation of Fischer-Schweder,” and he requested that the detectives be granted access to 
the materials. A week later, Richard Hagen at the consulate responded: “A representative of 
your office may see them at any time….The American Embassy stands ready and willing to 
cooperate in this respect.”88 
Over the summer and fall of 1956, the prosecutors and investigators mined these and 
other documents from the Einsatzgruppen trial. They quickly began to recognize their 
significance as a resource distinct from testimony. Although the team initially found little on 
the actual crimes carried out along the Lithuanian border, volumes of information about other 
mass executions in Eastern Europe emerged. These depicted a pattern of Einsatzgruppen 
shootings that mirrored the executions in Garsden, and as a result, they cast doubt on the 
claims made by Fischer-Schweder and others that the shootings there had been in response to 
partisan activity. The more the investigators uncovered, the clearer it became that Jews were 
targeted as Jews.  
By far the most significant set of historical documents to emerge from their research 
was the Ereignismeldungen, operational reports of the Einsatzgruppen itself. These daily 
summaries detailed the activities of the death squads as they proceeded through Eastern 
Europe, and they amounted to, as an Ulm newspaper later referred to them, “a ledger of 
death.”89 By November, the team had identified five reports that contained information on 
the crimes of Einsatzkommando Tilsit. Ereignismeldung #14, dating from July 6, 1941, gave 
details on the crimes they had been researching for the previous two years. The report stated: 
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From Tilsit three large cleansing actions [Grosssäuberungsaktionen] were carried out, 
and the following were shot: 
 
 in Garsden 201 people 
 in Krottingen 214 people 
 in Polangen 111 people 
 
In Garsden, the Jewish population supported the Russian border guards in the defense 
against the German attack. In Krottingen, during the night of the occupation one 
officer and two billeting officers [Quartiermacher] were surreptitiously shot by the 
population. In Polangen, on the day after the occupation one officer was furtively shot 
by the population. 
 
In all three large operations, Jews were predominantly liquidated. To be found among 
them, however, were also Bolshevik functionaries and snipers, who had been handed 
over as such to the Sicherheitspolizei in part by the Wehrmacht.
90
 
 
Another report, Ereignismeldung #19 from July 11, stated that units from Tilsit had killed 
133 people in Tauroggen, 322 in Georgenburg, 316 in Augustowo, 68 in Mariampol, 192 in 
Wladislawo, 122 in Tauroggen, 63 in Krottingen, and 1 in Schmalleningkin.
91
 “Thus far,” the 
report concluded, “1,743 people were shot.” According to their own records, 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit had carried out eleven mass executions in barely two weeks. 
 These reports established a concrete timeframe and specific numbers of victims for 
the crimes, which were two issues that had challenged the detectives since the first year of 
the case. If these records are contrasted with the chart Opferkuch had created during the first 
year of the investigation, the concrete information from the Ereignismeldungen solved many 
of the inconsistencies inherent in the perpetrator accounts. The specific information from the 
Einsatzgruppen reports involving victim numbers, dates of crimes, and locations meant that 
the prosecutors no longer needed to attempt the near impossible task of gleaning these 
specific details from fluid and contradictory perpetrator testimonies. 
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Unfortunately for the detectives, the documents prolonged two points of contention. 
First, the Ereignismeldungen claimed that although the majority of those killed had been 
Jews, these killings resulted from partisan activity. The issue of partisan involvement, and by 
extension of the legality of the shootings in a wartime environment, saw no resolution 
through these reports. Second, the reports did not address the question of the provenance of 
the execution orders. Who authorized the Einsatzkommando Tilsit shootings did not appear 
in these reports, which allowed the defendants to continue to invoke the Befehlsnotstand, the 
claim that if they had not carried out orders, they would have risked their own lives. 
Once the Ulm staff became aware of the Ereignismeldungen, they sought out all the 
additional iterations these took. The Nazi bureaucracy functioned like a massive distillery, 
such that lower levels produced reports, which were then summarized by mid-level officials, 
and finally the summaries of the summaries – the distilled essence of the originals – arrived 
at the top. The Ereignismeldungen were the summary of the original reports from the various 
Einsatzkommandos and Einsatzgruppen. The Ereignismeldungen were then summarized for 
Heydrich in the Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte (activity and situation reports). 
As the Ulm staff continued to gather information during summer and fall 1956 on the 
Einsatzgruppen cases, they learned in mid-November that the Institut für Zeitgeschichte 
(Institute for Contemporary History) in Munich maintained copies of many of these 
documents in question.
92
 Founded after the war, the Institut served as a documentation and 
research center into the Nazi era. In late November, Schüle convinced the deskbound Mettler 
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to travel to Munich and consult the records.
93
 Mettler requested access to the following 
documents: Heydrich’s summaries of the Ereignismeldungen, a number of affidavits, 
defendant information, and complete copies of the Ereignismeldungen.
94
 
Of increasing interest were any of the original reports filed by Einsatzkommando 
Tilsit, which had eluded them thus far. Einsatzkommando Tilsit must, the prosecutors 
reasoned, have provided their own reports to the Einsatzgruppen which then appeared in 
summary form in the Ereignismeldungen. At the end of his letter to the Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, Mettler wrote, “P.S. – In case there are any unit or operation reports, 
particularly from Stapo Tilsit (esp. those signed by its leader Böhme) or from SD Tilsit (esp. 
those signed by Hersmann), these would be of special interest.”95 By this point, both Hans-
Joachim Böhme and Werner Hersmann had been named co-defendants in the investigation, 
the most senior Nazi officials of the eventual ten on trial. The Institut, however, did not have 
these records. Mettler then asked Weida to ask the defendants whether they had filed 
reports.
96
 Confident that these reports had existed and desperate to find them, the Ulm team 
had Nellmann inquire whether they might be in the possession of the American consulate.
97
 
This effort too came up empty in the late 1950s.  
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Ultimately, the intuition of the prosecution about existence of low level 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit reports was vindicated. These reports had been written and had 
survived the collapse of the Third Reich, but they remained locked away in Eastern European 
archives as hostages of the Cold War, unavailable to scholars and investigators alike until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Had these been made accessible to the Ulm prosecutors, the 
case may well have taken a different trajectory. In one pivotal report filed after the Garsden, 
Krottingen, and Polangen shootings, Hans-Joachim Böhme wrote that “[Head of 
Einsatzgruppe A] Stahlecker expressed his general approval to the cleansing actions.” The 
same July 1, 1941 report explained that later in the week, Böhme met personally with 
Himmler and Heydrich. Böhme wrote that they “received information from me on the 
measures initiated by the Stapostelle Tilsit and sanctioned them completely.” 98  As Jürgen 
Matthäus, the historian who first uncovered these documents, explained: 
[Böhme] legitimize[d] the selection and execution of undesirable persons, primarily 
Jews, without waiting for specific orders from above…The authority to inflict 
suffering and death on civilians became detached from military rank and status, with 
lower- and middle-ranking officers [such as Böhme] taking the initiative while their 
superiors provided support, encouragement, or ex post facto legitimization.
99
  
 
This document indicated that Böhme had, in fact, not acted on any explicit orders, but had 
willed the Einsatzkommando Tilsit executions into existence of his own volition. This would 
have obliterated the defedants’ claims to have only followed orders. But for the Ulm team, 
this operation report remained only an idea, and for the trial, the document became a 
tantalizing “what-if.”  
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Although certain material proved wholly inaccessible, the Ulm team made the most 
of what they could access and scoured West Germany for resources. Mettler, for example, 
enjoyed the change of scenery at the Institut, where he “was very well received and fully 
supported.”100 There he found “a great deal of material,” including a number of potential 
witnesses for the investigation to explore. Another major effort came in December, the week 
following Mettler’s return from Munich, when Schüle and Opferkuch planned a trip to 
Berlin. Though the investigators had routinely taken to traversing Germany, Berlin presented 
its own set of challenges. With American assistance, the prosecutor and detective boarded a 
military aircraft in Frankfurt on December 2, 1956, which took them into the divided city.
101
 
While Opferkuch went around interrogating witnesses, Schüle worked at the Berlin 
Document Center and other organizations for a week to find personnel records and wartime 
information on the defendants.
102
  
In addition to consulting with raw historical documents, Schüle and the detectives 
came to rely on scholarly accounts of the Nazi state and the Holocaust. From the beginning, 
such materials had constituted a key facet of the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung’s outreach 
efforts to different organizations. Warscher focused extensively on tracking down Jewish 
survivors for testimony, but his attempts to locate documentation and scholarship proved 
extremely useful for the investigation. Yad Vashem had furnished the investigation with a 
number of Yiddish and Hebrew sources, even providing translations upon the prosecutor’s 
request, and other organizations proved equally willing to help.  
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Within a few days of Warscher’s initial November 1956 letters of request for 
resources and witnesses, Eva Reichmann at the Wiener Library responded enthusiastically. 
She wrote, “Of course we are more than ready to assist as best we can with the procurement 
of materials regarding the persecutions in Lithuania and in the specified locations.”103 The 
library first came into existence in 1933 to document Nazi policies against Jews, and as such 
it can lay claim to being the first “Holocaust memorial institution.”104 By 1939, the 
organization moved from Amsterdam to London, where its offices remained in the 1950s. 
The Library played an important role in furnishing the Allies with documentation for the 
Nuremberg trials, and Reichmann herself had by this point emerged as a significant historian 
and sociologist of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. With this background, Reichmann sent 
Warscher a number of references to Nuremberg materials, recommended Reitlinger’s work, 
and suggested several Lithuanian societies to contact. Over the coming months, the Wiener 
Library provided the investigators with numerous scholarly resources that allowed the 
investigators to place the disparate documentary record they had collected into a more 
analytical and established framework of historical interpretation. 
As a result of Warscher’s efforts and the investigators’ archival inquiries, two 
historians emerged as important experts for the investigation. A historian at Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte since 1951, Helmut Krausnick gave expertise on the Einsatzgruppen. Later 
the director of the Institut, Krausnick first became aware of the Ulm investigation upon 
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Mettler’s research visit in November 1956.105 The historian had previously been involved in 
the Allied trial of Einsatzgruppen members and had published an important volume on the 
Third Reich.
106
 Mettler and Krausnick became close and regularly exchanged letters over the 
coming year, addressing each other informally.
107
 In late 1957, after the preparation of the 
indictments, Mettler sent him a copy for review, a significant gesture and vote of confidence 
since these were not made public until the trial itself. At the same time, Mettler turned to 
Krausnick with a request: “Would you or one of your coworkers be able to serve as an expert 
witness in the trial for questions regarding the question of the Befehlsnotstand and the 
general function of the Einsatzgruppen?”108 Krausnick responded that he would need time to 
“go back over the material,” but agreed to assist as best he could.109 
As the case began to move toward trial, Schüle sought additional scholarly opinions, 
particularly on the issue of the Befehlsnotstand. In early 1958, the Ulm team came into 
contact with Hans-Günther Seraphim. A professor at the University of Göttingen and founder 
of its Contemporary History Division of the Institute for International Law 
(Zeitgeschichtliche Abteilung des Instituts für Völkerrecht), Seraphim had strong academic 
credentials.
110
 He also possessed previous trial experience, since he worked as a historian 
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gathering information for the Nuremberg trials and had served as an expert witness at several 
other trials during the 1950s.
111
 After several months researching the Befehlsnotstand, 
Seraphim prepared a twenty-six page expert opinion for the trial. In this he sought to answer 
the key question: whether refusing to follow orders to execute civilians put oneself at risk. 
Based on his extensive knowledge of the available documentation, Seraphim concluded, “In 
more than a decade of research…the expert witness has not found a single case that would 
permit the conclusion that the refusal by an SS officer to execute an extermination order 
would have led to consequences damaging to his life and limb.”112  
Through the work with Jewish organizations, case files, archives, and historians, the 
Ulm investigators succeeded in creating scaffolding for the criminal behavior of members of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit. This structure stretched from Hitler in Berlin to ordinary police in 
Eastern Europe and encompassed the military and SS in between. Now, if the defendants 
claimed to have only killed a small number of people during the first weeks of war, the 
prosecutors had wartime documents establishing their murder of 5,502 from June to October 
1941.
113
 If the defendants argued that those killed were partisans or had been convicted by 
courts, they had Wehrmacht documents discounting partisan activity and extensive 
documentation on the spontaneous nature of Einsatzgruppen killings. If the defendants 
insisted that to not execute civilians would have meant risking their own lives, they had 
expert testimony to demonstrate that they faced no such dangers. By using various forms of 
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evidence to establish parameters for the crimes, they succeeded in counterbalancing the 
claims of the perpetrators.   
 
From One to Ten 
The significance of Schüle’s broad, historical approach to the investigation became 
clear through the rapid expansion of the case. In the first year of the investigation, the Ulm 
prosecutors barely found enough evidence to indict Fischer-Schweder, and Nellmann’s June 
1956 intervention made it clear that he found this insufficient to secure a conviction. By 
contrast, the subsequent year under Schüle witnessed the expansion of the case from one to 
ten defendants. This became possible because they were no longer targeting specific 
individuals, but an entire hierarchy of Holocaust complicity. When they learned of a crime in 
a given area, they knew that whoever, for example, had headed the border police responsible 
for securing a specific town must have played a leadership role in the execution. All they had 
to do was identify that person and criminal charges would follow. Thanks to the scaffolding 
they had created, the investigators were able to plug the criminals into their case, rather than 
create an entire case to fit the criminal. 
Structuring all of this information on Nazi crimes, individuals, and chains of 
commands presented its own set of logistical problems for the investigators, who had to find 
a way to organize the information effectively. On a basic level, any new paperwork 
(correspondences, interrogations, and other information) went to the back of the file and was 
given a page number, which kept the main investigation records organized chronologically as 
the case unfolded. To make this information accessible, the team devised a series of card 
catalogs to sort and cross-reference the information. One catalog consisted of a list of 
220 
 
people.
114
 Anyone mentioned in the case would have a sheet created, which included the 
person’s birth date and current address (if known) and referenced any page number on which 
the person was mentioned. So, for example, Fischer-Schweder’s former employer in 1954 
had a short entry that included the page number in the main case file for a reference he wrote 
on Fischer-Schweder’s behalf. Fischer-Schweder’s file, by contrast, became several pages 
long with scores of references. Another card catalog involved specific crime locations and 
types, such as Garsden, the executions of women and children, or specific legal points to 
address, such as the Befehlsnotstand.
115
 This system required multiple copies of files and 
constant maintenance and updating, but it rendered the huge volume of data uncovered under 
Schüle’s expanded case searchable and efficient.  
Now that the investigators were recreating the crime complex through a combination 
of testimony, scholarship, and wartime documentation and had a centralized system for 
accessing this information, they were able to undertake a rapid expansion of the 
investigation. Well before Schüle had come on board, they had turned up incriminating 
evidence against other perpetrators involved in the same crimes as Fischer-Schweder. As 
early as November 1955, for instance, Werner Schmidt-Hammer had admitted to issuing the 
execution orders in Garsden. But only once Schüle arrived did Schmidt-Hammer become a 
target of the investigation. On June 29, 1956, the prosecutors filed an appeal to open the 
preliminary inquiry (Voruntersuchung) against Fischer-Schweder and Schmidt-Hammer.
116
 
Within a few weeks of Schüle’s involvement, the case had already grown to include a second 
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defendant. This document alleged that Fischer-Schweder had “deliberately and of his own 
volition cooperated with other perpetrators” in the murder of 550 people; Schmidt-Hammer 
meanwhile was accused of “having knowingly provided aid” in the murder of 490. At this 
point, the Ulm staff had evidence suggesting four shooting incidents (Garsden, Krottingen, 
Pogegen, and Polangen), with Fischer-Schweder present at all and Schmidt-Hammer at three.  
On July 3, the state court approved the request for a preliminary inquiry, which 
acknowledged that the initial investigation had turned up sufficient evidence to warrant the 
appointment of an investigating judge to the case.
117
 In West German investigations, the 
investigating judge conducted follow-up official interrogations with all material witnesses 
and provided judicial oversight for the case. For the Einsatzkommando Tilsit investigation, 
Fritz Lörcher, a 55-year old judge for the Ulm court, was assigned to the case in early July 
and remained on as investigating judge through the trial. Any expansions of the case required 
his approval, which, as became clear later on, was not always easily obtained. 
The case soon expanded beyond Fischer-Schweder and Schmidt-Hammer. Fischer-
Schweder’s statements, because of their self-exculpatory nature, pinned the responsibility for 
the executions on two others: Hans-Joachim Böhme and Erich Frohwann. The investigators 
began to search for these two men. Frohwann, it was rumored, had died at the end of the war, 
and the investigators sought proof.
118
 In early July 1956, they received a letter from the 
Austrian Ministry of the Interior that Frohwann had died shortly after the war, having hung 
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himself “from the top of the Heuberg” outside Salzburg.119 The investigators now wondered 
“whether Böhme is still alive and living in West Germany.”120  
As the SS-Sturmbannführer who led Stapo Tilsit, Böhme had immediately become 
the prime target of interest for the investigation.
121
 During July and August, the Ulm team 
revisited all the previous material witnesses to learn more about Böhme.
122
 Some claimed not 
to know him, others recalled dim memories, and another insisted Böhme had died during the 
war.
123
 By August, they had uncovered some information on Hans-Joachim Böhme (not 
“Hans” as they thought), including his SS number, rank, birth date, and hometown. Mettler 
sent this information to two offices. First, he requested that the Deutsche Dienststelle, which 
held records of war casualties, look for any persons matching Böhme’s details.124 Second, he 
asked the Stuttgart police to run a search request for Böhme and two others in the West 
German police bulletins under the headline, “Urgent Place of Residence Investigation.”125 
Although Mettler did not reveal the exact nature of the investigation, the request asked, 
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“What is known in police circles about these people during the war or after war’s end?” 
Finally on August 20, these efforts paid off. A telegraph arrived to the Stuttgart police that 
day, stating that Böhme is “officially registered and lives in Karlsruhe-Grünwinkel.”126 
Schüle immediately asked Mettler to request an arrest warrant for Böhme, confident 
that evidence placed him in a position of leadership in Krottingen and Garsden.
127
 On August 
23, Opferkuch and another detective went to Böhme’s office to arrest him. Böhme met them 
in his lobby. Told that he was under arrest, Böhme requested to return to his office on the 
third floor to gather his things. Under the guard of police, Böhme went upstairs and sprinted 
for his office window.  His apparent suicide attempt was thwarted only through the quick 
response of the Stuttgart police.
128
 A few nights later, Böhme again attempted suicide, this 
time in his jail cell as he jumped headfirst from his table. Through the fall, “he suffered a 
concussion, a laceration over his entire head, and a broken right arm. It’s not a life 
threatening situation.”129 His fall succeeded in placing him under hospital care, unable to be 
interrogated for over a month. The circumstances surrounding this prolonged recuperation, 
however, would soon become a source of suspicion for the detectives. Once Böhme did 
recover, detectives interrogated him continuously for the first three weeks of October 1956, 
and he offered crime details and perpetrator names that had earlier eluded their efforts. 
 On October 4, a few days into his interrogation, Böhme provided Weida and 
Opferkuch with the name of the SD head in Tilsit who had played a co-leadership role in the 
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shootings: Werner Hersmann.
130
 Two days later, Schüle wrote that based on the “strong 
charges” made against Hersmann, “it is intended to detain him and to have the Ulm court 
issue an arrest warrant.”131 Schüle and Nellmann appeared to have no doubts about the 
continued expansion of the case. A letter from Nellmann’s office following Böhme’s arrest 
stated, “It is to be expected that the further investigations will lead to the detection of 
additional people who took a leadership role in the carrying out of mass shootings in 
Lithuania.”132 Schüle’s instinctual decisions to request arrest warrants for both Böhme and 
Hersmann, before even interrogating the two, demonstrated that he was of one mind with 
Nellmann on this issue. The same, however, could not be said for other staff in Ulm, which 
reacted in alarm to his desire to arrest Hersmann.  
On October 9, Schüle went to Ulm to douse the fire he had started. There he met with 
Mettler and Lörcher. Mettler appeared close to the breaking point. Schüle wrote that he 
“complained about his burden from other cases.”  Saup had not lightened his load, and 
Mettler felt that he “could either properly work on the Fischer-Schweder, et al case or on the 
other 54 cases.” As a result, Mettler had grave concerns “about the planned ‘expansion of the 
investigation.’” Schüle found that the investigating judge Lörcher was “undergoing a crisis at 
the same time and feared that he would be burdened with more and more work by the 
investigation.” Schüle now had to rally his team from their dejected state. “We cannot afford 
half measures,” he explained. “The case must be completely resolved, even with the risk that 
the investigation will take somewhat longer.” Following the conversation, Schüle felt that 
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Lörcher “once again saw things clearly and would return to his work with more courage.”133  
He hoped to aid Mettler with his work, but Saup ignored these requests. 
With mutiny at bay, Schüle directed efforts back to readying an arrest warrant for 
Werner Hersmann. Because Hersmann had earlier been convicted by a court in Traunstein, 
investigators had no difficulty finding his current address in Frankfurt.
134
 Over the next 
several weeks, the investigators looked into Hersmann’s past and his involvement in the 
shootings to prepare evidence for a warrant. On October 25, Mettler filed a warrant request 
for Hersmann, whom he described as “an old fighter in the NSDAP and a fanatic,” accusing 
him of “750 counts of murder.”135 In addition to the shootings in Garsden and Krottingen, the 
prosecution had learned of additional crimes in Wirballen, Tauroggen, and Georgenburg. At 
three o’clock in the afternoon on October 29, Opferkuch arrested Hersmann at his work 
“without incident.”136 
On October 26, Mettler requested another arrest warrant, this one for Harm Willms 
Harms.
137
 The detectives had first heard of Harms earlier in September, when another 
witness stated that he had been head of the Grenzpolizeikommissariat in Tilsit, organized 
under Böhme.
138
 From this post, Harms directed the various border police units who had 
been instrumental in rounding up and guarding the Jews of the Lithuanian border towns. By 
the end of September, they had learned that Harms was working as a shoemaker in Bremen, 
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and sent Opferkuch to interrogate him.
139
 Similar to Schmidt-Hammer the previous year, 
Harms, perhaps panicking, offered a great deal of information, much of it self-incriminating. 
He described in detail five shootings, including two – in Batakiai and Eydtkau – that 
investigators had virtually no information on, and mentioned that there were “still other 
shootings” in towns he could not recall.140 Based on his own accounts, Harms accepted that 
units under his control had contributed to the executions in Garsden and Eydtkau. On 
October 26, Mettler received an arrest warrant charging Harms with 110 counts of accessory 
to murder.
141
 On November 5, he arrived in the Ulm prison, and the investigation now stood 
at five defendants.
142
 
The case now proceeded with the arrest of additional perpetrators at a rate of one per 
month until ten were apprehended. In early November, they first located Böhme’s deputy 
(Vertreter) in Stapo Tilsit, Werner Kreuzmann.
143
 Following his statements and those of 
Böhme, Hersmann, and Harms, Kreuzmann was arrested at his office on November 24.
144
 
Several weeks later, they interrogated Edwin Sakuth and Gerhard Carsten. Sakuth had 
worked at the SD Memel office, a subsidiary of Hersmann’s Tilsit office, and had 
coordinated with Fischer-Schweder and Frohwann on the early shootings.
145
 Carsten headed 
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the border police post in Schmalleningken, which operated under Harms and had participated 
in several mass executions.
146
 Sakuth was arrested two days after Christmas, and Carsten on 
January 18, 1957.
147
 By the end of February, the detectives had finally tracked down Pranas 
Lukys (alias Jakys), the Lithuanian police chief who had assisted in the massacres.
148
 
Detectives had been seeking him out for over a year, and immediately arrested Lukys on 
February 21.
149
 The final defendant, Franz Behrendt, worked under Harms at the 
Grenzpolizeikommissariat in Memel, and had been a person of interest for months. 
Following his interrogation, detectives arrested Behrendt on April 17, 1957.
150
  
By June 1958, the investigators had interrogated over two hundred witnesses, and in 
the end identified ten as indictable. They settled on these ten for a number of reasons. First, 
all ten had been officers in command of units involved in the shootings. The prosecutors 
decided not to pursue the rank-and-file members of the execution squads, particularly since 
many of these men came from police units. As Schüle later explained, “In our view, members 
of police battalions who took part in executions, so long as they did not commit excesses, 
should not be investigated as suspects because typically in war these police officers were 
deployed in close formation by their officer and so a public refusal to carry out orders was 
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impossible.”151 As a result, individuals who actually fired the shots faced no charges. In this 
regard, Schmidt-Hammer occupied a kind of limbo status for the prosecutors. Although he 
had been an officer and issued the physical shooting orders in Garsden, he had also only been 
a member of the Schutzpolizei and never joined the Nazi party, the only defendant not to do 
so. As a result, though he became the second target of the investigation after Fischer-
Schweder, he was the last to be arrested.
152
 The last named defendant, Behrendt, had spent 
nearly three months in prison before Schmidt-Hammer had spent one day.  
A second consideration in selecting out these ten involved the emergence of particular 
details that satisfied the strict definition of murder in West German law. Simply carrying out 
orders was insufficient to meet this condition, so detectives sought out details on the 
perpetrators that would indicate base motives, the internalizing of the racial ideology behind 
these orders, or cruel and malicious behavior. As a result, certain anecdotal evidence against 
these ten assumed substantial importance for the investigators. To cite a few of these claims: 
Fischer-Schweder had been accused of delivering the “coup de grâce” to still living victims 
in the Garsden pits and selecting a boy to be killed alongside his father.
153
 Hersmann had 
supposedly singled out a Jewish doctor to be shot in Polangen, against the objections of 
soldiers whom the doctor was treating.
154
 Later in the summer of 1941, Behrendt had 
advocated for the liquidation of a small ghetto of Jewish women and children, referring to 
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them as “useless eaters.”155 Carsten had led the selection of Jewish women and children – by 
implication, individuals he could not have suspected of partisan activity – in Georgenburg, 
“in full knowledge of their fate.”156 Significantly, such details allowed the prosecutors to 
portray these ten as particularly fervent enthusiasts of Nazi genocidal policies and ideology. 
The decision to try ten men also signaled the maximum capacity of the Ulm 
detectives to round up all the possible leadership of Einsatzkommando Tilsit. Many members 
had long ago died, either in the war or, as in the case of Erich Frohwann, by their own hand. 
Certainly, had Frohwann or others been alive, the case would have expanded to 
accommodate them. In other instances, though, the Ulm prosecutors were limited by 
jurisdictional disputes and international law.  
The case had briefly been the Ulm eleven, until the Cologne court intervened. On 
December 14, 1956, Mettler received an arrest warrant for Wolfgang Ilges, who now lived in 
Cologne and had been the former assessor in Stapo Tilsit under Böhme.
157
 In this position, he 
had provided essential support in the decision-making process for the executions. On 
December 19, Schüle interrogated Ilges with the Cologne senior prosecutor present.
158
 Two 
days later, the Cologne office requested their own warrant for Ilges, which set off a 
jurisdictional battle between Ulm and Cologne.
159
 By March, Mettler ceded the Ilges case to 
Cologne, because “Ulm has no regional jurisdiction.”160 Beginning in April, a full year 
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before the Ulm trial opened, the Cologne court tried Ilges and sentenced him to four years in 
prison on May 4, 1957.
161
 Revealingly, no other prosecutors objected to the Ulm court 
prosecuting war criminals harbored within their jurisdiction, as this would have required that 
office to assume additional work that the Ulm team already had offered to do for them. 
Another potential defendant was Wilhelm Gerke. In April 1957, this former detective 
who worked under Harms provided a statement revealing first-hand knowledge of the crimes 
in Garsden.
162
 Statements by other witnesses suggested he had a great deal of involvement in 
these crimes. In late April, Schüle requested an arrest warrant for Gerke.
163
 The problem, 
though, was that Gerke lived in Sweden. His statement had been carried out by a German 
attaché in Gothenburg. Schüle continued to request and receive warrants, which the Swedish 
government refused to honor.
164
 This led to a protracted extradition debate between Germany 
and Sweden, which found its way to the German foreign office and required a year to 
resolve.
165
 Eventually, in June 1958, Gerke was extradited to Germany, in time to testify at 
the Ulm trial but too late to sit in the docket as Schüle intended. Later, he would be tried and 
convicted in Dortmund for these same crimes.
166
 
 Despite these setbacks, in less than a year the Ulm team had succeeded in 
transforming a middling investigation into Fischer-Schweder into a massive case involving 
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ten defendants. In the process, they had uncovered a set of crimes far more extensive than 
those of the initial investigation. Where the investigators had initially examined a small set of 
crimes occurring during the days of confusion in the wake of the invasion of the Soviet 
Union, Schüle and his team had uncovered a web of criminality involving the ad hoc unit 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit. Assembled on the eve of the invasion, this unit for an entire 
summer had laid waste to the Lithuanian Jews living along the German border. These crimes 
had never before come before a court of law, its activities unknown save to those who had 
witnessed them. Now, thanks to the expansion of the case under Nellmann and Schüle, this 
was about to change. 
 
Ghosts in the Machine 
 After his second suicide attempt, when Hans-Joachim Böhme injured himself 
jumping from a table in his prison cell, the defendant was sent to the hospital in 
Hohenasperg, a centuries-old prison northwest of Stuttgart.
167
 Although his injuries were not 
life threatening, the prison physician Dr. Gerhard Mauch explained to Schüle that Böhme 
was not fit for interrogation because of the levels of “blood sugar and acetone” in his system. 
Schüle told Mauch that “although I am just a medical layperson, I cannot imagine that his 
blood sugar is so serious as to make him unfit for interrogation,” to which the doctor gave an 
“evasive answer.” Schüle then sought a second opinion on the issue which confirmed his 
suspicions that “normally diabetes does not affect one’s ability to be interrogated.” But 
Mauch, as the lead physician, refused to clear him.
168
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 A week followed with little progress. Mauch informed Schüle that Böhme could “not 
yet stand up.”169 Clearly agitated, Schüle retorted, “I don’t want to know when he can stand 
up, just when he can be interrogated.” Mauch gave a prognosis of another week for 
interrogation and a month for him to be transported back to his prison cell. A few days later, 
Mauch revised this and stated that Böhme would be unfit for another two weeks, and not 
movable for another six.
170
 On September 15, Nellmann requested a different doctor attend to 
Böhme.
171
 By early October, Böhme was finally cleared for interrogation, but after a few 
days he complained of a headache, at which point Mauch informed Weida that “he could not 
be interrogated any longer.”172 The following day, Mauch claimed that Böhme had suffered a 
heart attack and would be out an additional week. For Schüle and his team, the inability to 
interrogate their lead defendant proved worrisome. The investigation was entering its peak 
months, and more significantly, every day that Böhme did not appear before the detectives 
was a day he could prepare his responses so as to minimize his own guilt.  
 The longer Mauch delayed the detectives’ access to Böhme, the more Mauch himself 
became a target of their suspicions. None of the detectives believed that Böhme had medical 
problems so severe as to prevent his interrogation, and they began to wonder whether this 
doctor was not in fact harboring him from the investigation. Upon investigation, the 
detectives learned that Mauch had been an SS-Obersturmführer during the war.
173
 More 
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troublingly, they discovered that the doctor’s former house had been just a few doors down 
from Böhme’s most recent address in Karlsruhe. The detectives sent a request to the Berlin 
Document Center for more information on this Nazi doctor.
174
 In the end, the Karlsruhe 
connection seemed coincidental, and they could not prove their suspicions of collusion 
between Böhme and Mauch. 
 For the detectives and prosecutors of the Ulm case, however, the Mauch incident 
showcased an instinctual suspicion they had been forced to develop of any interruptions in 
the investigation by outside forces, even when those outside forces worked within the 
government. The sudden diabetes, headaches, and heart attacks were so perfectly timed and 
always favored Böhme over the investigation that they found no choice but to question his 
presiding physician, and with his SS background their suspicions proved partially correct. 
The Mauch case had not been the first incident in which the detectives encountered problems 
with former Nazis occupying government positions. With disturbing regularity, these 
individuals out of sympathy for the defendants, opposition to the detectives, or both chose to 
use their influence to gum up the progress of the investigation. Throughout the investigation 
and the trial itself, the investigators and prosecutors found that one of the great obstacles to 
pursuing these crimes could be found within West German law enforcement.
175
  
 As explained earlier, a pivotal decision Schüle made early on in the case was to have 
all interrogations carried out by his own team, no longer relying on local police. A strategic 
concern motivated this shift in part, as Weida and Opferkuch’s knowledge of the case made 
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for better interrogations. More significantly, the Ulm staff did not want to involve any other 
police departments because they could not be consistently trusted to safeguard the interests of 
the investigation. Schüle explained, “Another reason why we don’t like to work with 
unknown police departments is that we never know whether the officers doing the 
interrogating had themselves taken part in either the same or similar operations [as the 
executions].”176 Many of the crimes in question had been carried out by police officers, and 
many of these same individuals had then succeeded in rejoining the civil service after 1945.  
 The Ulm investigators encountered numerous former Nazis working within the police 
during their investigation. In late December 1957, the detectives interrogated a former 
policeman from Memel, Johannes Möst in Pforzheim. Prior to coming to Memel in 1940, 
Möst had worked in the Schutzpolizei at Himmler’s villa on the Tegernsee, but was 
transferred “on Himmler’s personal order…because the work at Himmler’s house did not 
agree with me.”177 He informed Weida that in Memel he took part in the Garsden executions. 
Although an important witness in his own right, Möst presented a delicate problem for the 
Baden-Württemberg state, since he was now employed as a senior detective in Pforzheim. 
Nellmann wrote to the Justice Ministry in early January that “this investigation has shown 
that multiple active police officers were involved in the mass executions.” He decided to 
inform the Ministry of the Interior of the sensitive issue and wanted the letter “delivered 
personally to the department head” because of the need for “confidentiality.”178  
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 Several months later, with the arrest of the tenth defendant, Franz Behrendt, the 
prosecutors learned just how widespread and potentially scandalous the problem of former 
Nazis in the police had become. A letter to Nellmann’s office in May 1957 detailed the 
results of a search of Behrendt’s home. There they found a series of letters between 
Behrendt, Otto Steinberger, and Herbert Schmidtke from 1956. The three had all served 
together in the Grenzpolizeikommissariat in Memel, though Steinberger had been assigned 
elsewhere during the 1941 shootings.
179
 Schmidtke had already been interrogated during the 
first year of the interrogation, and had provided numerous statements to the investigators, but 
he never offered up Behrendt with whom he had been in regular contact.
180
  
The letters that the detectives recovered from Schmidtke’s house revealed a process 
by which these three men had served as references on each other’s behalf, which allowed all 
three to again seek employment in the police service.
181
 For the prosecutors, the case exposed 
a hole in the reintegration process in West Germany. “Because I am convinced,” Nellmann’s 
deputy wrote to the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of the Interior, “that these same methods 
are being used by other former members of different Stapo offices…I might venture to 
suggest that the Federal Minister of the Interior as well as the various state Ministries of the 
Interior be informed of my findings.”182 
 The discovery of the prevalence of former Nazis and in many cases Holocaust 
perpetrators employed in West German law enforcement raised a number of issues for the 
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Ulm investigation. At the highest level, where Nellmann and the state ministries were 
concerned, the Ulm case revealed problems in the reintegration policies of the Adenauer 
state. The Ulm investigation continued to turn up issues that risked scandal. To the credit of 
Nellmann and Ministry of Justice, Schüle was never instructed to turn a blind eye to these 
obstacles. Had the state been more concerned with preserving a self-image of successful 
denazification, the top judicial authorities might have discouraged such extensive 
investigations once they began to expose information that could damage the state’s 
reputation. That they did not do so demonstrates a level of support for the investigation to 
pursue any and all leads regardless of potential blowback. 
For the Ulm investigators, this problem raised a key issue of trust. Since they could 
not rely on their fellow police departments, the team decided to seal themselves off in an 
effort to control the outcome of the case. As a result, however, they became increasingly 
isolated from the mechanisms typically used in West German prosecutions. For example, the 
detectives had succeeded in locating Böhme because of an announcement placed in the 
federal and state crime bulletins. Although this declaration made no note of the crimes in 
question, it alerted every police department in West Germany that an investigation into 
Böhme was underway in Ulm. A successful approach in certain respects, this announcement 
served as a warning to any former colleagues of Böhme who had found their way back in the 
police. Schüle wrote, “We experienced that police officers, who later became defendants, 
followed our announcements in the federal investigation bulletins exactly and communicated 
this to former comrades, who we weren’t aware, and warned them.”183 The risks of any 
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potential information seeping out to perpetrators outweighed the advantages of using these 
bulletins. “For this reason,” Schüle wrote, “we stopped issuing announcements.” 
 Since the network that police normally relied on to solve cases became closed for the 
Ulm investigators, they came to rely evermore on the new networks Schüle was creating. The 
Jewish organizations, document centers, and academics that assisted in the investigation need 
to be seen in part as a response to this breakdown of traditional channels. The success of 
these networks was in many respects also the failure of the West German judiciary. These 
were structural problems in the West German judiciary that bedeviled investigations 
throughout the 1950s. Many prosecutors, such as Saup, had little interest in putting forth a 
sustained investigation, but even in instances when prosecutors did seek a more serious 
effort, they were confronted with a law enforcement apparatus that could actively work 
against the interests of the state. Schüle’s success – and the ultimate success of the Ulm trial 
– hinged on his ability to overcome these limitations and seek strengths from elsewhere. 
 The reluctance to engage with police out of fear they might hamper the investigation 
also highlighted another challenge for the investigators: the need to safeguard the details of 
the case. Despite the broad body of evidence that the investigators had gathered against the 
perpetrators, if the perpetrators learned of this information, the case could easily be swung 
back in the defendants’ advantage. Whether information leaked out through the press or 
through the police, any insights perpetrators could gain into the state’s investigation 
inevitably favored them. As Nellmann later explained, “A premature publication would raise 
the fear that some of the guilty parties would flea.”184 This fear forced the judiciary to 
intervene with the Ulm press when they did catch wind of the investigation, asking them to 
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wait until the indictments were prepared.
185
 This fear motivated Schüle to stop placing 
announcements in police bulletins and raised the alarms against Mauch while he tended to 
Böhme. The chief advantage the prosecution possessed was that the defendants did not know 
what the prosecution knew; any unplanned information leaks threatened this advantage. 
 The need to preserve the advantage of the prosecution manifested itself in other ways, 
as well. Most significant was the treatment of the defendants following their arrest. Once 
placed in police custody, none of the ten defendants would be released until the trial ended. 
All filed repeated appeals to be released on bond, but every one of these appeals was denied. 
This meant that Fischer-Schweder had not left prison since his arrest in May 1956, two years 
before the trial would even begin. The prosecutors made a number of arguments to support 
this request. One concern was that the defendants posed a flight risk if allowed to leave. Such 
fears proved well founded. In 1952, Franz Rademacher, who had headed the Jewish desk of 
the Foreign Office, skipped bail from a Nuremberg court and fled to Syria.
186
 Similarly, 
when the Ulm detectives uncovered the plans of Franz Behrendt to flee to South Africa upon 
learning of his pending arrest, their concerns were born out that to release the defendants 
might mean their ultimate escape from justice.
187
 
 The prosecution also worried that to release the defendants would raise the “danger of 
collusion” (Verdunklungsgefahr). Fleeing the country would certainly harm the investigation, 
but to have the defendants able to move about and interact freely with each other could also 
seriously impair the prosecution’s case. If they were able to coordinate stories and defense 
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strategies, it could bring down the entire case. For this reason, the prosecutors not only 
insisted that the defendants remain in jail until the trial, they also made certain that the men 
never saw each other prior to the trial. This accommodation was no small feat. To keep ten 
men totally separate for over a year involved multiple prisons. At the time of the indictments, 
nine (Schmidt-Hammer was not yet arrested) were spread across six different prisons.
188
 
 Logistically, total separation proved a complicated process. If the ten men were just 
to remain in custody, this might not have been an issue, but they were involved in an active 
investigation and had to be summoned at various times to Stuttgart or Ulm, which created a 
game of musical chairs for the prosecution. At times, they had no choice but to double up the 
defendants and hope for the best. In October 1957, for example, Harms and Carsten were 
held in the same prison in Stuttgart for a single night. Carsten somehow learned of this and 
sought Harms out in the prison yard.
189
 At that point, Carsten “tried to get him to testify in 
the case that he [Harms] had been informed by Carsten about the arrest and planned shooting 
of supposed snipers in Georgenburg and had given his approval.” The principal allegation 
against Carsten involved his responsibility for the Georgenburg executions, and this one 
moment of opportunity could jeopardize the prosecution’s case.190 Luckily for the 
prosecutors, Harms himself reported the incident, claiming to have told Carsten that he 
“would not make any untrue statements.”191 As if anticipating the problems the investigators 
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were having with non-compliant police, Harms also reported “that the supervisors at the 
prison did not stop this conversation.”192 
 Few incidents more upset the prosecutors than the trial of Wolfgang Ilges in Cologne 
in May 1957. Not only had this case been split off from the main investigation, diverting a 
second set of resources into the same crimes, Ilges’ trial came a full year before the Ulm trial 
opened and nearly two months before the indictments of the ten were issued. Consequently, 
the Cologne case presented numerous challenges to the Ulm prosecutors’ ability to control 
the information from their own investigation. During the Ilges trial, Böhme and Hersmann 
were called to testify, which heightened the risk of collusion. Nellmann’s office requested 
that Lörcher take all pains to insure that the two would be transported and held separately for 
the Cologne trial.
193
 Even if the two remained separate, the Ilges trial also made details of the 
Ulm case public that the investigators had worked on privately for nearly two years. Out of 
concern that this might lead to an influx of media requests about the investigation, Schüle 
requested that the Justice Ministry handle all media inquiries prior to the release of the 
indictments.
194
 Finally, Nellmann objected to the Ilges proceedings not just because of the 
danger it posed for the Ulm case but as a jurist. After reviewing the Ilges indictment, he 
wrote “that the Cologne prosecutor’s office has made no investigation into the facts. Based 
on the summary of the indictment, it seems clear to me how unprepared the Cologne 
prosecutor’s office is for a conviction of Ilges.”195 
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 The Ilges case demonstrated that even well-intentioned West German jurists who 
were willing to prosecute Nazi criminals, such as the Cologne prosecutor, placed the Ulm 
case in jeopardy. Under Schüle, the investigators had launched an unprecedented 
investigation in West Germany. Through an international network of resources they crafted a 
balanced, extensive, and empirical case against ten Holocaust perpetrators at great expense to 
the state. Despite all these efforts, they possessed only a marginal advantage over the 
defendants. In the absence of survivors, perpetrator testimony remained significant. If the 
defendants had the opportunity to coordinate their claims, the state would likely be unable to 
convict many of them. An errant detail from the Ilges trial could set off a row of problems 
through the press. An announcement in the police bulletins could alert perpetrators of the 
investigation. A former SS doctor could delay access to the key defendant for weeks. In 
addition to the legion of difficulties facing the Ulm team in their investigation of crimes 
committed long ago and far away, elements in their own government were actively seeking 
to derail the case. These were the problems that all Nazi crimes cases faced in 1950s West 
Germany, and many of Schüle’s new strategies – the reliance on documentation and 
historical consultants – were created to overcome these challenges. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In May 1957, Mettler stepped down from the case. He had been sick periodically 
since the investigation had started, and on May 3 his doctor diagnosed him with “chronic gall 
bladder and small and lower intestine inflammation, bacterial problems, and as a 
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consequence persistent weight loss and serious exhaustion.”196 Mettler was suffering from a 
nervous breakdown, and the doctor recommended extended treatment in a health resort.
197
 
His health kept him away from the case for almost six months, and upon his return Saup had 
appointed another prosecutor, Robert Schneider, to assist Schüle with the prosecution of the 
case. Saup later described the impact this had: “On the basis of his doctor’s diagnosis 
(nerves!), Mettler was taken out of work for five and a half months. Schüle was forced to go 
on alone and finish the indictments himself. This behavior had to be and was generally seen 
as deplorable: shirking (wimpy [Kneifen]), unprofessional behavior towards Schüle.”198 
Mettler deserved better than the acrimonious judgment of Saup’s bitter words. He had 
devoted his time and energy to a case never fully supported by Saup. When Schüle came to 
the case, Mettler expressed no animosity or claimed any territorial authority over the case. 
Instead, he continued to labor on the case and developed strong relations at the Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, which allowed the case to make substantial strides in its efforts to build a 
document-based case against the defendants. Moreover, Schüle himself seemed to harbor no 
ill will towards Mettler following his departure from the case. Mettler had done what he 
could, given the limitations of the prosecutor’s office where he worked. The weight of the 
case and magnitude of the crimes could have broken down any prosecutor’s health. 
Saup correctly noted, though, that Mettler’s departure left Schüle alone to complete 
the indictments. At 212 pages, these were extensive to say the least, and they became the 
basis for the verdict handed down at the Ulm trial in August 1958.
199
 Over the summer of 
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1957, Schüle toiled to finish these and to lay out the entire case against the members of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit. The indictments were the signature accomplishment of the 
investigative strategy pioneered over the previous year. Arguably the most extensive account 
of the Holocaust in Lithuania written to that point, and the most important source of 
information on Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders until the fall of the Soviet Union, these 
indictments showcased the virtues of the crime complex approach and the historical 
methodology that underpinned it.
200
 
The indictments stated that upon the outbreak of war with Russia “the Einsatzgruppen 
and its subdivisions – the Einsatzkommandos – emerged with the goal of implementing 
Hitler’s orders to subject the Jewish race and other ‘potential opponents’ of the regime 
(communists) to ‘special treatment’ [Sonderbehandlung], meaning the physical destruction of 
these populations.”201 On the orders of Stahlecker, as head of Einsatzgruppe A, “an 
Einsatzkommando was created with members of the Stapo and SD branches in Tilsit, which 
was assigned to carry out extermination measures in a 25-kilometer deep stretch eastwards of 
the former German-Lithuanian border area.” This unit then called on members of the Memel 
police and later members of the Lithuanian police to assist in these executions. The 
indictments provided detailed accounts of eighteen distinct mass executions during the 
summer of 1941, and stated that additionally “in other sites not investigated within the 25-
kilometer zone, the Jewish women and children… were murdered by Stapo and SD Tilsit and 
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their Lithuanian accomplices.” Between June 24 and October 15, 1941, Einsatzkommando 
Tilsit murdered 5,186 civilians.
202
 
In the end, Fischer-Schweder, Böhme, and Hersmann, as the respective leaders of the 
Memel police, Stapo Tilsit, and SD Tilsit, held core responsibility for the mass executions 
and were indicted “as murderers, having carried out the premeditated mass murder of people 
out of base motives and with cruel intentions.” Böhme and Hersmann were accused 
specifically of 5,108 counts of murder, and Fischer-Schweder of 711. The other seven 
defendants—Schmidt-Hammer, Kreuzmann, Harms, Sakuth, Carsten, Behrendt, and 
Lukys—were accused of “aiding and abetting [Beihilfe] deliberately through word and deed 
in the mass executions carried out by the above mentioned perpetrators at the same time and 
location.” They were indicted on “hundreds of counts of aiding and abetting in murder.”203 
 With the indictments in place, the case began to move towards trial. Because of the 
magnitude of the investigation, however, the trial itself would not begin for nearly a year. A 
wall of paper stood between Schüle and the trial, as he had to sort out the logistics of 
bringing all the witnesses to the courthouse, allow the defense attorneys sufficient time to 
review the case materials, and answer the endless appeals of the defendants to be released 
from jail. These factors insured a long delay between indictment and trial. While Schüle 
prepared the case for trial, the detectives continued their investigative efforts well beyond the 
indictments. Through the trial itself, they continued to learn of new witnesses and uncover 
additional sources of evidence against the defendants. 
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 Although the investigation continued, the indictments marked the end of the 
remarkable year’s investigation under Schüle. Since Nellmann’s intervention in the fledgling 
Fischer-Schweder case in June 1956, the case had undergone a complete transformation. 
Weida and Opferkuch had struggled during the first year of the investigation to gather 
sufficient information for one indictment; now they were swimming in paperwork and 
evidence that had indicted ten. The case had changed from a local affair in a conservative 
West German backwater to the largest Nazi crimes investigation in West Germany since the 
end of the war, buoyed by an international network of organizations, scholars, and resources. 
As the prosecution succeeded in identifying unprecedented amounts and types of evidence, 
they proved able to reverse the tides that had favored the perpetrators in most 1950s West 
German Nazi crimes prosecutions. 
  
 
 
 
 
VI. Trial: Confrontation on the Danube 
 
The reason why many regard this trial as unpleasant lies in the fact that we all have a guilty 
conscience when we think back to the evil of those times. It’s simply that, if we’re honest with 
ourselves, we all judge ourselves harshly and have to agree with the witness Hartl: back 
then, we were all too cowardly.  
 
– Erwin Schüle, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial 
 
 The Ulm courthouse occupies a substantial area on the northern edge of the historic 
town center, less than a quarter mile from the towering church and just beyond that the 
Danube. Constructed in Italian Renaissance style during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, the building recalls the massive building scale that dominated the Gründerzeit period 
in Central Europe. Reddish-brown sandstone flanks the wings in imposing blocks, but the 
eye is drawn to the central entrance where two lions frame a large stairway. Three archways 
lead inside, between which sit two reclining Greek goddesses of justice, Themis and Dike. 
The entrance is capped in substantial Corinthian columns and rounded windows that look 
onto the main foyer. Perched above it all over five stories above Olga Street are statues of the 
six anthropomorphic virtues of piety, patience, peace, prudence, wisdom, and truth.
1
 
 The trial of ten members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit took place in the main 
courtroom, located on the second floor. Matching the austere exterior, the courtroom in 1958 
had dark wood paneling throughout. Lining one side of the room were tall windows which 
remained open, yet barred, for the spring and summer proceedings. At the head of the room 
was a long row of benches for the three judges and six jurors. The prosecutors sat just in 
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front of these nine men, facing the rows of wooden pews in the gallery. The gallery itself 
divided into three sections: the first row for witnesses, the next two for members of the press, 
and the rearmost reserved for the general public. In the space between the gallery and the 
judges’ table stretched the defendants’ docket. Five defendants sat in one row parallel to the 
windows, with the other five across the way. Their attorneys took up position immediately in 
front of their clients. While the judges and prosecutors faced the public, the defendants faced 
each other throughout the trial.
2
 Throughout the courtroom, a strong police presence guarded 
the entrance and sat alongside the defendants and witnesses. The only unique feature of the 
courtroom for this trial was a map. Standing throughout the proceedings next to the judges’ 
table, the map portrayed the German-Lithuanian border in 1941 and was marked with the 
towns where Einsatzkommando Tilsit had carried out mass murders.
3
 
 The four-month long trial in Ulm of ten members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit thus 
marked a moment of confluence of a wide array of individuals and demographics. 
Government officials, civil servants, jurors, the public, the media, Holocaust perpetrators, 
civilian witnesses, defense attorneys – all intersected in the courtroom of Ulm and took part 
in a wide-ranging debate over the Nazi past and what that past meant in the postwar present. 
For four months, Ulm played host to the most significant public forum on Nazi crimes since 
the Nuremberg proceedings. Though the trial would quickly be eclipsed in public memory by 
the Eichmann trial several years later and the Frankfurt-Auschwitz trial thereafter, the Ulm 
Einsatzkommando trial showcased the most extensive investigations of one state into Nazi 
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crimes in the postwar period, and its outcome would change the way West Germany 
prosecuted Nazi criminals. 
 The structure of the trial itself reflected the evolution of the Ulm investigation. The 
trial began first with the defendants attempting to create their own versions of the past that 
would allow them once more to escape justice, just as they had in the decade after 1945. 
Though the judges, prosecutor, and press all doubted the veracity of their statements and 
urged these men to come clean about their roles in Einsatzkommando Tilsit, the defendants 
obfuscated. In the process they succeeded in sowing confusion in the minds of courtroom 
observers. In the weeks of testimony following the defendants’ claims, a series of former 
civil servants and colleagues of the defendants testified against them. Like the first year of 
the investigation, which focused exclusively on the statements of former associates, this 
phase of the trial failed to create an accurate and believable picture of the crimes. Though 
these witnesses had many damning comments regarding the defendants, courtroom observers 
found their testimony mendacious, self-serving, and unreliable. The first half of the trial had 
hardly been a victory for the defense, but the prosecution had not yet built an ironclad case 
against the defendants. An uneven and conflicting portrait of the past had emerged, which 
would make any conviction difficult. 
 The trial noticeably began to shift when Erwin Schüle, the main prosecutor, presented 
the court with an array of new forms of evidence – different types of witnesses, historical 
documentation, and expert opinions. Just as these sources of evidence had revolutionized the 
investigation, they shifted the entire tone of the trial. While many of the difficulties in the 
first weeks of the trial took Schüle by surprise, he had also clearly saved his strongest 
witnesses and evidence for the final weeks. He called to the stand an array of civilians, 
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priests, and senior officials that the press lauded as far more reliable than earlier witnesses. 
The presentation of contemporary Nazi records and expert analysis of these provided, in the 
view of the court and the press, a definitive and irrefutable set of evidence. Thus, the trial 
itself resembled the contours and evolution of the investigation, with the crucial distinction 
that this trial took place publicly. The four months in the courtroom chiefly aimed to 
determine the guilt of ten defendants, but they were also a referendum on the merits and the 
possible future of Schüle’s new crime complex investigation strategy. The verdict would 
determine both outcomes. 
 
The Trial Begins 
 The long-awaited Einsatzkommando Tilsit trial began on April 28, 1958. The 
defendants were the first admitted into the courtroom. Beginning shortly after eight o’clock, 
these Holocaust perpetrators were brought from their jail cells and ushered into their seats. 
As they entered and passed by the various media on hand, many hid their faces. Bernhard 
Fischer-Schweder looked out at the press from behind a pair of dark sunglasses. Hans-
Joachim Böhme, Werner Hersmann, and others ducked behind papers and held their hands 
over their faces to shield themselves from photographers.
4
 From the vantage of the gallery, 
seated in profile on the left side were Böhme, Werner Schmidt-Hammer, Edwin Sakuth, 
Gerhard Carsten, and Werner Kreuzmann. Across from them were Fischer-Schweder, Pranas 
Lukys, Harm Harms, Hersmann, and Franz Behrendt.
5
 Over the past year, they had been kept 
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separate in jails across Germany. These few moments before their trial began were the first 
time they were all together since committing those thousands of murders in 1941.  
 A few minutes later, the defendants were joined by personnel from the Ulm 
investigation. Erwin Schüle took his place at the front of the courtroom as the lead 
prosecutor. Joining him was Robert Schneider, a thirty-eight year old prosecutor assigned to 
the case by the Ulm prosecutor’s office to assist Schüle after Rudolf Mettler had resigned 
from the investigation. The decision to appoint two lead prosecutors to the case spoke to its 
scale and complexity.
6
 Also present in the courtroom were the main investigators of the case, 
Robert Weida and Helmut Opferkuch. Throughout the proceedings, at least one of the two 
always attended, as their commentary on various points of the investigation proved essential. 
After years of effort, these representatives of the state finally had their opportunity to 
showcase the fruits of their extensive investigation before a West German court and public. 
 In addition to these familiar characters, the trial introduced several new groups of 
actors. Each defendant sought his own representation, which meant ten lawyers throwing up 
consistent objections and firing a seemingly endless barrage of paperwork against the state.
7
 
All ten defendants relied on the state to pay the bulk of these attorneys’ fees, and a number of 
them had been appointed by the state. As a group, they represented a wide sampling of legal 
attitudes in the postwar period towards the Nazi era. Some were staunchly conservative, 
others more liberal.  All but one seemingly had no overt desire to defend Holocaust 
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perpetrators. Yet, they took on the position and came to often surprising conclusions about 
the nature of the war years and the significance of postwar justice. 
 The key exception in this regard was defense attorney Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer. Since 
the end of the war, Aschenauer had made his young career by defending Nazi criminals, first 
through his work at the trial of Otto Ohlendorf in the Einsatzgruppen trial, then later as a lead 
advocate for the release of the Landsberg prisoners. He craved attention and relished the 
opportunity to defend Nazis and decry postwar injustice. The defendant Hersmann briefly 
joined forces in the postwar period with the Nazi apologist organization Stille Hilfe, which 
provided legal aid for perpetrators. Finding himself sorely in need of such assistance, he 
reached out to the organization. Writing to Helene Elisabeth Princess von Isenburg after his 
arrest, Hersmann stated, “Please continue to think about how we might convince or prompt 
Dr. Eschenauer [sic] to help. He is the only specialist and defense attorney in these matters 
that we still have.”8 Through these pleas, Hersmann brought Aschenauer to Ulm. By the time 
he arrived at the courthouse and took his seat before the Holocaust perpetrators, he was 
already the most well-known Nazi defense specialist in West Germany. On account of his 
stature and experience, he became the ringleader among the other defense attorneys in 
crafting their trial strategies. 
Presiding over the proceedings was Judge Edmund Wetzel. Like Schüle for the 
prosecution, Wetzel had been specially assigned to this case by superiors in Stuttgart.
9
 Born 
in 1903, Wetzel had no background in the Nazi party and had spent the prewar years as a 
prosecutor in Ravensburg, prior to serving in the war. He had a longstanding professional 
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relationship with State Attorney General Erich Nellmann, as well as other leading jurists in 
Baden-Württemberg, such as Richard Schmid and Fritz Bauer. It was Schmid who decided to 
assign Wetzel to the case.
10
 According to a colleague of both men, this decision stemmed 
from a belief that Wetzel could be trusted to guide the proceedings in the interest of postwar 
justice.
11
 Particularly considering the active role of the judge in German law, who acted not 
only as an arbitrator in the courtroom but also as an inquisitor, the need for a judge not 
heavily implicated in the Nazi regime became a prerequisite for an unbiased chance for a 
conviction. Wetzel filled this need. 
 Assisting Wetzel were two other judges, Dr. Fink and Dr. Fischer, who would 
determine the verdict in conjunction with the jurors. Fink in particular influenced the 
proceedings and provided most of the work in drafting the verdict at the end.
12
 Unique 
among the principals in the case, Fink was the only native of Ulm. He had spent the postwar 
period in a concerted effort to return to the judiciary of his home town. He received his 
doctorate in law in 1925 from the University of Tübingen as a twenty-six year old. He joined 
the Nazi party in 1933 and as a result was purged from his post at the end of the war.
13
 
Declared a Mitläufer in 1946 by denazification authorities, Fink rejoined the judiciary.
14
 That 
same year he successfully found employment in a lower office in Geislingen, despite his 
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wishes to remain in Ulm.
15
 In 1951, Fink finally found his way back to Ulm as a judge.
16
 In 
addition to these three judges, a fourth substitute judge, Dr. Heinrichs, was on hand through 
the trial in case any of the others fell ill. 
 Seated next to the judges was the jury. In all, six jurors drawn from peers of the 
defendants judged the proceedings. At that time, the six jurors as well as the three presiding 
judges deliberated on the outcome of the trial. A majority of two-thirds, or six, was needed to 
procure a verdict.
17
 In certain respects, the jurors represented a cross-section of postwar 
society. Four were from Ulm, while the other two came from nearby smaller towns. Among 
them were a civil engineer, a schoolmaster, a government superintendent, a locksmith, a 
machinist, and a design draftsman. These positions required various levels of education and 
suggest an array of backgrounds and life experiences. Where the group lacked diversity was 
its gendered composition. All six jurors were men. Even the local press noted that “among 
them were no women” – a curious configuration, particularly since several women were in 
the jury pool.
18
 Possibly this gendered imbalance stemmed from happenstance, as only two 
of the initial pool of twelve jurors were women, but another possibility is that in their 
selection some air of paternalism reigned. Female jurors may have been seen as too fragile to 
handle the grisly details of the case, or as too likely to allow their emotions to cloud 
judgment. Whatever the prevalent thinking, the result meant that no one involved in the 
trial’s outcome – from judges and jurors to attorneys on both sides – was a woman. 
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 From the first day, the courtroom crowded with various members of the press and 
public, the final two groups involved in the daily trial proceedings. In describing the first 
day’s proceedings, the regional newspaper in Ulm, the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, noted 
that “numerous photographers and reporters from Germany and foreign countries” filled the 
press rows in the gallery.
19
 Throughout the proceedings, media continued to report widely on 
the goings-on in the Ulm courtroom. Because no transcript of the trial itself was taken, these 
media reports provide an essential record of the day-to-day events. In particular, five regional 
papers – the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, the Ulmer Nachrichten, the Neu-Ulmer Zeitung, 
the Stuttgarter Zeitung, and the Stuttgarter Nachrichten – as well as the larger West German 
Frankfurter Rundschau had near-daily reports on the proceedings. Other national outlets, 
including radio, reported on exceptional days of the trial or provided occasional summaries 
on the Ulm proceedings. International news was less consistent, but many outlets offered at 
least passing mention of the trial. Because of the scale and scope of the trial, few news 
organizations found it possible to ignore the trial altogether. 
 Finally, ordinary members of the West German public occupied the back rows of the 
gallery. From the start, however, citizens of Ulm seemed to show little overt interest in the 
proceedings. Press noted the “relatively low participation of the public” during the first day 
of the trial.
20
 Photos from the first day similarly show a well-attended but not quite capacity 
gathering in the courtroom. This image was off-set by the eagerness of the media, hoping to 
snap up pictures of the defendants. From the first day of the trial, there was consequently an 
ambivalent relationship between the local community and the wider German public. Though 
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recognized as an important and newsworthy moment, few West Germans made the trek to 
the courthouse to take it in. As a result, the majority of the West German public engaged with 
the Ulm trial solely through the media.  
The press and public had first learned of the “Case against Fischer-Schweder and nine 
others” at a press conference a year earlier on July 5, 1957. By that point, all ten defendants 
were in custody and Schüle had just filed the indictments. For two years prior, investigators 
had taken pains to keep the case out of the press, but now they relished the opportunity to 
unveil their efforts. They informed the media of the crimes under investigation.
21
 This 
particular unit, Einsatzkommando Tilsit, was unfamiliar to all in attendance. More 
significantly, Schüle and Nellmann sought to win over public opinion by explaining the 
purpose of the trial. Only officers from the unit were under investigation, and the press noted 
that “rank-and-file were not indicted.”22 This settled concerns many West Germans had about 
any trials functioning as a second denazification that would re-target those Germans who had 
filled out the lower ranks in the Nazi state. They explained the timing of the trial as a simple 
result of fresh allegations: “The prosecutor’s office can only investigate a crime once they 
have knowledge of it.”23 This implied the inverse as well: once prosecutors had knowledge of 
a crime, they had a duty to investigate it. Throughout, the press conference sought to ease 
any suspicions that this was a politically-motivated prosecution.  
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The papers the following day discussed an upcoming “ghastly trial,” “one of the 
largest in the postwar period,” of “terrible events” of the Nazi era.24 The investigative efforts 
alone, they noted, had consumed countless hours and thousands of pages of paperwork. In 
all, ten men were to be tried for the execution of 5,502 civilians, mostly Jews, in the 
Lithuanian border regions in 1941. At this time, the prosecutors only released Fischer-
Schweder’s name to the press. Despite the unprecedented scale of the investigation, these 
reports appeared in only a handful of papers. Even in the city paper, which peppered its 
coverage with lofty claims about the “parallels to the Nuremberg trials” and the likelihood 
the case would “grab the attention of the entire world,” coverage was relegated to the interior 
pages of local Ulm news.
25
  
In the wake of the press conference, discussion about the “Fischer-Schweder trial,” as 
the press came to refer to it, abated for nearly a year until April 1958. During the months 
between the press conference and the start of the trial, the case continued as it had before: 
with Schüle and the investigators finalizing points and organizing the case largely out of the 
public eye. In the weeks before the trial began, members of the media were allowed to review 
the indictments, which prompted several of the local papers to run large summaries and to 
profile the ten defendants.
26
 By the time all parties had arrived in the Olga Street courtroom 
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on April 28, 1958, people throughout Baden-Württemberg had had the opportunity to learn 
of the pending trial, and the press was anxious to see the defendants in person. 
On the first day of the trial, following the necessary swearing in of the jurors and the 
registering of the defendants and their representatives, presiding judge Edmund Wetzel made 
opening remarks to all present about the nature of the case before them.
27
 Although he 
insisted that what would be taking place in that courtroom was “no show trial or spectacle,” 
he cautioned that “it will open a chapter from the time of the moral degradation of our 
fatherland.”28 Because of the sensitive nature of these crimes and of the unavoidable 
questions these would raise about the Nazi era and ongoing prosecutions, Wetzel issued a 
request to all present:  
It is a very difficult task to investigate events that lay seventeen years back. 
Therefore, judges, seek tirelessly after truth and clarity. Prosecutors, as 
representatives of the most objective office in the world, avoid crass sentimentality 
[frei von falschen Pathos seien]. Defense attorneys, put all grandstanding aside. 
Defendants, realize that true atonement means standing by your actions. Spectators, 
express your interest but do not disrespect the dignity of the court. Members of the 
media, report responsibly and prevent any speculation on the trial’s outcome. If each 
contributes to its part, then the foundation will be laid for a proper and just verdict.
29
  
 
Wetzel viewed the courtroom primarily as a means of achieving justice, and each constituent 
group at the trial – defendants, prosecutors, defense attorneys, public, media, and judge and 
jury – had an essential role to play.  
 Following Wetzel’s remarks, the defendants one-by-one took the stand to provide a 
capsule life history. Nine of the defendants took the stand on days two and three, but from 
the late morning to the end of the first session at five o’clock the court focused on the first 
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defendant: Fischer-Schweder.
30
 He had already earned enmity for his labor court lawsuit a 
few years earlier, and his demeanor on the stand proved immediately off-putting for many in 
attendance. He spoke, as one observer noted, “as though telling stories at a bar with a bottle 
of wine.”31 Throughout his “extensive and wordy” testimony, the Memel police director 
described himself as “very dependable, industrious, and not stupid.”32 Others chose a 
different set of adjectives. The press regarded him as “narcissistic,” and even one of the 
defense attorneys viewed him as an “arrogant” man who “tolerated no opposition.”33  
In this introductory phase of the trial, most media coverage focused on the three 
defendants initially charged with murder: Fischer-Schweder, Böhme, and Hersmann.
34
 The 
press seemed fascinated by Böhme’s postwar reinvention of himself.35 He attempted to 
portray himself as a sharp opponent of communism and, through convoluted explanations, an 
uncommitted Nazi.
36
 Interestingly, the media came to appreciate Hersmann’s testimony 
above all others. One article stated that Hersmann “is perhaps the only one of the accused 
who believed truly and deeply in fascist ideology,” and as a result, he was the only one 
“ready to account for the crimes.”37 Because of his fanaticism, Hersmann saw little reason to 
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lie about actions he regarded as just, thus he testified relatively openly in comparison to the 
other defendants who attempted to shield themselves and deflect blame onto superiors.  
The other seven defendants, accused of accessory to murder, occupied less space in 
coverage throughout the proceedings. Longtime police officers such as Kreuzmann, Carsten, 
Behrendt, Harms, and Sakuth were widely characterized as having “ordinary professional 
careers.”38 Schmidt-Hammer received attention in a number of papers because he alone had 
never joined the Nazi Party. The only other defendant who attracted interest in the early days 
was Lukys. As a foreigner, he was a jarring presence on the stand, where the press regarded 
his “barely understandable German” as a “torture for all involved.”39 Consequently, he 
attended the trial with a translator throughout.
40
 Lukys also complicated notions of Nazi 
crimes for the public. Portrayed as an opponent of communism, Jews, and Nazism, Lukys 
became seen as a nihilistic sadist, the press unable to reconcile his Lithuanian ultra-
nationalism with the Holocaust. Even one of the other defense attorneys wrote in his notes 
that Lukys had the “most debased character” of the ten.41  
On the third day, once all ten defendants had an opportunity to speak, the state’s 
charges against the defendants were read aloud in court. At nearly thirty pages, the opening 
resolution (Eröffnungsbeschluss) provided specific information on the crimes alleged against 
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each, as well as the nature of the evidence gathered.
42
 The heart of the case came down to the 
claim that these ten defendants had all taken on active leadership roles in Einsatzkommando 
Tilsit, a unit responsible for the murder of 5,502 mostly Jewish men, women, and children 
along the Lithuanian border from June 24 to October 15, 1941.
43
 Over the next four months, 
the aim of the state prosecutors would be to provide a wide range of evidence for these 
crimes and to prove that the defendants had been members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit.  
 
Defendants on the Stand 
 After the introductory phase, the trial unfolded in two broad stages. First, the 
defendants themselves took the stand to establish their version of events. This lasted through 
the middle of May. Second, through July, witnesses from both sides of the aisle and 
documentary evidence were presented to the court. Although the defendants could and often 
did retake the stand throughout the proceedings to respond to various points, this trial format 
seemed to favor the prosecution. Since the defendants were expected to make statements 
before the full scope of the evidence against them was revealed, this meant that each 
subsequent witness or piece of documentation – forms of evidence regarded as more reliable 
than the defendants’ own claims – not only established the defendants’ guilt but eroded their 
credibility and interpretive authority over the past. In essence, the defendants had only a short 
window in court to establish their version of events in the minds of the jurors and judge.   
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This format also meant that the presentation of the Holocaust in Lithuania before the 
public began at the grassroots level. Although the investigators had spent years 
reconstructing the Nazi chain of command and intended to reproduce the entire complexity 
of the Third Reich before the court, by placing the defendants on the stand first, the trial 
immediately transported all spectators to the chaotic circumstances of the German-Lithuanian 
borderlands on the eve of war with the Soviet Union. The trial thus began in media res, with 
no preliminary context for the crimes or the nature of the Nazi state, but rather beginning 
with the murky circumstances surrounding the creation of Einsatzkommando Tilsit. 
On May 2, the first time defendants testified on the crimes in question, Böhme and 
Hersmann, as the leaders of Einsatzkommando Tilsit, spoke about how the unit’s origins. 
They described a meeting between them and Einsatzgruppe A leader Dr. Walter Stahlecker 
on the day prior to the Garsden execution, during which Stahlecker had ordered them to 
create an Einsatzkommando to execute people accused of civilian resistance against the 
Wehrmacht. Hersmann, agitated, asked the court, “What could I have done?... As just a small 
man, I could not go against an order from Hitler.”44 Böhme similarly said the order came as a 
“horrible blow” to him, but he could not refuse to carry it out.45  
 At the next session, Kreuzmann testified that he also had been privy to the Stahlecker 
meeting. He claimed, however, that this only established a group responsible for “securing 
the rear of the army.” After further pressure from the prosecution, he admitted that among its 
duties was to shoot Jews and communists as “potential opponents” of the regime but insisted 
that these actions constituted military necessity and were not related to, as the Stuttgarter 
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Zeitung wrote, “the widely recognized actions against Jews.”46 Though he played a role in 
the murder of Jews, Kreuzmann said that they had not been killed as part of the Holocaust. 
Harms and Carsten, who testified later that day, generally agreed with Kreuzmann’s account. 
The distinction that Jews were killed as partisans and not as Jews represented a concerted 
effort on the defendants’ part to discount the prosecution’s assertions that racial motives had 
played a role in the killings. Murdering Jews for being Jews would have fit this racial bias, 
thereby meeting the “base motive” criteria for the charge of murder. Thus the defendants 
claimed to have murdered Jewish civilians “as carriers of communist ideas.”47 
 Since the start of the case, the presiding judge had largely allowed defendants to 
make their statements as they saw fit, but Fischer-Schweder’s demeanor on the stand during 
the fifth day of the trial required a reprimand.
48
 “Mr. Fischer-Schweder,” Wetzel intoned, 
“you are not here leading the trial – you stand before the court as a defendant. We are 
striving for objectivity, and we will not tolerate your interference with these proceedings!”49 
With an attitude described as “uncontrollable” and “arrogant,” Fischer-Schweder had 
provided “longwinded explanations” for several hours.50 At a certain point, he began to 
attack the legitimacy of the court, and Wetzel had to bring him back into line. In his 
testimony, Fischer-Schweder provided several contradicting explanations for the chain of 
command he followed as police director in Memel and how, as he claimed, this required him 
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to assist in the creation of the Einsatzkommando. The prosecutor also asked him to respond 
to claims about his drunkenness on the job. Initially, Fischer-Schweder bristled at the 
question, but then laughed it off with an old toast: “First get the job done, then drink and 
have fun! [Erst mach’ Dein Sach’, dann trink und lach].” By turns imperious and flippant, 
Fischer-Schweder became dubbed the “enfant terrible” of the proceedings.51  
 The first several days of testimony had focused on the creation of Einsatzkommando 
Tilsit; now the court turned to its actions. Starting that afternoon, Böhme retook the stand to 
give testimony for the next two days about the massacres. Böhme first agreed with the other 
defendants that “the destruction of Jews had nothing to do with racial hatred,” but rather with 
military necessity in the interests of deterring partisans.
52
 He then described the execution of 
201 people in Garsden. Böhme stated that Fischer-Schweder had insisted on the declaration 
of a “formal execution order” before each group was killed. The victims were led out in 
groups, and each group had to place the previous group’s bodies in the grave, which was 
done only because, Böhme claimed, “We wanted to work as quickly as possible.” His 
statements went on to address the executions in Krottingen, Polangen, Tauroggen, 
Georgenburg, and Wirballen-Kyrbatai. The group applied the methods used in Garsden in all 
instances. “I paid little attention to the executive affairs,” Bohme stated, “It ran smoothly, 
and it was always the same.”53 Throughout, Böhme portrayed himself as an absent officer 
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who conducted minimal oversight within his own unit. His overall defense strategy came 
down to the following remark: “It could be so, but it could also not be so. I can’t recall.”54  
This defense allowed him to parry the frequent accusations about the murder of 
Jewish women and children. Since the defendants were attempting to claim that their actions 
had constituted military necessity, it was clear to all that executing women and children in no 
way could be justified on military grounds. Thus, their murder became a cornerstone of the 
prosecutor’s efforts. Böhme had to confront these charges on two accounts. First were claims 
that Einsatzkommando Tilsit had carried out such murders. On this front, he provided what 
the press regarded as a “stupefying answer” that Stahlecker had ordered their executions “so 
that [the Jewish descendants] would not make difficulties later for our grandchildren.”55 
Second were allegations that Böhme ordered Lithuanian auxiliaries to murder women and 
children, which would have clearly transgressed their mandate from Stahlecker. Here, Böhme 
insisted that if such actions took place, he had not authorized them. When cross-examined 
about why he nevertheless reported figures from such executions to authorities in Berlin, 
Böhme equivocated, “An observer is not a participant.”56 The press widely disapproved of 
Böhme’s refusal to accept responsibility, noting that he “distanced himself from his earlier 
precise statements to provide a new and much more harmless self-depiction.”57  
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Like Böhme, most of the other defendants during those first days of testimony 
attempted to deflect blame onto senior officers. Unfortunately for Böhme, in most cases he 
was this senior officer. Several of the defendants heavily indicted Böhme during their time 
on the stand. On May 12, Hersmann recounted a meeting that occurred the day after the 
Garsden execution between him, Böhme, and Karl Jäger, the head of Einsatzkommando 3. 
From July to November 1941, Jäger’s unit murdered 136,000 Lithuanian Jews, and he 
numbered among the worst perpetrators of the Holocaust.
58
 Hersmann described their 
meeting as “not pleasant.” Once Jäger learned of Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s orders, he 
fumed, “The entire region belongs to us!”59 A jurisdictional debate had emerged over which 
units had the right to massacre Jews in Lithuania.  
When Hersmann recounted this story before the court, Wetzel asked why they had not 
given Jäger what he wanted. If he and Böhme truly had no interest in organizing and leading 
an Einsatzkommando, this was their opportunity to pass the duties along to an eager party. 
Hersmann vaguely responded to Wetzel that handing over the reins to Jäger was “militarily 
not possible.”60 In all likelihood, Hersmann and Böhme rebuffed Jäger because they also 
regarded their task as an opportunity to distinguish themselves within the regime.  
The trial went from bad to worse for Böhme over the following days of testimony. 
After the ninth court session, local press coverage ran the headline, “May 13th – A Dark Day 
for Böhme.”61 Harms had spent the day testifying about the fate of Jewish women and 
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children held in an improvised camp in Bataikia. Initially, they had planned to simply blow 
up the entire site with all prisoners inside, but proximity to a train station scuttled the idea. 
Harms recalled that Böhme then approached him and said, “Tomorrow, the Bataikia camp 
will be liquidated, and you will lead the action.”62 Harms objected to the assignment, and 
only after prolonged conversation and hurling insults at Harms did Böhme release him from 
the task. This account not only established Böhme as making key decisions about the lives of 
Jews in Lithuania, but also provided an example of refusing orders with no negative 
repercussions. Harms concluded his testimony with a further indictment against Böhme when 
he stated that he had “not only maintained his 25-kilometer stretch but sought out 
possibilities for enlarging it.”63 Over the next two days, Carsten and Lukys both testified to 
similar effect that Böhme had authorized and initiated a great number of shootings that 
frequently involved women and children.
64
  
On the last day of the defendants’ statements, Fischer-Schweder and Böhme once 
more took the stand. These two came through the first phase of the trial most damaged. 
Fischer-Schweder, through his arrogant demeanor, emerged as a widely contemptible figure, 
and when he retook the stand on May 20, he undermined his credibility as a witness. 
Although the press noted that he started out the day trying to make a “better impression than 
before,” his actual statements defied belief. He claimed that in Garsden, Krottingen, and 
Polangen “all those killed were snipers….Naturally, one of these or another could have been 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
62
 “13. Mai - schwarzer Tag für Böhme,” Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung (14 May 1958). 
 
63
 “‘Das Morden war mehr oder weniger Gesetz,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten (14 May 1958). 
 
64
 “Gestapo-Leiter Böhme wiederum schwer belastet,” Stuttgarter Zeitung (16 May 58); “Lager sollte geprengt 
werde,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten (17 May 1958). 
 
267 
 
a Jew.”65 As a result, he wanted the executions to be carried out in a “dignified” fashion and 
told Schmidt-Hammer to read the formal death sentence before each group was killed.
66
 He 
also made the “bold statement” that those killed in Krottingen had been convicted by a 
Lithuanian court, and Einsatzkommando Tilsit merely carried out the death sentence. 
Irritated, Wetzel stated, “That story might work on someone else, but not here.”67  
Böhme had suffered the most through this early phase, and he never reestablished his 
credibility. Despite repeated urgings from the judges and prosecutors, Böhme refused to 
speak honestly about his role in the crimes. Schüle incredulously asked if he really thought 
that all 5,000 victims had been “dangerous enemies” of the state. Böhme responded merely, 
“It is very difficult to know.” On another occasion, one of the judges demanded, “Come on 
and prod your heart into action. Answer for what happened like a man!”68 His claims to not 
know what happened were not only fully unbelievable but insulting to courtroom observers. 
As the local Ulm paper wrote about his testimony on May 21:  
The urgent appeals of the court stand in contrast to [Böhme’s] frigidity, which is truly 
frightening. Is he only putting on this front for show or is it real? Can Böhme not act 
in spite of himself, not bear to divulge his deepest feelings and to yield to his human 
emotions – or does this defendant truly have no feelings, no heart, no remorse, no 
conscience? That’s the question that remained unanswered at the end of his 
testimony, because only one person knows the answer: Böhme himself. And Böhme 
remains silent…69  
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As Wetzel had stated in his opening remarks, if there was to be any sort of reconciliation 
with the past, the defendants needed to be willing to confront what they had done. Böhme, by 
refusing to do so, prevented the court and the public from reaching such catharsis. 
 Even though most defendants proved more willing to acknowledge their role in 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit, the first four weeks of the trial had created no clear picture of what 
had happened in summer 1941. There was no way to assemble their many contradicting and 
partial accounts into any coherent narrative. Whether the victims were targeted as partisans, 
communists, Jews, or some combination of these remained unresolved. How orders moved 
through the Nazi chain of command and whether or not one could refuse orders were open 
questions. In their one opportunity to put forward their own version of events, the defendants 
had created a muddle of conflicting accounts which collectively undermined each 
individual’s hopes of avoiding a conviction. As the press concluded, “A true depiction of 
what actually happened will probably only come about once the court begins to interrogate 
witnesses during the evidentiary proceedings. The statements of the accused themselves are 
too reticent, imprecise, and uncertain to provide any clear picture of the events.”70 The media 
looked with hope towards the coming phase of the trial when witnesses would take the stand 
as offering the first real chance to understand what Einsatzkommando Tilsit had done. 
 
The Selective Memories of Ex-Nazis 
 The press was not alone in expressing optimism that the next phase of the trial might 
add historical clarity to a picture blurred by the defendants. Since the start of the trial, several 
schools had written to Schüle to inquire about bringing students to attend some of the 
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proceedings.
71
 For those considering careers in law, this was an excellent opportunity to 
watch justice in action. Although Schüle welcomed the idea, he sought to mediate the 
students’ experiences. Initially, schools expressed interest in attending early sessions with the 
defendants on the stand. In response to one, Schüle wrote, “[Attendance] is only 
recommended if witnesses besides the defendants are testifying because currently there is a 
fully subjective picture of the shootings.”72 To another interested in observing for a day, 
Schüle cautioned that “attending just one court session can’t provide a full picture of the 
events that are the object of the trial.”73  
 Through these subtle arrangements, Schüle attempted to shape public perceptions of 
the trial. Since the press conference announcing the investigation in July 1957, neither Schüle 
nor Nellmann had spoken publicly about the trial, but they were clearly aware that its 
importance went beyond the specific crimes being prosecuted. In a letter written during the 
trial, Schüle explained his view on the relationship between the trial and the Nazi past, “We 
as a German people are only deserving of a happier future if we have removed ourselves 
from the terrible shadow of the past.”74 This trial would serve to educate the public not so 
much in an effort to deter such crimes in the future, which is an aim of most trials, but rather 
to allow for a reconciliation between contemporary West Germans and Nazi crimes. West 
Germans needed to learn about and confront the realities of the Nazi state as a prerequisite 
for the democratic and judicial stability of the future. 
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Educating the public also functioned to legitimize the West German state in the arena 
of global politics. Like other Nazi crimes cases, the Ulm trial became symbolically important 
for West German efforts to gain acceptance as a democratic state that had shed all 
semblances of its Nazi past. Prosecuting criminals became one means of demonstrating that 
commitment. Nellmann proudly reported to the Justice Ministry in Baden-Württemberg to 
this effect following a meeting with a representative from a Jewish organization. The 
representative had told Nellmann, “More has been done to repair [Wiedergutmachung] 
Germany’s reputation through the investigation we’re leading than through all the monetary 
reparation [Wiedergutmachung] payments.”75 Throughout the 1950s, the Adenauer 
government had emphasized reparations for Nazi victims as its main tool for a public 
reconciliation with the past. As Nellmann recognized, these payments did nothing to solve 
the question of justice for the victims. The Ulm trial, even though initiated and prosecuted by 
Baden-Württemberg officials, became a symbol of all West Germany and its seriousness in 
addressing the Nazi era.  
For the prosecution, these expectations placed significant importance on the witness 
phase of the trial. The defendants’ statements, as expected, had been rife with internal 
contradictions and obfuscations. Routinely through their statements, Schüle had taken issue 
with certain comments only to note that he would return to the issue later.
76
 The prosecution 
used the defendants’ testimony simply to tee up later, more reliable witness statements. Such 
actions, coupled with the desire to steer observers away from the court during the defendants’ 
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statements, illustrated that they placed all emphasis in securing a conviction on the witness 
testimony that commenced at the end of May. 
The first set of witnesses testified from May 22 to May 30 and took aim at Fischer-
Schweder. Several former police chiefs testified that in no way would his superiors have 
authorized Fischer-Schweder to participate in the executions, thus undermining his claims to 
have been following orders.
77
 Another group of Wehrmacht officers swore that no partisan 
activity took place during the invasion, suggesting that no “snipers” were in the area as the 
police director had claimed.
78
 These testimonies left Fischer-Schweder “deeply unsettled.”79 
Initially temperamental, the cumulative indictments of these statements against his defense 
rendered the police director “meek” and “lost in thought” as he weighed his defense options 
going forward.
80
 Although these first witnesses allowed the prosecution to seize the initiative 
in the case, the next set of witnesses, chiefly police officers who had served with the 
defendants, had far more mixed results for the prosecution.  
The former civil servants, for the most part members of the Memel police, testified 
about the first three executions conducted by Einsatzkommando Tilsit, the only three in 
which Fischer-Schweder and Schmidt-Hammer had participated. For these two, the 
testimony proved particularly damaging. A number of witnesses testified that those shot had 
been targeted, as one said, “because they were Jews.”81 Another insisted that he had never 
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heard any allegations of partisan activity.
82
 Throughout, Fischer-Schweder endured relentless 
character attacks. One former employee of his testified, “If I were to say that he was 
dictatorial, that would be an understatement.”83 However much the testimony targeted 
Fischer-Schweder, it was Schmidt-Hammer who took the testimony the hardest. On June 3, 
after listening to a painful account of the Garsden shootings, Schmidt-Hammer suffered a 
heart attack in the courtroom and had to be rushed out on a stretcher.
84
 Although attorneys 
considered suspending the case against him, a physician soon declared him able to stand trial, 
and he returned to court within the week.
85
 
Although the testimony of these former civil servants clearly damaged the defendants, 
the media grew increasingly circumspect of the witnesses’ reliability. Witnesses repeatedly 
claimed to have no knowledge of certain events or insisted that certain information came to 
them only secondhand. The Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, which was often editorial in its 
coverage, declared the Memel police officers’ testimony to be a “scandal” and a “sad 
affair.”86 As the paper reported, “It is obvious that they’re lying because these same people 
who today twist in the wind and claim not to know anything were just a year ago during their 
first police interrogation capable of making amazingly exact and precise statements to all 
particulars.”87 Even when they acknowledged involvement, many professed moral opposition 
to their orders. As one witness, Hartl, stated about why he did not refuse such actions, “I was 
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too cowardly.”88 Because of the self-serving testimony many offered, their statements had a 
mixed impact on the trial. In the short run, they were able to land serious blows against 
Fischer-Schweder and Schmidt-Hammer. But in the long run, by backing away from their 
own authority and professing ignorance on key points, they undermined the credibility of not 
only themselves, but subsequent civil servants who would testify. 
This pattern of witnesses offering highly selective testimony continued as the 
prosecution began to call various members of Stapo and SD Tilsit to testify. They offered 
similar indictments of the defendants, but took pains to distance themselves from any crimes 
lest they should end up among them. On June 10, the court took action. “Finally,” the local 
Ulm paper wrote, “someone has been caught in the Ulm courtroom.”89 That day, Adolf 
Glowienka, a former SD Tilsit employee, had “astonishingly” testified not even to have 
known of the shootings. Apparently unbeknownst to him, another witness had testified 
several days earlier that Glowienka had not only attended but participated in the murder of 
women and children under Hersmann. Following his highly unbelievable testimony, Wetzel 
stated, “You have the right to keep your statements to yourself, but you do not have the right 
to lie to me.”90 Glowienka was promptly arrested for perjury, the first such incident during 
the trial but not the last. By arresting Glowienka, a strong message went out to those taking 
the stand that the court had the capacity and the resolve to uphold the integrity of the 
proceedings. Those who may have hoped to slip through the cracks as one of nearly two 
hundred witnesses would now have to rethink their testimonies. 
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The most sensational incident of the trial involved another such arrest, and this saga 
began to unfold the day after Glowienka’s testimony, when two other Stapo Tilsit members 
testified. In recounting what they recalled about the shootings, both men heavily implicated 
their former colleague Artur Gennat, who had worked in Kreuzmann’s division at the Jewish 
affairs desk and was currently a detective in Mainz. They testified that Gennat had carried 
out Böhme’s orders to “liquidate” Jewish women and children and alleged that he beat Polish 
laborers with a bullwhip during “aggressive interrogations.”91 Such testimony came as a 
surprise to the prosecution. Gennat was already scheduled to take the stand two days later, 
but the investigation had earlier found little reason to suspect Gennat of direct involvement in 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit. Since his first interrogation in December 1956, Gennat had claimed 
repeatedly to know nothing about any shootings. When detectives told him his claims were 
“unbelievable,” Gennat countered, “If such shootings actually were carried out, which I 
personally doubt, they could only have been undertaken by members of the border police.”92  
When he testified on June 12 at the Ulm trial, Gennat again insisted that he had 
played no role in any killings, or even had any knowledge of these actions. Asked to explain 
why the other witnesses had suggested his deep involvement in the crimes, he asserted that 
they had him confused with someone else.
93
 Given his current employment as a detective, the 
prosecution did not want to move against him prematurely and agreed to call all three 
witnesses back to testify on July 4. 
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On the night of July 3, Gennat paid a visit to the other two in an effort to get them to 
change their statements.
94
 He began by offering to host them at his home in Mainz for a few 
days, an appeal to their camaraderie. When the men refused to perjure themselves, Gennat 
showed them his badge and his service pistol as a clear threat. The men left Gennat that 
evening fearing what he might do. When they entered the courtroom the following day, one 
warned a police officer that Gennat might be armed.
95
 He was. Arrested and still called to 
testify, Gennat again professed his innocence and claimed he carried the weapon only 
because he was accustomed to doing so as a police officer. Wetzel, in disbelief, said, “You 
are probably the only witness who has ever appeared before me armed with a pistol.”96 
On some level, Gennat knew that his efforts were a mark of desperation. Before he 
left Mainz for his second round of testimony, Gennat prepared a letter for his wife and hid it 
in a kitchen cabinet with instructions for “what you should do in the event that I should 
suddenly die.”97 After his arrest in the Ulm courtroom, Gennat was taken down to the Ulm 
jail. On the evening of his second night in jail, he prepared another letter. It began by lashing 
out defiantly at the two men who “lied under oath,” stating that they “have me on their 
consciences.”98 He insisted that he had “nothing to do” with the Einsatzkommando Tilsit 
murders. He ended his letter with a final goodbye to his wife and children, telling them, 
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“With your pictures in my hand, I take leave of you.” Gennat then took what a coroner later 
declared “multiple deadly doses” of poison and killed himself in his jail cell.99 
Gennat’s suicide scandalized the trial. The judiciary immediately tried to determine 
how it had been possible for him to obtain or smuggle the poison in jail, never successfully 
finding the answer.
100
 The press jumped on the incident, which found coverage in all the 
major West German dailies. A week later, the court learned that another witness, Willi 
Artschwager, who had earlier testified, had also committed suicide.
101
  
These incidents dominated several weeks of the trial’s coverage in the media in part 
because that period lacked any clear alternative theme for the press to latch onto. From mid-
June into early July, the prosecution had been calling a dizzying assortment of witnesses to 
take the stand. Several more former members of the various police units stationed along the 
Lithuanian border took the stand, in some instances severely implicating defendants. Other 
witnesses were less effective. A range of priests and Lithuanian civilians testified, which 
provided a general sense of the conditions there during the early days of war, but offered 
little by way of first-hand accounts or precise information that could help the judges and jury 
determine a verdict. Without a certain direction, the trial left the media searching for a 
compelling narrative. Headlines during these weeks frequently spoke of massive crimes and 
horrific events, but these often involved units and areas that had no direct relation to the 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders. The press wanted headlines, and if Schüle’s witnesses 
could not provide them, then Gennat and other sensational events would have to suffice.  
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The Prosecution Builds and Rests 
Though Schüle’s prosecution had encountered unexpected setbacks, as many 
witnesses recanted earlier statements or professed ignorance on key points, he had saved his 
star witnesses and explosive investigation results for a final two weeks of prosecution. On 
seven court dates from July 8 to July 18, Schüle marshaled before the court an array of 
witnesses and sources, each providing a different account of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe 
and Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s role therein. These sessions, though few in number, 
showcased the fruits of his investigation into the Einsatzkommando crime complex. The case 
would be won or lost on the strength of these seven days.  
On July 8, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski testified. Bach-Zelewski had been an SS 
general (SS-Gruppenführer), which made him the highest ranking official to testify during 
the trial. Able to avoid prosecution at Nuremberg by agreeing to testify against the other 
defendants, Bach-Zelewski now offered damning statements in the Ulm trial. At the outbreak 
of war with the Soviet Union, he had been the officer in charge of Silesia, played a pivotal 
role in the origins of the Auschwitz death camp, and as a result had intimate knowledge of 
the origins of the Final Solution. He described what one newspaper termed “a kind of 
apotheosis of Nazi racial politics,” when he told the court about October 1941 orders that 
came from Hitler’s desk calling for the murder of Eastern European Jewry.102 He described 
an interaction with Himmler in Minsk at that time, when Himmler personally observed the 
mass executions of thousands of Jews. After, Himmler remarked, “No, that won’t do. That’s 
not possible. We must find more humane methods for mass murder.” “That,” Bach-Zelewski 
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informed the court, “was the hour of birth for the gassing of Jews.”103 The defendants had 
made pains to state that their actions were not part of the Final Solution, but Bach-Zelewski’s 
testimony defined these mass executions as a crucial step on the road to Auschwitz.  
Two days later, Schüle provided a counterpoint to Bach-Zelewski’s high-level 
assessment by calling two other key witnesses. First, Josef Warscher, the head of the 
Stuttgart-based Israelitische Kultusvereinigung, took the stand. Warscher had spearheaded 
the far-reaching campaign involving agencies in Great Britain, the United States, France, and 
Israel in an effort to locate Jewish survivors from the Memel area. As he stated in court, 
“Jews were so thoroughly destroyed in these areas that hardly any survivors remain.”104 In 
his testimony, Warscher stood in for all those Jews killed by Einsatzkommando Tilsit. His 
inability to locate any survivors – and the consequent absence of survivors’ voices during the 
trial itself – became an indication of how extensively the defendants had carried out their 
genocidal mission in 1941. The only reason no Jewish survivors testified was because 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit had ensured that there were none. 
Important as Warscher’s testimony was, the shocking statements of Ona Rudaitis 
immediately overshadowed it later that day. Rudaitis, a sixty-seven year old Lithuanian 
nurse, had first come to Schüle’s attention in spring 1957 as a result of his extensive combing 
of refugee camps for Lithuanians from the Memel region.
105
 She had lived in Wirballen, one 
of the many towns that had its Jewish inhabitants killed by Einsatzkommando Tilsit. She 
described first the arrest of the Jews of Wirballen approximately a week after the war began, 
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and how a German unit had appeared in town shortly thereafter and drove the male Jews off 
in three trucks to the edge of town. Rudaitis told the court that “you could hear the shots 
throughout the entire city” as the men were killed.106 A few weeks later, Rudaitis was 
returning home early in the morning after a house call outside of town. In the distance was 
gunfire. Concealing herself behind a cow herd, she soon came across a long grave filled with 
the bodies of half-naked women and children. Among the victims, she recognized her Jewish 
neighbor. Retreating to the cover of the herd, Rudaitis hid for over an hour as the killers 
returned with more Jewish women and children. She testified that these were the same 
Germans who had earlier shot the Jewish men of Wirballen. She witnessed firsthand as 
women and children were forced to strip before being led out in groups to the mass grave, 
where they were immediately shot. The entire execution, she stated, lasted four hours and 
claimed two to three hundred victims.
107
 
The press hailed Rudaitis’ testimony. She was the only civilian to testify throughout 
the entire trial with an eyewitness account of the executions. Her statements thereby 
presented an unimpeachable ground-level view of the horrors committed by 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit. The Stuttgarter Zeitung reported that Rudatis’ testimony “left no 
one in the courtroom untouched.”108 The Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung ran a photograph of 
Rudaitis, one of the only photos published from the trial in its pages, under the headline, 
“Finally the Truth Comes to Light.”109 All the major national press covered her testimony.110 
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Even though she had not been able to identify any of the defendants, her importance as an 
eyewitness cannot be overstated. The prosecution had already well established the way that 
these murders were carried out, the numbers killed, and other precise details. But until 
Rudaitis, they had not succeeded in putting a human face on the atrocities. When Rudaitis, an 
old woman, recounted seeing her neighbor lying dead in a mass grave and witnessing 
mothers shot alongside their children, she brought home to the courtroom and to the West 
German public the unbelievable inhumanity and cruelty that underpinned every moment of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s existence. 
The damage to the defendants’ case got more severe the following day, when 
Wilhelm Gerke testified during the entire session. Gerke had been a member of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit, but had left West Germany for Sweden in the early 1950s. Even 
though Schüle had tried desperately to arrange his extradition so that he could join the other 
defendants in the docket, his effort had come too late, and only in late June was he finally 
arrested and deported to Ulm.
111
 After detectives interrogated him for several weeks, Gerke 
finally took the stand on July 11. One report from the following day described Gerke’s 
testimony as an “unexpected turn” that, as another news outlet reported, “possibly the 
prosecution itself didn’t expect.”112 The Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung opened its coverage, 
“This was a day of triumph for the prosecution!”113 
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The cause of this celebration was Gerke’s apparent breakdown on the stand. In tears 
throughout his testimony, Gerke opened by stating, “I don’t want to dodge questions. I don’t 
want to save myself, nor do I want to save any of the others….I want to answer all the 
questions truthfully.”114 Unlike any of the defendants, Gerke admitted to having played an 
instrumental role in the majority of Einsatzkommando Tilsit executions. His indictments of 
the defendants, therefore, proved far more credible because he harmed his own case in the 
process. He recalled with specificity that Kreuzmann had been present at the first murder in 
Garsden, a charge Kreuzmann had been denying throughout the trial. He described Böhme 
calling for a house-by-house search for additional Jews in Georgenburg. And, sobbing, he 
told the court how he and Harms had carried out Böhme’s orders to murder Jewish women 
and children in Heydekrug.  
On this exceptional moment during the trial, Gerke as a clear Nazi criminal did what 
none of the defendants had been willing to do since the end of the war: he told the truth. It 
meant that he would now face investigation and prosecution for his role in these crimes, but 
it afforded the courtroom and the media a brief moment of catharsis. Part of this trial was 
about educating the public on what had transpired in the far reaches of the Nazi state, but a 
crucial aim for the prosecution and judges throughout was to get the defendants to speak 
honestly about what had transpired in 1941. Every time that Böhme took the stand and 
claimed not to remember, every time that Fischer-Schweder insisted that the victims were 
partisans, every time that Hersmann said he was only following orders – all these incidents 
robbed the court, the victims’ families, and the West German public of a possible moment 
when the criminal would confront his crime. To refuse to confess to what was so obviously 
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true rendered any such reconciliation impossible. The ecstatic response of the media to 
Gerke’s confession demonstrated how badly the public wanted similar honesty from the 
defendants and how routinely this had been denied.  
The trial resumed after the weekend on July 15, when Schüle began a two-day 
presentation of historical documentation in court. These records ranged from influential 
speeches by Nazi leaders to operation reports from various military units. The documents that 
resonated most widely in the trial were the Ereignismeldungen and the Stahlecker report. The 
Ereignismeldungen provided detailed numbers of those killed by Einsatzkommando Tilsit in 
various towns over the course of the summer in 1941. They had surfaced earlier during the 
trial, at which point the local Ulm paper published a photocopy of one of the reports under 
the headline “Ledger of Death.”115 Schüle circled back to the records now in order to 
emphasize how meticulously organized these murders were. The Ereignismeldungen also 
formed a backdrop to the explosive Stahlecker report. Officially the “Full Report of 
Einsatzgruppe A through October 15, 1941,” this was Stahlecker’s summary of all 
Einsatzgruppe A’s actions during the first four months of the war. In all, Stahlecker reported 
that 136,567 persons were murdered chiefly in the Baltic areas under his control. Of these, 
131,432 were Jews, and 80,311 were Lithuanian Jews. Included within the report was also a 
figure now familiar to anyone following the trial: Einsatzkommando Tilsit had murdered 
5,502 people during these four months. 
The final phase of the prosecution began on the afternoon of July 17 with the 
testimony of several expert witnesses. First on the stand was Rabbi Bloch, who was president 
of the Israelitische Kultusvereinigung. Bloch himself was from western Lithuania and one of 
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the few survivors of the Holocaust from that area. Since the end of the war, he had worked on 
a study of the Lithuanian Holocaust, which he described for the court. He stated, “All 
comparable studies have shown that in no other occupied area was the destruction [of Jews] 
so extensively and thoroughly carried out as it was in Lithuania.”116 He discussed how male 
Jews were killed first during the initial months of war, and by the late summer women and 
children became targets. This testimony, as well as the previously presented documents, 
linked the defendants’ actions to the evolution of the Holocaust in Lithuania. What they did 
mirrored massacres throughout Lithuania occurring at the same time, and in all instances, the 
targets were primarily Jews. 
Finally, the historians Hans-Günther Seraphim and Helmut Krausnick testified on 
July 18. Seraphim, a professor at the University of Göttingen, was tasked with taking on the 
defendants’ recurrent claims of the Befehlsnotstand, which posited that not carrying out 
orders would have risked death or physical harm. Seraphim laid out a systematic critique of 
this position, as he stated that in his “more than ten years of research,” he had never once 
found record of any incident when an officer faced physical harm for refusing to participate 
in an execution.
117
 Krausnick testified in the afternoon on the evolution of Jewish policy in 
the Nazi state. The leader of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich began his testimony by 
describing the discriminatory laws passed beginning in 1933. He detailed the escalation of 
these laws into genocide through a careful analysis of the years 1939-1942.  
In the wake of the expert testimony, the trial adjourned for the following week. When 
it reconvened, several final witnesses who had been unable to make their initial trial date 
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appeared, but for the prosecution the trial had already reached its apogee. During the two 
weeks from Bach-Zelewski’s testimony to Seraphim and Krausnick’s analysis, Schüle had 
succeeded in framing the criminality of the defendants from as many angles as possible. 
Bach-Zelewski had provided a high-level account of the Holocaust, Rudaitis gave a ground-
level view of its horrors, and Gerke spoke personally to the role the defendants played in 
these acts. Schüle also worked in historical documentation. If the jury might be reluctant to 
trust the memories of the witnesses, they now had the defendants’ own reports of the murders 
to consider. Finally, Schüle provided a range of expert opinions that examined the Holocaust 
in Lithuania, the legal repercussions of following orders, and the evolution of the Final 
Solution. Throughout the trial, the defendants had tried to seek refuge from certain 
allegations by making claims about the identity of the victims or the need to follow orders. 
After these two trial weeks, however, the defendants became suspended in a web with little 
hope of escape. The jury now knew what had happened, what it had looked like, what the 
context for these crimes was, and above all what role the perpetrators had played in carrying 
out the Holocaust in Lithuania. 
Moreover, these seven days of testimony showcased Schüle’s new approach to the 
investigation. The first two months of the trial, which had focused almost exclusively on the 
defendants’ statements and those of other civil servants, had resembled the approach taken by 
the Ulm prosecutors during the first year of the Fischer-Schweder investigation. As the press 
had concluded, this resulted in an unsatisfying and deeply contradictory version of events. By 
contrast, in seven days Schüle presented a much smaller group of witnesses and evidence, but 
each was so powerful and presented such a unique evaluation of the crimes that it erased 
many doubts from the previous months of trial. In Bach-Zelewski, Schüle demonstrated the 
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importance of looking at Nazi elite outside the German-Lithuanian border; in Warscher, the 
role of Jewish voices; in Rudaitis, the value of civilian testimony; in Gerke, the need to look 
beyond German borders to find important witnesses; in the expert witnesses, the authority of 
academic research; and in the presentation of documentation, the role of original sources 
from the Nazi period. These seven days therefore represented not just the climax of the 
prosecution but the concentrated essence of the crime complex investigation strategy. 
 Schüle began his closing argument on August 1. His extensive speech lasted until the 
late afternoon of the following day. At times, Ulm prosecutor Schneider took over so Schüle 
could rest. At a minimum, the prosecution had to clarify the charges for ten different 
individuals. Each was being tried for particular incidents, and now the prosecutors had to 
recapitulate each crime and each defendant’s role therein. But Schüle also decided to frame 
these narrow legal arguments within a nuanced, broad commentary on the nature of the Nazi 
state and the work left to do for West Germany to truly come to terms with its past. By now, 
the tenor of many of these statements will be familiar to the reader, but it is important to 
consider what Schüle hoped to achieve through these words. A private man, Schüle gave few 
interviews; his closing statements are therefore one of few windows that open onto the mind 
of this pioneer in Nazi crimes investigations.  
 The core of Schüle’s argument, and the line picked up the most by the media, was his 
assertion, “We all have a guilty conscience when we think back to the evil of those times…If 
we’re honest with ourselves, we all judge ourselves harshly and have to agree with the 
witness Hartl: back then, we were all too cowardly.”118 As he explained, this guilty 
conscience was not because most Germans identified with the Nazi cause, but because they 
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had allowed fear of the SS and the Hitler dictatorship to cow them into submission. They had 
failed to act in accordance to their morals. As a member of the SA himself, Schüle likely 
knew well the horrors inflicted in the name of Nazism. While Schüle acknowledged that 
Germans should have done more to stop Hitler, he stopped short of admitting the role that 
Germans played in bringing him to power in the first place. Thus his argument fell back onto 
a comforting postwar notion of Germans as passive receptors of the dictatorship and not its 
active creators. Their mistake was doing nothing. 
 In Schüle’s mind, the importance of this postwar moment was to do now what they 
should have done then. If they had been too cowardly before, now was their chance to make 
up for those years of indecision and to speak out against the SS and the Gestapo. For twelve 
years, Germans sat in silence under Hitler, and for the thirteen years after, West Germans 
pursued policies of silence towards that era. Better to reintegrate, grant amnesty to, and 
ignore the crimes of many Nazis than to explore seriously how these crimes had happened. 
Schüle was trying to rouse West Germans from this complacency. Now was an opportunity 
for West Germans to disavow all crimes done in the name of Nazi Germany and to ensure 
that the passivity of one era did not cross into the next. He urged the court not to make the 
same mistake twice, first by allowing these crimes to happen and second by allowing its 
perpetrators to escape justice. Through a conviction, West Germans could reaffirm their 
commitment to the principles of democracy and justice. As he stated, “This trial has been 
accused of being unjust as a political trial. I must once more intone: no one is standing here 
before the court because he was a Nazi, but nevertheless this trial bears political meaning. It 
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shows that the only basis for a government is justice. If this foundation is abandoned, then 
the end result is lies, arbitrariness, and murder.”119  
 During the second day of his closing statement, Schüle recommended sentences for 
all ten. For four of the defendants – Fischer-Schweder, Böhme, Hersmann, and Lukys – 
Schüle asked for convictions of murder and demanded life sentences. The first three had been 
charged with murder since the trial started, while testimony during the trial led Schüle to add 
the charge of murder to Lukys’ sentence. As Schüle explained, these four had been “masters 
of life and death,” who had carried out the murders “of their own volition.”120 The other six 
defendants were all accused of accessory to murder because some questions about their 
leadership role in the executions remained unclear. Schüle also reaffirmed that none of these 
men could claim to have just followed orders. He stated, “Even in the Third Reich, the taking 
of human life without a court order was a crime, just as it is today.” Moreover, all defendants 
had been active at the time of the crimes in law enforcement. They knew which orders had to 
be followed and which contravened the law. In choosing to engage in mass murder, all 
defendants had knowingly violated the law. 
 Schüle concluded his arguments with a reflection on the crimes. He asked the jury to 
think not only on the defendants who committed these acts, but on the thousands of victims 
who died as a result. Because no survivors had been found to testify, too often during the trial 
it had been possible to lose sight of the victims. This was not just a trial about what Germans 
had done; it was a trial about what Jews had been made to suffer. Thus Schüle concluded 
with the statement, “The victims were people who laughed, cried, loved, and worked, just 
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like you and I – and just like the defendants themselves!...For seventeen years, the sun has 
not shined for them anymore, and the victims have not even been allowed the peace of a 
grave. Their graves were later ripped open, the bodies burned, and the ashes strewn in the 
wind to hide the traces of the atrocities!” When he finished, the press reported, the courtroom 
“was still like a church…one could hear a pin drop.”121 The prosecution rested. 
 
Defending the Accused 
 After an eight-day pause, the trial resumed on August 11 when the defense attorneys 
began their closing statements. Throughout the proceedings, they had faced a difficult 
challenge in defending men who had participated in such horrific crimes. Many of the ten 
attorneys were state-appointed to the case and showed little overt interest in taking on such 
an unpleasant and daunting task as representing Nazi war criminals. Nevertheless, in the 
interest of fulfilling a vital duty in the machinery of justice, they took up the cases and 
attempted to find ways to interrupt or otherwise disrupt the prosecutor’s momentum in 
establishing the defendants’ guilt. For most of the trial, this consisted of questioning the 
motives or statements of certain witnesses, trying to prevent others from testifying, and 
offering several of their own to speak to the ostensible decency of their clients. In mounting 
the defenses, all ten defendants pled not guilty to the charges, and it was now the challenge 
of the defense attorneys to make this case in their closing arguments. 
 The only defense attorney with experience in Nazi crimes prosecutions was the man 
who had made his career defending Nazis in court: Rudolf Aschenauer. Hersmann’s attorney 
had left a deep imprint on the trial. Many of the other attorneys deferred to his experience 
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and presumptive expertise in crafting their own strategies. At a certain point during the 
proceedings, he actually proposed taking the stand himself as an expert witness, citing his 
experience with and knowledge of the Nuremberg trial records.
122
 The court rejected the 
idea.
123
 But when it came time for the closing statements, the other attorneys allowed 
Aschenauer to speak first, presenting him with an opportunity to establish the framework for 
all of their statements. 
“Once more a trial comes to an end,” Aschenauer began his day-long statement, “a 
trial with political background that concerns the most terrible and unbelievable acts of the 
history of the Nazi regime against people whose only mistake was being Jewish.”124 From 
the outset, he thereby firmly established the Einsatzkommando Tilsit actions within the 
context of the Holocaust, a point that many of the defendants had rejected. For Aschenauer, 
admitting the connection between Tilsit and Auschwitz became the starting point for 
defending Hersmann. In his discussion of the “phenomenon of the Final Solution,” he first 
described the cumulative effects of centuries of anti-Semitism on the German population. 
Multiplied by propaganda, communism, and strident nationalism, this “doctrine” of anti-
Semitism culminated in the belief that “Bolshevism was a Jewish invention. Bolshevism 
supposedly served to implement a Jewish plan for global domination.” Second, Aschenauer 
detailed that, under Hitler’s dictatorship, “the Führer was always right.” His word carried the 
force of law, and any action defying Hitler’s orders thereby constituted an illegal action. 
Throughout, he peppered his speech with references to historical documents and prominent 
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academics. He depicted the Holocaust as the cresting of an unstoppable wave, a culmination 
of long-term historical prejudices unleashed by the irrepressible will of a dictator. As 
Aschenauer stated, “In this context, high court, it is right for you to evaluate how responsible 
the defendants were and how widely they had freedom of action in these crimes.”125 
 Beneath this grand historical posturing, Aschenauer’s defense rested on the well-worn 
claim of the Befehlsnotstand, as he insisted that Hersmann would have risked his own life 
had he refused orders. Although the prosecution had devoted extensive efforts to debunk this 
widespread argument, Aschenauer did not cede the point. He referenced Field Marshal von 
Leeb’s postwar claims to have been bound by oath to Hitler’s orders and asked, “Does 
anyone believe that the ‘Führer order’ that Stahlecker communicated to Böhme and 
Hersmann was any less binding for them as it was for generals and field marshals? They held 
the rank of major.” Service to the state permitted no deviation from Hitler’s orders, so any 
action that challenged one’s moral beliefs necessarily created a “dilemma” (Zwangslage): act 
legally or act morally, knowing that the latter course might lead to punishment.
126
  
 His statements ended in a complicated critique of West German justice and its strict 
definition of murder. He stated, “There can be no doubt that the crimes that took place on the 
basis of the so-called ‘Führer execution order’ in a 25-km stretch of the Memel border meet 
the legal requirements of murder.” These crimes had clearly originated from base, racial 
motives, but their progenitors were the Nazi elite. Hitler, Himmler, and other elites may have 
willed these murders for racist motives, but that does not mean Hersmann and the others 
carried out the orders with the same malice. “There is no dual area of morality,” he stated, 
                                                 
125
 Rudolf Aschenauer, Plädoyer, EL 322/II, Bü 117, SL. 
 
126
 Rudolf Aschenauer, Plädoyer, EL 322/II, Bü 117, SL. 
 
291 
 
“that can distinguish between active participation and knowing acceptance.” If the court was 
to make a judgment about the defendants’ mental states at the time of the killings, it was 
engaging in a fool’s errand. These men had carried out horrible actions, but they were not the 
parties chiefly responsible. “If you convict,” Aschenauer concluded, “remember that before 
you stands only those who carried out what others, who are again honored and esteemed 
today, had carried out from their desks. Before you stand only the most easily identifiable 
perpetrators. What we cannot permit is a dual system of justice and a dual morality!”127 
 Aschenauer’s closing statement rebranded Hersmann and indeed the entire events of 
the Holocaust. Where Schüle had suggested that the Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders 
originated from a complex set of high-level planning and on-the-ground improvisational 
decision making, Aschenauer fell back on standard clichés of the Holocaust that played to 
West German sensibilities. These events had been organized at the top by Hitler, but they had 
come into being because of a long-running and deeply-seated anti-Semitism. Such a view 
took responsibility away not only from Hersmann but from all ordinary Germans who were 
powerless to stop this wave of history. Again, Aschenauer contrasted himself in this regard 
from Schüle, who had spoken about the “bad conscience” most Germans felt about their role 
in the Third Reich. Finally, by depicting Hersmann as just a mid-level officer forced to carry 
out orders, he suggested an imbalanced judicial system, which prosecuted the implementers 
of genocide but not its architects. Accepting such a view required a willful dismissal of the 
proceeding months of testimony, which had shown Hersmann and others clearly taking on a 
decision-making role in the executions. But its strength rested on its portrayal of the Third 
Reich as a system imposed on Germans as well as other Europeans. Schüle had asked West 
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Germans to identify with the defendants as perpetrators; Aschenauer asked that they identify 
with the defendants as victims. 
 Over the next week, most attorneys followed at least two aspects of Aschenauer’s 
argument. First, they minimized their clients’ roles by casting them as inconsequential 
officers forced to carry out orders. Keller, Sakuth’s attorney, stated, “In a press conference 
led by the prosecutor after the indictments were issued and when the trial was announced, the 
State Attorney General claimed that...so-called rank-and-file were certainly not indicted. This 
report is clearly incorrect.”128 Similarly, Heinz Schelbert argued, “The defendant Harms does 
not feel responsible for the events on the Lithuanian border because he only acted on 
orders.”129 Fischer-Schweder’s and Schmidt-Hammer’s attorneys both argued that their 
clients had acted only on the belief that they were protecting the state from partisans, not 
recognizing that they were actually being manipulated into committing genocidal acts 
organized by higher offices.
130
 The logic of following orders became a common line of 
defense for the defendants.  
Second, the attorneys raised questions about the legality and advisability of the 
postwar state in prosecuting these ten men. This second argument became more credible if 
the jury accepted the first. If these men were really just unwilling accomplices in the Nazi 
state, then the prosecution of them would appear all the more questionable. This argument 
also seized on the concept of nulle crime, sine lege – no crime without a law. Since these 
men had carried out actions considered, as they claimed, legal at the time committed, then the 
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West German court should not retroactively apply its own laws onto that era. Kreuzmann’s 
attorney Claus Joachim von Heydebreck gave this argument contemporary punch when he 
stated, “In the event of a reunification of East and West in a freely democratic Germany, 
would we really place the occupants of the Soviet zone back before a court, if they had 
obeyed the law and followed orders, which we in democratic West Germany deemed 
criminal?”131 He and others hoped to strike a note of discomfort by raising murky issues 
about the legality of these executions within the Nazi dictatorship and thereby the 
questionable ability of the court to prosecute the men under a different legal code. 
 Because of the strict definition of murder in West Germany, which emphasized the 
mental state of the criminal, personality also became central in several of the closing 
statements. On one end of the spectrum was Fischer-Schweder, who had earned a strikingly 
negative reputation through the trial. If the jury felt that Fischer-Schweder was a brash 
egomaniac who did as he pleased in court, then they might have no difficulty believing he 
had acted similarly along the Lithuanian border. His attorney Marcushen therefore asked the 
court to overlook his dictatorial demeanor. For nine pages – one-eighth of the entire closing 
statement – Marcushen defended his client’s character. “You could say,” Marcushen told the 
court, “that he’s no average person. Just as he is in appearance – big, tall, and powerful – so 
too is he in personality, always moving, impulsive, explosive, highly energized, and 
constantly active.” But, he cautioned, this should not lead to a “false verdict.” Fischer-
Schweder’s “impulsive and animated disposition” speaks to the fact that he acts “more from 
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emotion than from intellect.” Finally, he told the court, “If he is somewhat arrogant, that 
doesn’t necessarily mean he is a criminal.”132 
 On the other end of the spectrum, Schmidt-Hammer earned a good reputation 
throughout the proceedings, and his attorney sought to make the former lieutenant’s overall 
decency a part of his defense strategy. Next to Aschenauer, Rolf Nissen was likely the most 
accomplished of the defense attorneys. Though Schmidt-Hammer had few financial 
resources, his postwar employers were so taken with him that they provided financial 
assistance for his legal fees.
133
 Many of the other attorneys were young and state-appointed, 
but Nissen was already into his fifties during the trial.
134
 His strategy for Schmidt-Hammer 
sought to distance him from the other nine defendants. “Contrary to all the other defendants,” 
Nissen stated, “Schmidt-Hammer never joined the Gestapo, SS, SD, or indeed even the Nazi 
Party or its affiliates.” He continued, “None of the witnesses, none of the other defendants, 
not even the prosecutor has said even a negative word about Schmidt-Hammer’s personality. 
To the contrary, everyone has held him in the greatest esteem.”135  
Additionally, Nissen invoked Schmidt-Hammer’s suffering at the end of the war and 
his reintegration in the 1950s. “Schmidt-Hammer suffered body and soul in a Yugoslavian 
POW camp. As a late returnee [Spätheimkehrer] he immediately helped dutifully and 
diligently in the overall reconstruction effort, created a new livelihood for his wife and his 
two young children, and worked his way up to a respectable position.” All of these factors 
underpinned Nissen’s conclusion that Schmidt-Hammer differed fundamentally from the 
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other defendants and the verdict should reflect this. He said, “The German public will not be 
able to understand if the verdict does not make a clear distinction between Schmidt-Hammer, 
who rejected Nazism and only found himself caught up in this fate through a tragic chain of 
events, and the other defendants.” By separating his client from the other accused, Nissen 
asked the court and the public to identify with Schmidt-Hammer as an ordinary German 
swept up by happenstance into a sea of Nazi barbarism.
136
 
 Just as Schmidt-Hammer’s attorney had done, many emphasized the suffering that 
their clients had incurred. As part of 1950s West German society, these perpetrators had 
grown accustomed to leveraging their own misfortunes into postwar advantages, and their 
attorneys tried to use these victimization narratives to the same effect in Ulm. Harms’ 
attorney implored the court, “Your honors, as you now make your judgment about the 
defendant Harms, please consider that this sixty-five year old man, who lost two sons in the 
war, has already suffered greatly, that a wife and family wait for him, and that his own life 
expectancy numbers in the months.”137 Sakuth’s attorney echoed these sentiments: “Should 
he now also be stamped as a murderer, as a perfect monster, who deliberately opted for the 
crime? The phrasing of the verdict alone has significance in this regard. By convicting him as 
a murderer, you will destroy all piety and esteem his children have for their own father. 
Should that really be the experience of these proceedings for Sakuth? I can’t imagine.”138  
Such victimization language served two main purposes. It encouraged the jury and 
the public to empathize with the defendants. Furthermore, it created an equivalency between 
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the crimes committed and the punishment already served. The defense attorneys put forward 
the idea that suffering abounded during and after the war. The defendants may have inflicted 
some, but so too had they incurred it. Better to close the book on this era than to continue to 
perpetuate the cycle of suffering. The undercurrent of all these narratives of suffering was 
thus the lingering question Schüle had raised in his closing statement: is this trial necessary? 
While he clearly answered in the affirmative, the defense attorneys sowed the courtroom with 
seeds of doubt, insisting that there was little to be gained and much to be lost by a West 
Germany eagerly prosecuting its own. 
The most direct and remarkable expression of this position came from Kreuzmann’s 
attorney, von Heydebreck. He began his closing statement by claiming the trial raised “not 
only legal problems, but also psychological, historical, and political questions.”139 After 
addressing the legal problems mentioned earlier, he moved on to a reflection on the inherent 
role that human memory and forgetting played in the trial, and how errors of human memory 
fundamentally undercut the trial’s legitimacy. Referencing a mistake from Detective 
Opferkuch’s earlier testimony, von Heydebreck stated:  
Even an experienced detective was of the opinion after just seventeen months that he 
had been present at an interrogation of Böhme, when in reality he learned of the 
inquisitor judge’s interrogation only through an intense reading of the file. How much 
greater, then, is the danger that the accused and witnesses can no longer distinguish 
between what they experienced seventeen years ago and what they have since learned 
of through conversations and through questions put to them during numerous 
interrogations? 
 
The argument took on a metaphysical dimension when he began to challenge the memory of 
the court itself. With no audio or written record of the trial, would the jury and judges be able 
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to recall all that had happened in the past four months based solely on their notes? The record 
would never be complete, and in the absence of precision, no conviction was possible.
140
 
The French thinker Ernest Renan famously stated, “Forgetting, I would even go so far 
as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of the nation.”141 Though 
Heydebreck did not quote the nineteenth-century philosopher, this argument ran through his 
closing words and indeed just below the surface of many of the defense attorneys’ 
statements. Forgetting, in Heydebreck’s view, was not only inevitable, but necessary. For 
West Germany to move forward, it could not continue to linger on and litigate the past. 
Instead, learn from those mistakes and prevent them in the future. As he concluded, “We can 
only heal the wounds of the past if we preserve peace and freedom in the world. But for this, 
we need to keep looking to the future and not continue to look today for more people guilty 
of the crimes of the past.” A return of memory, he cautioned, would doom the nascent 
state.
142
 Such a view may have been articulated simply as a desperate attempt to avoid his 
client’s conviction, but it was also closely calibrated to match the fears of many West 
Germans and indeed the current political philosophy of Chancellor Adenauer.  
 
Verdict in Ulm 
 The court adjourned on August 18 and returned eleven days later on August 29 for 
the reading of the verdict. The final judgment came to a length of 503 pages, a momentous 
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and singular document coming out of West German Nazi crimes trials.
143
 Typically, verdicts 
included only a brief summary of the charges against each defendant, the verdict, and a legal 
explanation for the verdict. Hersmann’s earlier conviction by a Traunstein court in 1950 for 
the murder of German civilians at the end of the war, for example, produced only a four-page 
verdict. The length of the judgment alone testified to the unusual contours of this trial. 
 The size of the judgment reflected its scope. Rather than focusing solely on the ten 
defendants, the judges who wrote the verdict, chiefly the assistant judge Fink, shared the 
conviction of the prosecution that any decision could only come out of a consideration of the 
full scope of the Final Solution in Eastern Europe. Thus, the verdict contained a sweeping 
history of the Third Reich, detailing how that state arrived at a policy of genocide. Within 
this broad history, the role of Einsatzkommando Tilsit was singled out. Its origins were 
explained in great detail. The anatomy of the various state police units – Stapostelle Tilsit, 
SD Tilsit, and the Memel Schutzpolizei chief among them – provided a clear view of the 
hierarchy of power along the German-Lithuanian border. Twenty-two distinct massacres 
were reconstructed on the basis of testimony and documentation presented in court. The first 
crime, the Garsden shooting, was analyzed in particular detail as the most thoroughly 
documented and therefore best example of how these crimes unfolded. The twenty-two 
massacres were then subjected to rigorous legal analysis, looking at issues such as the 
provenance of orders, the identity of the victims, the purported legality of the shootings, and 
the role of each defendant in these incidences.  
In creating the historical judgment, Fink relied on notes during the trial but more 
significantly on the indictment Schüle had prepared in June 1957. That 212-page document 
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provided the organizational skeleton of the verdict. Fink was able to revisit sworn affidavits 
of defendants and witnesses that Schüle had referenced in the indictment in order to properly 
cite and quote individual statements. Footnotes and hundreds of citations throughout the 
judgment transformed it from a mere legal explanation for a verdict into a paramount history 
of the Holocaust in Lithuania. In its breadth, scope, and precision, the judgment in Ulm 
immediately became one of the foremost historical accounts of these events. Even today, the 
verdict remains a preeminent source for the history of Einsatzkommando Tilsit.  
 In the courtroom on August 29, Judge Wetzel read out the verdict. The final version 
took several additional weeks to finalize, but Judge Wetzel’s six-hour reading of the verdict 
established its core principles and precedents. The press crowded the courtroom that day. 
Though national media outlets had shown consistent but hardly enthusiastic interest 
throughout the trial, all were eager to learn its outcome. The largest Nazi crimes trial in West 
German history was now at its end, and its verdict could have serious repercussions for 
subsequent investigations. Even a photographer from the Deutsche Film AG, an East German 
news agency, was on hand to document the verdict. Perhaps in response to the communist 
presence in the courtroom, Wetzel began with reference to the “clearly emerging parallels” 
between the Nazi and Soviet states. The former regime, he cautioned, ought to serve as a 
reminder to the latter of what could happen when states “strive after absolute power.”144 
 Before announcing the verdict, Wetzel provided the court and the media with some 
perspective on his aims during the deliberation and throughout the trial. From the start of the 
trial, he stated, his goal was to prevent the case from veering off course “because a spectacle 
and a search for truth never go hand-in-hand.” The search for truth, however, was made 
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difficult throughout the trial because of the unreliability of both the defendants and those 
witnesses who were also implicated in the Tilsit crimes. “The experience,” Wetzel declared, 
“was that untruthfulness had triumphed in the courtroom as never before.” Just as the press 
had worried through the first months of the trial, the self-serving testimony of many 
witnesses and the defendants had made the road to a conviction quite difficult. Only through 
“the course of many court sessions and difficult debates” had the judges and jury been able to 
seek out the truth and “find and do what’s right.” They had arrived at a verdict by pushing 
aside emotions and focusing on what had been proven in the court of law.
145
 
 The key decision that the judges and jury made in their verdict came down to the 
following: “The court has determined that it was Hitler who gave the verbal orders [for the 
Final Solution] and that Himmler and Heydrich plotted and carried these out.”146 Though 
condemning Hitler and his inner circle for the origins of the Holocaust might not seem a 
remarkable decision, this conclusion all but guaranteed that none of the defendants would be 
declared guilty of murder. Unless their actions had demonstrably transgressed these orders, 
the court had found that only Hitler and his inner circle were guilty of murder, just as 
Aschenauer had claimed in his closing statement. If the others had simply carried out orders 
arranged by higher offices, they could be convicted of accessory to murder at worst. 
 Having arrived at this conclusion, the court decided that all ten defendants were guilty 
of accessory to murder. The individual verdicts were as follows:  
 Hans-Joachim Böhme convicted on 3,907 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to 
fifteen years imprisonment and ten years loss of civil rights 
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 Werner Hersmann convicted on 1,656 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to 
fifteen years imprisonment and ten years loss of civil rights 
 Bernhard Fischer-Schweder convicted on 526 counts of accessory to murder; 
sentenced to ten years imprisonment and seven years loss of civil rights 
 Pranas Lukys convicted on 315 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to seven 
years imprisonment and five years loss of civil rights 
 Werner Kreuzmann convicted on 415 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to 
five years imprisonment and four years loss of civil rights 
 Harm Harms convicted on 526 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to three 
years imprisonment and two years loss of civil rights 
 Franz Behrendt convicted on 1,127 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to five 
years and three months imprisonment and three years loss of civil rights 
 Gerhard Carsten convicted on 423 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to four 
years imprisonment and three years loss of civil rights 
 Edwin Sakuth convicted on 526 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced to three 
years and six months imprisonment and two years loss of civil rights  
 Werner Schmidt-Hammer convicted on 526 counts of accessory to murder; sentenced 
to three years imprisonment.
147
 
This was a complicated verdict that left neither side of the aisle completely satisfied. 
For the defendants all of whom had pled not guilty, the convictions were of course a 
disappointment, but the sentences were a victory. None of the four accused of murder – 
Böhme, Hersmann, Fischer-Schweder, and Lukys – was convicted on those charges. Rather 
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than face the lifetime sentence Schüle had called for, they faced only seven to fifteen years. 
For the other six defendants, these sentences were far more lenient than what Schüle had 
requested. Only Schmidt-Hammer was sentenced along Schüle’s recommendations, but his 
was the least severe of all ten sentences. The generous sentences suggested that the defense 
attorneys had successfully convinced the jury that the members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit 
were not chiefly responsible for that unit’s actions. By ascribing full responsibility to Hitler’s 
inner circle, the court found that these ten had indeed only followed orders.  
The particular sentences also exposed holes in the prosecution’s case. Although 
Böhme had been the leader of Einsatzkommando Tilsit for all 5,502 murders listed in the 
Stahlecker report, he was convicted on only 3,907 counts. Wetzel had expressed doubt 
throughout the trial about Böhme’s claims that many executions were done independently by 
Lithuanian auxiliaries (though still attributed to Böhme in the documentation), but the jury 
felt that they did not have enough precise information to convict him of nearly 1,500 
additional crimes. For similar reasons, the jury convicted many of the defendants on fewer 
counts than the prosecution had hoped. The details of the convictions and the basic finding 
about Hitler’s ultimate responsibility thus suggest that the prosecution did not fully 
accomplish its task during the trial.  
But the prosecution had succeeded on the most important point: the trial culminated 
in ten convictions. After three years of investigation and four months of trial, for the trial to 
end in acquittals would have devastated the judiciary and likely set back other investigations 
into Nazi crimes across West Germany. Moreover, during the late 1950s, acquittals remained 
prevalent. From 1950 to 1957, 46 percent of all Nazi crimes trials in West Germany had 
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resulted in acquittals.
148
 If the court had fully bought into the defense attorneys’ argument 
that the defendants were only following orders, acquittal of all defendants might have been in 
order. The prosecution had presented enough evidence from varying perspectives on this 
point, however, that the jury did not let the defendants fully off the hook.  
By convicting all ten, the court validated Schüle’s novel approach to the 
investigation. As Wetzel noted, the testimony of the defendants and other members of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit could not be relied on during the deliberation. Thus, the verdict 
could only have resulted from other sources and other witnesses, such as civilians, experts, 
and historical documentation. Had the trial relied exclusively on the interrogation of former 
Nazis, which was the investigation strategy during the first year of the Fischer-Schweder 
case, there would have been no possibility of a conviction. Instead, it was the investigation 
revolution that Schüle initiated in 1956, which produced new forms of evidence and a more 
sophisticated structure for understanding the nature of these crimes, that led to a conviction. 
Though the results may not have been exactly what Schüle had asked for, the verdict was a 
clear success for the crime complex approach to Nazi crimes investigations. 
 
Conclusion 
 For four months, the courtroom in Ulm had become a forum for discussion over the 
nature of Nazi crimes and the responsibility of the West German state to prosecute the 
perpetrators responsible for the Holocaust. Involved in this debate were the perpetrators, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, a variety of witnesses, the media, and the public. Each 
group had assigned its own values to and expectations of the proceedings, and in the end, the 
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trial left few completely satisfied. For the perpetrators, the case would be measured only by 
its verdict, and when the court convicted all ten, they could only interpret the outcome as a 
failure. While they had avoided the worst charges of murder, all now bore the stamp of a 
Nazi criminal. Whatever successes these perpetrators had enjoyed in the postwar period, 
whether they had achieved these gains legally or illegally, they had been unable to outrun 
their pasts and now faced futures marked as felons. 
 The prosecution and the defense attorneys also evaluated the case foremost on its 
outcome. Yet, they recognized that this case touched on fundamental questions of justice in 
postwar society. As Schüle made clear in his closing statements, the importance of this case 
went beyond the four walls of the courtroom. With perpetrators like those on trial in Ulm still 
living and thriving in postwar society, Schüle viewed these trials as a necessary way of 
asserting West Germany’s commitment to justice. Murder, he argued, was murder, regardless 
of when it occurred or under which regime. If West Germany was to stake its claim as a 
moral successor to the unjust Nazi state, it needed to hold those accountable who had denied 
justice to others.  
While Schüle made his case by appealing to values of justice and equality, the 
defense attorneys pointed to the unique historical circumstances of the Nazi state and postwar 
West Germany. Nazi Germany, they argued, had indeed been an immoral world but one that 
demanded immorality of others. These defendants, as a result, were not craven murderers but 
the unfortunate result of such a dictatorial system. At the same time, the defense attorneys 
rallied around the common postwar argument that prosecutions bred social divisions. In the 
uncertain years after the war with a West German state struggling to its feet, turning its own 
citizens against themselves could only sow unrest. Already, they argued, the Cold War had 
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pitted Germans against Germans, and now a fault line was to be drawn between Germans 
before and after 1945. At the core of Schüle’s views on the trial and those of the defense 
attorneys was thus a debate over the foundational principles of West Germany. 
 The judges and the jury approached this case recognizing the wider values at work 
but concerned with the narrow question of truth. Sitting through months of sessions and 
hundreds of hours of testimony, the judges and jury had to find a way to assemble this wealth 
of data into a plausible version of events in 1941, and then apply West German criminal law 
to that historical record. In the process, they came to evaluate the nature of evidence put 
before them. The many witnesses who were civil servants had largely approached the case 
less with an interest in truth and more with a desire to avoid implicating themselves in any 
crimes. As a result, the judges and jury came to reject much of their testimony. Not only had 
it plainly been self-serving, but their testimonies as a group failed to agree. No clear picture 
of the past could possibly emerge, they concluded, by relying exclusively on witness 
statements. Instead, they gravitated towards what they regarded as more empirical sources of 
information – scholarly accounts and historical documentation. These sources of information 
became seen as the most reliable avenue available for seeking out the truth behind the 
Einsatzkomando Tilsit murders.  
 The media too focused on questions of the truth, but while the judges and jury had to 
make that truth conform to West Germany law, the media reconciled it with preexisting 
narratives of Nazi criminality. The press largely approached the trial with two stereotypes of 
Holocaust perpetrators: either low-level individuals forced to carry out orders, or sadists and 
Nazi fanatics committed to the genocidal project. The media tried to force the Ulm 
defendants into these molds. They viewed individuals like Schmidt-Hammer and Harms as 
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unfortunate and generally unwilling accomplices in Nazi crimes, while portraying Fischer-
Schweder and Hersmann as Nazi ideologues and Lukys as a sadistic killer. Nevertheless, the 
defendants in Ulm did not fit easily into preformed stereotypes of bestial Nazis. Many were 
career police officers who scarcely resembled the dyed-in-the-wool SS or Nazi radicals often 
portrayed as perpetrators. But because these dimensions of the trial did not sit comfortably 
with existing narratives of Nazi crimes, the press tended to pass over inconsistencies and 
presented an impression of the proceedings that gravitated towards the sensational.  
 The public focus on what happened in 1941, the frustration that the media directed at 
the unwillingness of the perpetrators to admit their crimes, and the voluminous account 
provided in the verdict all reveal the importance of historical truth in assessing the impact of 
the trial.  In this regard, the case pointed to an important aspect of transitional justice.  As 
emerging democracies confront the human rights violations of the preceding state, many 
value truth over harsh sentences.
149
 The Ulm trial in this regard functioned as a public forum 
that allowed for a debate over the Nazi past in an effort to make sense of what had happened.  
By attempting to come as close as possible to a full historical understanding of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s crimes, the verdict became a state-approved version of this 
historical truth.  Thus, the verdict represented not only a condemnation of these ten 
defendants, but an affirmation that the West German state would acknowledge and deal with 
the crimes of its predecessor. 
In the end, there were two groups whose views on the Ulm trial would determine its 
legacy: the public and West German state officials. With the exception of the several hundred 
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spectators who shuffled in and out of the courtroom during the four month trial, the vast 
majority of West Germans encountered the Ulm trial through the press. This meant that many 
developed a skewed perspective on the proceedings, but nonetheless the opinions of the 
public had the potential to determine the legacy of the trial and its impact on subsequent 
investigations. Similarly, the West German government, referring to elected and senior 
officials, had played little direct role in the Ulm trial. That such a massive trial emerged with 
little higher-up involvement was itself a remarkable development, but the government in time 
would develop a response to the trial’s outcome. After four months in the courtroom, the 
Ulm trial ended in a verdict. The public and the government would determine the trial’s 
legacy over the following months.
  
 
 
 
 
VII. Legacy: A Central Agency for Nazi Crimes Investigations 
 
During this trial, the prosecutor’s office has received many letters, the tenor of which is 
often, “Make quick work of these criminals!”… To all those with such understandably 
righteous indignation, we must respond: Precisely because the defendants had back then 
trampled on justice and law, we need to show them that no person can or should be convicted 
without having a legal hearing.  
 
– Erwin Schüle, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial 
 
  
The Baden-Württemberg Attorney General Erich Nellmann received two reports on 
August 19, 1958 from prosecutor Erwin Schüle, who at that point was awaiting the verdict in 
the Ulm trial.
1
 Since the start of his involvement in the case in 1956, Schüle had been 
gathering data on unprosecuted Nazi crimes uncovered along the way. Much of this 
information came from interrogations and archival discoveries, but since the trial began in 
April 1958, he also received letters from various civilians in West Germany who were eager 
to share with him their knowledge of other Nazi crimes. After making his closing statements, 
Schüle compiled this data into the two reports that he sent to Nellmann. These revealed the 
breadth of the Nazi criminal enterprise, exposing swaths of hitherto unprosecuted Holocaust 
crimes that stretched from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. Once he read over Schüle’s work, 
Nellmann urged the state to take immediate action on these cases, particularly since the 
statute of limitations for the most serious crimes would end in less than twenty months. To 
expedite these cases, Schüle and Nellmann proposed the creation of a centralized prosecution 
agency to launch investigations into unprosecuted Nazi crimes.
2
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Just over a month later, the state justice ministers from the West German states 
agreed to create the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärungen 
nationalsozialistischer Gewaltverbrechen (Central Office of the State Justice Ministries for 
the Investigation of Nazi Crimes), the first systematic attempt among the West German states 
to coordinate investigations into Nazi crimes. Justice Minister Wolfgang Haussmann 
volunteered his state of Baden-Württemberg to host the agency and offered to devote 
resources from his own judiciary to staff it from the start. Beginning on December 1, 1958, 
this agency began its operations, and Schüle became its first president. Over the coming 
decades, the Zentrale Stelle launched thousands of investigations into Nazi criminals. 
One of the most important legacies of the Ulm trial was its impact on the creation of 
the Zentrale Stelle. To understand the relationship between these events, it is necessary to 
consider the reactions of both the public and the government to the trial. While gauging 
public response is always a difficult process, this chapter demonstrates that the trial had a 
broad but shallow impact on most West Germans.
3
 Because of the trial’s size and scope, 
most had the opportunity to learn of the trial through media coverage, yet the trial itself did 
little to change public opinion on the larger issue of Nazi crimes prosecutions. Instead, most 
preferred to interpret the trial according to their own preexisting attitudes towards Nazi 
crimes, the Holocaust, and ongoing prosecutions. Some were hostile to the proceedings, 
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many supported it, and many others expressed ambivalence. Overall, the trial provoked a 
surprisingly muted response from West German citizens. 
Yet this muted response was itself an important development in the process of 
coming to terms with the past. It revealed that the passions of the initial postwar year 
regarding Nazi crimes cases had been tempered by the late 1950s. This moment of relative 
calm offered an opportunity to shift the tone and tenor of the debate. A vocal minority of 
West Germans used the Ulm trial to initiate a wider discussion about unprosecuted Nazi 
crimes.
4
 With a looming expiration of the statute of limitations on all but the most serious 
Nazi crimes in 1960, their concerns found urgency among concerned members of the 
judiciary. As a result, the relatively muted response of the public created an opening for those 
in favor of a renewed campaign of Nazi crimes investigations. The absence of a sustained 
response from the public bred a situation in which government action was dictated not by 
overwhelming public opinion but rather by which voices were shouting the loudest.  
In the wake of the trial, certain individuals – Schüle and Nellmann foremost among 
them – used this moment of opportunity to claim interpretive authority over the Nazi crimes 
question in postwar society. They pointed to the statute of limitations problem and to the 
swaths of unprosecuted Nazi crimes to make their case for a critical reappraisal of the 
situation through the creation of a centralized investigative agency. They directed these 
challenges at the justice ministers of the states of West Germany, whom they urged to make a 
priority of Nazi crimes cases while there was still time. The calls for the Zentrale Stelle, for a 
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critical judicial response to Nazi crimes, began first in the halls of regional judiciaries before 
spilling over onto the pages of newspapers or influencing federal policy. Thus, it was at the 
state level, and not at a federal level or in West German society, that the case in Ulm 
generated any sustained or serious interest.  
Under state officials, the Ulm case drove discussion over the need for a new approach 
to Nazi crimes and became a blueprint for how to carry out subsequent investigations. While 
other states were also calling for a more coordinated response to Nazi crimes investigations, 
it was Baden-Württemberg that determined the form and function of the Zentrale Stelle. 
Many potential alternatives to the Zentrale Stelle came under consideration of the states. To 
understand why this option was chosen, why Baden-Württemberg led the effort to create the 
agency, and why Schüle and the lead Ulm investigators became its core staff, the impact of 
the Ulm trial is essential. Regional variables, specifically the Ulm trial and the personnel 
involved, fundamentally affected the terms of the debate over how to address the Nazi crimes 
issue. The discussions among the various state ministries reveal a clear structural relationship 
between the Ulm trial and the Zentrale Stelle. The experiences of the trial and the strategies 
for its investigation determined the form and function of the Zentrale Stelle. In short, the 
Zentrale Stelle became an enlarged replica of the Ulm investigation. 
 
The Public Response 
 In the years after 1945, public interest in Nazi crimes trials steadily decreased. 
Waning interest mirrored the declining number of trials, but it also reflected a mounting 
opposition to the trials that did occur. According to extensive public opinion polling 
undertaken by American authorities from 1945-1955, initial enthusiasm for prosecuting the 
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high level officials during the Nuremberg proceedings gave way over the coming years to a 
belief that these ongoing trials were not advancing the causes of justice and the best interests 
of the West German state. By 1950, only 10 percent of those surveyed showed support for 
confronting the war crimes issue in West Germany, and over half called for the release of 
those already convicted.
5
 As the authors of the study concluded, “By the mid-1950s West 
Germans had, for the most part, rejected the formal trappings of Nazism…The data also 
underscore a second and equally important point: West Germany wanted the books closed on 
the Nazi era.”6 The rejection of ongoing prosecutions therefore reflected less any residual 
Nazi sympathies among the public and more a belief that that chapter of Germany’s past 
needed to be set aside in order to move forward. 
 How was the Ulm trial received in this cultural climate? As described earlier, 
aversion to ongoing prosecutions had created postwar conditions favorable to the perpetrators 
of the Ulm trial and a legal culture reluctant to devote resources to sustained investigations. 
Yet the very existence of the Ulm trial and the ultimate inability of the perpetrators to avoid 
prosecution suggests that cracks in postwar attitudes of apathy and victimization had begun 
to appear. To understand the extent to which West Germans were beginning to reappraise 
their attitudes towards the Nazi past, it is necessary to consider the response of the public to 
the trial. The lessons drawn from this case reveal a society divided on the issue of using the 
courts to address the process of dealing with Nazi era crimes. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Ulm trial’s verdict, the local Ulm newspaper, the 
Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung, published an informal poll with comments that revealed a wide 
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range of conflicting attitudes towards the trial and its outcome. Several disagreed with having 
a trial at all. A businessman who identified himself as a late returnee from the Soviet camps 
stated, “Thirteen years after the war, it seems impossible to me to precisely measure the 
magnitude of guilt. So in my view these trials are highly problematic, if not dubious.” One 
housewife stated, “This trial was neither necessary nor important. I can only regret that we 
Germans expose ourselves before the world to dirty our own nest.” The majority, however, 
supported the continued prosecution of Nazi criminals. Some looked at the trial as an 
obligation of the West German state to deal with the Nazi past. A wife of one of the jurors 
said, “We were all complicit in the events of those years and should do everything to atone 
for the past and to get rid of all hate and bitterness.” Others, like one elected official, viewed 
the case as a simple question of justice: “What’s ten or fifteen years in the life of a person? If 
people say that too much time has passed since the crimes, they’re utterly wrong.”7 
 The sharpest disagreements among those interviewed stemmed from the verdict. 
Many found the verdict “too mild.” One businesswoman commented, “Such devils should be 
shut out of human society.” Similarly, several Holocaust survivors criticized the outcome. 
One group intended “to gather signatures and protest against this much too generous verdict.” 
Another Auschwitz survivor demanded death sentences, stating, “There were good and bad 
Germans, and even among the concentration camp guards and SA officers there were 
upstanding individuals who secretly gave us food to eat and allowed us to move about. So 
there’s no excuse for these defendants to have behaved as they did.” But other West Germans 
felt that the trial had gone too far. A sixty-six year old widow worried, “After so many years 
it’s difficult to reconstruct the situation back then…I am of the belief that the people were 
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compelled to follow orders which came from the top. To refuse to do so was gambling with 
your life.”8 As a result, the mild sentencing seemed to satisfy few on either side.  
 A more significant set of documents are the letters from 110 civilians who followed 
the trial through the news and felt compelled to write letters to the state.
9
 These letters first 
began to arrive during the summer of 1957, when Schüle and Nellmann held a press 
conference to announce the case. Between the investigation and the start of the trial, only 
nine such letters had been received. During the first three months of the trial, through the end 
of July, the prosecutors received an additional thirty-nine letters. In the month of August, 
during the period between the closing statements and the reading of the verdict, thirty-five 
letters arrived. Following the reading of the verdict, the remaining thirty-six came through 
the mail. The closing statements and the verdict prompted the greatest number of reactions – 
either in favor of or against.  
 The geographic range of the letters reveals that the Ulm trial resonated throughout 
West Germany. Writers from each West German state with the exception of the miniscule 
Saarland wrote in to discuss the Ulm trial. Of the eighty-seven authors writing from West 
Germany, the largest group, thirty-three, came from Baden-Württemberg, the state that held 
the trial. Substantial numbers also arrived from West Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, and 
Bavaria. An additional thirteen letters came from abroad, with nearly half sent from Israel 
and the United States. No letters from any Eastern bloc member arrived. The range indicates 
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that people throughout West Germany could and did follow the Ulm proceedings, even if its 
coverage was uneven. Nevertheless, the case retained regional appeal in southwest Germany 
and did not achieve anything resembling uniform impact throughout the country. The interest 
of individuals in the United States and Israel, most of whom were Jewish, showed that 
among non-Germans, it was mostly Holocaust survivors and the families of victims who 
expressed the most interest in the West German trial. 
 An important factor to consider in looking at these letters is the number of letters 
themselves. On one hand, 110 unsolicited reactions might suggest that the trial had a deep 
impact on the West German public. For such a number of individuals to be so affected by the 
trial as to put pen to paper and send off their thoughts to the government indicates that many 
times more might have shared such reactions and many times that at least knew of the trial. 
On the other hand, another Nazi crimes trial occurring at the same time as the Ulm trial 
provoked a far wider response. The much shorter trial of Martin Sommer in Bayreuth left that 
prosecutor’s office deluged in thousands of letters.10 Although a trial of only one man, the 
Bayreuth case focused on a stereotypically sinister Nazi. Martin Sommer, “the Hangman of 
Buchenwald,” was accused of horrific crimes, including many counts of murder. The trial 
enjoyed front-page headlines, while the Ulm trial found lesser coverage within national 
papers. The disparity between the quantities of letters each prosecutor received can thereby 
partially be explained through the relative prominence of each trial’s coverage in the media.  
The disjuncture also suggests, though, that something about the Sommer trial hit 
home with the public in a way that the Einsatzkommando Tilsit trial did not. This likely 
underscores a fundamental distinction between many postwar Nazi crimes trials and the one 
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in Ulm. The case against Martin Sommer lacked any moral ambiguity. He was clearly a 
sadist whose victims were innocent prisoners, and the most sensational charges against him 
involved the torture and murder of German priests. His trial therefore conformed perfectly to 
West German attitudes regarding Nazi crimes and criminals. Because Germans had been 
among his victims, Sommer could easily be seen as an enemy of the West German state. The 
public could write letters condemning Sommer because the process allowed them to absolve 
themselves. The same did not hold for the Ulm trial, where ordinary Germans, many just 
police officers, were being tried as genocidal killers. As Schüle argued, a West German could 
not seriously evaluate the trial in Ulm without also confronting his or her own past.  
As a result of difficult questions raised through the Einsatzkommando Tilsit trial, the 
letters sent in to the prosecutor’s office revealed a complex set of attitudes towards the 
proceedings and its wider implications. Schüle summarized these documents in his closing 
statement as saying, “Make quick work of these criminals!”11 But the actual letters defy such 
a simple thesis. Four general categories of response emerge through these letters: support, 
moderate opposition, extreme opposition, and no stated opinion. Some letters combined 
elements from categories, for example a mixture of criticism of the trial with qualified 
support for the verdict. Nearly 50 percent of all letters supported the trial outright, slightly 
over 35 percent opposed, and 15 percent had no stated opinion.  
Perhaps the least thoughtful responses came from those extremely opposed to the 
trial. Their letters erupted in pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic epithets that often bore the hallmarks of 
deeply disturbed individuals eager to rail against any postwar authority. One individual sent a 
series of unsettling collages. In one, he posted an assortment of news clippings and headlines, 
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defacing the images of Eisenhower and Khrushchev as he invoked an incoherent stream of 
Cold War invective in opposition to the trial.
12
 Another wrote letters so violent and 
threatening in their language that Schüle asked investigators to look into their author.
13
 After 
a month, Heidelberg officials confirmed that their author had been a senile resident known 
for his anti-government positions. Recently, he had protested the local post office by defiling 
its outgoing box.
14
 
Not all those who staunchly opposed the trial showed evidence of an unstable mind. 
Many wrote in anonymously to condemn the court. One blamed the court for the “murder” of 
Arthur Gennat, who committed suicide in jail after his arrest for perjury in the Ulm trial, and 
Martin Sommer. He wrote, “Someday history will see Sommer and Gennath [sic] as pioneers 
in the fight against all non-Germans, and you – you men of Adenauer’s justice – will be the 
defendants of tomorrow!” He concluded, “Germany awake! We’re taking revenge!”15 Others 
shared this admiration for the defendants, whom they saw as champions of Germany during 
its greatest hours. One wrote directly to the defendant Hersmann himself, stating, “Despite 
everything, I am still proud today to have belonged to an organization that had men like you 
as its leaders.”16 Among these radical responses were therefore a significant number of 
Germans who had likely been Nazis in the past and carried their sympathies still now. For 
them, the trial was pure inversion, an attempt to demonize heroes and lionize cowards. 
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More interesting were those that opposed the trial less stridently, often by interpreting 
the trial through well-worn dispositions towards Nazi crimes held in postwar Germany. 
Several responded to Schüle’s claims in his closing statement that all Germans have a “bad 
conscience” regarding the Third Reich. One wrote, “Why should we Germans alone have a 
bad conscience? Other peoples have done no less terrible things during and after the war.”17 
Another echoed this sentiment, calling it a “puzzle” that Germans would prosecute other 
Germans while no one was doing anything about Soviet crimes.
18
 Many affected this knee-
jerk victimization attitude towards the trial. Several letters invoked the carpet bombings of 
German cities and asked why those criminals were not being tried.
19
 For many of these 
authors, prosecutions were a zero sum game, in which either Germans could be tried for their 
crimes or the Allies for theirs. By continually focusing on Nazis, one worried, “our 
reputation abroad is severely damaged.”20  
Paralleling this belief that the Ulm trial ignored German victimization was a 
conviction among many that, although the crimes may have been horrific, the ten Ulm 
defendants should not be held accountable. One wrote, “The men of the Einsatzkommando 
received high sentences. The generals who carried out the all-consuming war of Corporal 
Hitler received high pensions.”21 Many worried that the “poor soldiers” tried at Ulm were 
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being unfairly singled out.
22
 Although the trial went to great lengths to show that these 
defendants were not mere “little men” in the Nazi state, many readers continued to argue that 
they had been forced to carry out the orders.
23
 This trial spoke to the belief that most 
perpetrators had no choice but to comply with orders. These responses conformed to the 
pervasive belief after 1945 that only Hitler and his elites were responsible. Rather than 
heeding the testimonies at the trial and the expert testimony that no one risked punishment 
for refusing to murder civilians, these writers rejected all evidence and clung rigidly to their 
narrow understanding of Nazi policies of mass murder. 
The largest set of responses expressed support for the trial and its outcome. Some 
authors shared Schüle’s assessment that the trial spoke to a broader indictment of all 
Germans. One wrote, “It’s correct that we all bear some guilt because we were too cowardly 
weak and too comfortable.”24 Another hoped the trial might serve as an antidote to the “great 
failure of the German ‘quickness to forget.’”25 Still another characterized the current political 
climate of amnesty as fostering a “wild west,” where those culpable for Nazi crimes had been 
left free to reintegrate.
26
 For some, the trial did prompt a critical assessment of the Nazi era 
and the shortcomings of West Germany’s approach to dealing with those crimes. Whether 
these individuals developed their opinions in response to the trial or simply had these 
preexisting views confirmed by the proceedings is unclear though. 
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Others who supported the trial focused instead on the case as it related to these 
particular defendants. These respondents fit the mold Schüle described during his closing 
statements of just wanting to make a quick trial and lock these perpetrators away. One wrote, 
“I warmly welcome these demonic events of the past finally being brought to the public. 
There are still many people in Germany who don’t believe that such things could happen!”27 
Indeed, many who supported the trial seemed unaware of the crimes in Eastern Europe and 
wrote to the prosecutors with questions about the unit and the defendants. These responses 
revealed an interest in the crimes and the trial, but did not connect the events to any wider 
culture of complicity during the Third Reich. Instead, they attempted to make the defendants 
fit into predetermined expectations of Nazi criminality, which emphasized the brutality, 
inhumanity, and sadism of the perpetrators. 
What led certain individuals either to support or to denounce the trial is difficult to 
determine. Certain factors such as age, education, job, and political affiliation may have 
played a role, but such information does not present itself through the letters. Of the variables 
that can be examined, such as when the letters’ date and point of origin, not enough variation 
emerges to suggest that they played a contributing role in individual’s responses.  
The one category that emerges through the letters as a significant factor in one’s 
response is gender. Many letters were anonymous or provided only a surname, but a set of 
sixty-nine letters revealed the gender of their author. Fifty-seven of these came from men; 
only twelve from women. Itself a reflection on the still patriarchal society of West Germany, 
in which politics – and by extension, law – were seen as the purview of males, the types of 
responses each group offered revealed an important difference in how they approached the 
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Nazi past. Of the fifty-seven letters from men, twenty-four (42 percent) supported the trial. 
Of the twelve from women, nine (75 percent) showed support. Despite the small sample size, 
this suggests that women almost two-to-one supported the trial over men. Such a distinction 
likely speaks to the experiences each group had with the Nazi state. Many men were 
presumably veterans of the war, and the trial directly related to experiences they may have 
encountered. With only men numbering among the defendants, they may have imagined 
themselves on the docket, thereby leading them to reject the trial. Women, on the other hand, 
were less encumbered by the crimes, or at least the public perception of the perpetrator 
skewed predominantly male. Women may have found it easier, as a result, to condemn the 
perpetrators and celebrate the trial.  
In addition to offering support for or opposition to the trial, many letters either 
provided or requested specific information about the events in question. Thirty-six of the 110 
letters raised specific questions about the crimes committed. This interest took two forms. 
First, there were many who wrote to offer information about certain crimes that might be of 
interest. One man currently living in a refugee camp informed Schüle that he was preparing a 
report on the Holocaust in Lithuania.
28
 Others sent addresses of people who might have 
knowledge of the crimes, provided reference to other Lithuanian massacres, or detailed 
anecdotes from the war in Lithuania. Many others simply had unrelated accounts of their 
experiences in the Third Reich or of former Nazi criminals still in West Germany. 
Second, significant numbers of people requested information. They wanted to know if 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit had been active in certain areas, if there was a list of victims’ 
names, or if other Tilsit members remained at large. A number of these letters came from 
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Jewish survivors actively seeking information on the fate of their loved ones. One woman 
wrote to Schüle, “Did the members of Einsatzgruppe Tilsit [sic], who supposedly shot 
several thousand Jews in the summer of 1941, also work in Libau, Latvia? I’m interested in 
having this question answered because my husband, the Jewish attorney and notary Dr. Ernst 
Wechselmann, was shot on the beach in Libau in the summer of 1941.”29 These letters spoke 
to a fundamental lack of knowledge confronting many West Germans in the late 1950s. 
The letters offering and requesting knowledge also demonstrate vividly that many 
lacked information about Nazi crimes and that they lacked resources for finding this 
information. The woman whose husband was killed in Libau had ostensibly spent seventeen 
years trying to understand and find out who had been responsible for his death. A chance trial 
in Ulm gave her a flicker of hope for getting answers to this question. For her, there was no 
central resource. Many others like her had information on crimes committed but had nowhere 
to turn with this information. Schüle, simply by virtue of being the only one investigating 
these crimes, became the default expert for many. Through this investigation, he gathered 
information on other unprosecuted crimes. Certain West Germans, although a minority, were 
eager to discuss and deal with Nazi crimes in a way that had hitherto not taken place. In 
Schüle, they hoped to have found a prosecutor willing to do so.  
The responses offered through the Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung poll and the letters to 
the prosecutor provide a complex snapshot of opinions regarding Nazi crimes prosecutions. 
Little evidence indicates that people reevaluated their beliefs about the Holocaust and the 
Nazi period solely as a result of the Ulm trial. Rather than adjust their views in light of that 
trial, the majority interpreted the trial according to their preconceptions of Nazi criminality. 
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Many who opposed the trial fell back on well-worn tropes of criminality that the perpetrators 
had been forced to carry out orders under duress. Yet, to arrive at such an interpretation 
required a very cursory understanding of the trial and these defendants. The majority of the 
evidence presented at the trial depicted these men as leaders of the Nazi state in the German-
Lithuanian borderlands, not as the low-level functionaries as many civilians suggested. While 
there were a number of those radically opposed to the trial, the majority with reservations 
expressed the view that the Nazi period was best left in the past. 
The high percentage of those supporting the trial, however, shows that some shift was 
underway in West German thinking on the Holocaust and Nazi crimes. If postwar notions of 
victimization had created an illusion of West German solidarity, by the mid-1950s many 
were coming to realize that this narrative had also been used to provide cover for 
perpetrators. The perpetrators exposed cracks in the legitimacy of this narrative, which 
created discursive space for an outcry against the policies of amnesty and reintegration. The 
responses to the Ulm trial indicated the presence of a critical voice in West German society 
open to and even encouraging an ongoing judicial response to Holocaust crimes. For 
Wechselmann, who lost her husband, this was a deeply personal mission, while others voiced 
their concerns in the language of justice and fairness. If other crimes had been committed, 
ought not those perpetrators to be tried as well?  
The Ulm trial itself likely did little to create and foster this public criticism, but it did 
point to a latent willingness in West German society to reopen the Nazi crimes question. The 
many letters that came in revealed that passions remained high at either end of the spectrum, 
but the relatively few letters in comparison to the Sommer trials reveals that what might be 
considered a silent majority of West Germans took a neutral position on the case. The muted 
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response to the case suggested that space existed in West German discourse that allowed for 
more direct challenges to the postwar status quo regarding Nazi prosecutions. The most 
important legacy of the Ulm trial – the creation of the Zentrale Stelle – came about when the 
leadership behind the trial occupied that space to call for a new response to the Nazi past.  
 
The Justice Ministry  
Available evidence suggests that the Fischer-Schweder investigation first required 
state-level involvement with the June 9, 1956 decision Nellmann made to expand the case to 
all members of Einsatzkommando Tilsit.
30
 Until that point, the investigation had been a 
parochial affair, not of concern to the Baden-Württemberg judiciary. Once the state attorney 
general and his senior prosecutor Schüle became involved, however, the case transformed 
into a more pronounced effort of the state. Certain exchanges between chief Ulm prosecutor 
Saup and Nellmann had found their way to the state judiciary earlier, but there is no 
indication that the state ministry took an active interest in the Fischer-Schweder case prior to 
Nellmann’s June intervention.31 His decision required action on the part of the Justice 
Ministry. Nellmann requested, for example, the Justice Ministry to authorize the “release” of 
Ulm prosecutor Mettler from his other duties so that he could focus on the Fischer-Schweder 
case exclusively.
32
 While the ministry authorized this request, it also sought information two 
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days later from chief Ulm prosecutor Saup to better understand Nellmann’s position.33 This 
all suggests that the spur to ministerial engagement stemmed from Nellmann, and not from 
interest from within the ministry.  
This tendency to respond to developments in the Ulm case rather than shape them 
developed into a pattern through the trial in 1958. The Baden-Württemberg Justice Ministry 
displayed little interest in taking the reins in determining the shape of the case, though it did 
provide support for Nellmann and Schüle when needed. Soon after Schüle joined the case, 
the investigators began to collect information concerning higher-level Nazi officials in order 
to understand better the chain of command and military structure in the wartime east. This 
historical approach to the case required familiarization with the relevant war crimes records. 
As a result, the investigators sought documentation from the trial of Martin Sandberger, 
former head of Sonderkommando 1a, which operated under the same regional command 
structure in the Baltic as the Tilsit unit. The Justice Ministry controlled access to some of this 
documentation, which Nellmann requested and received.
34
 Though this was one of the first 
acts of direct involvement in the Ulm case, the Justice Ministry would go on to serve other 
important functions. 
Perhaps most significantly, the senior ministry officials possessed the political clout 
that Nellmann and Schüle lacked; therefore it became an important instrument for the 
investigation. Eventually, the prosecutors exhausted the Sandberger documents and sought an 
audience with Sandberger himself, who until 1958 was held in the American-controlled 
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Landsberg prison. Such a meeting with Sandberger required diplomatic dealings with US 
officials, which the Justice Ministry was able to orchestrate.
35
 Other requests for federal 
assistance also had to go first through the state ministry. When Schüle sought the extradition 
of Gerke from Sweden, this process had to be initiated through the state officials, who then 
pressed the issue with the West German Foreign Office.
36
 The ministry also assisted in 
policing the media. Schüle aimed to keep as much information as possible on the targets of 
the investigation out of the public eye so that no potential suspects might catch wind of the 
case. The judiciary issued press releases and assisted in managing the public relations of this 
effort, which served further to deflect attention off Schüle so he could focus on the case at 
hand.
37
 In these ways, the Justice Ministry played an important role in carrying out the 
wishes of the prosecutors in instances where their interests outstripped their capabilities. 
Finally, in addition to requesting the aid of the Justice Ministry, the prosecutors 
regularly kept the ministry officials abreast of the developments in the case, often at the 
request of the ministry itself.
38
 Each time the case expanded with an additional arrest, 
Nellmann updated the department with a briefing.
39
 Notable developments, such as when the 
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Ilges case split off into a separate prosecution in Cologne and when Mettler left the case, 
similarly resulted in reports to the judiciary.
40
 Sensitive issues encountered during the 
investigation were also brought to their attention. For example, Nellmann informed officials 
that “multiple active police officers were involved in the shootings” and asked them to notify 
the Interior Ministry of these difficulties.
41
 These and other scandals, such as the Gennat 
suicide and the SS doctor overseeing Böhme, were referred to the department.
42
 In all, this 
demonstrates that the Baden-Württemberg Justice Ministry remained well informed of the 
proceedings of the case, though in no way can it be said that the office dictated the terms and 
shape of the investigation. Nellmann and Schüle pursued the case as they deemed necessary, 
only bringing in the state officials to make a request or inform them of a major development.  
Since 1953, Wolfgang Haussmann, a classically liberal representative with a long and 
distinguished political lineage, had been the head of the Justice Ministry in Baden-
Württemberg. Few could rival the political acumen of Haussmann, who came from a political 
dynasty in southwest Germany. His grandfather, Julius Haussmann, had been a revolutionary 
in the agitations of 1848 and was ultimately imprisoned for his efforts to democratize the 
German states. Wolfgang’s father, Conrad, was among the founders of the Deutsche 
Demokratische Partei, the leading German liberal party in the Weimar Republic. Although 
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forced to disband in 1933, the party reformed in 1946 as the Deutsche Volkspartei with 
Wolfgang Haussmann and future West German president Theodor Heuss among its founders. 
In 1948, the party became the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP). From 1946 to 1952, 
Haussmann was the Württemberg-Baden state chairman (Landesvorsitzender) and from 
1952-1964 the state chairman of the party in Baden-Württemberg.  
During the 1950s, Haussmann’s actions closely aligned with the FDP’s “opening to 
the right,” which sought to gain political strength by appealing to the fragmented right in 
West Germany.
43
 In particular, this entailed outreach to some questionable elements of 
society. One of the most assured strategies for garnering ex-Nazi support was to rally around 
the cause of the Landsberg prisoners. Under control of the Americans, Landsberg prison in 
the early 1950s still held a significant number of convicted war criminals, and securing their 
release became the darling cause of many on the German right. During the early 1950s, 
Haussmann had been among the most ardent supporters of these amnesty efforts. Most 
prisoners were released by the mid-1950s, but Martin Sandberger had not been. So at the 
same time Ulm prosecutors were seeking documentation and access to Martin Sandberger, 
Haussmann was actively lobbying for his release from prison.
44
  
These experiences and attitudes within the judiciary informed and in many ways 
explained its initial apathy to the reports on unprosecuted crimes that Schüle turned in during 
the close of Ulm trial. During the previous years, the ministry and Haussmann had 
demonstrated little active interest in the Nazi crimes issue, instead acting only in response to 
targeted requests from prosecutors. Haussmann decided to hold off on discussion of these 
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issues until the upcoming meeting at Bad Harzburg for the Justice Ministers and Senators 
Conference, an annual meeting for the ministers to discuss the most pressing matters of the 
year. The Justice Ministry saw little need for proactive engagement on the issue because the 
prosecutor’s concerns would be addressed in due time. Moreover, the Nazi crimes issue did 
not need a prominent advocate, as the Bavarian Justice Ministry had recently decided to 
champion the cause. 
 
The Bavarian Summer 
 The first state-level suggestion for a centralized effort in West Germany to deal with 
Nazi crimes prosecutions percolated up through the Bavarian judiciary in late July 1958. A 
few weeks before Schüle and Nellmann made their proposal to the Baden-Württemberg 
Ministry of Justice for a centralized coordinating agency for Nazi crimes, a set of similar 
concerns were appearing in the Bavarian Ministry of Justice. The judiciary there circulated a 
request to the federal and state justice ministries that the Nazi crimes question be addressed 
at the Bad Harzburg conference.
45
 The timing of this letter came on the heels of a busy few 
months in Bavaria regarding Nazi crimes. Martin Sommer, the “Hangman of Buchenwald,” 
received a life sentence in a Bayreuth court in July 1958 for horrific and sadistic murders.
46
 
Although the trial resulted in a lifetime sentence for Sommer, the case had taken eight years 
to bring to trial due to various fits and starts within the Bavarian judiciary. The press labeled 
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the whole ordeal a “tragicomedy of justice.”47 This embarrassment for the state was only 
compounded by a more substantial scandal that developed out of the Bayreuth proceedings. 
 During the Sommer trial, allegations surfaced that a former camp doctor remained at 
large in Bavaria. The Frankfurter Rundschau quoted one witness, “The former camp doctor 
Eisele killed more people in a week than Sommer had in his entire life.”48 Dr. Hans Eisele, it 
turned out, had been living in Munich under his own name since 1945 and currently ran a 
private dentist practice there. While the prosecutors prepared criminal charges, Eisele 
received advanced warning of his impending arrest, likely from someone within the police. 
As they went to arrest the dentist, the police found an empty home. The next day, Eisele 
surfaced across the Mediterranean in the non-extraditing country of Egypt.
49
 A dual scandal – 
first that a brutal doctor could openly resume his career as a dentist after the war and second 
that he could escape to Egypt with impunity – quickly consumed the Bavarian judiciary. The 
incident became front page news across West Germany, with the Bavarian judiciary and the 
federal foreign office receiving the brunt of the public criticisms.
50
 The very emergence of 
this scandal though revealed the shifting sensibilities of the public towards perceived 
miscarriages of justice in Nazi crimes prosecutions. In contrast, a similar case in 1952, when 
Franz Rademacher, head of the Jewish desk in the Foreign Office, skipped bail after 
appealing this verdict in his trial in Nuremberg-Fürth and fled to Syria, failed to prompt any 
comparable public or media outcry against the Bavarian judiciary.
51
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The Eisele affair and the attendant media condemnation of the judiciary led officials 
to seek explanations for how he had avoided detection for so long, how information had 
leaked, and who had enabled his escape. The Justice Minister of Bavaria concluded that the 
Eisele affair had not been a one-time lapse or a stain on Bavaria’s record of Nazi crimes 
investigations, but rather a broader indictment of West Germany’s attempts to deal with such 
crimes. In a letter sent on July 22, 1958 to the other state and federal justice ministers, 
Deputy Director Leopold argued, “The case of the concentration camp doctor Hans Eisele 
has shown that, despite the extensive efforts carried out by German law enforcement 
agencies to expose and investigate Nazi crimes, not all persons who have been implicated in 
serious crimes have been brought to justice.”52 He then cited a recent report that many crimes 
from Dachau concentration camp remained uninvestigated. The problem, as Leopold saw it, 
stemmed from insufficient access to war era documents captured by the Allies and now being 
stored, sorted, and microfilmed outside Germany. To some extent, unavailable sources may 
have served as a useful scapegoat for Bavaria’s problems, but it did point to a real and 
significant problem: without access to the materials documenting the crimes, it was 
impossible for German prosecutors to sustain a proactive campaign of investigations. 
To solve this problem, Leopold suggested a coordinated effort among the states that 
would pool their financial resources for the purpose of gathering together war crimes 
documentation. He suggested that the “most important source of these” were those gathered 
by the Allies after the war, and that the Federal Ministry of Justice had “already undertaken 
the necessary steps…for giving access to this material to German prosecuting authorities.” 
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Due to the extensive collection of these documents, though, Leopold wrote that the states 
needed to work together “under a unified plan” to detail and review these records “without 
overburdening a single state.” A “division of labor” would mutually benefit all the states. By 
providing collective resources to investigate these records and make copies of materials as 
needed, the states would be able to address systematically the crimes of the Nazi era. 
Although Leopold’s plan contained few details about the organization of this document 
review, he made clear that the prosecution of individuals would “of course remain the 
responsibility alone of the prosecutor’s office where the crime occurred or its perpetrator 
lived.”53 Leopold concluded his letter by asking the other justice ministers to pledge their 
support for this financial and labor cooperation. 
  Over the next several weeks, various ministers in the German states responded with 
varied approval for the proposal. Some, such as Wolfgang Haussmann in Baden-
Württemberg, appreciated the call for renewed inquiry into Nazi-era crimes, but suggested 
that to succeed this effort would require more than a combing of Allied archives.
54
 Justice 
Minister Kielinger of Berlin expressed interest in the proposal, but would “reserve his final 
judgment” until the states had worked out funding details.55 Most states went the route of the 
Hamburg minister, Dr. Biermann-Ratjen, who wrote that he “agreed in principle with the 
proposal.”56 While no one outright dismissed the idea, few offered a full endorsement.  
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As a result, in early August, Federal Minister of Justice Fritz Schäffer suggested “to 
add the question at hand to the schedule of the 27
th
 Conference of the Justice Ministers.”57 
Leopold agreed with the idea and confirmed Bavaria’s willingness to take the lead on the 
issue at Bad Harzburg. Yet significant questions about the strength and nature of this 
proposed coordination remained unaddressed. What financial and personnel commitments 
were expected from each state? Would the unit assembled for this task serve as a temporary 
working group or something more formalized and permanent? How would the relationship 
between this coordinating unit’s preliminary investigations and the states’ subsequent 
criminal cases be defined? Moreover, how would the issue of jurisdiction be resolved? 
 
Lessons from Ulm  
While the justice ministers began to plan for a discussion of the Nazi crimes issue, 
Erwin Schüle and Erich Nellmann were growing frustrated. Through the experiences of the 
Ulm trial, these two men came to identify a number of problems hindering Nazi crimes 
investigations, and they each wrote a series of reports from late July through mid-August 
1958 that they sent to the Baden-Württemberg Justice Ministry detailing their experiences. 
Schüle and Nellmann approached the reports from differing perspectives, but each came to 
the same conclusion: the West German judiciary needed a centralized prosecution agency to 
deal with Nazi crimes. 
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Although their complaints were legion, they fell broadly into two categories: 
jurisdictional concerns and structural problems inhibiting successful investigations. For 
Schüle, the jurisdictional problems assumed paramount significance. In the course of 
investigating the Einsatzkommando Tilsit crimes, the prosecutor had uncovered extensive 
evidence of additional such crimes. Schüle’s database contained many individuals who had 
never been brought to trial. With all the media attention lavished on the trial, the prosecutors 
received numerous letters from individuals asking for information on Holocaust crimes in 
one region or making allegations of criminality against other individuals. Because there was 
no central organization in West Germany for making such requests or appeals, many saw 
Schüle and the others involved in the Ulm trial as West Germany’s de facto legal experts on 
the Holocaust. By the end of the trial, Schüle had received information on additional 
shootings in Lithuania and stretching up the Baltic coast. Additional allegations were made 
about shootings to the south under Einsatzgruppe B, as well as camp crimes.
58
 Few of these 
had any connection to the state of Baden-Württemberg; either the crime occurred or the 
criminal lived outside the state’s jurisdiction. As Schüle explored the options for dealing with 
these unprosecuted crimes, he found few viable options.  
Schüle attempted first to refer Nazi crimes allegations to the prosecutors with 
jurisdiction over the cases, but problems quickly emerged. Because most of these crimes 
occurred outside Germany, jurisdiction became a source of contention. Schüle and Nellmann 
had previously encountered jurisdictional debates regarding the Ilges case in Cologne, but 
this subsequent round dwarfed their earlier frustrations. Typically in cases with foreign crime 
locations, jurisdiction derived from the place of residence of the criminal, but the multiple 
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perpetrators involved in these crimes complicated this issue. In the Ulm trial, as Nellmann 
stated, “Of the ten accused, only for one of them did Ulm have regional jurisdiction. The 
other nine defendants lived scattered across all of West Germany.”59 As the Ulm trial 
demonstrated, a more legally and economically effective means of prosecuting Nazi 
criminals was to prosecute the entire crime complex – one trial of ten men instead of ten 
trials of one. Other courts did not express such interest. The approach of the crime complex 
did not appeal to a German judiciary still committed to pursuing the minimum. As a result, 
Schüle was forced to refer different perpetrators to various courts even though they 
concerned the same crimes.
60
  
The sheer complications of sorting out these Nazi crimes cases were well expressed 
through the experiences of an investigation in Bielefeld. Beginning in March 1958, the 
Nordrhein-Westfalen court began an investigation of two individuals used as witnesses in the 
Ulm case – Sudau and Schmidtke.61 Both had taken part in other atrocities in Lithuania, and 
Schüle felt that Gerke and Krumbach, who had seriously implicated themselves in the same 
crimes through their testimony at Ulm, ought to be added to the Bielefeld case to avoid 
holding two separate trials. The Bielefeld prosecutors, however, had no intention of 
expanding their case unless required to do so. A further complicating factor was that Gerke 
had been extradited from Sweden, so determining the jurisdiction for his case proved a game 
of hot potato for the German courts.
62
 This impasse eventually involved Haussmann who 
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wrote his counterpart in Nordrhein-Westfalen to see if he could help sort out the issue.
63
 No 
gentlemen’s agreement could break the obstinacy of the Bielefeld court, though, and a full 
year later in September 1959, the German Supreme Court had to weigh in on the issue, 
ultimately siding with Bielefeld against a combined trial.
64
 The two would later be tried in 
Ulm to the chagrin of Saup.
65
 Regardless of the outcome, both sides recognized that delaying 
prosecutions for over a year solely as a result of jurisdictional debates did not enhance the 
image of the judicial system in West Germany. 
Schüle shared these concerns with Nellmann in the two reports dated August 19, 
1958. In the first, he listed seventeen individuals, including Gerke and Krumbach, who had 
taken some leadership role in the Einsatzkommando Tilsit murders and who had yet to be 
tried for these crimes.
66
 He wrote, “It is unclear who should carry out the investigations into 
these accused.” He went on to describe that logically many of these should be tried in a 
single case, but noted the difficulties he had in convincing other prosecutors to take on this 
view. Even though “the greater part of the newly accused and witnesses live in northern – 
more precisely northwestern – Germany,” these areas had expressed little interest in the 
cases, and the Ulm court had no interest in a second major trial. In the second letter, Schüle 
went beyond the Tilsit murders to list “additional executions of Jews and communists by 
members of Einsatzgruppen.”67 Even though he and his team had only looked into one unit 
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operating along a small stretch of the German-Lithuanian border, he had uncovered evidence 
of at least eighteen sets of crimes involving several hundred thousand victims. Some of these 
crime descriptions were quite specific, such as shootings at a fort near Kaunas, while others 
were remarkably vague, such as allegations of 100,000 shot in the Baltic area. Not all 
concerned mass shootings, as Schüle also uncovered evidence of camp crimes in Poland.  
Nellmann was well aware of the jurisdictional challenges confronting Nazi crimes 
investigations, and he had presented similar complaints a few weeks earlier, on July 22, to 
the Justice Ministry. He lambasted the strategy of splitting these crime complexes up into 
discrete cases of one or two perpetrators, arguing that approaching cases in this way 
significantly undermined the effectiveness of the courts. “A great number of prosecutor’s 
offices,” he stated, “investigate the same crime complexes without knowledge of each 
other.”68 As a result, the offices could not benefit from each other’s insights and they might 
significantly impede each other’s progress. Nellmann also argued that smaller cases were 
inefficient. Although a single trial such as that in Ulm was indeed expensive, the attorney 
general stated that in these crime complex cases the costs of transporting witnesses, often 
from overseas, “are incurred only once.” The alternatives would be enormous fiscal waste for 
bringing witnesses to deliver the same testimony to a number of different courts, or these 
witnesses would not be called at all for financial reasons, and the case would lose important 
sources of evidence. 
On top of jurisdictional problems, Schüle and Nellmann encountered a second set of 
challenges involving structural impediments to Nazi crimes investigations. They believed 
that the success of the Ulm trial went beyond the decision to try all ten individuals; it 
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revealed the strengths of the Ulm investigations and the deliberateness of its prosecutorial 
efforts. Nellmann stated in his July letter to the Justice Ministry with a dose of self-
confidence that for many state prosecutors “there’s also a partially unconscious timidity 
regarding the ‘big case,’ which entails a lot of time and effort, and demands knowledge, 
decisiveness, and organizational capacity, which not every prosecutor possesses.”69 Neither 
Nellmann nor Schüle possessed such timidity, and they succeeded because their investigative 
team was given the resources to develop an in depth approach to the Ulm trial. As a result, 
the Ulm investigators developed fluency in an investigative language few others spoke. 
Through several years of work, they had familiarized themselves with the major 
documentation centers on Nazi crimes in Germany, developed a network of organizations 
and experts interested in prosecuting Nazi crimes, and mastered the legal arguments 
necessary to secure convictions. Such efforts, Schüle and Nellmann knew, proved an 
aberration in the West German legal system. 
In some cases, the inability of other state offices to carry out successful investigations 
revealed a dark problem within the judicial system of West Germany: the presence of many 
former Nazis in the police force hindered investigations. The Ulm investigation revealed how 
Nazis at various levels of the German legal system obstructed the investigation. Nellmann 
mentioned this serious – and quite potentially scandalous – trend within Nazi crimes cases in 
his July report: “When it comes to the police, at times former comrades of those who need to 
be investigated are in the police service. Other times, the accused are today reemployed in 
the police.”70 These occurrences significantly impaired the state’s ability to prosecute crimes 
                                                 
69
 Nellmann to Justizministerium Baden-Württemberg (22 July 1958), EA 4/106, Bü 2, HS. 
 
70
 Nellmann to Justizministerium Baden-Württemberg (22 July 1958), EA 4/106, Bü 2, HS. 
 
339 
effectively. Schüle drew the conclusion that “as a rule, the cooperation of the police has to be 
turned down since experience has shown that many former Gestapo officers are again 
employed in the police service.”71 Any attempt to deal with the Nazi crimes issue would need 
to address the imbalance of prosecutions by state and the unreliability of local police forces. 
In other cases, though, the obstacles to successful investigations stemmed simply 
from inability and lack of experience. “Not every prosecutor,” Nellmann assured the Justice 
Ministry, operates “from bad intentions.” Instead, as Schüle stated in his August reports, “No 
adequate investigation results can be expected from local police offices with their lack of 
sufficient knowledge.”72 The kind of information and insight that Schüle and his staff had 
accumulated over the three year investigation proved atypical for the judiciary. “Not 
everywhere,” Nellmann reiterated, “knows of the [Berlin] Document Center or of the 
possibility to draw from the published records of the Trial of the Major War Criminals in the 
International Military Court and other sources, which need to be known and used to be able 
to investigate successfully.”73 This created a dilemma for Schüle and Nellmann. They had 
developed a staff with a singular set of talents for a particular type of investigation, but the 
federal structure of the German courts required that these types of cases be deferred to less 
experienced and often less willing prosecutors and investigators. 
A final structural challenge, the looming statute of limitations, concerned Schüle and 
Nellmann. In his second August report, Schüle wrote, “It should not be overlooked that the 
carrying out of investigations will need to be accelerated because the statute of limitations 
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threatens to expire.”74 The experience of the Ulm trial had demonstrated that strict West 
German legal definitions of murder elided most involved in Holocaust crimes, as a result “by 
the middle of 1960 prosecution will no longer be possible.”75 This meant the state had less 
than two years to launch investigations into a wide-ranging number of crimes, with 
undoubtedly more still undiscovered. “For this reason,” Schüle summarized, “the individual 
crime complexes need to be worked by different prosecutors, unless a central prosecutor’s 
office is created to pursue such crimes.”76  
To address all of these jurisdictional and structural shortfalls of the West German 
judiciary, both Nellmann and Schüle urged the justice ministers to create a central 
prosecutor’s office for Nazi crimes investigations. A central resource of trained staff, they 
believed, could slice through the Gordian knot of jurisdictional entanglements, sidestep the 
problems of untrained investigators or Nazi sympathizers in the police, and dodge the 
impending statute of limitations by quickly initiating cases. Nellmann proposed the idea of a 
“special prosecutor’s office” which would coordinate state prosecutions over the next two 
years.
77
 Schüle put forward a similar set of ideas: 
Regarding the specialized skill set required for carrying out investigations, I consider 
it necessary to create a central prosecutor’s office, with prosecutors from all the states 
as members. Specially selected investigators, who should preferably be chosen from 
all the states, could be assigned to this central investigative office so that officers 
from the appropriate jurisdiction are available.
78
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In content and form, their proposals suggested a far more consequential program of 
prosecution than what the judiciary in Bavaria had suggested. Leopold’s proposal described a 
central research agency that would spend a short period of time poring over documentation 
and cataloguing unprosecuted crimes. By contrast, Schüle suggested the creation of a full-
blown prosecutor’s office, which would not only uncover crimes, but investigate and 
prosecute them as well.  
 
Swallowing Camels, Straining at Gnats 
 Despite the combined voice of senior prosecutors within Baden-Württemberg, the 
Justice Ministry initially did little on the Nazi crimes issue. In response to Nellmann’s report 
from July 22, the Justice Ministry did issue a directive to the various prosecutors in Baden-
Württemburg, stating, “It is expected that the prosecutors…take thorough note of these 
sources of information [recent publications on Nazi crimes].”79 They had reduced the 
problems Nellmann raised to a simple matter of prosecutors familiarizing themselves with 
scholarship on Nazi crimes. Apart from being used to draft a reading list, Nellmann’s report 
had little impact and was interpreted as having regional, not national, significance. The 
response to the Schüle reports of August 19 was to wait. The ministry had decided that these 
criminal allegations “are not so important that immediate action is needed. This can be left 
alone until the discussions at the Justice Minister Conference at the beginning of October. 
The statute of limitations doesn’t threaten before March 1960.”80 Schüle and Nellmann’s 
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initial recommendation for a centralized agency did not even merit consideration. Although 
Nellmann and Schüle had offered significant insights into the problems confronting the West 
German judiciary, something more would be needed for these ideas to take hold.  
Nellmann decided to amplify their voices by appealing to the public. A week after the 
Justice Ministry tabled the Nazi crimes issue, Nellmann wrote an editorial for the Stuttgarter 
Zeitung titled “Central Investigative Office Must Bring Clarity to Nazi Crimes.”81 Nellmann 
sought to force the judiciary into action by making a direct appeal to West Germans’ senses 
of fairness, justice, and morality.  
Subtitled “Lessons from the Ulm Trial,” Nellmann’s article articulated the 
insufficient attempts to address Nazi crimes, the limitations in the judiciary, and the 
advantages a central agency could offer. He began his case with a broad appeal: 
The prosecution of crimes of the Third Reich, which brought millions of people 
suffering and death and plunged our country into disgrace and shame, crimes that no 
economic miracle and no boom in exports can cover up – the prosecution of these 
crimes proceeds without a system, unplanned, by chance. We should not allow 
murderers and their accomplices to go free, when we could catch them with a 
systematic and tactical course of action… 
 
To date prosecutions occur purely by chance. One person has the bad luck to be 
charged, the other not. Indeed there are thousands of unprosecuted crimes. So if 
everything really has been done to find the perpetrators, then we need to accept that. 
The worst and most extensive crimes have been prosecuted, but not all. Those 
convicted know that many other criminals roam free. For those convicted and those 
that go free, this inequality is an injustice.
82
 
 
Although he partly touched on the responsibility of Germans to deal with Nazi era crimes, 
the crux of the argument dealt with the concept of fairness. Prosecuting purely by chance 
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devalued the integrity of the judicial system. By using the language of justice and equality, 
this argument cleverly avoided the issue of whether or not war crimes prosecutions were a 
good thing. Some people had already been prosecuted, and so the burden fell on the judiciary 
to prosecute all who were responsible. The alternative of doing nothing was fair to neither 
those convicted nor those who remained free.  
 After making this broad moral appeal, Nellmann proceeded to lay out the practical 
concerns that confront the judiciary in trying these cases. He wrote that currently, if one 
office finds evidence of another criminal even if those crimes are the same as those being 
investigated in that office, this case is split off into two, rather than prosecute the two 
individuals for the same set of crimes. Conversely, “two prosecutor’s offices can investigate 
different criminals for the same crimes without being aware of the parallel efforts.” When 
jurisdictional concerns alone determine the prosecution of Nazi crimes, Nellmann warned, 
the cases run the risk of “fizzling out” (Verzettelung). As an alternative, perpetrators could be 
gathered together in one prosecution for a core set of crimes, as took place in Ulm, which 
“can result in a historical process that brings to light the murder of Jews in a given area, with 
more or less all those responsible present.”83 
 Nellmann’s editorial then detailed a plan for a central agency to address these 
imbalances within the German judiciary.  This proposal suggested that the “states of the 
Federal Republic delegate prosecutors and police officers to a central investigative office 
created for the prosecution of war crimes, the murder of Jews, and concentration camp 
crimes. Under the leadership of a senior prosecutor, who himself will most likely report to 
the federal attorney general, they will investigate these crimes.” Early on, the central office 
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will target “large crime complexes (such as specific concentration camps, Einsatzgruppen 
and Einsatzkommandos, etc.).” The office would then determine which state should 
prosecute these crimes, “either because that is where the crimes took place or where the 
majority of the accused live.” By placing personnel experienced in Nazi crimes cases, 
Nellmann expressed confidence that the agency would work. “These officers are familiar 
with the documents from the Nuremberg trials, they know the Jewish organizations (to which 
we have turned with requests for help), they know and have researched the considerable 
emerging scholarship, they will also work with the Landesämtern für Wiedergutmachung, 
which must be in possession of considerable materials.” After a few years of intensive work, 
the agency will “dissolve,” having fulfilled its mandate. He ended his article by reminding 
the audience of the scale and significance of the problem: “We should not strain at gnats and 
swallow camels.”84 
Nellmann’s editorial prompted immediate and varied responses throughout West 
Germany. He received letters of support from a number of readers.
85
 Within the week, the 
SPD in Bonn formally supported the outlined central office.
86
 A number of other editorials 
appeared in various West German papers offering degrees of support for Nellmann’s 
proposal, which turned the question into a national issue.
87
 Within Baden-Württemberg, the 
Stuttgarter Zeitung ran a number of other pieces expressing support for Nellmann and 
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criticism of efforts to that point. In a piece on September 11 titled “General Reckoning,” the 
columnist asked the justice ministers to take action and create a centralized solution to the 
Nazi crimes issue. With reference to the upcoming conference, he wrote, “No matter what 
happens, the 3rd of October 1958 will become an important date in postwar history.”88 
This public pronouncement also stirred a response from an agency to this point not 
involved in the regional affairs of the Ulm trial: the Federal Justice Ministry. At a national 
level, the case had made little initial impact. As mentioned earlier, the Baden-Württemberg 
Justice Ministry worked at times with the West German Foreign Office, for example to 
arrange the extradition of Gerke from Sweden or to negotiate access to Allied-controlled 
documents, but these issues did not involve the Federal Justice Ministry. That office seems 
only to have learned about the case when the trial formally began. In a letter from April 29, 
1958, it wrote to the Baden-Württemberg Justice Ministry, having heard “from press reports” 
about the case against “Gerhard [sic] Fischer-Schweder.”89  Rather than seek details on the 
origins of the case or the legal parameters involved, the federal office merely asked “for a 
report about the outcome of the proceedings and a copy of the verdict in due time.” Clearly, 
the ministry had no conception of the potential significance of the proceedings in Ulm and 
had no interest in taking any kind of active role therein, however that might be defined.  
With Nellmann’s editorial, though, some federal response on the significance of the 
trial and the future of Nazi crimes prosecutions was needed. Nellmann and others indicated a 
preference for federal involvement, arguing that high level action offered the best chance for 
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a substantive overhaul.
90
 Under CSU politician Fritz Schäffer, the Federal Ministry of Justice 
expressed ambivalence towards this idea.
91
 In a lengthy internal memo from September 18, 
Ministerialrat Gossrau wrote, “It is obvious that the initiative of Bavaria as well as the 
opinion of Baden-Württemberg regarding this issue have come in response to numerous 
recent press articles.”92 The Eisele affair, Sommer trial, and Ulm trial had fostered the public 
impression of random prosecutions, and now those states were scrambling to save face. He 
admitted that such a coordination would be “useful,” but noted that these discussions also 
“have a political side.” Any federal involvement would likely entail “parliamentary debate,” 
and for this reason, Gossrau suggested, “The initiative must lie with the states.” Legally, as 
well, he expressed concern about the possibility of a federal solution; if the states ceded 
control to the federal government, “this would require a change to the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Judiciary Constitutional Law [Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz].” The better 
solution, he suggested, would be to create an informal “working group” 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft) under the oversight of a state attorney general. “In no way,” Gossrau 
reiterated, should this be the work of the West German attorney general. 
Others in the Federal Ministry of Justice were less inclined to join Gossrau in the 
backseat. On September 22, another memo circulated within the department that criticized 
his recommendations. The author suggested that although Gossrau’s call for a working group 
would be “unobjectionable,” it would also be fairly ineffective. “The most extensive 
intensification and coordination of prosecutions could only be achieved through the 
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involvement of the Federal Attorney General.” Whether or not this could be “constitutionally 
justified” was admittedly a concern, but the position nevertheless remained clear that 
anything less than federal involvement could not be considered the maximum effort in Nazi 
crimes prosecutions.  
Baden-Württemberg Ministry Director Emil Müller received a mixed response from 
the federal ministry the day prior to the Bad Harzburg conference. His counterpart in the 
federal judiciary informed Müller that “the Federal Ministry of Justice has concerns about the 
organization of the central investigative office under the Attorney General. But it would be 
welcome if such a central investigative office were to be created in a state.”93 Provoked by 
Nellmann’s editorial, the ministry set a course that seemed to favor inaction. They would 
support the states’ efforts, but put forth little of their own.  
The Ministry of Justice in Baden-Württemberg exhibited a complicated reaction to 
Nellmann’s publication. To the public, the ministry projected confidence that it was doing all 
it could to address the Nazi crimes issue. Officials contacted the editor of the Stuttgarter 
Zeitung the following week to address the Nellmann piece and another article published 
alongside it, which had criticized the insufficient efforts of the German judicial system.
94
 The 
Justice Ministry responded in defense of its actions and aimed to clarify some points of 
jurisdiction.
95
 The following day, the Stuttgarter Zeitung ran another editorial with the 
additional information, but emphasized that the ministry had “no objections to the creation of 
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a central agency.”96 Behind the scenes, the article had inspired Minister of Justice 
Haussmann to take up the Nazi crimes issue. On September 12, he wrote to the other justice 
ministries, concerned that “the media and public” had been discussing for weeks the Eisele 
affair, the Ulm case, and now the Nellmann article.
97
 He stated that the ministers needed to 
make it clear to the public that “the states’ attorneys have pursued Nazi criminals in 
numerous investigations, the most extensive of which was the Ulm trial.” Following the dust-
up with the Stuttgarter Zeitung, Haussmann concluded that the judiciary had failed to make 
the full extent of its efforts known to the public, exposing them to unwarranted criticism.  
The second and more significant response to the Nellmann publication took place 
within the West German judicial channels and expressed itself through two Baden-
Württemberg reports circulated among the various states. In a nine-page report sent just two 
days after Nellmann’s piece and relying on extensive quotation from Schüle’s August letters, 
Haussmann expressed concern about the number of unprosecuted crimes uncovered through 
the Ulm trial. “The experiences of the prosecutor in the Fischer-Schweder case,” Haussmann 
wrote, “has renewed the urgent necessity of coordinating all investigations into Nazi crimes 
of violence.”98 Only a week earlier, the ministry had felt these issues could be safely tabled 
until October, but in the wake of Nellmann’s piece the same matter now demanded 
immediate attention.  
The following week, Haussmann circulated his endorsement for a central 
investigative agency and in the process expressed the first state-supported alternative to the 
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Bavarian proposal. Although he still believed that “a coordination and intensification of the 
pursuit of Nazi violent crimes” was needed among the states, Haussmann distanced himself 
from the Bavarian proposal. He wrote that Leopold’s plan for “joint analysis of Allied legal 
records…was itself insufficient for the desired intensification and coordination.” Instead, 
allowing for some disagreement regarding the details of Nellmann’s plan, Haussmann agreed 
with its broad strokes. He concluded with reference to the seventeen additional crime 
complexes Schüle had uncovered, noting that this issue needed fuller discussion at the 
upcoming conference. Consulting documentation made for a good start, but hardly an end 
point in the pursuit of Nazi criminals. Such a goal required a more extensive effort of 
cooperation. As a result of his involvement, Haussmann mainstreamed the ideas that Schüle 
and Nellmann had otherwise been floating in various circles.  
In the next few weeks, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Justice refined 
Nellmann’s plan and clarified its new position prior to the Bad Harzburg conference and 
soon gained an ally in Bavaria. Around the same time that the Nellmann article appeared, the 
Bavarian plans for unfettered access to Allied documents stalled. On August 22, in response 
to a federal request filed on behalf of the Bavarian ministry, the U.S. Embassy in Bonn 
wrote, “Under current rules and regulations, the documents and files from the war crimes 
cases are not made available for a general examination, and by no means will these files be 
released from the custody of the U.S. army. Access to the documents can only be made under 
the supervision of an army representative.”99 Although a document review remained a 
                                                 
99
 Quote from US Embassy, Statement (Bonn, 22 August 1958), EA 4/106, Bü 2, HS. The Bundesminister had 
previously contacted the German Foreign Office to request access to the materials on behalf of the Bavarians; 
see, Bundesminister der Justiz to Auswärtige Amt, Bonn (22 July 1958), EA 4/106, Bü 2, HS. 
 
350 
technical possibility, the Bavarians maintained that only control over the documents could 
provide a long-term solution.  
In pursuing other options, Bavarian Ministerialdirigent Rösch aimed to clarify the 
Baden-Württemberg position heading into the conference. Baden-Württemberg 
Ministerialdirektor Müller explained in a late September conversation that “no final 
decision” had been made regarding Nellmann’s plan, but that the “idea of a central 
investigative office had met with approval.”100 Rösch expressed concerns about “whether the 
specific states were capable of dedicating the substantial capital that this would require and 
especially whether they can hand over the number of prosecutors and personnel needed.” 
Although Rösch raised important questions about the nature of the agency, at no point did he 
indicate opposition to the basic idea, and this conversation informed his planning for the 
conference the next week. 
On the eve of the Bad Harzburg conference, the two southernmost West German 
states had committed themselves to lead an effort for the creation of a centralized solution to 
the Nazi crimes problem. Over the previous few months, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg 
had both encountered particular difficulties in their attempts to deal with prosecutions in their 
own states. The Eisele affair tarnished the image of the Bavarian judiciary and police 
departments. The Ulm trial had the opposite impact in Baden-Württemberg, which came 
across as the vanguard state of Nazi investigations. In the former case, an absence of 
information had led to one criminal’s escape; in the latter, an excess of incriminating 
information threatened to overburden the state’s prosecutors. In both instances, the states’ 
justice ministries arrived at the same conclusion: the piecemeal and random pursuit of Nazi 
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criminals hampered their overall abilities to prosecute. The lesson each derived from recent 
events was that only a cooperative and systematic approach to the issue could provide fair 
and responsible results. 
  
“Is Baden-Württemberg Ready to Take on This Agency?” 
The West German justice ministers and their support staff gathered in Bad Harzburg 
on the morning of October 1, 1958, to begin their four-day annual conference. Each year, a 
different state presided over the conference and determined its location. For the twenty-
seventh conference, that honor fell to the Lower Saxony Ministry of Justice, which selected 
Bad Harzburg because “there offers the possibility for conference participants to get to know 
the beauty of the Harz mountain range, but also the problems affecting the Lower Saxon 
region on the GDR border.”101 This town of 25,000 sat near the border with East Germany, 
and during the morning of the third day of the conference the ministers planned a “trip 
through the upper Harz mountains and the border region.”102 Despite its politically sensitive 
location, Bad Harzburg was best known as a spa town with natural springs, and the ministers 
intended to enjoy themselves. They planned to spend their evening before the tour of the 
region in the local casino. The opportunity to package the conference as a personal retreat 
proved so popular that the organizers scrambled to arrange overflow lodging options.
103
 
In between soaks, car rides, and gambling, the ministers intended to discuss the major 
challenges confronting the judicial system in West Germany. The conference consisted of 
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two concurrent sessions, one with the justice ministers that addressed the most significant 
matters of the day, and the other with the Referenten that involved more technical judicial 
issues. The agenda for the main session laid out nine topics for discussion among the 
ministers. These included proposals to rework the age structure for judges and prosecutors, 
changes to the Judges Act (Richtergesetz), and questions about compensation for 
attorneys.
104
 Various states had pushed certain of these issues onto the agenda. For example, 
an official in the Berlin judiciary stated prior to the conference that “the most important 
points for my office concern…changes to the liability law.”105 As these topics suggest, most 
of the discussions involved precise legal questions and bureaucratic points of organization. 
Something of an anomaly to this pattern was the fourth item on the agenda: “the prosecution 
of Nazi violent crimes.”106 
Although buried in the middle of the conference agenda, the discussion of the Nazi 
crimes issue took over five hours.
107
 Bavarian Justice Minister Ankermüller provided a brief 
introduction, noting that the issue had taken on “urgent meaning” of late and that “the public 
demanded…newer, more effective methods” of prosecuting these cases.108 Before turning the 
issue over to his colleague Bavarian Ministerialdirigent Rösch, Ankermüller urged “the states 
and federal government to cooperate in the search for the ways and means to come to a 
solution to this problem.” Rösch, who had clarified his views the week prior with his 
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counterpart in Baden-Württemberg, then proceeded to offer a thirteen-page analysis of the 
Nazi crimes crisis. Rösch described the extensive efforts carried out to date, boasting that 
since 1945 Bavarian courts had handed down sentences amounting to 788 years and 8 
months imprisonment for Nazi criminals. Clearly, he argued, the problem was not a lack of 
effort. Instead, he noted three key problems with Nazi crimes cases: the absence of a 
systematic approach, the parallel investigations in different states, and the widespread 
unfamiliarity with scholarship, research institutes, and Allied trial records. 
Rösch concluded by presenting three choices for how to address these problems and 
get the Nazi crimes issue under control. First, the “most extensive” plan derived from “the 
recommendation of State Attorney General Nellmann” which entailed “the creation of a 
central investigative office for the entire Federal Republic.” This plan’s strengths lay in its 
“united leadership and central controls,” but the drawbacks included “very extensive material 
and personnel needs” and that “the actual capacity to prosecute would lie ultimately with the 
state prosecutor with jurisdiction.” Second, the West German states could agree to a 
“distribution of reviewed crime complexes.” So, for example, Hesse could take the lead on 
investigating forced labor camps in Poland, and another state would address deportations 
from Greece. This avoided the creation of a new central agency while still maintaining 
cooperation among the states. Third, the “minimum solution” involved “the creation of a 
central document collection office” that would organize a “card index” of crimes arranged by 
perpetrator and crime location. This card index would make it possible “on the one hand to 
exhaust the available material and on the other to preclude parallel investigations.” Rösch 
354 
concluded, “It will be the purpose of this discussion to determine which of these three should 
be chosen, or whether other options or none should be pursued.”109 
Following these opening comments, conversation turned first to the federal position 
on the matter. Baden-Württemberg Minister Haussmann took the opportunity “before these 
different options are discussed” to press Federal Minister of Justice Fritz Schäffer to 
formulate his office’s position. Until now, the states were unaware of the internal discussions 
about this matter within the federal ministry. The federal response had been a clear priority 
for Haussmann’s office. The week prior, Haussmann wrote to Schäffer in support of the 
creation of a central investigative office. This agency, Haussmann noted, “could be organized 
either under the Federal Attorney General or a State Attorney General.”110 He hoped to 
“transfer the entire matter to the federal government,” but only Schäffer could determine the 
outcome.
111
 Would a new agency operate on the federal level or only among the states? 
During the Bad Harzburg meeting, Schäffer expressed little interest in taking an active role in 
these discussions. According to the minutes, Schäffer “explained that he is thoroughly in 
favor of a central agency. But this must be achieved through the clear agreement of the states, 
because otherwise there could be constitutional difficulties.”112 In two sentences, he punted 
the pursuit of Nazi criminals back to the states. 
Following Schäffer’s abdication of involvement at the start of the meeting, Dr. 
Ankermüller opened the subject for debate, the state ministers now the only means of 
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bringing about a change. Schleswig-Holstein Minister Leverenz first took the floor to caution 
that the issue veered towards a “dangerous area.” He warned his fellow ministers that they 
should not “be made servants to the press or public opinion.” By creating a central agency, 
they would be “admitting themselves that not enough has been done.” Instead, they should 
stand firm in their non-systematic approach and continue to prosecute just those who came to 
their attention. Rösch’s plan to “study the past without concrete leads” was “not the work of 
the judiciary, but of historians.” Leverenz passionately advocated for doing nothing, and at 
least one other minister acknowledged that his concerns were “considerable,” but for the 
most part the conversation quickly moved beyond his objections in favor of the next speaker. 
When Haussmann addressed the conference following Leverenz, the issue seemed to 
have lost traction. The federal ministry had withdrawn active support and Leverenz had 
suggested that inaction was the best – and easiest – course of action. As Haussmann later 
recalled, the matter threatened to “melt in the sand,” if not for the “urgent words” he put 
before the ministers.
113
 Where Rösch had pointed to numerous setbacks stemming from a 
lack of access to documentation, Haussmann highlighted three structural problems.
114
 First, 
the “altogether worthless” denazification policies had placed a substantial burden on the state 
judiciaries. Second, using the Ulm trial as evidence, he warned that “active police officers 
were at times involved in crimes being investigated or have the accused as colleagues or 
superiors.” Third, prosecutors had to operate under the looming expiration of the statute of 
limitations for aiding and abetting murder in 1960 and murder in 1965.
115
 That gave only two 
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years to investigate unprecedented crimes in an area stretching “from the North Cape to the 
Black Sea.” To deal seriously with all these crimes within such a tight time frame would 
require a centralized agency to coordinate Nazi investigations, the most substantial of 
Rösch’s three options. Haussmann concluded his speech with a moral call: “The agency will 
demand much effort, money, organization, and energy. But in the end, the biggest crimes of 
the century will not go unpunished.”116  
This provoked a range of responses among the ministers, though most expressed 
support for Haussmann’s plan. Hamburg Senator Biermann-Ratjen “regarded the initiative of 
Baden-Württemberg as downright liberating [geradezu als befreiend].” Senator Zander of 
Bremen felt similar to Leverenz that they should not respond simply to “the pressures of the 
press or public,” but recognized that the pursuit of Nazi criminals “has to happen now.” 
Minister Ney of the Saarland held out hope that access to Allied archives could resolve the 
issue, but Federal Minister Schäffer interjected to remind them that “nothing more can be 
done” because the Allies had closed down this option. Noting that Haussmann’s speech had 
“left an impression on him,” Justice Minister Dr. Flehinghaus from Nordrhein-Westfalen 
suggested that the conversation should “be limited not to the question of if, but rather how” 
to make this agency a reality. Finally, the State Secretary from Hessen asked perhaps the 
most pertinent question of the day: “Is Baden-Württemberg ready to take on this agency?”117  
Baden-Württemberg had already produced every nascent plan for a central 
investigative agency, from Schüle’s early reports to Nellmann’s editorial; now, the state was 
given the reins in crafting the language and organization for the new office. “The conference 
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asked Baden-Württemberg to house this central agency,” Müller later explained, “with the 
reason that our state had the most experience in these efforts because of the Ulm trial.”118 
Haussmann immediately drafted a resolution for the new agency. In two paragraphs, he 
wrote that the justice ministers discussed the Nazi crimes issue, agreed on an agency that 
would focus on crimes “committed by Germans outside Germany” and whose task would be 
“to utilize all on-hand material, in so far as that has not yet happened, to carry out the needed 
initial investigations and to coordinate prosecutions.”119 The organizational details would be 
determined following the conference.  
This draft opened up a new round of discussions over the wording and purpose of the 
resolution. Dr. Kielinger of Berlin suggested the organization not so much coordinate but 
“guarantee the coordination” of investigations. Schäffer, who wanted no part in planning the 
agency, nevertheless wanted some credit and asked that the resolution include the Federal 
Minister’s support for the effort. Dr. Biermann-Ratjen suggested that the organization make 
use of all “on-hand and obtainable” documentation. Predictably, this discussion at times 
devolved into critiques of minutiae. Dr. Kielinger wanted in one instance to change 
“particularly” to “also.”120 
At the end of the conference discussion, the ministers finalized a resolution to be 
distributed to the press. The statement amounted to the founding text of the Zentrale Stelle:  
The Justice Ministers and Senators have exhaustively discussed the pursuit of Nazi 
camp and war crimes at the 27
th
 Justice Minister Conference in Bad Hazburg because 
of the experiences of recent trials. They have analyzed the possibilities for how 
unpunished crimes, particularly those committed by Germans outside Germany, can 
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be expedited and brought to justice through stronger cooperation among the different 
offices. 
 
To that end, the Justice Ministers and Senators have agreed to create a central office 
of the state departments of justice [Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen], 
whose task will be to utilize the on-hand and obtainable material to carry out the 
necessary pre-investigations and to ensure the coordination of prosecutions. 
 
To carry out these actions, the state departments of justice will forthwith develop the 
organizational terms of the agency. 
 
The Federal Minister of Justice, who attended the session, has welcomed the decision 
of the Justice Ministers and Senators and has promised them all possible support. 
 
Through this agreement, the ministers committed themselves to establishing as soon as 
possible an agency whose precise parameters had yet to be defined. Each state promised 
material and financial support to this central agency. The ministers loosely agreed that “the 
state where the agency will be created will appoint its leader and that each state will send two 
to three prosecutors.”121  All consented that the Baden-Württemberg would be home to this 
organization and that Haussmann would next “make recommendations for the organization 
of the office.”122 Meanwhile, the other states would seek respective parliamentary approval 
of the resolution, following which the agency could begin operation. 
Although the ministers had approved this resolution, they had done so over continued 
objections from Schleswig-Holstein Minister Bernhard Leverenz.
123
 He first challenged the 
investigative target of the Zentrale Stelle: “Why should crimes committed by Germans in 
foreign countries be set apart? It should concern itself at least in equal measure with crimes 
that were committed by Germans in Germany.” Müller quickly reminded Leverenz that a 
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core motivation for creating the agency was to sort out the thorny issue of jurisdiction, a 
problem that did not exist when the crime location lay within German borders. But more than 
that, Leverenz’s view reflected a still pervasive belief in West German society, one which 
evidently stretched to the highest reaches of political office: that the suffering of Germans at 
the hands of the Nazis was commensurate with the suffering of other victim groups. The 
extreme disparity between the number of crimes committed within Germany versus those 
committed against Jews, communists, and civilians in the east underscores the poor 
understanding Leverenz must have had of the historical reality of the Nazi criminal empire. 
One could critically view Leverenz’s objections as defending Nazi crimes; more 
charitably, Leverenz seems to have represented a dying but still significant brand of postwar 
politics. The narrative of German victimization during the war permitted strange political 
contortions, and Leverenz’s opposition to the agency reflected the belief that the preservation 
of German social unity required a tendentious reading of the past. For Leverenz, efforts like 
denazification and the proposed new office divisively pitted Germans against Germans. 
“What,” he asked, “is meant by ‘Nazi crimes of violence’? Where would, for example, 
verdicts from Wehrmacht courts [Wehrmachtsgerichte] and people’s courts 
[Volksgerichtshofs] stand on this?” He worried the Zentrale Stelle would set prosecutors 
down a slippery slope that would end in a new denazification program. These concerns also 
seemingly dovetailed with Leverenz’s own right-leaning political orientation. As an FDP 
politician, he was part of the opening to the right in the early 1950s, as was Haussmann, and 
so had many far-right constituents to consider. Even once it became clear that an agency 
would be created over his objections, Leverenz noted his “concern” that Nellmann would 
want to run the new organization. Writing an editorial to capture the goodwill of the public 
360 
was far too public and abrasive for Leverenz, who preferred the agency keep away from the 
public spotlight. Leverenz was no mere cipher for Nazi apologetics. Instead, he was 
frustrated with a judicial system that was moving beyond the fragile social peace constructed 
in the postwar years. In many ways, what is surprising is not that Leverenz objected to the 
agency, but that he was the only one to do so.  
 
Designing the Zentrale Stelle 
With hindsight, the Bad Harzburg decision looms as a momentous turning point in 
West German attempts to come to terms with the Holocaust, but at the time, the resolution 
did little more than promise action down the road. The states had agreed to create an agency, 
but this agency had no leader, no home, no organization, and only a vaguely defined purpose. 
Haussmann and the Baden-Württemberg judiciary immediately set about developing these 
pieces. The day after the conference, Müller and other Ministry of Justice officials began a 
series of meetings with Nellmann and Schüle to discuss the events. At times, these 
discussions could be self-congratulatory, as they hailed Schüle’s efforts in the Ulm trial and 
Nellmann’s Stuttgarter Zeitung article as having “brought the discussion of this issue back in 
flux.” They decided that “the jumping off point for the Zentrale Stelle should be the Ulm 
trial” and the crime complexes that trial exposed, which Schüle had written about in 
August.
124
 Organizationally, they planned for an agency with five prosecutors and support 
staff, they addressed the need for reliable detectives “based on the experiences of the Ulm 
trial,” and they “intended that Schüle take on this work along with Schneider [the second 
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prosecutor in the Ulm trial].”125 For the first time, as well, Schüle was mentioned as a 
possible leader for the agency. 
A month later, the justice ministers gathered once more in Bonn to, among other 
things, approve the organizational schema Haussmann had circulated in the middle of 
October. Members of the Baden-Württemberg judiciary had created this draft a week after 
the Schüle and Nellmann discussions. When the ministers approved this proposal on 
November 6, they replaced the vagueness of the Bad Harzburg resolution with a concrete 
plan for the creation of the Zentrale Stelle.  
For the first time, the contours of this “Central Office of the State Justice Ministries 
for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes” came into sharp relief. In the first sentence they 
emphasized that the agency was created “for temporary duration” to “prepare and coordinate 
prosecutions.”126 The organization would be housed in Baden-Württemberg and placed under 
that state’s nominal control, though it formally remained an interstate agency. The agency’s 
leader would report directly to the state attorney generals, and the other German prosecutors 
in turn would notify the Zentrale Stelle of all independently prosecuted Nazi crimes cases. 
Beginning in April, the agency would be proportionally staffed from the various states. 
Jurisdictionally, the Zentrale Stelle focused on “those crimes for which there is no 
jurisdiction over the crime scene in the Federal Republic.” The agency’s primary task was 
“to gather, sort, and exhaust the obtainable material” on Nazi crimes, organizing this research 
around “crime complexes” based on “location, time, and perpetrator group.” Once evidence 
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of crimes had been uncovered, the agency would refer these cases to the appropriate 
prosecutor’s office. In instances where jurisdictional debates might arise, the Supreme Court 
would settle these debates. 
In the following weeks, the ministers returned to their state parliaments with this 
blueprint seeking final approval. The new agency was to begin operations on December 1, 
but many details had yet to be arranged. For one, the final location took time to determine. 
Baden-Württemberg officials considered a few cities in the vicinity of Stuttgart, such as 
Pforzheim and Tübingen, before deciding on Ludwigsburg. The baroque city had a few state-
owned buildings that could be quickly transformed to meet the needs of the new office and 
was “easier to get to than Tübingen.”127 At the end of November, Haussmann also wrote the 
justice ministers to nominate a leader for the office: Erwin Schüle.
128
 The choice perhaps 
came as little surprise to any of the ministers who were by now well familiar with the 
prosecutor’s achievements in Ulm.  
With little fanfare, Schüle and his skeletal staff began operations in December 
1958.
129
 Officially, not all state parliaments approved the agency until the middle of the 
month, but the office had been able to begin its operations on December 1.
130
 Only four 
strong, the staff would more than triple over the coming year as the states allocated 
prosecutors.
131
 A few weeks after its creation, at Schüle’s behest, a special investigative task 
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force – Sonderkommission Z – was assigned to help prepare cases. The Baden-Württemberg 
state police explained, “The creation of Sonderkommission of the state police force in 
Stuttgart is necessary on account of the difficulty of the material and the extensive regional 
contexts of the criminal investigation work. It will include six officers and begin operations 
soon.”132 Among these six were the two chief investigators of the Ulm trial: Helmut 
Opferkuch and Robert Weida. By January, Schneider, who had prosecuted the trial with 
Schüle, would join the staff as a prosecutor.
133
 
In June 1959, Schüle appeared before a meeting of the state justice ministers to report 
on the first six months of the Zentrale Stelle. Despite its small staff and limited access to 
other states’ resources (not all of the states had yet delegated investigators to assist the 
Zentrale Stelle), Schüle could proudly report that already the agency had initiated 208 cases 
into new crime complexes.
134
 These cases concerned primarily Einsatzgruppen and 
concentration camp crimes. Five major Nazi criminals had already been taken into custody as 
a result of these investigations. Schüle walked the justice ministers through the methods of 
these crime complex investigations. He told them that the agency staff began by reading over 
available scholarship on Nazi crimes, particularly the work of Gerald Reitlinger on the Final 
Solution. Next they consulted historical documentation, chiefly the International Military 
Tribunal records from the Nuremberg proceedings. For Einsatzgruppen crimes they looked at 
the Ereignismeldungen, the reports on facts and figures from various mass executions in 
Eastern Europe. For concentration camp crimes, Schüle relied on research committees 
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studying various camps, such as Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Finally, he relied on a network 
of organizations – research institutions, archives, Jewish rights organizations – to create an 
immense field of possible sources of evidence for unprosecuted Nazi crimes.
135
 
Schüle also explained to the justice ministers the importance of the Zentrale Stelle 
and his methods for carrying out these investigations. First, only he and his investigators 
possessed the knowledge of this material and the global contacts with the various informal 
partners in these investigations. To relegate these cases to other state prosecutors would 
diminish the chances of these investigations resulting in trials, let alone convictions. Second, 
the Zentrale Stelle had become a bastion of investigative integrity with specially trained and 
trustworthy staff. Schüle cautioned the justice ministers about his negative experiences 
working with unreliable – and at times hostile – investigators and prosecutors throughout 
West Germany. He referenced past experiences when targets of investigations had turned out 
to be currently employed in the West German police. In its short existence, Schüle 
concluded, the Zentrale Stelle had demonstrated not only the superiority of its investigative 
methods but also its importance as an incorruptible agency free from the infiltration of 
reintegrated Nazis.
136
 
In Schüle’s report on the Zentrale Stelle’s first six-months of operation, the line 
repeatedly blurred between his descriptions of that organization and his experiences in the 
Ulm trial. This was because the Zentrale Stelle was effectively an enlarged replica of the Ulm 
investigation. The investigative strategies exactly copied those pioneered in Ulm. The 
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reluctance to engage with outside agencies carried over from the negative experiences during 
the Ulm case. The Zentrale Stelle’s staff used the same network developed through the Ulm 
trial, working with local Jewish cultural offices, academic scholars, documentation centers, 
emerging archives, and survivor and displaced persons networks. Even in terms of personnel, 
with the appointment of Opferkuch and Weida to the special investigative unit, the Zentrale 
Stelle to all appearances had become an organization built for the purpose of harnessing the 
resources and skills showcased during the Ulm proceedings.  
 
Conclusion 
 The relationship between the Ulm trial and the creation of the Zentrale Stelle reveals 
a moment of ambivalence and possibility in postwar West Germany regarding the Nazi 
crimes issue. The public expressed unease with the Ulm trial over the issue of ongoing 
prosecutions. Trials like that in Ulm and scandals like the Eisele affair showed that 
prosecutions were occurring by chance and justice was applied unevenly on Nazi crimes. 
Society seemed willing either to forgo investigations altogether or to coordinate the efforts 
and make a sustained attempt to address the issue, but the half-measures of chance 
investigations and uncoordinated policies among the states made a farce of the postwar 
state’s commitments to justice and equality before the law. For many, what set the Federal 
Republic apart from Nazi Germany – and even apart from the Democratic Republic in the 
East – was its commitment to the fair and equitable distribution of justice. The choice seemed 
to be either to commit the necessary resources to categorically prosecute Nazi crimes or to 
press ahead and leave these crimes in the past. 
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As society wavered over which path to go down, individuals like Schüle and 
Nellmann aimed to push it towards a coordinated approach towards Nazi crimes 
investigations. Nellmann recognized the uncertainty in society in his editorial, which 
challenged West Germans to consider the unfairness of prosecuting only some criminals who 
had the misfortune of being spotted. More than just provoking a social response, though, 
Nellmann knew that any change needed to come about internally through the judiciary. The 
federal government had never expressed interest in taking on the Nazi crimes question, and 
the public could be won over to support ongoing investigations, but it could not be counted 
on to lead these calls. The only means for prompting this change had to start within the 
judiciary, and a wider impulse to confront the Nazi past would have to emanate from there. 
While some in the judiciary were open to these discussions, others expressed concern over 
the cost, jurisdiction, and oversight of a new agency. To create any such agency, its 
advocates needed to make this solution an attractive option to the West German judiciaries. 
The key moment that transformed the Zentrale Stelle from a cumbersome idea to a 
viable reality came when Nellmann and Schüle convinced Baden-Württemberg Justice 
Minister Wolfgang Haussmann of this mission. Because what emerged from the Bad 
Harzburg resolution and the debate over the Zentrale Stelle was a sense that while many 
states could recognize the wisdom and efficacy behind such an idea, none wanted to take the 
initiative in creating it. Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria both lobbied to put the issue on the 
agenda, but at no other point leading up to the conference did any other states float proposals 
for how to address these issues. It was the transformative experiences of the Ulm trial and 
Eisele affair that spurred these states to action, but even so the Bavarian ministry demurred 
when it came to assuming responsibility for the agency. Similarly, as one Baden-
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Württemberg Justice Ministry official wrote, “with a number of the judiciaries initially there 
was little willingness to show their own initiative in this matter.”137 In the end, only 
Haussmann was willing to volunteer his state for the new organization. Thus it fell to Baden-
Württemberg to organize, house, support, and staff the Zentrale Stelle. 
Seen from this perspective, the decision to create the Zentrale Stelle reflected less an 
overarching desire to initiate new investigations than a desire to have someone else do this 
for them. But this need not be interpreted as a cynical action on the part of the judiciary. 
Investigating crimes that had occurred under a different regime over a decade ago in lands 
now beyond the Iron Curtain required incredible amounts of time, energy, and resources. The 
Ulm trial consumed three years of effort, the full-time attention of up to six detectives and 
two prosecutors, and in the end, though convicted, the perpetrators received extremely light 
sentences. Few states were willing to make similar commitments for such a dubious 
outcome, but the Zentrale Stelle offered an elegant solution. By sending off a few personnel, 
the states were able to free up the rest of their staffs from the pressures of initiating Nazi 
crimes investigations, and Baden-Württemberg, the one state able and willing to pursue these 
crimes, now had the resources to do so.
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
This trial bears political meaning. It shows that the only basis for a government is justice. If 
this foundation is abandoned, then the end result is lies, arbitrariness, and murder.  
 
– Erwin Schüle, closing statements of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial 
  
 
 Shortly before his trial in Ulm began, Hans-Joachim Böhme received a package in 
prison from his wife.
1
 Included was the recent translation from French of the 1951 historical 
novel Memoirs of Hadrian by Marguerite Yourcenar. Written from the perspective of 
Hadrian, the novel revolves around the Roman emperor’s reflections on his life as he 
confronts death and meditates more broadly on themes of history, power, and memory. In a 
postscript, Yourcenar described her interest in Hadrian as a historical figure. She wrote that 
he occupied a position in Roman history when the power of the old gods over the people had 
diminished, yet the influence of Christianity had not taken hold. For Yourcenar, these themes 
resonated with her views on postwar Europe. Dominant ideologies of fascism, nationalism, 
and imperialism had been cast aside after World War II, and no one yet knew what might 
take their place.
2
  
Whether Böhme agreed with these themes is unknown, but he did embody them in 
postwar West Germany. While the years after 1945 made it clear that Nazism as the 
dominant ideology of Germany was no more, the question of what might replace it and how 
the successor state would deal with Hitler’s legacy remained unclear. For a decade after 
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1945, Böhme and the other nine Ulm defendants attempted to reintegrate into this society. 
Amidst the chaos and confusion of the postwar years, many adopted new personalities, 
crafted selective wartime biographies for themselves, or otherwise concealed their pasts as 
Holocaust perpetrators. But this question of how to come to terms with the Nazi period and 
the Holocaust remained unsettled. The defendants had reintegrated into a society that had not 
yet processed the enormity of the crimes committed or the broad spectrum of perpetrators 
responsible. By the mid-1950s, in the course of an investigation into one perpetrator, all ten 
found themselves under arrest for their role in crimes of the Holocaust in 1941.  
By the time of their trial in Ulm, the ten defendants had become relics of an era that 
society was eager to leave behind. Their trial hinted at the changes underway in West 
Germany that would contribute to the emergence of a Holocaust-centered understanding of 
the Nazi era. Increasingly critical voices called for a more serious process of coming to terms 
with the past, and the trial of Holocaust perpetrators became evidence of this shift. Although 
it would not be until well into the 1960s that this reappraisal of the Nazi past would become 
central to West German identity, already during the Ulm trial it was clear that society was 
retreating away from the policies of inclusion and amnesty towards former Nazis. The 
conviction in August 1958 made clear the perpetrators’ transition from reintegrated Nazis to 
social pariahs. Like canaries in the mineshaft, their changing status in postwar society 
foretold the wider cultural confrontation with the Nazi past in the coming years.  
Although the social consequences of their crimes endured, the defendants quickly 
overcame the legal repercussions. By the end of 1962, only one of the ten remained in prison. 
Harm Harms was released in May 1959, after serving just two-thirds of his sentence.
3
 In 
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January 1960, Gerhard Carsten saw his sentence cut short as well.
4
 By November, three of 
the remaining defendants were paroled: Franz Behrendt, Werner Kreuzmann, and Edwin 
Sakuth.
5
 In December 1961, despite his high sentence, Werner Hersmann was released on 
parole, with the court citing the large amount of time he had already spent in prison since the 
end of the war as justification.
6
 Werner Schmidt-Hammer and Pranas Lukys won a retrial on 
appeal, but their sentences were upheld by the Ulm court on November 3, 1960.
7
 Lukys was 
released on time served, while Schmidt-Hammer began serving a sentence ending in 1962.
8
  
Only two of the defendants never again rejoined West German society. One was the 
former police director of Memel, Bernhard Fischer-Schweder. His improbable life – he had 
been imprisoned at various times by the Nazi government, the Allied occupiers, and the West 
German state – ended in a prison hospital on November 28, 1960, due to complications from 
an operation.
9
 More than any other individual, Fischer-Schweder put into motion what 
became the massive trial in Ulm. He had risen the highest of the ten defendants in postwar 
society, achieving the high position of camp director in Ulm. This post brought him 
overexposure, though, and soon questions swirled about his past. As investigators began to 
dig, they uncovered a far larger web of criminality that involved dozens of unprosecuted 
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massacres in Lithuania. By miscalculating his own security in postwar society, Fischer-
Schweder triggered the investigation that undid the reintegration strategies of the other nine. 
The last defendant in prison was Hans-Joachim Böhme. The leader of 
Einsatzkommando Tilsit, Böhme received the longest sentence at the Ulm trial, and the court 
repeatedly denied his requests for parole.
10
 The great chameleon of the postwar period, 
Böhme reinvented himself after 1945. He eschewed his past as a prominent of the Nazi elite 
to become a lawyer in a savings and loan office. Others had sought out new careers or, as 
with Fischer-Schweder, sought to capitalize on their previous experience in the civil service, 
but only Böhme succeeded in completely starting a new life through his embrace of the 
Stunde Null. As his trial in Ulm indicated, however, by the end of the 1950s, these myths of a 
clean break from the past, which had been providing postwar cover for the perpetrators 
attempting to reintegrate, began to break down in West Germany. Throughout the 1960s, 
Böhme sat in prison, while waves of new investigations into Nazi crimes started.  
In early May 1968, Böhme became seriously ill and was transferred to the prison 
hospital in Hohenasperg, where he had previously spent time recovering from a failed suicide 
attempt over a decade earlier.
11
 All that month, as Böhme lay in a hospital bed, student 
protests in West Germany reached a fever pitch. Students railed against the perceived 
hypocrisies of the state and called for a critical confrontation with the Nazi past. They were 
calling for a cultural reconciliation with the past, in many ways similar to the legal 
reconciliation with the past that came about through the Zentrale Stelle. As a negative 
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foundational myth, the protestors believed, the Third Reich and the Holocaust could inspire 
the Federal Republic’s commitment to human rights and justice at home and abroad. On the 
last day of the month, Böhme – the last Ulm defendant in prison – died.12 
* * * 
A seeming paradox lay at the heart of the Ulm trial’s outcome. Although all but 
Fischer-Schweder and Böhme were back on the streets within four years of the verdict, most 
in West Germany regarded the verdict as a great success for the prosecution. For an 
individual such as Hersmann to serve only three years of a conviction for accessory to 
murder on 1,656 counts suggests that West Germans were evaluating success by some 
standard other than length of sentence. Indeed, the disparity between the crimes and the 
punishment, between the low sentences and high regard for the prosecution, underscores the 
unique circumstances surrounding the prosecution and nature of Nazi crimes cases.  
Traditionally, punishment has three aims: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
13
 
The sentences handed down in Ulm, and indeed most Nazi crimes verdicts, satisfied none of 
these aspects. Minimal sentences for crimes of enormous magnitude hardly constituted 
retribution for the thousands of victims summarily massacred and buried in mass graves. 
Regarding deterrence, there may have been an initial aim in the immediate postwar trials at 
preventing a resurgence of Nazism, but by the time of the Ulm trial, the prosecutors never 
expressed concern over another program of genocide. If they had, it is again dubious that 
such short sentences would have done anything to deter potential mass murderers. Finally, in 
terms of rehabilitation, there was no fear of recidivism in regards to these ten perpetrators. 
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Indeed, part of what had made the Ulm trial so shocking was that these had seemed to be 
ordinary men, who had proven capable of living as normal, law-abiding citizens during the 
postwar period. Even the prosecution never attempted to portray them as uncontrollable 
killers who posed a safety threat to West Germans. To see the Ulm verdict as many West 
Germans saw it at the time therefore requires some other set of metrics. Although the 
defendants were tried according to normal criminal law, it is clear that society evaluated the 
trial by different standards.  
The verdict represented three crucial successes: first as a symbol of West German 
opposition to the Nazi era in general, second as a didactic process of establishing a historical 
record of the Holocaust in Lithuania, and third as a validation of the new investigation 
approaches carried out in Ulm in particular. As a symbol, the trial and conviction of ten 
Holocaust perpetrators became a pivotal instance of transitional justice, as the West German 
state morally condemned the Nazi state and its adherents. The evidence available at the trial 
primarily indicated that these men had carried out orders, and the major debate at the trial 
concerned whether or not one was legally culpable for carrying out state-ordered actions. The 
conclusion of the judge and jury that these men were indeed responsible was therefore 
tantamount to a condemnation of the entire hierarchy of the Third Reich. Though Hitler and 
the elites may have held absolute control, individuals had agency, and their actions, as the 
verdict made clear, had legal consequences.  
The symbolic value of the trial became clear in other responses to the case. Many of 
the letters written to prosecutor Erwin Schüle from West Germans expressed support not 
simply for the trial of these ten but for an ongoing judicial process of dealing with the Nazi 
past. As Schüle indicated in his closing statement, these trials were a means for West 
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Germany to stake its claim as the moral successor to its immoral Nazi predecessor. By using 
the very system of justice that the perpetrators had denied to their victims, the trial – simply 
by virtue of its existence – advanced the causes of the West German state.14 The symbolic 
value of the trial as a trial and the conviction as a conviction, regardless of the length of the 
actual sentences, allowed the West German state to make clear its commitment to justice, 
equality, and democracy. As a form of transitional justice, the Ulm trial thus became a crucial 
moment for the successor state to reject its predecessor.  
The verdict also played an essential role in establishing what Lawrence Douglas has 
termed the “didactic legality” of the case.15 One aim of the trial was to educate the public on 
the crimes committed under the Nazi state. At the time of the trial, few historical accounts of 
the Holocaust had surfaced, and the courtroom became an important vehicle for revealing the 
extent of these crimes. While West Germans were aware of the crimes committed against 
Jews, most had preconceptions about the way these crimes were carried out and who 
perpetrated them. The Ulm trial confounded these expectations. The crimes in question were 
not committed in concentration camps and many of the perpetrators came from ordinary 
police units. As a result, Einsatzkommando Tilsit revealed whole dimensions of the 
Holocaust that had been overlooked in the public and in previous trials. The trial pulled back 
the curtain on the machinery of the Holocaust and showed the involvement of the Nazi state 
at all levels in carrying out acts of genocide. 
The verdict and the massive judgment that accompanied it cemented the didactic 
value of the trial. The five hundred page judgment detailed the entire apparatus of the Nazi 
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state along the Lithuanian border. By committing itself to this record, the court created a 
state-approved history of the Third Reich and the genocide of Lithuanian Jews. The verdict 
therefore represented the importance of the trial as a process for discerning the truth of what 
happened in 1941. Throughout the proceedings, courtroom observers as well as the judges 
implored the defendants and witnesses to speak truthfully. On one level this was about 
establishing facts in the case, but on another level it was about allowing their honest 
testimonies to provide a cathartic moment for the public. The desire to use the courtroom as a 
forum for coming clean about the past revealed a desire in West Germany to establish a 
historical record of what happened. In order for there to be reconciliation, there needed first 
to be truth.
16
 Though many of the defendants repeatedly refused to acknowledge their roles in 
these crimes or professed ignorance, the verdict succeeded in providing that catharsis by 
creating a historical account of the crimes.  
For the investigative team responsible for the case, the verdict also validated the new 
strategies they pioneered over the span of three years. Although the case failed to progress 
much during its initial year, by June 1956, when Erwin Schüle joined the case, the 
investigators began to develop new methods and succeeded in expanding the case to ten 
defendants. Under Schüle and with the support of Baden-Württemberg Attorney General 
Erich Nellmann, investigators developed a transnational network of resources that greatly 
enhanced the power of the otherwise small Ulm prosecutor’s office. They worked with 
Jewish rights organizations in an effort to track down witnesses, they found archives and 
documentation centers with contemporary records on the crimes, and they contacted 
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historians and scholars to provide context and analysis for the massacres in Lithuania. This 
approach – the investigation of the crime complex – had been enormously time-consuming 
and expensive. The resulting conviction of all ten defendants, which came at a moment when 
nearly half of all Nazi crimes trials ended in acquittals, bore out their efforts. 
As a tacit endorsement for the crime complex approach, the verdict also enabled 
Schüle and Nellmann to press the state to adopt their new strategies and to initiate a new 
wave of Nazi crimes investigations. In the immediate aftermath of the trial, both men voiced 
concerns to the state about the volume of unprosecuted Nazi crimes that might expire with 
the statute of limitations in 1960. When they found little initial reception in the state 
judiciary, Nellmann decided to raise these issues in the newspapers. By taking advantage of 
the tools at their disposal, Nellmann and Schüle convinced the state justice ministers to create 
the Zentrale Stelle for coordinating Nazi crimes. The entire foundation and operating 
principles of the agency became an exact replica of the crime complex investigation carried 
out in Ulm. The validation of the Ulm verdict therefore provided a pretense and justification 
for Nellmann and Schüle to push for additional, more systematic changes within West 
German judicial attitudes towards Nazi crimes. 
With this validation, the careers of the main investigators in Ulm took off. Helmut 
Opferkuch and Robert Weida, the two detectives who worked the Ulm case from its earliest 
days, stayed on at the Zentrale Stelle for over a decade. Although initially intended as a 
temporary agency, the federal decision to extend the statute of limitations on serious Nazi 
crimes beyond 1960 also extended the agency’s mandate, and the two detectives remained. 
These men had no experience with Nazi crimes cases prior to the Ulm investigation, yet by 
1959 they became the handpicked investigators for the new state agency. While at the 
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Zentrale Stelle, both became outspoken advocates for continuing Nazi crimes prosecutions, 
giving speeches at schools and to police academies on the importance of this issue.
17
 Though 
they had begun their careers as a banker and a mechanic, respectively, they retired as two of 
the most successful and accomplished Nazi crimes investigators in West Germany.  
More complicated is the story of prosecutor Erwin Schüle, who had been the architect 
of the crime complex investigation in Ulm and led the Zentrale Stelle during its initial 
decade. Schüle’s career as a Nazi investigator came to an inglorious end in 1966. As the 
preeminent Nazi prosecutor in West Germany, Schüle had emerged as a ripe target for Cold 
War attacks. Beginning in 1965, the Soviets began to spread allegations that Schüle had 
taken part in the murder of Soviet citizens in 1942.
18
 The West German government launched 
an internal investigation, which found no basis for these accusations.
19
 Nevertheless, the 
incident damaged Schüle’s public standing, particularly because of the politically sensitive 
post he held as leader of the Zentrale Stelle. He resigned and returned to the Baden-
Württemberg judiciary where he became state attorney general.
20
 Despite this end to his 
tenure at the Zentrale Stelle, he played a paramount role in carrying out not only the Ulm 
investigation, but hundreds of others that started under his watch at the Zentrale Stelle.  
Nellmann retired not long after the Ulm trial. Unlike his senior prosecutor Schüle, 
Nellmann saw few direct benefits from the trial, though he – perhaps more so than any other 
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individual – had a massive impact on its evolution and legacy. As Baden-Württemberg State 
Attorney General, Nellmann intervened regarding the Ulm trial on two crucial occasions, 
each radically shifting that case’s trajectory. His first intervention came in June 1956 when 
he called for an overhaul of what was to that point an investigation of just Fischer-Schweder. 
His decision to reappraise the case and appoint Schüle to spearhead the new effort 
transformed this parochial investigation into the seminal Nazi crimes case of the 1950s. His 
second decision came in the immediate aftermath of the trial, when he penned an editorial on 
the lessons from Ulm, publicly airing out the inadequacies of current investigation strategies. 
This publication forced the state justice ministers to take up the issue at their annual 
conference, which produced the Zentrale Stelle. When suggested as a possible candidate for 
the agency, Nellmann demurred and finished out his service as state attorney general until 
retirement in 1961.
21
 An enigmatic individual, Nellmann fundamentally affected the outcome 
of the Ulm trial and its legacy. 
The story of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial ultimately concerns individuals, 
such as Nellmann, Schüle, and the investigators, but also the perpetrators and the defense 
attorneys, historians and Jewish rights activists, the local Ulm prosecutors and state and 
federal officials, the press and the public. These various individuals and groups all crossed 
paths during the course of this momentous legal trial and public confrontation with the Nazi 
past. Some met during the investigation phase, others in the courtroom, and still others in the 
halls of state bureaucracy in the trial’s wake. Yet all their personal histories intersected for a 
moment in time to provoke a debate on the West German past. To understand the Ulm trial is 
to make sense of this sudden collision of histories and to see how this city along the Danube 
became, if only for a moment, the center of these debates that continue to resonate today. 
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